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Abstract
OH CANADA, YOUR HOME ON NATIVE LAND: SETTLEMENT,
DEVELOPMENT AND CONFLICT IN SOUTHERN ONTARIO
By
Shana Siegel

Adviser: Professor William Kornblum
On February 28, 2006, members of the Haudenosaunee Six Nations reserve in southern
Ontario physically occupied and halted construction on a housing development bordering
their reserve. The Haudenosaunee claimed that the site was part of a larger tract of land
that they had never surrendered, and they vowed to remain on the land as long as
necessary prevent the planned development from taking place. When police had still not
removed the Haudenosaunee protesters almost two months later, some 2,000-3,000 local
non-Native residents began voicing their frustration and anger in regular anti-protest
rallies. On some occasions, these rallies escalated to the point of what one local
politician called “intense, irrational anger” and even “near riots.” This Sociological study
examines some of the factors motivating both the 2006 protest, and the reactions to it by
local non-Native residents and their federal, provincial and local government officials.
Based on legal, archival and ethnographic research; media analysis; GIS mapping; and
45 interviews with residents of the town of Caledonia and the Six Nations reserve, as well
as with local government officials, a few conclusions are reached. In examining the
motivations for the 2006 protest, the results of the legal and archival research suggest that
the Canadian government violated its own Supreme Court of Canada rulings, as well as

iv

its binding international legal commitments regarding the human rights of indigenous
peoples. This research also suggests that these violations of the rights of indigenous
peoples have long constituted the norm in Canadian society, producing a climate in which
Native peoples are regularly dehumanized and dispossessed. In examining the various
responses to the protest, the dissertation pays particular attention to the ways that nonNative residents and government officials constructed and acted upon various settlercolonial narratives when seeking to justify their responses to the protest. The dissertation
argues that both these narratives and the legal violations can only be understood within a
broader context of problematic patterns of thought and behavior that have long been
inherent in –and even foundational to—Western society and the Western cultural
worldview.
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Introduction
I first became interested in the 2006 Haudenosaunee Six Nations protest and the related conflicts
in Caledonia in June 2006, when a friend forwarded a couple of news articles about the conflict
to me. At the time, I was studying for my oral examinations in the areas of Trauma, Privilege
and Imperialism, and I was immediately fascinated by the tales these articles told about the
events of a single May weekend: Native protesters had been blocking a main highway running
through a small Ontario town for months in protest over land they said had been illegally taken
from them, and in direct disobedience to Canadian and provincial laws they say did not apply to
them. On this particular weekend, Non-Native residents, furious at the months-long road
blockade gathered en masse in the road and were throwing bread and cheese at Native protesters,
screaming at them to “go home.” The Ontario Provincial Police stood in formation between the
two groups, desperately struggling to keep them apart, but repeatedly failing as one side or the
other broke through the police line in a series of mass fistfights. Eventually, Native protesters
took down their road blockade in what they said was an effort of good will. But non-Natives
who had been demanding an end to the blockade for months reacted angrily, setting up their own
road barricade against Native people attempting to enter the town and in the process trapping one
car of Native people in a sea of angry, yelling, non-Native residents. The trapped passengers
were eventually rescued (without their car) by police, but in the process several more fistfights
broke out between Natives and non-Natives. Native protesters responded by re-barricading the
road and, in the case of one Native protester, digging up the highway with a backhoe (until he
was quickly stopped by Native Clan Mothers). By the end of the day, a car had been crashed
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into the local power station (by persons still unknown), causing an explosion that left everyone in
the area –and surrounding areas—without power. 1
As perhaps any Sociologist and/or activist would be, I was quickly hooked on reading stories
about the conflict. It was a case study involving all of the elements I had thought were present in
many important conflicts in the world, all of the elements I was studying: competing claims to
sovereignty, underlying dynamics of privilege and oppression, and histories of imperialism and
trauma. To me, the reasons behind the Haudenosaunee protest seemed fairly straight forward:
Haudenosaunee protesters believed that the land belonged to them and that it was wrongfully
taken from them, was being developed all around them, and legal avenues for stopping the
development of their lands hadn’t worked. Regardless of the accuracy of the Haudenosaunee
claims (which I could not judge when I started out on this project), what interested me most was
the reported behavior of non-Native people: throwing bread and cheese, yelling “go home,” and
reportedly circulating KKK flyers in opposition to the protest. 2 These are the things that
fascinated me, I didn’t know what they meant, but I wanted to know.
As I started looking further into the conflict, as is generally the case with any conflict in the
real world, the more I read about it, the more complexity I found. There was a wide range of
reactions to the protest among local non-Native residents, with many residents exhibiting
outright support for the protest, many vehemently opposed to it, and perhaps the majority being
1

The bread and cheese was being thrown on what the Haudenosaunee Six Nations refer to as
Bread and Cheese Day, celebrated on Queen Victoria’s birthday, when the rest of Canada
celebrates Victoria day. The Haudenosaunee holiday originates in treaty agreements with Queen
Victoria through which the British Crown made annual presents to the Haudenosaunee. Though
the practice ended around 1901 with Victoria’s death, it was revived in 1924 by the Six Nations
Band Council, which celebrated the occasion by distributing bread and cheese to all Six Nations
members.
2
The KKK flyers were later said to have likely been a hoax –i.e., flyers advertising a fictional
KKK meeting and attributed to fictional KKK alleged members that were created and distributed
around the Haudenosaunee reserve to stir up anger, fear, resentment or so on.
2

somewhere in between. This range from support to opposition was perhaps even more faceted
and complex among the Haudenosaunee, who had two forms of government (traditional and
colonially-imposed) and an even wider range of views on the acceptability of protests, on
politics, on religion, on community, on responsibility, and on ways of being in the world. Yet,
through this complexity and confusion, some things became more clear. One is that the 2006
protest was a conflict between the Haudenosanee Six Nations and the Canadian and Ontario (as
well as, to a lesser extent, Haldimand county) governments. Another is that some non-Native
residents (in fact, quite a few) were extremely angry about the Haudenosaunee protest,
responding in a manner that one local politician referred to as an “intense, intense, irrational
anger.” 3 A third was that many residents, the media, local government officials and (always
unnamed, anonymous) provincial and federal government officials repeatedly insisted that there
was no validity whatsoever to the Haudenosaunee claims on the land, and thus grievances in
their protest. In fact, this latter point was repeated so often in the media --by reporters speaking
on their own, or quoting the above-mentioned people— that I began my research convinced that
this must be partially true, that there were two sides to the story, and that the Native protesters
may be right about some things, but were wrong about others. Fourth, there appeared to be a
correlation (though not an explanation) between this belief and the intensity of non-Native anger.
And finally, verbalizations of this anger were most often focused on dismissing and negatively
characterizing Haudenosaunee protesters and their government(s) in various negative ways, such

3

Former Ontario Premier (1985-1990) David Peterson (quoted in: Harries and Rusk, 2006) was
talking about the displays of anger on the May weekend, briefly discussed above. Peterson
elaborated, explaining that the anger was at least in part due to a complete failure on the part of
non-Native governments at all levels (local, provincial federal) to communicate with non-Native
residents:
The people are totally in the dark on all sides, other than there’s communication from the
confederacy chiefs. If you want to know what is going on, you listen to Ohsweken [Six
Nations] radio. You don’t get it from your government.

3

as: liars who simply made the story up for attention; criminals who delighted in breaking the law
at any opportunity; exaggerators who were unable to let go of an unfortunate past and thus made
mistaken and delusional claims in the present; sore “losers” who were resentful that their
ancestors made poorly informed or corrupt decisions in the past and now wanted some sort of
compensation for done deals from long ago; greedy opportunists who expected to get something
for nothing by playing upon the white guilt of bleeding heart Canadians for personal financial
gain; or angry “terrorists” who found joy in inconveniencing/ “terrorizing” non-Natives
whenever possible.
After pouring over media articles and various reports that I found online, and finding these
same patterns again and again, I decided that if I was really going to understand the dynamics of
the conflict, or the motivation behind the intense non-Native anger, I needed to figure out what
parts of the Haudenosaunee protesters’ claims were true and what parts were not true. To this
end, I set off on what I thought would be a very brief sidestep into the historical facts
surrounding the land in question by consulting the few existing secondary sources that had
anything at all to say about the Haudenosaunee’s Haldimand Tract land and how this land moved
from Haudenosaunee hands bit by bit over a 40-50 year period, starting just after the land was
declared to belong to the Haudenosaunee “forever,” in 1784. But these secondary sources,
including the seminal work on the topic (Johnston, 1964) to which all other sources referred, fell
short of providing answers to many of the questions that I had, and even left me with many new
questions. For example, the map in Johnston’s book only acknowledged some of the parcels
within this Haldimand Tract land, while a map that was allegedly leaked from the Department of
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Indian and Northern Affairs Canada 4 marked out many more parcels, but I had no other source
with which to verify the shapes in this map. 5
Soon, I moved on to primary sources, expecting to find maps in old treaties or land share
agreements 6 that would help me piece together the story behind both the specific piece of land
under protest, and perhaps the rest of the contested lands in a 950,000-acre stretch along southern
Ontario’s Grand River. To my surprise, there were no maps connected with any of the purported
surrenders by the Haudenosaunee Six Nations of the Grand River, and there appeared to be a
number of other irregularities pertaining to these alleged surrenders. Even more surprising was
the fact that the primary document the Canadian government had been holding forth as “proof”
that the land under protest in 2006 7 had been surrendered to Canada did not prove this surrender
at all. On the contrary, this document is proof both of coercion on the part of government
officials who were intent on getting the rest of the Haudenosaunee lands, and of Haudenosaunee
resistance and refusal to cooperate with the government’s plans (see chapter 1). Further, the two
other documents which are often cited as supporting evidence of this surrender by the Canadian
and Ontario governments are, likewise, not at all what they have been presented to be
4

Later renamed the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, and most recently
renamed the Department of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development.
5
The map was leaked to the September 13, 2006 edition of the Tekawennake newspaper. (See:
Windle, 2006j).
6
These are generally referred to as documents of “Surrender,” though there is considerable
evidence suggesting that Native nations –including the Haudenosaunee Six Nations—neither
permitted the alienation of land through their own laws, nor believed that they were alienated the
land in these “surrenders.” Instead, as McNeil (2001-2002), Hutchins (2009), Linden (in
Ipperwash Inquiry, 2007) and others point out, the Native intention and understanding of these
agreements was that these were not land alienation agreements, but were land share agreements -or even friendship agreements unrelated to land entirely (see chapter 4).
7
See the 1841 “General Surrender” found in Canada (1891: 119-123). Canada has repeatedly
cited this document as full evidence that more than 1/3rd of the Haudenosaunee Grand River
lands were surrendered to Canada in 1841 by a meeting of the Haudenosaunee Confederacy in
full council. However, this is an entirely false representation of the document and the events
surrounding it (see chapter 1).
5

(particularly when considered in the broader context of Haudenosaunee Six Nations history), and
do not appear to corroborate the stories of the these governments at all (see chapter 1). On the
contrary, these documents all appear to corroborate the stories told repeatedly by Haudenosaunee
Six Nations protesters and both of the Haudenosaunee Six Nations governments that the land in
question was never surrendered and never intended to be surrendered by any Haudenosaunee Six
Nations people. This point is worth repeating: As of this date, the Canadian and Ontario
governments have failed to provide any additional evidence that the lands under protest in 2006
were ever surrendered by the Haudenosaunee Six Nations. In addition, it seems doubtful that
any such evidence exists. 8 Yet, despite their failure to prove their ownership of the land, or to
provide evidence in support of their claims, the Canadian and Ontario governments have
continued to behave as if this land belongs to them and can be used however they please without
any consideration of real or potential outstanding Haudenosaunee interests on the land. 9 By
acting in this fashion, both governments are persistently and egregiously violating Canada’s own
Supreme Court rulings mandating consultation and accommodation with Native nations prior to
planning development projects on lands under claim by Native nations –regardless of whether or
not these claims have been proven in court (see chapters 1 and 4). Together, these violations,
plus the existing evidence, plus the Canadian and Ontario governments’ ongoing antagonistic
8

This statement is made based 1) on personal searches at both the Ontario Archives and the
Library Archives Canada, which revealed no additional evidence to support the Canadian and
Ontario governments’ story, but did produce even further evidence supporting the statements,
assertions and community memories of the Haudenosaunee, and 2) on the Canadian and Ontario
government’s longstanding resistance to a 1995 lawsuit brought against them by the
Haudenosaunee Six Nations. The lawsuit is merely requesting an accounting of all
Haudenosaunee Six Nations lands, resources and trust funds, how the Canadian and/or Ontario
governments allegedly came to possess them (in terms of lands and resources) and/or what the
Canadian and/or Ontario government did with them (in terms of trust funds managed by the
Canadian government).
9
Here I am using the legal terminology, “interests on the land” to denote outstanding title or
rights claims that may exist on the land. See, for example, Wilkins (2003).
6

approach to all Haudenosaunee requests for information relating to their lands, resources and
trust funds, all point to a disturbing trend of dispossessing Native peoples from their lands,
resources, and trust funds, as well as their domestic constitutional rights and international human
rights that Canada is legally bound to honor, uphold, and promote. What’s even more disturbing
is the fact that this ongoing dispossession and violation of constitutional and international human
rights is not an incident unique to the Haudenosaunee; on the contrary, it appears to be the
standard operating procedure for the Canadian and provincial governments in their one-sided,
coercive relations with Native peoples across Canada. 10
These realizations substantially changed the focus of the dissertation. As with any complex
conflict, this conflict involves multiple stories, all of which deserve to be told, though they
cannot all be told here. Thus, I hope that this dissertation is just the first in a series of stories that
I tell in relation to this conflict. Though this dissertation is concerned with non-Native
(government officials and residents, alike) responses to the 2006 Haudenosaunee protest, the
non-Native story is not told here (though I plan to tell it in the future, and have already done
numerous interviews with non-Native residents to this end). Further, this dissertation does not
provide a detailed reconstruction of the events of the conflict (something that I am halfway
through writing), nor does it provide a detailed examination of historical Haudenosaunee-nonNative relations (something I would like to write in the future), nor does it explore the historical

10

Numerous international and constitutional legal scholars, as well as international human rights
monitoring bodies have already repeatedly attested to this fact (Amnesty International Canada, et
al., 2012), as has the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
(CERD). Recently, in its Concluding Observations and Recommendations for Canada (2012),
CERD has once again called on the Canadian government to end discrimination against Native
peoples, and has criticized “Canada’s failure to properly respect the land and Treaty rights of
Indigenous peoples, noting “the rigidly adversarial positions taken by Canada” in land
negotiations and that decisions over resource development are often made without proper
consultation or the consent of the affected peoples” (at para. 20).
7

range of opinions and approaches among non-Native government officials towards the
Haudenosaunee and other Native peoples in Canada. Instead, the story that is told here is being
told because it is the story that most needs to be told. This story involves a very broad
examination into how it is that Supreme Court of Canada rulings, Canadian Constitutional law,
and international human rights laws that the Canadian government is legally bound to uphold can
be so persistently, egregiously, and discriminatorily violated for one category of people within
borders of Canada, and how it is that the vast majority of non-Native Canadians (government
officials and residents alike) sit back and say nothing while this happens. Further this
dissertation is the story of how it is that such large numbers of non-Native Canadians
(government officials and residents alike) are not only passively complicit in these abuses, but
are actual active supporters of them –even to the extent of lobbying their government towards the
further progression of these violations and/or towards the inducement of additional, new
violations. Finally, this dissertation is the story of how it is that, in their complicity or active
support and promotion of these ongoing constitutional and international human rights violations,
non-Native Canadians (government officials and residents alike) persist in their unquestioning
belief that the Native people like Haudenosaunee Six Nations are simply lying about, making up,
or drastically exaggerating their grievances --despite massive evidence to the contrary; and why
it is that these non-Native people persist in characterizing Native peoples who assert their land,
treaty and human rights as liars, exaggerators, sore losers, opportunists, criminals, terrorists,
and/or any number of other negative characterizations.
The answers to these questions, I argue, are related to transgenerational, historical and
ongoing trauma and the psychopathological mechanisms that western society and the western
cultural worldview provide for denying, repressing, and/or normalizing this trauma and the

8

intolerable feelings resulting from it of anxiety, insecurity, fear, shame, and guilt. Though this
dissertation argues that western society and the western cultural worldview consist of a number
of problematic patterns of thought and behavior which have been identified as
psychopathological in the clinical literature on trauma and post traumatic stress disorder, it
should be clarified that it is not the people who are psychopathological, but the society in which
they live. Certainly it can be and is argued that this society –western society—is internalized in
each of every one of us who live within western society, and is thus a part of who we are, so, too,
is our common collective humanity. In fact, this common collective humanity is much more a
part of who we are, individually and collectively, than the psychopathological society that
persistently encourages and requires us to ignore who we are, and to violently repress it, and to
become something else –something that is obediently possessed and used for the benefits of a
few, but to the detriment of ourselves, other people, other life forms, and ultimately the planet.
The same processes that are at play in the dispossession of the Haudenosaunee people from the
land, treaty and human rights are at play in the dispossession of each and every one of us from
who we are as human beings. And it is imperative not only to the mental health of members of
western society, but to their liberation as well, and to the very survival of the human species, that
each and every one of us work to rediscover this common collective humanity that is within all
of us, and abandon forever the psychopathological patterns of thought and behavior that will
otherwise continue to destroy ourselves, other people(s), other life forms and the planet, until
there is nothing left to sustain the human species and most of the plant and animal species on the
planet. It is not only necessary and possible that we do this, but it is our responsibility --the
responsibility that those us alive now have to ourselves, others, our future generations, all other
life forms and their future generations, and the planet.
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SOME NOTES ON TERMINOLOGY
There are at least two terminological issues that should be addressed here, the first of which is
the use of the term “Haudenosaunee” versus the term “Haudenosaunee Six Nations.” In some
instances, when I wish to refer specifically and solely to the Haudenosaunee people who live on
or belonging to the Six Nations reserve, I will use the phrase “Haudenosaunee Six Nations.” The
rest of the time I will simply use the word Haudenosaunee, which may be referring either
primarily to the Haudenosaunee people living on the Six Nations reserve, or to the
Haudenosaunee people more generally, who live throughout Ontario, Quebec, upstate New
York, Wisconsin and beyond. In these cases, the context surrounding the word will presumably
guide the reader in terms of the intended meaning.
The second terminological issue that needs to be addressed is my use of the words “we,”
“our,” or “us” when discussing the numerous problematic patterns of thought and behavior
inherent in Western society. As a non-Native member of Western society, I am writing about the
society in which I live, and am writing to anyone who cares to read my dissertation, whether
Western, non-Western, or somewhere in between. In order to position myself within the society
in which I live, it is only appropriate that I use these terms, rather than terms which would
artificially separate me from this society, such as “they,” “theirs,” and “them.” Using these latter
terms would imply that I feel it is possible for one to artificially separate oneself –through
criticism—from the society in which one lives and/or from the responsibilities that all
Westerners have for addressing and ending the perpetration and destruction our society has
wrought upon the entire world (including ourselves). I have included at the beginning of Chapter
2 a loose definition of what I mean by “Western,” both historically and in the present day. This
definition primarily includes the people of European and European-descended nations, a well as
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those nations that have adopted Western style political, economic and social forms of
organization and production. However, when I am writing about the problematic patterns of
thought and behavior in Western society, or various other problems inherent in the Western
cultural worldview, I ask readers to consider for themselves to what extent they are a part of this
society and its problematic patterns. In some ways, Western imperialism has reached all corners
of the globe, slicing the planet up into territorial nation-states with governments that rule over the
masses within their territories in a wide variety of ways (but generally in hierarchical, top-down,
mini-empire formations). Yet, in other ways, peoples around the world have resisted their
consumption by Western culture and their own assimilation into Western-style nation-states to
varying degrees of success. Many of these non-Western peoples retain large portions, and
sometimes virtually all, of their own, unique cultural worldviews, and have simply learned to
live within two very different cultures. While I expect this latter array of diverse peoples around
the world to be familiar with many of the problematic patterns of which I write, my use of the
words “we,” “our,” or “us” is not at all intended to forcibly include these non-Western peoples as
Westerners, nor is it in any way intended to exclude non-Westerners from the various
discussions in this dissertation. It is just me, writing about problems that I have noticed in my
society, to anyone who cares to read it.
GUIDE TO THE CHAPTERS
Chapter 1 provides a brief summary of the 2006 conflict between the Haudenosaunee Six
Nations protesters and the Canadian and Ontario governments, while also giving a brief
overview of the reactions of local non-Native residents to the protest. This summary is drawn
from thousands of news articles and hundreds of video clips, as well as dozens of interviews and
various background reports. This chapter also provides a brief summary of who the
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Haudenosaunee are –how the Haudenosaunee nations came to form a Confederacy and what
some of their main cultural traditions and beliefs are. An historical background relating to the
Haudenosaunee Six Nations land, resources and trust funds is also included, as is an examination
of the specific area of land under protest in 2006 and the land claims with which it is associated.
This chapter intends not only to raise the relevant issues surrounding the protest, but to establish
the validity of many of the Haudenosaunee grievances. Given this validity, the denial and
dismissal of these grievances by non-Native government officials and residents is the
phenomenon that most needs to be explained and understood in this dissertation.
The second chapter provides an historical overview of various problematic patterns of thought
and behavior in the Western cultural worldview, including the denial and dismissal of the
grievances of others. Through identifying and examining the historical positioning of these
patterns within Western society and the Western cultural worldview, I argue that many of these
problematic patterns are rooted in historic traumas perpetrated by some members of Western
society against other members of Western society. These traumatic events were so devastating
for such large portions of Western society over such a long period of time that they have created
ripple effects which are still felt today. Further, the processes that formed Western society were
based on these traumatic destructions of local communities and cultures, and the Western
hierarchical monoculture that came to forcibly replace these local communities and cultures has
long failed to provide its members with many of the essential positive elements of culture, such
as mechanisms for healing individuals from traumatic events and reintegrating them back into
the community/society. Lacking these mechanisms, Western society and the Western cultural
worldview have primarily provided Westerners with psychopathological mechanisms for coping
with present, past and transgenerational trauma. As such, these psychopathological mechanisms
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and the numerous traumas that preceded them, form much of the foundation of what Western
society is and has been for many centuries. In fact, I argue that these traumatizing processes and
the production of psychopathological coping mechanisms are, in many ways, what is actually
meant by the term “civilization.” Through Western society’s “civilizing process,” the historical
traumas and psychopathologies of Western society have been reenacted on “less-civilized”
Westerners, as well as allegedly “uncivilized” non-Western peoples. The Western worldview
has long held that it is necessary to inflict these civilizing processes, because forcing other
peoples to become Westerners is “progress;” however, the real purpose of reenacting Western
traumas and psychopathologies upon other peoples is to pacify and tame them, so that they are
no longer able to resist as Western elites and the militarized governments that support them
plunder their lands, resources, labor power, non-capitalist systems, and anything else that can be
used to accumulate capital for Western elites. In other words, the purpose of the “civilizing”
process is and has long been accumulation by dispossession (Harvey, 2003).
Chapter 3, in contrast, examines some of the characteristics of societies that were not
traumatized by centuries of conquest and “civilizing”/colonization. That is, it provides the
reader with a brief glimpse into healthy societies and cultural worldviews, as represented by the
majority of Native societies that were existing in the Americas prior to the start of the European
invasion. Some of the characteristics of these –i.e., healthy—societies include the idea that all
living things have a right to what they need to survive, and that human beings do not have a right
to deprive other living things or other human beings of this. Other common aspects of the
cultural worldviews of these societies include the idea that healthy human beings desire peace,
and that if “one does not feel that pain, one has become brutalized and ‘sick’” (Forbes, 2008: 1214, 6-7; see also: Akwesasne Notes, 2005: 31-40). The contrast between the traumatized and
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psychopathological nature of the Western thought and behavior in Western society, and the
majority of Native societies existing in the Americas prior to the invasion, further demonstrates
and reinforces the points made in both chapters 2 and 3. This exploration also provides a
necessary framework for understanding the competing worldviews of Haudenosaunee protesters
and non-Native Canadian government officials and residents.
Chapter 4 returns to the examination of the 2006 Haudenosaunee protest and the non-Native
reactions to it by examining the responses of federal, provincial and county-level government
officials, as well as individuals in positions of authority (the media, the local development
corporations, for example). The responses of these figures of authority are examined within the
context of theories regarding the production of atrocities and the conditions of atrocity-producing
situations. The chapter argues that the Canadian government, and the British-Canadian
government before that, have exhibited a longstanding pattern of treating Native peoples as “fair
game” for projection and scapegoating by non-Natives, primarily because Native peoples have
stood in the way of other policy objectives, such as the accumulation of Native lands, resources,
labor power, and the cooptation of non-capitalist forms of social organization inherent in Native
societies. To this extent, after using these theories to examine some of the specific ways in
which non-Native government officials and non-government authorities authorized and
routinized attack upon, and the dehumanization of, Native peoples during the 2006
Haudenosaunee conflict, this chapter examines several of the ongoing human rights violations
that are being perpetrated against Native peoples across Canada in pursuit of these accumulationby-dispossession objectives. The chapter will also speculate on the international and domestic
consequences of these ongoing human rights violations in the face of mounting changes in the
international human rights regime that have recognized indigenous peoples rights to: self-

14

determination; consultation and free, prior, and informed consent; and freedom from any forced
extinguishment of their inherent human and treaty rights.
Perhaps the fundamental reason why the above human rights violations are ongoing in
Canada and other settler states is the assertion of European-descended sovereignty over Native
lands and peoples. While international law has not yet specifically addressed the rights of
indigenous peoples to sovereignty, there is an increasing trend in international human rights law
toward this end. Some of this can be seen in the condemnations that international human rights
monitoring bodies have made of the alleged legal justifications used by Canada and other settler
state governments in their assertions of sovereignty. According to these international human
rights monitoring bodies, these legal justifications amount to legal fictions, which were built
upon archaic political theories Western conceptions of “civilization” created to justify the
European theft of non-Western lands and resources and the genocide and enslavement of nonWestern peoples (i.e., accumulation by dispossession). As such, human rights monitoring bodies
have proclaimed that these alleged justifications have no legal standing, and any court cases
based upon them should be reconsidered in this light. These trends in international human rights
law are basically eroding (and even decimating) the very foundation upon which the Canadian
government and other settler state governments claim sovereignty over Native peoples, and
tremendous changes in relation to international, state-centric concepts of sovereignty, including
increasing recognition of indigenous sovereignty, can be expected in the coming decades.
Chapter 5 will examine many of these issues, demonstrating the fictitious nature of Canada’s
claims to sovereignty over Native lands and peoples within Canada’s geographic borders, while
also demonstrating the role of Western concepts of “civilization” in the formulation of these
legally fictitious claims.
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Finally, after having provided a historical-cultural context for them, chapter 6 will consider
the reactions of local non-Native residents to the 2006 Haudenosaunee protest. Because there
was a broad range of reactions to this protest over several months time, and because a more
detailed examination of some of these reactions is in order, this chapter will primarily focus on
the behavior of the 20-30% of local non-Native residents who opposed the Haudenosaunee
protest during the first two months. In doing so, this chapter demonstrates the existence of many
of Western society’s problematic patterns of thought and behavior discussed throughout the
dissertation. Because the first two months of the protest were the least confrontational, the
examination of non-Native opposition to the protest within this largely peaceful period is useful
in demonstrating the ways in which Western society’s problematic patterns of thought and
behavior were utilized by many non-Native residents to escalate non-Native anger and mobilize
non-Native opposition to the protest (and to Native treaty rights). While non-Native support, and
even non-Native ambivalence, neutrality, and/or silence in response to the protest are also
extremely worthy avenues of examination, and are touched upon in the introduction, conclusion,
and in small ways throughout the chapter, non-Native opposition to the protest appears to have
been the norm in the small town of 10,000 people, and its public displays dominated space in the
town, coverage in the media, and dialogue with government officials for the duration of the
protest and beyond. (Indeed, six years later several non-Native residents still regularly gather
near the 2006 protest site and voice their anger over alleged “special privileges” enjoyed by
Native people and alleged provincial police discrimination against non-Natives).
The dissertation concludes with a few words on the absolute necessity of healing from past
individual, group, and societal traumas in order to move away from the psychopathological
patterns of thought and behavior that have long infected Western society and its members, and
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has adversely impacted virtually every living thing on the planet whose future existence is now
severely threatened.
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Chapter 1:
Overview of the Conflict and Background to the Conflict
Non-native governments are stealing our land all up and down the Grand
River…and the government will not sit down and talk with us.
~ Haudenosaunee Confederacy Chief Arnold General, quoted in Morse 2006a.
With the way our neighbors are developing land around us, there will soon be
nowhere for Six Nations to expand in the future. This is not about us, it's about
our children. It's the future of our children that is being targeted (with this kind
of encroachment). I don't think there is a better reason to unite than to protect
our rights and land.
~ Protest Spokesperson Janie Jamieson, quoted in Windle, 2006d
Generations have grown up talking about this problem, contemplating this
disparity that threatens to overshadow all lesser woes, stewing about how it can
be addressed and made right, but ultimately having to pass it on to the next
generation because it simply never moves forward. That's what's happening, has
been happening all along, and it isn't the sole prerogative of so-called 'radicals'
within the community. It's everyone's shared past. It's a grievance that rankles
far more than white people can appreciate, and to simply trifle it away as
something of no consequence, as something that happened long ago to other
people and can be swept aside using that universal broom of last resort called the
rule of law, well that is no solution. It's a delay. And it won't do forever. There
will be a price to be paid for that type of arrogance, and the shame of it is that it's
just so avoidable because all it demands is an honest examination. ....[W]ill
Canada have any appetite for clearing up past mistakes or [will] they want to
stonewall and take their chances that this can be made to disappear for another
day?
~ Tekawennake 2006c
THE CONFLICT
When construction started on the Douglas Creek Estates housing development in October 2005,
members of the Haudenosaunee Six Nations had already been waiting several decades for land
claims procedures, court cases and even international appeals 11 to recognize their title to their
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In the 1920s the Haudenosaunee sent a Cayuga Chief, Deskaheh, to the League of Nations to
plead for justice against Canada’s ongoing violations of Haudenosaunee rights and misuse of
Haudenosuanee trust funds. This will be discussed in slightly more detail in chapter 4. The
Haudenosaunee also sent representatives to the United Nations in the 1970s, and have continued
18

Grand River lands. But while official avenues for contesting non-Native encroachment on these
lands were dragging on at a snails pace, 12 non-Native encroachment and development on them
was racing along at unprecedented rates (Hemsworth, 2006b; Harries, 2006b). 13 Making the
situation worse, in June 2005 the province of Ontario passed its Places to Grow Act: legislation
seeking to accommodate an estimated three-to-five million new people into southern Ontario
over the next two decades by mandating settlement and development quotas in areas throughout
southern Ontario’s Greater Golden Horseshoe region –a region which includes the
Haudenosaunee’s Grand River lands (Ontario Ministry of Public Infrastructure Renewal, 2005;
Hamilton Spectator, 2006c; Canadian Press, 2006r; Nolan, 2006c). 14 Knowing full well that once

to be actively involved in the shaping of legal instruments of international human rights of
indigenous peoples, such as the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
See also: Akwesasne Notes (2005).
12
There are over 800 outstanding Specific land claims registered in Canada (this number does
not count Comprehensive land claims, which would add several hundred more to this number),
and new claims continue to be registered every year. Through the Canadian land claims process
it takes an average of 13 years to resolve a land claim, but claims can easily take two and even
three decades before they are resolved. See: Canada. Standing Senate Committee on Aboriginal
Peoples (2006: 1), SNGR (2006a and 2006c), Oliveira, Mike and Canadian Press (2006), CBC
News (2007b), Asch & Zlotkin (2002), U.S. Secretary of State (2009). The Haudenosaunee Six
Nations filed 29 claims between 1980 and 1995, and as of today only one of those claims has
been resolved (Six Nations Lands and Resources, 2012).
13
Both sources cited state that there had been rapid growth in the town over the past 20 years.
14
Ontario’s 2005 Places to Grow Act is an award-winning growth plan intended to reduce urban
sprawl in the Greater Toronto Area while simultaneously accommodating the influx to the region
of millions of new people over the next 15-25 years. The legislation places strict limits on new
developments within the Greater Toronto Area, limiting 40% of new development to already
built-up areas, and mandating settlement and development quotas on lands outside the Greater
Toronto Area, but still within the Greater Golden Horseshoe area. Haudenosaunee Six Nations
Grand River lands fall into this category.
The push to settle and develop lands under Haudenosaunee claim may have, in part, been a
result of concerns regarding a potential future labor shortage in the Greater Toronto and Greater
Golden Horseshoe area. See, for example: Conference Board of Canada (2007). But, also see
chapter 4, which argues that the primary reason for this push is the drive by Canadian
government officials and corporations to pursue financial gains from the ongoing accumulation
by dispossession of Native peoples throughout Canada from their lands, resources and human
rights.
19

their lands were settled and developed by non-Natives, no Canadian court would ever “return”
the lands to Haudenosaunee hands, 15 and facing only rejection in their efforts to reason with the
local developer and government officials at the federal, provincial, and local levels, 16 the
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See, for example: Chippewas of Sarnia Band v. Canada (Attorney General) (2001),
Chippewas of Sarnia Band v. Canada (Attorney General) (2000), and Kent McNeil’s discussion
of these cases (McNeil, 2001-2002). Though there are no statutes or court rulings that would
allow a court to extinguish a valid title of a Native nation simply because their land is already
occupied by non-Native people (McNeil, 2001-2002; Reynolds, 2009), the Ontario Supreme
Court and Ontario Court of Appeals in Sarnia did just this: extinguishing a valid Native title to
land in order to “protect” the interests of non-Natives who had settled in houses and built
businesses on the land. (The Chippewas of Sarnia did not seek to evict non-Native residents on
the land, but did seek to evict a few of the corporations operating on the land). In doing so, the
court not only ignored relevant Supreme Court rulings on protection of Native interests in
reserve lands (such as Guerin v. The Queen [1984] at 383), and violated the Chippewa of
Sarnia’s constitutionally protected rights, but also sent a strong “message to Aboriginal people
that they cannot depend on the Canadian legal system to uphold their claims to lands that were
wrongfully taken in the past” (McNeil, 2001: 344). McNeil continues: “The Court of Appeal’s
decision indicates that, regardless of the legal validity of their claims, judges will not necessarily
allow those claims to prevail if they conflict with the claims of other Canadians who did not
participate in and were not aware of the wrongs that were committed,” (emphasis in original).
See also: Reynolds (2009).
16
In the 12-14 months prior to the occupation, members of Six Nations had made various efforts
to alert the developer, area politicians, non-native residents, and anyone else who would listen,
that the site earmarked for development was on land under claim. Starting around January 2005,
the Elected Council of Six Nations began sending letters to officials in Haldimand, Brant and
Norfolk Counties, the City of Brantford, the owners of Henco Industries Unlimited, Inc., (Henco)
Don and John Henning, Ontario's Growth Secretariat, the Ontario Minister of Public
Infrastructure, the Ontario Minister of Natural Resources and Aboriginal Affairs (David
Ramsay), the federal Department of Justice and the federal Minister of Indian Affairs (Andy
Scott). (Windle, 2006a; Muse, 2006f). Six Nations Community members had also staged a
number of protests and informational pickets in Caledonia, starting in October 2005, as well as a
letter-writing campaign directed at Haldimand County officials. When several Haudensoaunee
women went to the Caledonia construction site in 2005 attempting to discuss Haudenosaunee
land rights and Canadian laws with the company developing a housing subdivision on the land,
workers at the not only dismissed the women’s attempts to talk about Haudenosaunee rights but
reportedly kicked dirt on the women ant told them to “bring it on,” according to Cayuga subchief Leroy Hill, who added: “And our people brought it on.” (Leroy Hill, quoted in: Ahooja,
2008b). On members of Six Nations bringing public attention to this issue for at least a year, see
Howlett (2006b), Rook and Proudfoot (2006b); on efforts by the Six Nations Elected Council
beginning in January 2005, see Ontario, Legislative Assembly of Ontario (2006b), Windle
(2006a), ass also: Windle (2006h), Muse (2006d). On the informational picket and the protest,
20

Haudenosaunee Six Nations took a different approach to dealing with Canada’s long trail of
broken promises and ongoing injustices. In the early morning hours of February 28, 2006, after
months of planning, members of the Haudenosaunee Six Nations entered the construction site,
blocked off the entrances, raised the Haudenosaunee flag, declared the site “Six Nations land,”
and dug in for a peaceful but determined fight to prevent the development that would forever
take the land from Six Nations’ hands (Legall, 2006g & 2006l).
The protest set off a cascade of events. Though many non-Native residents in the area
expected the protest to be short-lived and quickly quashed by police, police refused to move in
on protesters until Henco Industries, Ltd., (the development company and provincially-registered
owners of the land) obtained a court injunction (Best, 2006c; Legall, 2006d). Over the next few
weeks the owners of the development company, Don and John Henning, obtained a series of
court injunctions against the protesters, but many of these were not enforceable by police
because they were merely civil orders. 17 Finally, Ontario Superior Court Justice David Marshall

see: Walkom (2006), Muse (2005a, 2005b and 2005c), Jackson (2005); Regional News (2005),
Legall (2005). Hamilton Spectator (2006c), Best (2006e).
17
The March 3 order was a civil injunction pending trial of the merits of the case, with the trial
date set for March 9th (Coyle, 2006). Though many non-Natives mistook the trial date for the
date the injunction would be enforced by police, the OPP did not and could not enforce it
because it was a civil injunction (Legall, 2006i). On March 9th, the court issued the development
company a permanent, interlocutory injunction, which was also a civil order (also pending trial
of the merits of the case) rather than a criminal order, and thus the provincial police again said
they had no authority to enforce the order, though many non-Natives expected the new trial date,
March 16th, to be the date that protesters were cleared off the land (Canadian Press, 2006i;
Legall, 2006j). The March 16th trial, held on both the 16th and 17th, resulted in a criminal order,
which set a new deadline for March 22, and would have been enforceable by the OPP, had the
order not also contained some technical errors that prevented police from enforcing the order
until it was corrected (more on this below). The Hennings also claimed in their injunction
application that the blockade was causing “contract breaches with builders and interfering with
the company’s finances,” and sued the Haudenosaunee protesters and their traditional
government for $5 million in damages. (Best, 2006c).
21

awarded the Henning brothers a criminal injunction against the protesters and held a hearing to
set penalties for protesters who violated the injunction.
At the beginning of the hearing, Haudenosaunee protesters requested that Judge Marshall
(who owned several parcels of land in areas under claim by the Haudenosaunee Six Nations)
recuse himself from the potentially precedent-setting case on the grounds that this ownership
constituted a conflict of interest (Gamble, 2006e & 2006f; Legall, 2006h; Jackson, 2006g; Best,
2006e). 18 Marshall, however, asserted that virtually all judges in the county owned land in areas
under Haudenosaunee claim, and noted that “[t]he land I own was acquired through the legal
system…it’s the only legal system we have here” (Legall, 2006h). He further argued that the
case was not about land ownership but was about protesters’ violation of an injunction and thus
there was no conflict of interest (Legall, 2006h; Gamble, 2006e). Yet, as he proceeded to issue a
criminal injunction against Haudenosaunee protesters, Judge Marshall justified his injunction by
citing the Canadian government’s longstanding policy and practice of extinguishing Native title
to lands –thus admitting that the case was, after all, about land. 19 From his bench in a county
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The case was expected to set precedents in terms of how local courts would deal with land
claim protests, but not in terms of the rights to lands, since the Supreme Court of Canada had
already recognized that native peoples have these rights. Haudenosaunee Six Nations protest
spokesperson, Dawn Smith, actually had three requests for Justice Marshall: First, to remove
himself from the case based on the conflict of interest caused by his ownership of land in areas
under Haudenosaunee claim. Second, Smith asked Marshall to recognize the Canadian
Constitution, which gives the federal government sole jurisdiction over matters relating to
“Indians and Lands reserved for Indians” [See section 91(24) of the Canadian Constitution Act,
1867], and to recognize Haudenosaunee sovereignty and the Haudenosaunee’s special status as
allies of the Crown. Third, Smith asked that Justice Marshall hear a court-recognized authority
on Aboriginal and Six Nations’ history talk about Haudenosaunee sovereignty, the Canadian
Constitution and Constitutional protections for First Nations land and treaty rights.
19
Justice Marshall reasoned that, because of Canada’s longstanding policy and practice of
“extinguishment” --or of refusing to recognize title to Native lands that are or are being settled
and developed by non-Natives, and instead offering only financial compensation for these losses- the Haudenosaunee title would never be recognized in non-Native courtrooms and thus the
balance of convenience” weighed in favor of the developer, who should not be caused ‘undue
22

courtroom that was, itself, build on lands under Haudenosaunee claim, Justice Marshall then
urged the Haudenosaunee protesters and their traditional government to move off of the site
before they were arrested: 20
I accept that you believe in your heart you’ve been treated unfairly…. I respect
the claims but not holding Henco and buyers for ransom. It’s my humble view
that’s not just. It takes courage to turn and walk away, to be strong enough to turn
and walk away. This court is asking the clan mothers, the chiefs and the Mohawks
to turn and walk away. (Legall, 2006k; Best, 2006e)
Rather than heed the injunction, Haudenosaunee people strengthened their resolve and
gathered en masse on the site for the March 22 injunction deadline. Hundreds of Non-Native
supporters and Native people from other Haudenosaunee and Native territories across Canada
also arrived to support them (Legall, 2006a; Bonnell and Canadian Press, 2006c; Canadian Press,
2006m; Gamble & Canadian Press, 2006). 21 Meanwhile, local non-Native residents who
opposed to the protest gathered around the perimeters of the protest site, standing or sitting in
bumper-to-bumper traffic in the middle of the street, eager to witness the anticipated police
action that would force the end of the three-week-long protest (Legall, 2006a). As police
helicopters circled overhead, protesters and their supporters on the site locked arms, forming a
inconvenience’ by a Native protest over title and rights claims that would never be realized. In
this reasoning, Justice Marshall entirely ignored the Canadian Supreme Court rulings mandating
Crown consultation and accommodation with Native peoples prior to planning or undertaking
development projects that might adversely impact outstanding Native interests on lands. See, for
example: Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests) [2004]; Taku River Tlingit
First Nation v. British Columbia (Project Assessment Director) [2004]; Mikisew Cree First
Nation v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage) [2005].
20
Marshall’s actions are in line with observations in the Sociology of Law, and Law and Society
literatures which note that, because of their relative privilege, at least some judges, such as US
Supreme Court Justice John Marshall, have a substantial financial stake in the outcome of some
of their own rulings, particularly those relating to Native title. See, for example: D’Errico
(2000).
21
The Hamilton Spectator reported seeing “more than 200 people” on the site, while the
Canadian Press –via the Toronto Star and the Montreal Gazette-- reported that there were “about
400 Indian protesters” there (not all protesters were native). The Brantford Expositor, also using
Canadian Press reports, simplified and merely stated “hundreds.”
23

human chain against any police movement. The 2:00 P.M. deadline came and went without the
anticipated police appearance. Apparently the criminal injunction contained some technical
errors, 22 and the OPP --who were still coming under fire for the 1995 killing of a Native protester
during a similar Native protest 23 -- wanted to do everything strictly according their protocol. 24
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Crown Attorney John Pearson noted that the March 17th order, which set the March 22
deadline, erroneously stated that protesters would be fingerprinted and photographed under the
Identification of Criminals Act, though this act could did not apply to contempt of court cases.
After the March 22 deadline passed with no OPP enforcement of the order, the Superior Court
Judge was asked to clarify the order by including in it both the statement that the fingerprinting
and photographing would be done under a probation order, and the statement that protesters
would be guilty of criminal as well as civil contempt. The order was amended on March 28.
(See: Legall, 2006b & 2006n; Best, 2006f; Harries, 2006c; Canadian Press, 2006l; Bonnell and
Canadian Press, 2006d; Burman, 2006b). However, OPP officials also stated that: “The OPP
respects the order of the court. We're legally bound to obey the court order so we shall undertake
our responsibilities in the safest manner possible. This is a complex issue and the safety of all
those involved is paramount. We’re hoping for a peaceful resolution.” (Bonnell & Canadian
Press, 2006e; Gamble and Canadian Press, 2006).
23
A public inquiry into the 1995 murder of unarmed Native protester, Dudley George, was still
ongoing in March 2006, and by this time the public inquiry had turned up substantial evidence of
provincial government interference in police conduct. For example, the Inquiry found that
Ontario Premier Michael Harris and his administration had attempted to influence the operations
of the OPP by “persistently, and forcefully pushing for a quick resolution to the occupation of
the park,” rather than following the Ontario government’s own guidelines for dealing with
occupation protests on contested native lands –guidelines which called for patience and
negotiation (Windle, 2006e). The Harris administration’s attempt to interfere with police
procedures was, perhaps, most famously highlighted through testimony about a meeting Harris
called the day before Dudley George was shot. According to testimony of former Ontario
Attorney General Charles Harnick, Harris had shouted to the meeting of OPP and high level
officials: “I want those fucking Indians out of the park!”(Ibid; Bonnell and Canadian Press,
2006b; CBC News, 2007a). The Inquiry also round that there was a racially-charged, antiNative and anti-treaty rights climate in the Harris administration, as well as in the OPP. For
example, though the problem of unsettled Native land claims is well recognized in Canada,
where whole government bodies have been created and funded to try to eventually resolve these
problems, a few years before the Ipperwash conflict, Harris was quoted in a news article (entitled
“PC leader slams do-nothing Natives”) criticizing natives who fight for their land and treaty
rights and characterizing them as people who “spent all their time on land claims and do nothing
to help themselves economically.” Harris also characterized the hundreds of native land claims
filed in Canada as mostly “unjustified.” (Windle, 2006e.). Further the Inquiry found that several
of the OPP officers involved on duty the day unarmed non-Native protester Dudley George was
shot and killed had referred to the protesters as “fucking Indians,” and later celebrated the death
of Dudley George with memorabilia such as “Team Ipperwash ‘95” T-shirts and coffee mugs,
24

To this extent, OPP officers had been meeting regularly with various parties to the protest, and
had told members of the Haudenosaunee’s traditional government, the Haudenosaunee
Confederacy Council, 25 that no move would be made against the protesters on this day (Muse,
2006e. See also: Legall, 2006o; Best, 2006c; Muse, 2006d; Windle & Muse 2006).
On the same day that the police refused to enforce the criminal injunction against the
protesters, the owners of Henco Industries, Ltd., brothers Don and John Henning, ran a full-page
advertisement in several local papers pleading with the public to pressure the Ministry of Indian
and Northern Affairs to step in to resolve the dispute (Henco Indstries, Ltd., 2006; Hennings,
2006a, 2006b & 2006c). In their advertisement, the brothers reasserted that they had “done
nothing wrong or illegal”(Legall, 2006g; Canadian Press, 2006h), that they had had no previous

which used symbols depicting dead native warriors. (Canadian Press, 2006j). On OPP officers
referring to native protesters as “Fucking Indians,”see: Canadian Press (2006q).
24
OPP protocol calls for seeking a peaceful, negotiated resolution to Native land claims protests,
and exhausting all peaceful options first, before making a show of force to remove protesters
(see, for example: Bonokoski, 2006; Edwards, 2006b; Bowen, 2006; Canadian Press, 2006k;
Ontario Provincial Police, N.d.). Though the OPP had a protocol, or “game plan,” in place to
negotiate a peaceful resolution to the Ipperwash Provincial Park protest, several top officers
apparently did not follow this protocol: negotiators were not prepared or sent in to talk to the
protesters (Bonokoski, 2006), and officers leading the OPP’s special unit, the Emergency
Response Team (ERT), were recorded on two different days prior to the shooting stating that
they wanted to: “amass a fucking army. A real fucking army and do this. Do these fuckers big
time.” (Edwards, 2006b). Officers were also accused of creating a “made-up emergency” both in
response to mounting pressure from non-Native cottagers (Edwards, 2006b; Bowen, 2006) and in
order to justify violating the protocol and moving in to “do” the protesters. [On accusations that
the OPP made up an emergency to justify moving in against the protesters, see: Canadian Press
(2006k). Bowen (2006) also reported on the same “emergency” incident reported in Canadian
Press (2006k), but does not mention the accusations that this incident was “made-up” for the
purpose of justifying the move on protesters (nor does he mention that the officer in charge of
ordering the move did not have evidence to back up the “made-up emergency”).]
25
Hereinafter also referred to as the Confederacy Council or the Confederacy Chiefs. The
Haudenosaunee Clan Mothers, or simply Clan Mothers, also have an important leadership role in
this traditional government.
25

knowledge of any objections to their development, 26 and that they were being unfairly “held
hostage” by a “splinter group” of the Haudenosaunee Six Nations who were jeopardizing their
business (Henco Industries Limited, 2006; Henning, 2006b & c). 27 Though the brothers’ claims
to having no previous knowledge of Haudenosaunee objections were not entirely honest, 28 the
brothers were certainly well-justified in their frustrations with protest and the absence of federal
involvement in seeking a resolution to it. Others, including the Haldimand County Council
(Best, 2006e), 29 the Caledonia Chamber of Commerce, 30 the Haudenosaunee protesters 31 and the
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From the start of the protest, the owners of Henco Industries, Ltd., Don and John Henning, had
insisted that they had no previous knowledge of any objections to their development by the
Haudensoaunee Six Nations. For example, Don Henning stated in an affidavit that Henco
Industries Inc. had notified the Band Council when submitting (to Haldimand County) their 2003
draft plan for the subdivision and “had received no objections.” (Quoting the Spectator’s
paraphrase of the affidavit. Hamilton Spectator, 2006c). "As a result,” Hennings affidavit
continued, “the Douglas Creek Estates plan of subdivision was approved." (Ibid). The brothers
also maintained that they had no knowledge or notice of Haudenosaunee problems with the
development when they started construction in October 2005, or even when their final
subdivision plan was approved (by the county) and circulated to the Six Nations Band Council in
December 2005 (Best, 2006c).
27
The company had already put $6 million into the development at this point, and had also
already sold six of the ten houses that were partially constructed on the site. (Best, 2006c; Legall,
2006c & d).
28
The Hennings’ claims of innocence/naïveté received considerable media coverage, and
dominated press narratives of the protest. Yet, another version of the story that got occasional
media coverage painted a very different picture of the Henning’s knowledge of objections to
their development. For example, Native protest spokespeople had insisted from day one that the
Hennings had known about the outstanding Haudenosaunee claims on the land and about
Haudenosaunee objections to the development (Windle, 2006h), and a news article revealed
letters written to the Hennings in 2005, which corresponded with Haudenosaunee pickets and
protests near the site before the start of construction (Hamilton Spectator, 2006c). At these
protests and pickets, the Hennings or their employees were unwilling to talk with
Haudenosaunee women about Haudenosaunee claims, had told these women that there was
nothing they could do to stop the development, and had even reportedly kicked dirt on the
women and told them to “bring it on.” As Cayuga Sub-Chief Leroy Hill stated: “And so our
people brought it on” (Ahooja, 2008b).
29
The council also passed two resolutions, one requesting provincial help with future
development, and one requesting federal help on resolving the long-term issues (Regional News,
2006b).
26

Haudenosaunee Clan Mothers (Rotinoshon’non:we, 2006) shared these frustrations and made
similar pleas to the public to pressure the federal government to resolve the land claims dispute.
Despite these pleas, since the start of the dispute federal officials had denied any
responsibility in resolving the matter, and had presented several conflicting stories allegedly
supporting this denial. 32 The fact that the Canadian Constitution Acts of 1867 and 1982 both
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The plea of the Caledonia Chamber of Commerce actually asked for a “quick, permanent
resolution to the issue in town,” (the quote is a paraphrase of the Chamber’s press release as
described in: Jackson, 2006f) in a press release which stated: “The Chamber’s concern is on
behalf of the business community. The real estate market, general business trade and
employment loss are being affected as a result of this interruption to an otherwise healthy
economy,” (Ibid).
31
For example, protester Wes Elliott told the Dunnville Chronicle that neighbors of Six Nations
should call their federal representative, MP Diane Finley and insist that she tell the Canadian
government to step in and start working to resolve outstanding land claims in the area: “The only
viable solution is for them to apply pressure to their government. Everyone who sits on our land
are our neighbours. Anything that they can do to help will be greatly appreciated.” (Best,
2006b).
32
For example, around March 8, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada communications officer
Brock Worobel stated that the agency could not get involved in the protest because it was related
to a land claim that was also the subject of ongoing litigation between the Haudenosaunee Six
Nations and the Canadian and Ontario governments (the Haudenosaunee Six Nations’ litigation
against the latter governments was merely asking for an accounting of what happened to
Haudenosaunee lands, resources and trust funds, but this litigation had been put on hold in
2004/2005). As such, Worobel suggested that the Ontario Provincial Police were the appropriate
authorities to resolve the protest. (On the March 8 statements of Brock Worobel, see: Best,
2006c; Jackson, 2006h; Muse, 2006d). Around March 15th, another spokesperson for the federal
Indian Affairs Minister Jim Prentice acknowledged that Prentice knew the protest revolved
around a land claim, but then characterized the protest as a “local dispute” between the developer
and the protesters, and said the federal agency had no intention of getting involved. (“We don’t
have a direct role in a protest such as this. We don’t play a part in the protest itself, which is
between the protesters and the developer,” that would have to be resolved by the developer and
“the group of Six Nations activists occupying”) [Quoted in: Legall, 2006e; Muse, 2006h;
Canadian Press, 2006i). By April 7, the federal Minister of Indian Affairs was insisting that the
dispute was not related to a land claim at all (“This isn’t a land-claims matter. The actual root of
the problem is not a land claim. For the time being, it’s a protest”), and federal spokesperson
Deirdre McCracken told reporters that the protest “has nothing to do with the federal
government,” and “is really under the jurisdiction of the province.” (quoted from: Fragomeni,
2006). Meanwhile, the federal Member of Parliament for the area, Diane Finely, had originally
told reporters that she could not get involved because the protest was a matter for Indian and
Northern Affairs Canada. Eventually Finely changed her excuse, citing ongoing litigation
27

place land claims and all matters pertaining to “Indians and Lands reserved for Indians” under
the sole jurisdiction of the federal government 33 did little to influence either the federal
government or the provincial court judge who asserted his authority over the protest (this will be
discussed further in chapter 4). Yet, by the time the March 22nd deadline had come and gone
with no police movement, the mounting pressure was apparently enough to force some moderate
movement on the part of the federal government. On March 23rd, though still denying all
responsibility for resolving the dispute, the federal government appointed a federal fact-finder to
the dispute with the mandate to “investigate the nature of grievances, identify the jurisdictional
implications and explore the possibility of mediations” to bring about en end to the protest
(Legal, 2006i; Coyle, 2006; Best, 2006b; S. Smith, 2006a).
Though some non-Natives referred to the University of Western Ontario Assistant Professor
of Law, Michael Coyle, as a mediator or a rescuer (Legall, 2006i & 2006n; Canadian Press,
2006f & 2006u; Burman, 2006a; Hamilton Spectator, 2006d; Regional News, 2006a), Coyle had
been given neither meditation nor decision-making power in his appointment, 34 as the
Haudenosaunee Confederacy Council knew too well. Thus, while Confederacy Council Chiefs
welcomed what they said was a positive first step by the federal government, they also noted that
all facts in the conflict had already been known by Ottawa for the past 300 years and that it was
time the federal government send someone with real decision-making power to engage in
instead, but by that time the federal agencies had already abandoned that justification, claiming
the dispute was a local matter. On federal MP Diane Finely referring the matter to Jim Prentice’
office (the INAC), see: Muse (2006d & 2006h). On federal MP Diane Finley’s office citing court
(and potential police) involvement as the reason for her lack of involvement, see: Best (2006e).
33
See section 91(24) of the Canadian Constitution Act, 1867. Only the federal government can
resolve Native land claims.
34
Coyle did have extensive mediation experience, and experience with First Nations issues. This
experience –often cited by Coyle and by news articles—may have added to some of the
confusion as to what Coyle was actually sent to do. (Legall, 2006i; Best, 2006b). On Coyle’s
mandate, see: Coyle (2006), Best (2006b), S. Smith (2006a), Harries (2006b).
28

meaningful talks with the Haudenosaunee Six Nations traditional government to resolve the issue
(Haudenosaunee Six Nations “Iroquois” Confederacy Council, 2006cMarion & Canadian Press,
2006; Smith, 2006a; Best, 2006b; Burman, 2006a; Canadian Press, 2006f). 35
Reaffirming their resolve to support the protest until this happened, 36 Confederacy Chiefs and
Clan Mothers standing on the steps of the Onondaga longhouse read to the media their response
letter to fact finder Michael Coyle, laying out a short list of four items that, if agreed to by the
federal government, would immediately end the protest by: 1) placing a moratorium on all new
development on lands under Haudenosaunee claim until these land claims were resolved; 2)
ending the criminalization of Haudenosaunee protesters who were merely fighting to protect
their land, resource and treaty rights; 37 3) ending the “self-dealing,” i.e., the negotiations between
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“Our neighbours want the Canadian government to act. We want the Canadian government to
act.… We believe the federal government has the power to end this dispute today. We believe
there is a solution that is in Canada's power to iron out….” (Best, 2006b; Marion & Canadian
Press, 2006). Haldimand County Councilmember Buck Sloat made a similar criticism regarding
the federal government’s search for facts it had already known for centuries. However,
according to Sloat, the Haudenosaunee protest was illegal, the protests were criminally
trespassing on the developers’ land and interfering with his access to property, and the police
needed to end the protest immediately. (Best, 2006b).
36
“I’ve been so troubled about what’s going on all around us,” one Clan Mother stated, referring
to development on lands claimed by the Haudenosaunee. (Bernice Johnson, quoted in Best,
2006b). Another Clan Mother noted that the Haudenosaunee had no choice but to continue the
protest “or we’re lost again,” (Unnamed Clan Mother, quoted in: S. Smith, 2006a). On this
point, see also: Haudenosaunee Six Nations “Iroquois” Confederacy Council (2006c), Marion &
Canadian Press (2006), Burman (2006a). Marion (IBID) pointed out that the gathering of Chiefs
and Clan Mothers was not a full expression of the Confederacy Council. Chiefs and Clan
Mothers present represented various clans of the Mohawk, Cayuga and Onondaga nations, and
those present were also likely those who had been in support of the protest consistently since the
beginning, and had been present on the protest site.
37
“Our people down there are not criminals and the police know this. We hope the federal
government orders the police to disengage… Our people don’t want to see violence. We don’t
want this thing to escalate any further… If Ottawa committed to a moratorium on construction,
those people would be happy to leave.” (Cayuga Sub-Chief Leroy Hill, quoted in several
different sources (with a few slight variations in the exact wording of the statement. One source
said: “our people” and “police understand this,” while another source said “those people” and
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the federal government and the Six Nations Band Council, a federally created, funded and
colonially-imposed body of government opposed by the majority of the Haudenosaunee
people; 38 and 4) re-entering into an ongoing relationship with the Haudenosaunee Six Nations
Confederacy Council and honor commitments made by the Crown centuries ago through the
Two Row Wampum treaty agreement (Haudenosaunee Six Nations “Iroquois” Confederacy
Council, 2006c). 39 Mohawk Chief Allan MacNaughton clarified for the media the role of the
Haudenosaunee Six Nations Confederacy Council:
The Confederacy Council is not a splinter group or a special interest group. We
are the government of Six Nations: We hold these treaties and lands in our
jurisdiction. Canada has the ability to end this now --they've had the ability for
300 years. We the Chiefs are sending this message back with Mr. Coyle, that the
development of our land in Caledonia must stop and that talks between the federal
government and the Confederacy Chiefs [must start] not only over this dispute,
but over what has happened to our lands and trust fund. Canada must come to the
table with people mandated to make decisions, not fact finding. Our people have
been waiting for 300 years. Our neighbors are waiting and need their government
to act (Smith, 2006a ).
The suggestion of a moratorium on construction, coupled with the unexpected staying power
of the protest, began to send ripples of panic and anger through Caledonia --particularly among
those who worked in the real estate, investment and construction industries. Perhaps in response
“the police know this.” One other source, still, said “the OPP understand this.”). (Marion &
Canadian Press, 2006; Best, 2006b; Burman, 2006a).
38
“The community is against the elected council dealing with land claims. But that is who
Ottawa deals with.” [Cayuga sub-Chief Leroy Hill, quoted in: Burman, 2006a; Best, 2006b
(says community opposition was “overhwhelmingly opposed”); Smith, 2006a]. And, on the
appointment of fact finder Michael Coyle, Hill also noted the “insulting overtones when the
federal government continues to recognize only its Indian Affairs [colonially-imposed] band
council. While it sends Mr. Coyle back to us, Canada continues its talks on our land with the
band council and the province” (Quoted in: Smith, 2006a. See also: Burman, 2006a; Marion &
Canadian Press, 2006).
39
The Two Row Wampum is a treaty of peace, respect, friendship and non-interference.
According to the treaty, the British ship and the Haudenosuanee canoe would travel the river of
life together along parallel lines, side by side, never touching, never crossing, but willing to help
each other as friends. In the treaty, the Haudenosaunee agreed never to attempt to steer the
British ship, and the British agreed never to attempt to steer the Haudenosaunee canoe.
30

to this escalating anxiety, a few high profile non-Natives intensified their own demands
regarding the end of the protest. Haldimand County Councilmember Buck Sloat condemned the
protesters’ interference in the Henning’s access to their property and demanded police act to
immediately end the protest. In a similar vein, the Henning’s lawyer confidently announced to
the media that this newly-revised injunction 40 would be enforced by police “immediately”
(Legall, 2006b). 41 These escalations in official demands, as well as in the power and authority
presumed by local officials making them, again raised expectations among non-Native residents
who opposed the protest. Though OPP officials were still voicing their intent to follow their
protocol by pursuing dialogue, safety, and a peaceful resolution to the conflict rather than
confrontation and force, 42 area non-Natives again gathered en masse in a nearby parking lot to
watch what they expected to be a forced end to the protest (Windle, 2006f; Greenberg, 2006a).

40

The revised injunction was issued on March 28, the day after the Haudenosaunee press
conference. For more on this, see the above discussion and notes, or see: Best (2006f), Harries
(2006c), Canadian Press (2006l), Bonnell and Canadian Press (2006d), Legall (2006n), Burman
(2006b), Smith (2006a) Marion & Canadian Press (2006). On Judge Marshall being “irate” or
“peeved” see: Legall (2006b) Canadian Press (2006l).
41
However, Harries (2006c) quotes the Hennings lawyer, Micahel Bruder, as stating that the
order would be enforced “as soon as reasonably practical,”-a much more reasonable assertion,
given the OPP’s emphasize on dialogue and a peaceful resolution.
42
For example: “We are progressing, and as long as we’re talking, that’s positive. We’re hoping
the work we’re doing behind the scenes is going to be effective. We’re pleased that everyone is
allowing us the opportunity to bring this to a peaceful resolution” (Brantford Expositor, 2006d;
Healey & Morse, 2006). “[W]hat we need people to do and what we really try to express here is
that we need their understanding, we need them to be patient, cooperative, and understand that
not only are we working towards the peaceful resolution but one that is long lasting” (Jackson,
2006j). And: “It’s safe to say the OPP continues to learn, develop and grow with the needs of our
communities in a manner that is conducive to being respectful to everybody involved…
Although this (standoff) is staged in Caledonia, it has wide reaching ramifications. We want to
make sure we’re doing everything appropriately and that every avenue is explored.” (OPP
Sergeant Dave Recktor, from “It’s safe” to “Caledonia” was quoted in: Healey & Morse, 2006.
From “it has wide” to “explored,” was quoted in Jackson, 2006j). See also: Bonnell, Gregory &
Canadian Press, 2006d; Jackson, 2006f; Legall, 2006n; Brantford Expositor, 2006d; Ontario
Provincial Police, 2006a; L. Greenberg, 2006a; Canadian Press, 2006u; Morse, 2006b; Healey &
Morse. 2006; Jackson, 2006j.
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“It might get a little rough,” said one non-Native resident, adding that he hoped the protesters did
not have weapons (Windle, 2006f). However, instead of the expected show of force, what they
witnessed was a verbal standoff with the local sheriff who came to read the court injunction to
the protesters. As the sheriff read the court injunction, some protesters read their own counterinjunction while others drummed loudly in the background, resulting in what one reporter called
“an unintelligible jumble of verbiage” (Ibid). After the readings, both sides attempted to give the
other side copies of their order, and both sides refused to take the orders of the other side. At
least one protester made an obscene gesture towards the sheriff, and as the latter departed the
scene, copies of both orders lay scattered on the ground, stomped on by one protester and lit on
fire by another (the fire quickly smoldered out) (Legall, 2006m; Windle, 2006f; Burman, 2006b;
Greenberg, 2006a; Canadian Press, 2006u).
After the March 22nd public appeal by the Hennings, there was a change began in the media
coverage of the protest. Prior to this date, media coverage primarily focused on positive stories
about the protest and its supporters, but after this date considerably more coverage focused on
sensationalizing the potentially threatening aspects of the protest, 43 such as through playing upon
stereotypes of Native warrior societies, whose members began arriving on the site. 44 This shift in
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Prior to this date, only a minority of news outlets –in particular the local Regional News—had
expressed decidedly anti-protest views. Most local newspapers had continued to portray the
protest in a sympathetic light and, when dealing with non-Native views at all, had focused on
profiling non-Natives who expressed these sympathetic views. Though many news accounts still
remained sympathetic to the protest immediately after this date, anti-protest views increasingly
trickled into the media coverage.
44
Most non-Natives in Canada have only negative associations with Native warrior societies
(which are often compared to the Hell’s Angels or gangs). Non-Natives are not entirely without
reason for having these associations as, in the past, some Native warriors had engaged in
activities that were less than peaceful, and were in some cases outright destructive for Native
communities in which they operated. This was the case in Akwesasne in the late 1980s when
wealthy non-Natives (including the governor of New York State at the time) had joined together
with a few Akwesasne Mohawks to forcibly establish gambling venues on the Akwesasne
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media coverage became even more perceptible after the verbal standoff with the sheriff on
March 30th, which was broadcast into the homes of residents throughout the area and treated as
evidence that the protest had become militant and confrontational. 45 Some media outlets adopted
both the language of victimization and the factual misrepresentation that had been prominent in
the Henning’s public appeal. As such, these media reports characterized the protesters as a
disorganized, leader-less group of people who could not be satisfied. These reports often argued
that protesters should thus “pack it in while they’re ahead,” instead of unfairly continuing to
punish the Hennings, who had (allegedly) already consulted with the Six Nations Band Council 46
“as part of a three-year planning process” (see for example: Brantford Expositor, 2006b). Other
news articles played with the wording they used to describe the peaceful protest. For example,
reserve. Gambling on the reserve went against the wishes of the traditional government and a
large portion of the reserve population. As the latter struggled to prevent monied non-Natives
and their Native partners from establishing casinos and other gambling venues on-reserve,
Natives invested in the establishment of gambling venues formed warrior societies which
resorted to patrolling streets in heavily armed motorcades, intimidating those who spoke out
against the gambling venues, chasing large numbers of people from their homes on the reserve,
and engaging in shootouts with those who remained until at least two people were dead as a
result. Many of these same Mohawk warriors later arrived –armed-- at Oka, where they
reportedly promoted their own agenda at the expense of the Native people who were already
peacefully protesting against non-Native encroachment on Mohawk lands (non-Natives wanted
to expand a golf course onto the Mohawk’s land, which also contained a Mohawk burial ground)
(George-Kanentiio, 2006; Johansen, 1993). Most non-Natives in Caledonia and throughout
Canada only knew of Native warriors from these militant actions, as well as from the 1995
standoff in Ipperwash Provincial Park (which was widely and knowingly misrepresentated by the
news media as an armed conflict, though all of the Native protesters in the park were unarmed)
(Orkin, 2003).
45
The shift in reporting was based on a real shift in dynamics at the protest site. For example,
even some of the original Haudenosaunee protesters voiced concern with the escalation of verbal
confrontation on the March 30th verbal standoff with the local sheriff. And while some
protesters dismissed this as a show for the cameras, at least one took this as his cue to exit the
protest, stating: “I’ve been here from the beginning and I can’t do this. I’m outta here” (Wes
Elliot, quoted in: Windle, 2006f).
46
The Six Nations Band Council is the federally-created, funded and controlled governing body
of the Haudenosaunee Six Nations –i.e., the colonially imposed governing body. This will be
discussed further later in the chapter. The assertion that the Hennings had consulted with the
Band Council is simply untrue.
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though all of the residents interviewed in one news article had admitted that the protest had been
peaceful, the reporter described it as a “military encampment preparing for battle,” and quoted
confused residents who could not understand why the police had not yet cleared the site. The
same reporter also emphasized that the protest was frustrating, inconveniencing, and negatively
impacting non-Native residents living near the site, and even allegedly preventing one resident
from selling her home (Legall, 2006f).
This shift in reporting captured numerous voices of non-Native opponents to the protest –
voices that had previously been virtually ignored in all but perhaps one local weekly paper. 47
For example, one resident countered Haudenosaunee claims to sovereignty by stating:
Contrary to some protesters' beliefs, they are subject to the laws of Canada. Just
ask any of the natives currently serving time in Canada's prisons. (Lupton, 2006)
Another resident, in keeping with the escalation in demands by local officials, argued that the
protesters were receiving special treatment for being allowed to stay on the protest site and, like
county councilmember Buck Sloat, demanded that police “Get them out now. Do it peacefully if
they will allow it, but get them out!” (Lupton, 2006). Though residents were in many ways
helpless to end the protest, some residents began to demonstrate their opposition to the protest in
other ways: around this time Haudenosuanee people began reporting that derogatory statements
and discriminatory behavior were directed towards them by some non-Native business owners in
Caledonia, a few of whom even reportedly refused to serve Native customers. Some non-Native
residents of Caledonia even organized to boycott businesses that continued to serve Native
people (Autonomy & Solidarity, 2006a; Interviews with Caledonia and Six Nations residents,
2009). All of these discriminatory actions and behaviors eventually led to a Haudenosuanee
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The Regional News had consistently voiced anti-protest (and even outright anti-Native) views.
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boycott of Caledonia businesses, as well as a non-Native boycott of local business that served
Natives (Muse, 2006i; Interviews with Caledonia and Six Nations residents, 2009).
Non-Native responses to the protest will be more thoroughly explored in Chapter 6. What is
important to note here is that, though there had, from the very start, been a constant, simmering
of non-Native opposition to the protest (as well as some outright anti-Native sentiment), it did
not start to emerge in the media –or in the solidified actions of non-Native residents-- until after
the verbal showdown between the protesters and the local sheriff and, perhaps more importantly,
after the Haudensoaunee Six Nations Confederacy Council’s request for a moratorium on
development on all lands under Haudenosaunee claim. After this request, the already escalating
sense of urgency among non-Native residents escalated to new heights (see for example:
Brantford Expositor, 2006a; Jackson, 2006j). The request reminded residents invested in real
estate, construction or financial investment industries, as well as residents who had banked their
futures upon the predicted rapid growth of Caledonia, 48 that there was more than just a 40-acre
tract of land at stake. The Haudenosaunee had filed claims on the lands up and down the Grand
River. “The whole town is ours,” noted one protester referring to the fact that the town of
Caledonia had been built on lands under Haudenosaunee claim (Janie Jamieson, quoted in
Greenberg, 2006a). 49 Further, combined with the staying power of protesters and the inaction by
provincial police, the request also infused the protesters’ demands with a new seriousness that
had previously not been considered by most non-Native residents. As one protester noted of this
staying power:

48

As noted above, Caledonia was supposed to be the fastest growing community in southern
Ontario, with residential development as the single largest industry in the area (Best, 2006a).
ON resident’s expectations for, and financial investments in this rapid growth, see chapter 6.
49
Statement by protest spokesperson Janie Jamieson, quoted in: Greenberg (2006a). On
increased alarm among non-Natives, see: Brantford Expositor (2006a); Jackson, 2006j.
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We plan to maintain the site until we get what we want… It’s not about the
money. It’s about the land. We want the land back six miles on each side of the
Grand River from the mouth to the source…. First and foremost, we want the
title. Nobody else is going to develop here. (Jeff Hawk, quoted in Legall, 2006m;
Best, 2006a) 50
Intent on making sure that the Confederacy Council did not succeed in its call for a
moratorium on all new development in the area, 51 and that the protesters did not succeed in
stopping the Henning’s subdivision, 52 non-Natives in the construction, real estate, and financial
investment industries quickly raised the alarm among other residents, handing out flyers
declaring: “If this situation is not resolved quickly we could all be looking at significant
decreases in our property values.” The flyers urged residents to pressure their elected officials to
pay the Hennings and other “builders, trades men and home owners a monthly stipend until the
situation is resolved,” and also urged them to attend a counter-protest rally which sought to
guarantee the survival of the residential development industry in town (Best, 2006a; Pearce,
2006a). Several hundred residents heeded the call to rally with the Hennings and other local
50

Meanwhile, as the protest remained unarmed, peaceful and mellow --but unmoved by court
injunctions or the threat of arrest—the demands of the protesters had become slightly more
militant and had begun to take on a new level of seriousness. One protester explained to the
media that he was willing to die in the protest and that police would have to kill him and take
him out in a body bag to remove him. Reflecting on his anxiety with the situation and his
readiness for the worst case scenario, he added: “Sometimes I hope it doesn’t end violently,
sometimes I hope it does. At least it would be finished and we cold show we are ready to do
what we have to do.” On the protest being described as peaceful and mellow (by protest
spokesperson Janie Jamieson), see: Brantford Expositor (2006c). On the protest being unarmed
see: Greenberg (2006b). On statements by protester Michael Laughing, reported as one or more
of the following: that he was willing to die, that police would have to kill him to remove him, or
that he would only be taken out in a body bag, see: Legall (2006f & 2006m), Jackson (2006j),
Healey & Morse (2006), Nolan (2006b).
51
For example, Haldimand County Councilor Craig Ashbaugh stated outright that: “a
moratorium on development cannot be allowed.” Ashbaugh, quoted in: Best (2006a).
52
Something that, anti-protest residents argued, would set a bad precedent for development (on
Haudenosaunee lands) in the area. To this extent, real estate business owner Bruce MacDonald,
noted that the protesters’ demands “would indicate that all lands [in the Haldimand tract] are
subject to their interference.” MacDonald, talking to Best on April 4 and quoted in: Best
(2006a).
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business owners, and showed up to the rally holding signs stating: “We want our town back,”
“Put an end to this now,” and “Municipal, Provincial, Federal Do Something.” As they gathered,
local real estate lawyer Ed McCarthy emphatically and confidently (though also incorrectly)
announced to the crowd that the Haudenosuanee lands under protest had “absolutely” been
surrendered in 1841, and claimed that both the protest and the police failure to remove the
protesters were flagrant violations of the law: 53
The laws are being flagrantly violated…. There’s a need to bring this to an end
and to bring it to an end promptly…. The law of the land has to be enforced….
This land belongs to Henco Industries Ltd. Nobody has the right to interfere with
it. (Nolan, 2006c; Bauslaugh, 2006a)
These statements were given an additional boost of legitimacy the following day when
Haldimand County Mayor Marie Trainer uncritically --and incorrectly-- reasserted them, stating
decisively that “there’s no doubt” that the lands under protest had been obtained legally by the
Canadian government, and adding: “I guess the Natives are not believing anyone or anything”
(Pearce, 2006a). 54
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Estimating 250 residents in attendance: (Bauslaugh, 2006a; Pearce, 2006a). Estimating 300:
(Windle, 2006b; Smith, 2006b). On estimates of 500: (Fragomeni, 2006; Canadian Press, 2006o;
Graham and Canadian Press, 2006t; Graham, 2006). Nolan (2006c) says “ a few hundred,” but
notes that rally organizer Jamie McMaster estimated that 500 people attended.
On messages on protest signs, see: Nolan (2006c) and Baughslaugh (2006a). On demands
that the protesters be removed by force and/or complaints of falling property values or a hurt
town image, see: Pearce (2006a), Baughslaugh (2006a), and Nolan (2006c). On McCarthy being
a real estate lawyer --rather than a lawyer who deals with treaty or First Nations’ issues (a fact
that was not reported in the first several articles that quoted him)-- see: Macleod (2006). On
McCarthy’s insistence that the land was surrendered in 1841, see, in addition to above citations:
Pearce (2006a) Nolan (2006c), Baughslaugh (2006a), Windle (2006b).
54
In this same article the mayor complained about the existence of “four different factions of
natives that have to be consulted,” and voiced her concern about potential protester violence, see:
Baughslaugh (2006a). The mayor also escalated her public statements on the protest after her
mid-May meeting with Indian Affairs Minister Jim Prentice. Before the meeting, though Trainer
had uncritically adopted every bit of rhetoric opposing the Haudenosaunee protest, she had also
maintained that a peaceful, negotiated resolution would be the best outcome because “When it’s
finally come to a conclusion, they (the natives) are still going to be my neighbours and my
37

Despite widespread and growing opposition to the Confederacy Council’s demands among
area non-Natives, a series of meetings aimed at ending the protest were finally opened to the
Confederacy Council and Haudenosaunee protesters on April 12 (McKay, Nelson and Nolan,
2006; Canadian Press-CTV Toronto, 2006; Livingston, 2006; Burman, Macleod and Nolan,
2006; Harries, 2006d; Windle & Van Every, 2006). This marked the first time that the federal
and provincial governments had sat at the same table with the Haudenosaunee Six Nations
Confederacy Council since the Canadian government had outlawed the latter and imposed a
colonial Band Council system of government upon the Haudenosaunee Six Nations people in
1924. 55 Regardless of this historical first, Canadian and Ontario officials, and even Band
Council Chief David General, completely ignored the Confederacy Council’s suggestions for
ending the protest (see Appendix 1 for a list of the proposals made by each government at this
meeting) 56 until several days later when the Six Nations Band Council voted seven to five to

friends and their grandchildren will go to school with my grandchildren” [Trainer, quoted in:
Pearce, (2006a)]. She had also adamantly advocated federal involvement in resolving the protest,
responding to assertions by federal officials that the protest was not a federal matter by stating
that “Everything to do with natives has to do with the federal government. The natives don’t
want to leave until they are assured something will happen with their land claim” (Fragomeni,
2006; Canadian Press, 2006n). However, the mayor emerged from her meeting with Prentice
asserting her agreement with Prentice’s position to not deal with “the radicals (in the
subdivision) out there” (Best, 2006g):
If you go out and deal with the Mohawks or the ones causing this problem from all
across Canada, you’re just giving them more power, so there’s no way anyone is going
to deal with them. The minister made it quite clear and I have to agree, you can’t deal
with the radicals that are out there. (Quoted in: Jackson, 2006k).
55
This will be discussed further below.
56
In fact, these three governments failed to discuss the protest at all, and ignored all of the
Confederacy Council’s attempts to do so. One Band Council member, Helen Miller, remarked
upon this, voicing her frustrations as well as the likely frustrations of others attending the
meetings:
I came to these meetings thinking we were here to discuss how to resolve the
occupation. Our chief General presented a paper that council didn’t discuss, approve
and had no knowledge of until late Monday night. Yesterday we dealt with that paper,
today I was waiting for us to come back with ideas on how to end the protest. Not once,
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transfer the lead in talks to the Haudenosaunee Confederacy Council 57 –the only council with the
ability to end the protest. Yet, even with the lead officially transferred to the Confederacy
Council, the Canadian and Ontario governments refused to respond to any of the Confederacy
Council’s suggestions for ending the protest 58 and, instead, focused solely on the suggestions

yesterday or today, were the people on the site even mentioned, or any concern shown
about their safety. I wanted to stop the OPP from going in…. There were some good
things in the paper that Dave developed. But it’s not going to help get people off that
site. The government paper is not going to get people off that site. They have put the
onus on the Confederacy and Six Nations Council and have taken themselves out of the
picture when they’re the only ones that can bring and end to it. I don’t want anyone’s
blood on my hands (Band Councilor Helen Miller, quoted in: Windle & Van Every,
2006).
See also: Windle & Van Every, 2006; Haudenosaunee Six Nations “Iroquois” Confederacy.
2006a; Harries, 2006d; Jackson, 2006e; McKay, Nelson and Nolan, 2006. The actual, April 13th
Draft proposal has not been located to date, but a letter from Jim Prentice outlining some of the
Drafts’ points has. See: Canada, Minister of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development,
2006. Also giving a summary of what was contained in the federal and provincial, joint Draft
proposal: Harries (2006d). See also: Haudenosaunee Six Nations “Iroquois” Confederacy.
2006a; General, 2006.
57
Windle & Van Every, 2006. To this extent, Band Council Chief David General drafted a letter
to the Canadian and Ontario governments stating that the Band Council wanted the INAC to
recognize the lead of the Confederacy Council, and that the Band Council would continue to play
a supportive role. In addition, the letter stated that the Band Council supported the suggestions
voiced by the Confederacy Council both in the meetings and in the March 27th letter, and wanted
the federal and provincial governments to respond to these suggestions. However, the letter also
stated that David General’s Draft Terms for a New Understanding Among Six Nations, Canada
and Ontario should be “honoured and form the basis of ongoing talks surrounding the resolution
of the activities at Douglas Creek Estates” –something that completely contradicted the assertion
that the Band Council was giving the Confederacy Council the lead in the negotiations (Since
David General’s Draft Terms document completely ignored all of the suggestions raised by the
Confederacy Council as issues that, if addressed, would end the protest. See: Six Nations Band
Council, 2006. Also see: Haudenosaunee Six Nations “Iroquois” Confederacy, 2006a.
58
For example, Confederacy attempts to meet the three non-Native governments part-way on the
request for a moratorium, by requesting either a temporary, 90-day moratorium on only the
Douglas Creek lands, or a moratorium “until there are reasonable negotiations going on,” were
simply ignored or refused, as were Confederacy attempts to broker a deal on the second request –
a promise from Canada and Ontario that the protesters would not be criminalized for asserting
their land, treaty and self-governance rights. On this latter request, the Confederacy had been
willing to meet the government part way by simply asking for either a temporary (90-day) stand
down by police, in order to give all the parties time to negotiate a peaceful end to the protest; or
by requesting simply that the Attorney General intervene to ensure that the judge heard the
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that Band Council Chief David General had made (which had nothing to do with ending the
protest at all 59). Not surprisingly, these talks quickly broke down. 60

historical and legal arguments on the matter that had not yet been heard. Both of these offers
were refused, with both Canada and Ontario stating that they did not want to interfere in ‘police
business’ –a position which clearly sought to confine the protest over violations of Six Nations’
rights and Canadian Supreme Court rulings (which went well beyond the jurisdiction of local or
provincial police) to a mere case of local trespassing (with a clearly one-sided and historical
view of who was doing the trespassing). (Muse, 2006b). On the offers of placing only a 90-day
moratorium on development and a 90-day order for the OPP to stand down, see: Best (2006d),
who also reports that neither government was willing to follow the Confederacy’s suggestion to
compensate the developers. Also see: Indian Country Today, (2006). On the federal
government’s refusal to accept, acknowledge or consider these options, see, in addition to
sources cited above: Muse, 2006b; Windle & Van Every, 2006; Haudenosaunee Six Nations
“Iroquois” Confederacy, 2006b; Windle, 2006i; Gamble, 2006a.
59
See Appendix One. Further many items in the federal and provincial proposals that came
closest to satisfying the Haudensoaunee grievances –such as working to resolve Haudenosaunee
land claims or returning lands taken from the Haudenosaunee-- were either not defined
concretely or came with subtle catches. For example, these two governments promised to
commit to having talks about these items (or the possibility of these items), without defining
when talks would take place, what, concretely, these talks hoped to achieve, and how quickly Six
Nations community members could expect to see results. And given Canada’s tendency to drag
out land claims for, on average, two or more decades, these vague commitments really couldn’t
mean that much without being more defined in these ways. (See: Muse, 2006b). And Further,
the provincial government’s ‘commitment to engage in talks’ around the ‘possibility’ of making
certain provincially-owned lands (most of which were under Six Nations claim) ‘available’ to the
Six Nations community came with the condition that “Any lands made available pursuant to
these discussions would be credited or set off against any lands transferred to any claims
settlement agreements.” (Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Canada, and
Minister responsible for Aboriginal Affairs, Ontario, 2006). In other words, Canada and Ontario
were giving themselves a two-for-one offer, and trying to make it sound beneficial to Six
Nations, by stating that Six Nations lands under claim might be made available to the Six
Nations community in exchange for the abandonment of an equal amount of land that was under
claim. But since both sets of lands were under claim –and thus already thought to be owned by
the Haudenosaunee Six Nations community—then the question remained, exactly what would
Six Nations be gaining by agreeing to this? Or, as protest spokesperson Janie Jamieson asked:
“That’s already our land so what kind of a bargaining tool is that?” (Best, 2006d).
60
Haudenosaunee Six Nations “Iroquois” Confederacy, 2006b (“These issues are urgent matters.
They require thoughtful, meaningful solutions and the serious attention of all parties, not simply
throwing a few dollars at a band council department or promises of what might be. Canada
needs to take this matter seriously and open talks with the Confederacy Council on the issues we
have raised in our latter of March 27, 2006 and that still remain not only unresolved but not even
considered by the Minister. We urgently await their reply”). See also: Muse, 2006b; Windle &
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Protesters responded to the breakdown in talks by issuing a renewed call for support. The call
was met by mid-afternoon by Native warriors from in and out of province and members of the
Hamilton Steel Workers union (Windle, 2006i; Gamble, 2006a). Also responding to the
breakdown in talks, Ontario Provincial Police forces began amassing forces in the area and the
Hennings threatened a lawsuit against the police if they did not enforce the injunction (Gamble,
2006a; Windle, 2006i; Legall & Nolan, 2006b; COP, 2006). A confrontation between police and
protesters was supposedly put off when all parties to the conflict returned to talks on April 19th.
Talks lasted late into the night and, with the Confederacy Council finally being taken seriously,
reportedly resulted in breakthroughs that brought all parties closer to a settlement than they had
ever previously been (CTV News 2006h & 2006f; Nelson, 2006; Schmidt, 2009; CBC News,
2006h; Hamilton Spectator, 2006e; Canadian Press, 2006b; Windle, 2006g; Miner, 2006a;
Urquhart, 2006). With talks scheduled to resume the following morning, OPP officials assured
Mohawk Confederacy Chief Allan MacNaughton that the police keep to their promises not to
move in on protesters in the Caledonia subdivision as long as talks were underway (Schmidt,
2009; Windle, 2006g; Hughes; Miner, 2006a). 61
A few hours later, at about 4:30 A.M. on Thursday, April 20, hundreds of OPP officers armed
with assault rifles, tasers, tear gas, and pepper spray --and with guns drawn and ready to fire-descended upon the protest site in a move of quick, “overwhelming force” that was intended to

Van Every, 2006; Windle, 2006i; Best, 2006d; COP (2006); Canadian Press, 2006b; Gamble,
2006a.
61
The OPP had actually made a number of promises that were broken that night. OPP officials
promised the Confederacy Council and the protesters the following: 1) they would not move in
on that specific night; 2) they would not move in so long as talks were ongoing; 3) they would
not move in during night time; 4) they would notify the Confederacy and protesters prior to
moving in; and 5) once they had made the decision to move in, they would first warn protesters
of the possibility of arrest, in order to give those who did not want to be arrested a chance to
leave (Hughes, 2007; Windle, 2006g; Schmidt, 2009; Gamble, 2006d; Miner, 2006a).
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end the protest by removing the protesters under the cloak of darkness. 62 Officers reportedly
covered the entire site within seconds, dragging sleeping protesters out of tents, using pepper
spray and tasers against several protesters, and arresting 16 people –in some instances, without
first giving the protesters the promised pre-arrest warning or an opportunity to leave without
arrest. 63 Nonetheless, even as protesters were detained on one of the streets running by the
protest site, other Six Nations members began trickling onto the site, and eventually flooding into
62

Some of the officers were dressed in full SWAT gear. See, for example: Windle (2006g) and
Nelson, (2006), which also reported that there were “tactical officers and uniformed officers,” as
well as police dogs and a helicopter flying overhead. Both sources also report that officers
carried assault rifles (Windle) or “high powered rifles drawn and pointed at unarmed protesters,”
(Nelson). On there being hundreds of officers, see: (Windle, 2006g; Hill, 2006; Indian Country
Today, 2006). Nelson (2006) reports that there were “more than 24 police vehicles lining the
road” outside of one of the several entrances to the property; while the Globe and Mail (2006a)
and Graham (2006) both included an account that police swarmed everywhere and an estimate of
how many were there could not be made.
Most sources report that officers entered the site with guns drawn; were also armed with tear
gas, tasers and pepper spray; and descended upon the site with quick, “overwhelming force” (or
even “abrupt violence”[Indian Country Today, 2006). For example, in addition to the sources
cited above, see: Resource News International, 2006b; Canadian Press, 2006o; Graham &
Canadian Press, 2006; CTV News, 2006f; Graham, 2006; Hill, 2006; Legall, 2006p.
Other sources that partially report on (and support the above reports on) the police presence
include: Globe and Mail, 2006; Dunfiled & Howlett, 2006; Agence France Presse, 2006;
Ontario Provincial Police, 2006b; Associated Press, 2006; CTV News, 2006h; CBC News,
2006h; Muse, 2006a.
63
See the last note in the above paragraph for a description of the various promises police had
made to the protesters (and the Haudenosaunee Confederacy Council) pertaining to police action
against the protesters.
On police covering the entire site within seconds, or on accounts stating or implying that the
OPP failed to give some protesters the promised opportunity to leave before being arrested
appear see: (Nelson, 2006; Resource News International, 2006a & 2006b; Canadian Press,
2006o; Graham & Canadian Press, 2006; Graham, 2006; Windle, 2006g; CBC News, 2006h;
Pearce, 2006c). On protesters being dragged from their tents, see: (Globe and Mail, 2006a;
Dunfield & Howlett, 2006). Accounts suggesting that police used tasers and pepper spray
against protesters (in some cases, prior to giving warnings) include: Hamilton Spectator (2006e)
(which stated that: “protesters were pepper-sprayed as police approached the barricade in the
darkness”) and Resource News International, (2006a & 2006b) (which stated that: “a number of
people were subdued with shocks from Tasers as police “covered the entire area within
seconds”). Other accounts of the use of Tasers and/or pepper-spray can be found in: CTV News
(2006h & 2006f), Globe and Mail (2006a), CBC News (2006h), Dunfield & Howlett (2006),
Nelson (2006), and Hill (2006).
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the site on foot, in pick-up trucks, and in all-terrain-vehicles. 64 As a critical mass of Six Nations
reinforcements gathered at various points on the site, unarmed Six Nations women at one corner
of the site began linking arms and walking in a line straight towards the police officers, forcing
officers to chose whether to attack the unarmed women or move back. Officers at this corner
eventually backed off the site, at which time the women focused their attention on another
corner, marching peacefully and unarmed towards the police and walking them backwards off
the site. The women eventually cleared officers from every corner of the site, and officers began
retreating the area (Hill, 2006a; Windle, 2006g; Nelson, 2006; Graham, 2006; Graham and
Canadian Press, 2006; Dunfield & Howlett, 2006; Adams, 2006).
After the forced police retreat, some protesters celebrated the victory while others worked to
ensure that another police raid would not occur in the near future. To these ends protesters
blocked a section of the main road through Caledonia with an 18-wheeler, and blocked other
areas of the road, and other roads around the protest site, with piles of gravel or wooden planks,
tire fires, guard rails, portions of torn up highway fencing, gravel piles, logs, tree branches, and
64

In their official “timeline of events,” the Hamilton Spectator held that police had cleared,
secured and then left the site by mid-morning, before protesters reoccupied (Hamilton Spectator
2006e). It is not clear why the Spectator gave this official version, in contradiction of virtually
all other reports, including some by its own reporters. On protesters forcing police off the site,
see, for example, Windle (2006g), who reported that as early as 5:30 am there was a steady
stream of Six Nations cars and people moving onto the site, with over 100 people on the site
(taunting the police) shortly after this time. Adams (2006) reported that there were sufficient
numbers of Six Nations people on the site to push police off the site as early as 7:30am. And
another article in the Hamilton Spectator (Nelson, 2006) stated that by 8am Six Nations people
were stepping out of the woods, well behind police lines, in increasing numbers. The article also
stated that by 8:15 am OPP officers were leaving the site. A first hand account from Hill (2006)
similarly reported that protesters pushed police off of the site by 9am (and not that police left,
and protesters re-took the site). A number of other articles also report that Six Nations
reinforcements pushed police off the site (Graham & Canadian Press, 2006; Graham, 2006;
Dunfiled & Howlett. 2006; Muse, 2006c; CTV News, 2006h; CTV News, Anchor Lloyd
Robertson; Erwin, 2006; Associated Press, 2006). These reports are apparently confirmed by
CHCH news video showing lines of linked-armed protesters walking police off the site (Gamble,
2006d).
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other make-shift barricades. Many of these barriers were either burning or were ready to be set
on fire if it became necessary to stop another police raid on the site. 65 A number of other
protesters, wary of the police regrouping, flooded into nearby subdivisions on foot or ATVs to
patrol for a renewed police presence. Some of these protesters carryied baseball bats, lacrosse
sticks, or wooden rods, and many wore masks over their faces (to protect against a pepper spray
attack) (Nelson, 2006; Dunfield & Howlett, 2006; CBC News, 2006h; Rook, 2006b & 2006c;
Rook & National Post, 2006; Globe and Mail, 2006a; Graham, 2006; CTV News, 2006f;
Gamble, 2006b; Adams, 2006; Hamilton Spectator, 2006e; Dunfield, 2006). 66
The failed police raid, and the chaos that followed on that day and the next, was the last straw
for many residents who were opposed to the protest and had been waiting for two months for the
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Tire fires were reported lit in a number of spots on Argyle Street, Sixth Line Road and
Highway 6. On the various types of road blockades, see: (Nelson, 2006; Harries, 2006e;
Dunfield & Howlett, 2006; Muse, 2006c; CBC News, 2006h; Gamble, 2006d; Rook and
Canadian Press, 2006; Bailey, 2006; Legall & Morse, 2006b; Rook and National Post, 2006;
Nolan, 2006d;
Pearce, 2006b; Rook, 2006b; BBC News, 2006; Adams, 2006; Globe and Mail, 2006a;
Associated Press, 2006; Graham, 2006; Windle, 2006g; CTV News, 2006f; Hamilton Spectator,
2006e; Resource News International, 2006a & 2006b; Edwards & Gombu, 2006; Healey &
Nolan, 2006; Canadian Press, 2006p; Miner, 2006a & 2006c). The latter source also notes that
protesters were ready to light up barricades on Highway 6 by pass if police came.
66
Though many of the young men patrolling the perimeter and barricades of the protest site were
reportedly yielding sticks, bats, and other make-shift weapons, there were also a fair number of
older Six Nations’ members at the scene attempting to calm protesters’ anger and keep high
emotions from leading to violence and injury. For example, one Native couple who said they
were representing the Apostolic Motorcycle Ministry of Jesus Christ, went to the site to talk with
the young men who had the job of protecting the site. The couple asked these protectors to be
aware of the perceptions they were giving to others who saw them with make-shift weapons like
baseball bats, and asked them not to carry such weapons:
You need to put that down. That’s not called for. Don’t brandish it. It looks like you
want to fight. I know how you feel inside, but I want to see you at the end of this.
When all of this is over, I want to know that you’re alive. I don’t want to see anything
bad come to the people … not for Caledonia residents and not for Six Nations. Not at
all. (Lesley Greene, quoted in Hemsworth, 2006a).
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police to end it. While many in the town remained sympathetic to the protest, 67 and support for
the protesters poured in from other areas, 68 those residents who had already been angry,
frustrated or afraid found further fuel for these emotions in what they heard about or saw in the
days activities. They had watched police officers driven away by people who had already been
characterized as criminals by protest opponents, watched masked protesters with bats or sticks
speed through subdivisions near the site on ATVs, 69 seen the black smoke in the sky from tire
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“We’ve been here all day and (the protesters) have done nothing wrong… I’m embarrassed to
be Canadian right now” (Unnamed resident, quoted in Oliveira, 2006). Others, such as Kathy
Maher, who lived right by the protest site, noted that the OPP never sent officers by to let
residents know what was going on, but at least six protesters had stopped by her house to make
sure everything was alright, to assure her kids that everything would be alright, and to offer help
in the event that Maher and her family needed anything (Miner, 2006b). Still other residents
found the protesters more than willing to comply with resident concerns [See Mike Watson and
Steve Tong’s experience successfully getting the protesters to stop driving ATVs in their
neighborhood, as told in: Proudfoot (2006) and Muse (2006g) and noted in Interviews with
Caledonia Residents (2009)].
68
“In our experience, where people stand up for their rights –including the labour movement—it
gets turned into a law and order issue and we get criminalized. We stand with [the Six Nations].
It [the protest] should be resolved with discussion” stated Hamilton Steelworker and member of
United Steelworkers Local 1005, Paul Lane, who came to the site with his local president and a
contingent of union members, (quoted in: Pearce, 2006c). On the unions present, see also:
(Hamilton Spectator, 2006e; Marxist-Leninist, 2006a & 2006b). Members from numerous
groups, including the following, also showed up to support the protest and help stave off another
police raid: Solidarity for Palestinian Human Rights, the Communist Party of Canada, Ontario
Coalition Against Poverty, No One Is Illegal, and Justicia for Migrant Workers had a presence
on the site, and large numbers of unaffiliated non-Natives arrived at the site to show their
solidarity and help defend against another OPP offensive. Others were prevented from making it
to the protest site after the Canadian border police refused entry to Natives from reserves in the
US, and provincial and/or local police forces reportedly stopped and harassed Native people
leaving their reserves within Canada. Many of those unable to make it to Caledonia simply held
their own solidarity rallies where they lived (or posted information on how to travel to southern
Ontario without detection). On the Canadian Border Police stopping and refusing to allow Native
from reserves in the US to enter Canada, the stopping and harassment of some natives leaving
reserves in Canada, and the posting of instructions on how to get to southern Ontario without
police detection, see: Marxist-Leninist (2006a & 2006b). On one solidarity rally which involved
the blocking of traffic and the hanging of warrior flags on the Mercier Bridge, see: Rook
(2006b).
69
Protest leaders reportedly stopped protesters from driving ATVs through neighborhoods near
the protest site after a few residents complained to protesters. The protesters were so organized,
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fires, 70 seen or heard that a van was toppled over a bridge and set on fire to block a freeway near
the site, experienced the high tension, near-chaos, and general uncertainty that permeated the
morning of the failed raid, and heard the Mayor’s panicked request for the army to come in and
finish what the OPP failed to do (Dunnville Chronicle, 2006; CTV News, 2006d). Responding
to the morning’s events, angry residents gathered near the barricades throughout the day,
reportedly taunting protesters with insults and demanding that they “go home” 71 or taunting and
challenging police for sitting in vans around the protest site rather than making another move to
end the protest (Gamble, 2006b; Adams, 2006; Hamilton Spectator, 2006e; Interviews with
Caledonia residents, 2009; Rook, 2006b; Graham & Canadian Press, 2006; Nelson, 2006). By
nightfall, several hundred non-Native residents had joined the mob of angry, taunting residents
(Healey & Nolan, 2006; Nolan, 2006d), until Ontario Provincial Police moved in around 9:00

and the response to the complaint so immediate that when one of the Caledonia residents who
had complained were given a ride back to his subdivision, “another protester stopped them to say
they were no longer allowed to drive the vehicles through the neighborhood” (Proudfoot, 2006).
70
Tire fires were set in the morning response to the raid, but Clan Mothers stopped protesters
from burning tires due to environmental concerns. After that pallets were burned and gravel
piles were used to block roads instead. (Pearce, 2006b). The exchange was also reported in:
Windle, (2006g) which did not mention Jamieson’s name, but instead stated that Clan Mothers
ordered the stop to burning tires because of pollution to the environment (and that protesters
complied).
71
Only a few news articles mentioned this development, and most simply mentioned it in
passing as a series of angry verbal exchanges between residents and protesters. But at least one
article, which discussed the confrontations in slightly more detail, painted a different picture,
noting that it was mostly non-Native residents who were speaking and hurling insults, while
Native protesters manning the barricades –some of whom had pieces of wood, shovels or bats—
merely watched, speaking up only when residents got too near to the barricade, and then only “to
order Caledonians back.” See: Healey & Nolan (2006). Articles that summarized the face-offs as
angry verbal exchanges coming equally from both sides include: Edwards & Gombu (2006) and
Gamble (2006d) (the latter source also notes that residents had been gathering around the
barricade, and pushing (“easing”) close, throughout the day). Oliveira (2006) noted that
“[c]urious onlookers and angry locals linger day and night near the fortified barrier.” On
residents stating that they felt abandoned by the police or being critical of the police for leaving,
see: Edwards & Gombu (2006); Legall & Morse (2006a); Healey & Nolan (2006); Gamble
(2006d).
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P.M. and forced residents back from the barricades (Edwards and Gombu, 2006; Healey &
Nolan, 2006). Though the police had started the day facing off with protesters in an attempt to
remove them, they ended the day facing residents, in an attempt to create a buffer zone between
residents and Native protesters and keep the former from moving in and sparking a physical
confrontation.
Non-Native residents were furious with this development in the police procedure, and over
the next 40 days this anger culminated in both regular angry gatherings of non-Natives taunting
Native protesters near the barricades, and a series of ever-intensifying anti-protest rallies, some
of which drew 2,000-3,000 people in a town of only 10,000 (Bonnel & Canadian Press, 2006c;
Canadian Press, 2006v). Anti-protest rally-goers frequently sang the national anthem, waved
Canadian flags, and demanded police or military action against the Native protest. Some of
these rallies ended in “near riots” with hundreds of flag-carrying non-Natives rushing the police
lines near the protest site, shouting insults at OPP officials and racial slurs at Native protesters,
while attempting to force their way through the police lines and onto the site --presumably to “do
what police wouldn’t do” and forcibly remove Native protesters from the land. 72 At the peak of
this “intense, intense, irrational anger,” 73 the county mayor made derogatory remarks about
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Harries & Rusk (2006) describe these incidents as “near riots.” At least 500 residents
participated in one or more of these incidents, or 5% of the town’s population (Harries, 2006a;
Harries and Rusk, 2006). CBC News (2006a) reported that close to 1000 residents stormed the
police line on April 24th. On another occasion in May, non-Natives succeeded in pushing
through the police lines and physically confronting Native protesters in a mass fist-fight that
involved hundreds of people and culminated in a power outage that impacted thousands of
people in several southern Ontario counties. On residents yelling racial slurs at Native protesters
and insults at police, see: Harries (2006a). On the April 24 raid in particular, see also: (Bonnell &
Canadian Press, 2006a; Rook & Proudfoot, 2006a; Weber & Howlett, 2006; Rook, 2006a).
73
As described by former Ontario Premier David Peterson (Harries & Rusk, 2006).
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Native protesters on national television 74 and non-Native business owners refused to serve
Native customers (Muse, 2006i; Autonomy & Solidarity, 2006a; Interviews with Caledonia and
Six Nations residents, 2009). Likewise, kids’ non-Native sports teams refused to play
Haudenosaunee sports teams; non-Natives threw trash out car windows at Native people walking
down the street; and some non-Native residents even reportedly stockpiled Molotov cocktails in
their backyards or planned to ship guns into the town in the event that “shit hit the fan” and a
“civil race war” broke out in Canada (something that people were still talking about three years
later) (Interviews with Caledonia residents, 2009; Haudenosaunee Confederacy, 2007). 75 Adding
fuel to the fire of non-Native opposition, a late May decision by the province to stop all
development on the site under protest sparked a day of mass confrontation and repeated fistfights
that left residents throughout several counties without power. 76
The motivations behind the explosive and sometimes violent expressions of non-Native anger
in Caledonia have been largely framed and justified in terms of financial hardships and other
injuries that are said to have been inflicted upon non-Native residents by the Haudenosaunee
protest. While it is certainly true that some non-Native residents were adversely impacted by the
74

The mayor stated that Native people didn’t understand, but needed to understand, that
Caledonia residents don’t have checks coming in every month and have to go to work –implying
that the Native protesters didn’t work and relied on monthly welfare checks. Haldimand County
NEWS RELEASE # 6, 2006; Bonnell, 2006a &2006b; CTV News, 2006a & 2006c; Legall &
Nolan, 2006a; Harries & Rusk. 2006; CBC News, 2006f.
75
Interviews with Caledonia residents, February-June, 2009.
76
According to some residents, the intense conflict on one long weekend in May was largely a
result of the efforts of local realtors and others in the construction and financial investment
businesses misinforming and inciting fear, anger and anxiety among local residents in an attempt
to unravel the province’s proposed moratorium on development (Interviews with Caledonia
Residents, 2009). On the May weekend in general, see: (Canadian Press, 2006d; CBC News,
2006b, 2006c, 2006d, 2006e & 2006g; MacArthur, 2006; Pona, 2006; Globe and Mail, 2006b;
Hamilton Spectator, 2006b; Canadian Press, 2006g; National Post/Broadcast News, 2006a &
2006b; CTV News, 2006b, 2006i, 2006f & 2006g). The latter two sources noted that “NonNative locals are upset because they believe that the natives are dictating how the dispute will be
resolved, Laurie reported.”
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protest, such as construction workers employed on the Douglas Creek Estates development who
may or may not have gone weeks or even months without steady work because of the protest, the
discussion in chapter 6 will demonstrate that the vast majority of non-Native residents who
claimed to have been victimized by the Haudenosaunee protest greatly exaggerated their claims
to victimhood. In some cases they perhaps did so in pursuit of financial compensation. Further,
as the below background discussion will show, none of these non-Native residents were
victimized anywhere near the extent to which the Haudenosaunee have been victimized by nonNative government policy and private non-Native settlement and development on their lands for
hundreds of years. Thus, however injured some non-Native residents may have felt that they
were, these injuries certainly cannot compare to the historical and ongoing injuries inflicted upon
the Haudenosaunee by non-Native governments and by private non-Native individuals acting
under the approval and direction of these governments.
Regardless of who was injured or how heavily anyone was injured, what is of interest here is
the fact that non-Native government and resident grievances against the Haudenosaunee protest
routinely sought not merely to establish the legitimacy of their own grievances, but to dismiss
and deny Native grievances. To this extent, the Canadian and Ontario governments routinely
released statements (often made by anonymous officials) asserting that the Haudenosaunee
claims regarding their lands and rights were false, fabricated, mistaken or purposefully deceptive
(see chapters 4 and 6). Likewise, many non-Native residents who vocalized opposition to the
Haudenosaunee protest frequently did so by denying, dismissing and outright denigrating the
Native protest (and sometimes Native people). In doing so, these non-Native residents employed
two types of (frequently overlapping) tactics. First, they used assertions of race, class, gendered,
legal and nation-based dominance over Native peoples, such as through demanding that the
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Canadian, Ontario and Haldimand County governments proceed as usual with their settlement
and development plans on lands under Haudensoaunee claim –and employ the militarized armed
aggression of the Canadian army, if necessary, to do so. Second, they attempted to assert
exclusivity in the ability to make claims to victimhood (“the victims are the people living in the
community” 77), thereby exaggerating the injury caused to non-Natives (“what about my right to
go about my life?” 78 and “at least clear the road so we can get on with our lives” 79) and replacing
Haudenosaunee grievances with these exaggerated non-Native claims. These patterns of thought
and behavior that are involved in denying Haudenosaunee claims to injury, and in instigating,
perpetuating and intensifying the ongoing violation of Haudenosaunee land, resource and treaty
rights, need to be understood, and will be examined in more detail in chapter 6.

BACKGROUND
1) The Haudenosaunee Six Nations Confederacy 80
The Haudenosaunee Six Nations 81 is a confederacy of Native nations 82 that are governed on the
basis of consensus, and thus constitute one of the oldest known participatory democratic
traditions still in existence, and the only governing tradition founded on the basis of actively
striving for peace (Akwesasne Notes, 2005; Lyons, 1992: 33; Porter, 2006 and 2008: 24; Woo,
77

A Caledonia resident paraphrased in Nolan (2006a).
An unidentified Caledonia resident quoted in Harries (2006e).
79
An unnamed Caledonia man, quoted in Nolan (2006d).
80
This is an extremely abbreviated description of the formation of the Haudenosaunee Six
Nations Confederacy.
81
Also known as the Haudenosaunee Six Nations Confederacy, the Six Nations Confederacy, the
Haudenosaunee, the Iroquois and/or the Iroquois Confederacy.
82
The Haudenosaunee were originally a confederacy of five native nations –the Mohawk,
Oneida, Onondaga, Cayuga and Seneca. Around 1722 the Tuscarora joined the confederacy,
making it the Six Nations confederacy. Other Native nations, or parts of Native nations, have
since joined or merged with the Confederacy, such as the Tutelo and members of the Delaware;
however, given the manner in which these nations joined or are represented in Confederacy
decision-making, the Confederacy is still referred to as one of Six Nations.
78
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2003; Johansen, 1998; Vachon, 1993). According to the Haudenosaunee’s detailed oral history,
the confederacy was formed long before Europeans began their invasion of the Americas, 83 and
at a time when there was much warfare and violence, when people had forgotten their common
humanity and the rules handed down to them for treating and getting along with other human
beings and other life forms. 84 As Oren Lyons (1992) has stated:
These people lived at a time of dark despair and chaos. Their story recounts a
period when humans had cast aside the rules of coexistence, a period when
bloodlust and vengeance overshadowed the goodness in human beings. It was a
time of what we today would call civil war, when brothers hunted brothers, when
head-hunting was common, and when men and women sought vengeance for
wrongs, real and imagined. (P. 34)
During this time of great chaos and fighting, a man known as the Peacemaker, 85 together with a
woman he met named Jigonsaseh, traveled around to each of the original five member nations,
seeking to talk to the fiercest and most feared men among them as well as the women leaders
(Akwesasne Notes, 2005; Lyons, 1992; Porter, 2008). 86 One by one, sometimes with the aid of
another man, Hiawatha (or Aionwahtha), the Peacemaker and Jigonsaseh convinced each of
these men, along with the other members of each of these nations, that there had to be some force
83

Haudenosaunee oral history, and some convincing historical evidence, suggests that the
Confederacy was formed long before European contact, perhaps even a thousand years or more
before this (Akwesasne Notes, 2005; George-Kanentiio, 2006; Porter, 2006; Lyons, 1992;
Vachon, 1993). Though many Western-style scholars have attempted to set a more recent date
for the founding of the Confederacy (Taylor, 1993; Johnston, 1964; Wise, 1971), these accounts
both lack evidence and contradict Haudenosaunee oral history. For a more detailed, and very
well-researched discussion of both western and Haudenosaunee methods of determining the date
the confederacy was formed, see Mann & Fields (1997), who date the founding of the
confederacy at 1142 C.E..
84
Tehanetorens (2000) notes that people had strayed from and began to forget their traditional
ways of life –began to forget instructions on how to live with the natural world and with each
other.
85
The name of the Peacemaker is not generally spoken outside of ceremonies; therefore, though
his name has been written in various articles, in this paper “Peacemaker” will be used to refer to
this person.
86
See also: Mann, Barbara Alice. 2000. Iroquoian Women: The Gontowisas. New York: Lang
Publishing. (Thanks to Barbara Mann for pointing out this source).
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that created all life and the world around them, and that this force would not want men to destroy
the world the living things in it (Akwesasne Notes, 2005; Lyons, 1992). Instead, the Peacemaker
argued, healthy minds desire peace, 87 which could be established when members of a society
worked together 88 not only to eliminate violence and conflict, but to establish universal justice
for all people and all living things 89 –all of which have an equal right to what they need to live,
and none of which can deprive another of this. 90 In actively striving for universal justice and
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“The Peacemaker began his teachings based on the principle that human beings were given the
gift of the power of reason in order that they may settle their differences without the use of force.
He proposed that in every instance humans should use every effort to counsel about, arbitrate,
and negotiate their differences, and that force should be resorted to only as a defense against the
certain use of force. All men whose minds are healthy can desire peace, he taught, and there is
an ability within all human beings, and especially in the young human beings, to grasp and hold
strongly to the principles of righteousness. The ability to grasp the principles of righteousness is
a spark within the individual that society must fan and nurture so that it may grow. Reason is
seen as the skill that humans must be encouraged to acquire in order that the objectives of justice
may be attained and no one’s rights abused.” (Akwesasne Notes, 2005, pp. 33-34).
88
“The power to enact a true peace is the product of a unified people on the path of
righteousness, and reason is the ability to enact the principles of peace through education, public
opinion, and political, and when necessary, military unity. The “power” that the Peacemaker
spoke of was intended to enable the followers of the law to call upon warring or quarrelling
parties to lay down their arms and to begin a peaceful settlement of their disputes” (Akwesasne
Notes, 2005, p. 34).
89
Peace, as the Peacemaker understood it, flourished only in a garden amply fertilized with
absolute and pure justice. It was the product of a spiritually conscious society using its abilities
of reason that resulted in a healthy society. The power to enact peace (which requires that people
cease abusing one another) was conceived to be both spiritual and political” (Akwesasne Notes,
2005, p. 34).
90
Akwesasne Notes, 2005: p. 33 (“Other political philosophers and organizers have come to the
conclusion that governments can be formed for the purpose of establishing tranquility, but the
Peacemaker went considerably further than that. He argued not only for the establishment of law
and order, but for the full establishment of peace. Peace was to be defined not as the simple
absence of war or strife, but as the active striving of humans for the purpose of establishing
universal justice. Peace was defined as the product of a society that strives to establish concepts
that correlate to the English words power, reason, and righteousness”); Lyons, 1992, pp. 38-39
(“The Peacemaker taught that peace is not simply the absence of violence but can only exist
through the vigorous efforts of clear-thinking people to eradicate injustice in the world…. In
summary, The Peacemaker facilitated what can be described as a revolution. He caused the
power of the warrior leaders to be subordinated to the workings of the council of elders whose
purpose was to promote peace within the framework of a true confederacy”).
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peace, the Haudenosaunee sought to eliminate all causes of conflict, such as by removing “all
thoughts of prejudice, privilege or superiority” and recognizing that “no person or people has a
right to deprive others” of what they need to survive. 91 In addition, the Peacemaker argued that
the purpose of government is to prevent the abuse of anyone’s rights, not to orchestrate or
participate in this abuse (Akwesasne Notes, 2005: 32; Lyons, 1992: 34). 92
One by one members of the Five Nations agreed to the Peacemaker’s ideas, known as the
Great Law of Peace (or Kaianere’kowa) 93, and together they buried their weapons of war and
formed a governing body, the Confederacy Council. This Council was founded on ideals of
universal justice, rather than of law and order. It was also founded on the principles that “the
power and authority of the people lies with the people and is merely transmitted by them through
the ‘chiefs’” (Akwesasne Notes, 2005: 34). As such, the Chiefs of the council had no power of
coercion, domination or self-enrichment, but they do have great responsibilities to serve the will
of the people of their clan, who make participatory-democratic decisions on the basis of
consensus. The Chiefs also were (and are) selected democratically by the women of their clan,
and nominated by their Clan Mothers, who can veto their decisions or remove them from their
position (“dehorn” them) if they fail to serve the will of the people and/or follow the Great Law
91

Akwesasne Notes, 2005, p. 33. Also see p. 34 (“The principles of law set forth by the
Peacemaker sought to establish a peaceful society by eliminating the causes of conflict between
individuals and between peoples. It was a law that was conceived prior to the appearance of
classes, and it sought to anticipate and eliminate anything that took the appearance of group or
class interest, even in the form of clan or tribal interest, especially in the area of property”).
92
According to the latter source: “The true purpose of human political organization, The
Peacemaker argued, must be to oppose violence. This, he said, can be accomplished when men
of healthy minds and bodies unite to create a just world in which human abuse is abolished
forever, and in which war is abandoned as a way of settling disputes. Force, he asserted, is
justified only when it is necessary to halt aggression and to create the conditions we might call a
truce that could be used to create a road to peace.”
93
Also translated as the “great way of being” in Alfred (2010), who describes this as a
philosophy of life based on and reflective of the best lessons that humans have learned, and
messages they have been given, about how to live as human beings.
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of Peace. In addition, the women, as those who can alone give life and allow the culture to
continue, held their own councils through which they made (and still make) all of the decisions
regarding when to go to war and when to have peace, the location of villages, the distribution of
food, life in the village, and decisions pertaining to a number of other matters, including all
matters related to the Haudenosaunee lands. 94
The men on the council of Chiefs were responsible for conducting relations both among the
five (late six) confederated nations and internationally with other Native nations, or with
Europeans, once their invasion of the Americas began. While each nation within the
confederacy governed itself in its own affairs, each also agreed to yield a portion of its
sovereignty to the group in affairs that impacted the entire confederacy, as no nation could make
unilateral decisions that impacted others. For example, any “decision concerning the disposition
of Seneca lands must first pass through the Confederacy Council, where the other nations, who
also have rights in Seneca lands, can participate in the decision-making process” (Akwesasne
Notes, 2005: 35; Lyons, 1992). 95 As a participatory democratic tradition of actively striving for
peace, the Confederacy was (is) open to, and welcoming of, other nations or individuals outside
of Haudenosaunee territories who wished to join and seek shelter under the Great Law of Peace,
so long as they adhere/d to the Great Law and did/do not induce factionalism among the people.
Further, as a governing tradition that actively strived for peace, aggression was only to be used in
self-defense, only when all efforts at diplomacy had failed, and only to the extent that was
94

The women have so much power in matrilineal Haudenosaunee society that some westerners
have remarked that the council of chiefs appears to “serve only to represent and aid the women
in matters in which decorum does not permit the latter to appear or act,”(Father Joseph Francois
Lafitau (1974) [quoted in Bonaparte, 2008]). See also: Akwesasne Notes (2005), Lyons (1992),
Taylor (2006) Johnston (1964), Woo (2003).
95
As title holders of the land, the women and the Clan Mothers also (and perhaps primarily)
needed (and still need) to be consulted, and to be in agreement on any decisions pertaining to
lands.
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needed to achieve an end to the hostilities. Even then, three warnings, ordered by the Clan
Mothers, had to have been delivered before any hostile actions could be taken. 96 Lyons (1992)
has further noted that:
Even following the unconditional conquest of an invader, the conquered were to
enjoy rights. There would be no collection of spoils from those who were
conquered. There would be no requirements that a conquered people adopt the
religion of the conquerors. The aggressors would be required to disarm, but
otherwise they would be left in control of their country, and the dispute would be
taken to the Great Council, where it would be resolved. (P. 34)
And that:
The ideas and principles expressed in the Silver Covenant Chain and other
traditions of the Haudenosaunee have been central to our relations with other
nations and states, whether Indian, European, or American. In these traditions,
there is a recognition that peoples are distinct from each other. However, since
the beginning of our memory this distinctiveness has been seen as a foundation
for mutual respect; and we have therefore always honored the fundamental right
of peoples and their societies to be different. This is a profoundly important
principle, and one which, even in the twentieth century, humans continue to
struggle to realize. (P. 42)
As a result of building societies around the Great Law of Peace, the Haudenosaunee were able
to achieve a relatively stable society, free from police or coercion, in which theft, rape, and the
inequalities experienced in European societies were virtually unknown (see chapter 2 for more
on these inequalities, and chapter 3 for more on the Haudenosaunee and other Native societies in
the Americas). These results amazed many European settlers who contrasted this level of
freedom and respect experienced by the Haudenosaunee with the oppression and inequalities
experienced in the colonies --many of which were governed by martial law (Canny, 1979;
Mohawk, 1992 & 2000). Though there have been times when the Haudenosaunee have
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This sentence was added by Barbara Mann through email correspondence and editing
suggestions, April 19, 2012. Mann cites the following source: Parker, Arthur C. 1916.
Constitution of the Five Nations, or Iroquois Book of the Great Law. Albany: NY: State
University of New York, p. 54.
55

imperfectly followed their principles and ideals, the society that they were able to maintain was
revolutionary in many respects, and the Haudenosaunee Confederacy was later used as a model
for both the United States Constitutional Democracy, and the League of Nations (now the United
Nations) (Lyons, 1992: 32, 39; Mohawk, 1992; Berman, 1992; Woo, 2003; Johansen, 1998;
Akwesasne Notes, 2005: 38; Vachon, 1993; Porter, 2006).

2) The Haudenosuanee Grand River Territory

Figure 1. The top map shows the area of detail, the bottom map shows the Haudenosaunee Six
Nations Confederacy Grand River Territory (outlined in red), a portion of the Haudenosaunee’s
traditional territory that was set aside for their sole use in perpetuity in the Haldimand
Proclamation of 1784 (this land is also sometimes referred to as the Haldimand Tract).
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In 1784, a sizeable portion of the Haudenosaunee Six Nations Confederacy settled on a 950,000acre tract of land in their traditional beaver hunting grounds along southern Ontario’s Grand
River (see Figure 1). The move was the result of Crown promises to the Haudenosaunee, as well
as Crown treaty violations and attempts to repair these violations. Several years prior to this,
when the Haudenosaunee were struggling to defend some four million acres at the center of their
traditional territory from encroachment by non-Native squatters, land speculators and corrupt
government officials, 97 Crown officials at war with the thirteen revolutionary colonies made the
repeated promise to Haudenosaunee member nations that if they fought with the English in the
war then the Crown would –at Crown expense-- restore them to the state they were in prior to the
outbreak of hostilities. 98 Though many among the Haudenosaunee member nations took this
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The center of the Haudenosuanee’s traditional territory is in what is today upstate New York.
The Haudenosaunee’s full traditional territory spanned east to west from the Huron to the
Mississippi Rivers, and north to south from southern Michigan, Ontario and Quebec to Kentucky
and the northern short of Chesapeake Bay (Six Nations Council, 2010/2011). Or, alternately
explained as: “from the upper Great Lakes through the Ohio Valley and Pennsylvania to the
limits of Cherokee territory in the Carolinas” (Berman, 1992: 148). Berman notes that the
Haudenosaunee held political and commercial hegemony over this area --and the Indian nations
within it-- and controlled “trade routes, the allocation of rights in large but relatively unpopulated
hunting territories, and the process of international relations with the Dutch, French, and
English,” into the 1790s, which made the Haudenosaunee “a significant commercial and military
friend or formidable foe for the Europeans,” dependent upon the fur trade. The full extent to
which this was so is unlikely to be reflected in European documents (Ibid, 148-9). On the
Haudenosaunee’s ongoing, sovereign struggle against encroachments by non-Native squatters,
land speculators and corrupt government officials who ignored binding treaties with the
Haudenosaunee, see: Akwesasne Notes (2005), Berman (1992), Taylor (2002 and 2006),
Nammack (1969), Harring (1998).
98
These promises were made on numerous occasions –both verbally and in writing-- prior to and
during the Revolutionary War --“particularly during the critical months of 1780 and 1781, when
so much depended on the Indians’ ability and readiness to maintain adequate pressure on
American forces,” (Johnston, 1964: xxxiv). See, for example, the written promise made by
Frederick Haldimand Esquire, Captain General, Commander in Chief of the Province of Quebec,
and General and Commander in Chief of his Majesty’s Forces in the Province and the Frontier,
7th April 1779 (LAC Haldimand Papers, 1779-1783: Section 3, p. 7). See also the promise made
by Haldimand in 1779 that the Mohawk villages of “Conajoharie [sic], Tiyondarago [sic], and
Aughwago [sic] would be restored to them ‘at the Expense of the Government, to the state they
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promise to heart and fought with the British in the war, 99 at the end of hostilities the British
Crown signed over to the 13 colonies more than 4 million acres of Haudenosaunee lands in what
is today upstate New York. This move, enshrined in the 1783 Treaty of Paris, was made without
the knowledge or consent of the Haudenosaunee, and despite the fact that the land was neither
Britain’s nor the colonies to barter. Additionally, the move violated a number of treaty
agreements and promises made by the British Crown not only with the Haudenosaunee, but with
a number of other Native nations as well (Johnston, 1964: 36; Berman, 1992; Taylor, 2006). 100

were in before’” the war (Letter from Frederick Haldimand to Daniel Claus, 17 December 1783,
quoted in Good, 1994: 25). Also see Good (1994: 35): “At the outbreak of the American
Revolution Sir Guy Carleton, Governor of Quebec, requested the Mohawks to “assist in
defending their country, and to take an active part in defending his Majesty’s possessions;
stating, that when the happy day of peace should arrive, and should we not prove successful in
the contest, that he would put us on the same footing in which we stood previous to our joining
him. … After the defeat of the British, Carleton’s successor, Haldimand, promised the Mohawks
that they would be granted land in Quebec “to hold on the same footing with those w fled from.”
And see: Canada, Legislative Assembly (1870).
99
The Haudenosaunee Six Nations Confederacy Council took an official position of neutrality in
the war, but individual nations were free to do what they wanted, and many member nations
fought with the British in the war. To this extent, the Mohawks and members of other
Haudenosaunee nations [if not the “great majority of Iroquois,” as argued by Taylor (2002)] took
up arms and fought with the British in response to this promise (see Porter, 2006; Vachon, 1993;
Taylor, 2002; George-Kanentiio, 2006; Taylor, 2002; Lyons, 1992; Vachon, 1993; GeorgeKanentiio, 2006). Some Oneidas and Tuscaroras chose, instead, to fight with the 13 colonies
during the war (Taylor, 2002; Lyons, 1992; Vachon, 1993). George-Kanentiio (2006) argues
that the Mohawks were actually split in the war, with many fighting for the British under
Mohawk Johseph Brant, and some fighting for the 13 colonies.
100
In addition to the Haldimand Promise (the signed promise that the Crown would restore, not
steal and sign away, Haudenosaunee lands), the 1783 Treaty of Paris violated the 1768 Fort
Stanwix Treaty which, signed by the British Crown and at least 35 Native nations, was still in
effect and could not be unilaterally changed (Johnston, 1964: 36; Berman, 1992; Taylor: 2006).
In fact, a main component of the treaty was an agreement to a line, going north to south, which
divided white and Indian lands. According to the treaty, no Native nation could sell or dispose
of lands west of the treaty line without consent from all 35 nations (Taylor, 2006: 116). The
Treaty of Paris also violated the Crown’s own Royal Proclamation of 1763 –a proclamation
which, Borrows has convincingly argued, was as much an agreement with Native nations as a
declaration and directive by British Crown to British subjects (Borrows, 2002).
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Despite the Crown’s rather unprecedented generosity to the thirteen colonies in the 1783
Treaty of Paris, 101 Crown officials knew full well that they did not have the authority to
unilaterally change their previous treaties and promises with Native nations. For example, an
embarrassed and ashamed 102 Governor-in-Chief Frederick Haldimand wrote to his superiors in
Britain, remarking:
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According to both historians today and Crown officials in 1783, the British Crown’s decisions
to sign away this land was an act of unprecedented –and unnecessary—generosity towards the
colonies, which had been worn to the brink of near dissolution during the war, were nearly
bankrupt, faced growing internal anger and unrest, and were being strained ever further by Indian
raids along the insufficiently defended frontier (Taylor, 2006: 111-2, Johnston, 1964: 35). Since
the colonies would not have dreamed of all that they were given in the 1783 Treaty of Paris, and
the British were certainly aware of the colonies weakened state (Taylor, 2006; Johnston, 1964),
there may have been other reasons for the betrayal by Britain, such as the desire for Crown
officials to have a buffer zone of friendly Indians between the British subjects and the colonies
and/or less friendly Indians. On the Crown’s desire for a buffer zone see: Taylor (2006: 114115) and Taylor (2002). Though Taylor (2006) suggests that the decision to create a buffer zone
came slightly after the signing of the 1783 Treaty of Paris, and in response to Haudenosaunee
complaints about it, he also notes British fears about further aggression from the colonies and/or
from unfriendly Native nations –noting, for example, that in 1783 there were only 200,000
British subjects north of the 49th parallel, but there were 2,500,000 Americans in the colonies
(Taylor, 2006: 118-119). In addition, there were 35 Native nations set to defend the 1768 Fort
Stanwix treaty line against non-Native encroachment (Taylor, 2006:116). Others speculate that
the Crown wanted to out-maneouver/eliminate the Americans from the fur trade by positioning
the Haudenosuanee in their traditional hunting grounds in Canada –and thus rendering
unnecessary the hunting grounds around the American side of the Great Lakes (Lord North to
Governor General Haldimand, August 8, 1783, reproduced in Johnston, 1964: 42; see also p. 53
and Taylor, 2006: 113-114).
102
Crown officials were reportedly not only embarrassed and ashamed at the illegal betrayal of
their Haudenosaunee allies, but also aggrieved and humiliated at the unprecedented –and
unnecessary-- extent to which this betrayal humbled the Crown before the war-worn and
considerably weakened independent colonies. The overly-generous conditions of the 1783 treaty
were remarked upon by General Alan Maclean, while at Fort Niagara, as “certainly beyond their
[the colonies] most Sanguine Hopes or Expectations…” (Johnston, 1964: 35); and GovernorGeneral Frederick Haldimand expressed more outright shame in a letter to a friend:
My soul is completely bowed down with grief at seeing that we (with no absolute
necessity) have humbled ourselves so much as to accept such humiliating boundaries. I
am heartily ashamed and wish I was in the interior of Tartary. (Taylor, 2006: 112).
Further, the Home Secretary and Leader of the House of Commons, Lord Sydney later stated of
Upper Canada’s attempts to placate the Haudenosaunee with offers of compensatory lands:
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These people, my Lord, have as enlightened Ideas of the nature and Obligations
of treaties as the most civilized nations have, and know that no infringement of the
Treaty of 1768… can be binding upon them without their express concurrence &
consent. (Taylor, 2006: 115, emphasis added)
Because the Haudenosaunee had been excluded from the 1783 Treaty of Paris negotiations [an
act that some Haudenosaunee chiefs interpreted as an affirmation of their continuing status as
independent and sovereign nations (Taylor, 2006)], they were not immediately aware of the
unauthorized and illegitimate betrayal. Crown officials, terrified of a potential Native uprising,
did everything within their power to prevent the Haudenosaunee from learning about it –from
lying outright to “gifting” the cold, hungry, poorly clothed and war-traumatized Haudenosaunee
in refuge in Niagara with 1,800 gallons of rum in the hopes of keeping them inebriated for a few
more days or weeks (Taylor, 2006: 112-14; Johnston, 1964). 103 Despite these best efforts,
rumors of the terms of the treaty began trickling in to the Haudenosaunee encampment at
Niagara. 104 Crown officials moved quickly to attempt to repair some of the damage done by the
treaty by promising that pre-war treaty agreements and promises would be kept 105 and that the

If the [Mohawk] Indians should not accede to any Proposals that may be made to them
by the American Deputies, or cannot be prevailed upon peaceably to accept the asylum
already directed to be offered them, within the Province of Quebec, Our Situation will
in some degree become embarrassing. (Quoted in Good, 1994, p. 26).
103
Further, British officials who had been making steady efforts to decrease the amount of
presents given annually to native nations, also reversed themselves and instead increased presents
to the Haudenosaunee. They also attempted to placate the Haudensaunee by completely
misrepresenting the terms of the peace treaty:
Citing a secret (non-existent, in fact) clause to the peace treaty, Sir John Johnson &
John Butler assured the Iroquois that the forts would never be relinquished until the
Americans had done Justice to the Indians (Taylor, 2006: 114).
104
“The Indians from the Surmises they have heard of the Boundaries, look upon our Conduct to
them as treacherous and Cruel; they told me they never could believe that our King could pretend
to Cede to America What was not his own to give, or that the Americans would accept from Him
What he had not right to grant” (General Alan Maclean, at Fort Niagara, remarking on the Native
perception of illegality of their betrayal, quoted in: Taylor, 2006: 112 Johnston, 1964: 36;).
105
To this extent, Crown officials agreed –in violation of the newly-signed treaty with the
colonies-- to honor the 1768 Fort Stanwix Treaty borders and retaining numerous border forts
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Haudenosaunee and other Native nations would be compensated for their losses in the war
through deeds granted to them in Upper Canada (today lower Ontario). 106 To this end, Governor
General Frederick Haldimand was authorized and requested by the King of England 107 to find

signed away in the 1783 treaty (Taylor, 2006:113-121; Johnston, 1964: xlii, 42, 53). In fact,
Crown officials were so afraid of an impending uprising by the Haudenosaunee that the
Haudenosaunee not only “compelled a dramatic shift in British policy” in these above-mentioned
areas (Taylor, 2006:114), but also induced the Crown into “endorsing, advising and supplying
presents (especially ammunition)” to a newly-formed confederation of 35 Native nations intent
on defending the borders of the 1768 Fort Stanwix Treaty that clearly went against British
interests by uniting “Indians independently of white people,” and thus rendering worthless the
longstanding British policy of dividing Natives by promoting jealousies among them (Taylor,
2006: 116).
106
In granting land, the Crown not only sought to make up for violations of pre-war treaties and
agreements, but also conceded to another Haudenosauene demand: that an Indian buffer zone be
created in the area of overlap between the 1768 Fort Stanwix Treaty and the 1783 Treaty of
Paris. This buffer zone was actually quite strategic for the British as well, who wanted nothing
more than a buffer between their remaining colonies and potential attacks by the newly
independent colonies to the south, or by less friend Indian nations to the west (Taylor, 2006: 113121). In addition, this buffer zone also had economic appeal to the British, since an Indian buffer
zone would virtually eliminate the newly-independent colonies from competing with British
merchants and settlers in the fur trade (Taylor, 2006:114; Johnston, 1964: 42, etc.).
107
“…The King… much approves of your having sent Major Holland to … survey the North
Side of the Lake Ontario, as well as of your intention of carrying into execution your endeavor to
prevail upon the Mohawks to settle to the Northward of the Lake, provided the country should be
found well suited for their convenience. These People are justly entitled to Our peculiar
Attention, and it would be far from either generous or just in Us, after our Cession of their
Territories and Hunting Grounds, to forsake them. I am, therefore, authorized to acquaint you,
that the King allows you to make those Offers to them, or to any other Nations of friendly
Indians, who may be desirous of withdrawing themselves from the United States, and occupying
any Lands which you may allot to them…” (Lord North to Governor General Haldimand,
August 8, 1783, p. 42 in: Johnston, Charles M. 1964. The valley of the Six Nations. Toronto:
University of Toronto Press).
There were also a number of strategic reasons for wanting to satisfy the Haudenosaunee. For
example, see Johnston (1964, p. 42, in the same letter from Lord North) and Taylor (2006) both
of whom point to Britain and Upper Canadian official’s desire to corner the fur trade by keeping
the Haudenosuanee in their traditional beaver hunting grounds. Good, 1994, p. 26, who notes
that Lord North had wanted the Haudenosaunee to serve as a “barrier against the colonies’
incursions” as well as a barrier to the western Indians. Taylor (2006) also notes this. In addition,
Good (p. 27, note 21, quoting: NAC, Haldimand transcripts, vol. B-115, p. 113, Frederick
Haldimand to Sir John Johnson, 26 May 1783) notes the competition between the Upper Canada
and the 13 newly-independent colonies for the alliance of the Haudenosaunee:
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lands agreeable to the Haudenosaunee Six Nations as compensation for their losses in the war, as
thanks for their alliance with the British in the war, and as partial fulfillment of the Haldimand
Promise. One of these grants, 108 made on October 25, 1784 through the Haldimand
Proclamation, was intended to partially compensate the Haudenosaunee for their losses by
granting them a tract of their traditional territory located along the Grand River: 109
allotting to them… six miles deep on each side of the river beginning at Lake Erie
and extending in that proportion to the head of the said river, which them and
their posterity are to enjoy for ever. 110
Despite the permanence implied in the wording of the document (“for ever”), and the intent
behind it, 111 today the Canadian government only recognizes 45,000 acres --less than 5% of the

It is frequently asserted that Joseph Brant’s pro-British warriors were barred from
returning to their former villages after end [sic] of the American Revolution, but that
situation did not last long. By 1784 American agents were inviting them back with
sweet offers to treat for the purpose of a part of their lands. Haldimand’s offer was
intended to head off the effect of these “proposals from the United States”
108
The other grant was on the Bay of Quinte, and will not be discussed here.
109
As Phil Monture, Six Nations lands researcher and President of Native Lands, Inc., stated:
“They granted us portions of our own land. Big deal.” (Haudenosuanee Confederacy. 2007).
110
Grant from Governor Haldimand to The Six Nations Indians, October 25, 1784 at the Castle
of St. Lewis at Quebec. Indian Treaties and Surrenders, from 1680-1890, Vol I. No. 106, page
251. Frederick Haldimand was the highest ranking Crown official in British North America at
the time, serving as Commander in chief of Crown forces in North America and Governor
General (Good, 1964, p. 28).
111
According to legal scholar Sidney Harring (1998a & 1998b) the wording of this document
implies the conveyance of fee simple property, or property that was being given outright --along
with all of its associated rights-- to the Six Nations. Other loyalists in the war were being granted
deeds in fee simple, so there was little reason for the Haudenosaunee to expect to be given
anything less (see also: Good, 1994, pp. 20-21). In fact, Brant clearly expected –and was
convinced he was receiving-- more: the Haudensoaunee were recognized as sovereign and
independent before the war (when the “government well knew we were the lawful sovereigns of
the soil, and they had no rights to interfere with us as independent nations”) so there was no
reason the grant should not also recognize this sovereignty after the war [Speech of Joseph Brant
at Six Nations Council meeting, Fort George, 15-17 August 1803, quoted in: Good (1994: 34)].
Good further notes that recognizing the sovereign independence of Native nations was part of
British Common law, and continued to be US common law that Native nations could grant their
land to whomever they wanted, and those who purchased from them would hold their land
“under them by a title dependent on their laws….” In fact, Frederick Haldimand made it quite
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original 950,000-acre land grant-- as belonging to the Haudenosaunee Six Nations, and claims
the other 95% of the land as Canadian or Ontario property (see Figure 2). 112

clear to Brant that the land would be granted through a deed [see, for example, “Substance of
Brant’s Wishes Respecting Forming a Settlement on the Grand River” and Haldimand’s Answer,
March 1783, reproduced in pp. 44-45 in Johnston (1964: 44-45), which specifically states that
the land will be granted to the Six Nations “by a Deed”and would be held by them “on the same
footing as those we fled from.” See also: Speech of Joseph Brant at Six Nations Council meeting,
Fort George, 15-17 August, 1803, quoted in: Good (1994: 35, 31). Jennings (also quoted in
Good, 1994: 37) further found that the Haudenosaunee were told that “the Crown was saving
their land instead of Crown land, and saving it for them instead of for the Crown,” meaning that
Crown officials clearly intended to portray to the Haudenosaunee that they would be considered
sovereign title holders of their Upper Canadian lands]. Good (1994: 31, note 27) further notes
that the Haldimand Grant was viewed as a binding treaty agreement by British-Canadian
officials into at least the early 1820s. For example, Good states:
In R. v. Phelps (1823), 1 Taylor 47 at 52-53 Robert Baldwin argued for the defence that
“[t]he foundation of the title from General Haldimand is evidently a treaty, and as such
must be recognized by the court, for all courts of justice will recognise treaties, as is
constantly seen in cases of seizures, etc. The [Six Nations] Indians must be considered
as a distinct, though feudatory people; they are not subject to mere positive laws, to
statute labour, or militia duty, though perhaps to punishment for crimes against the
natural law, or law of nations. It may be considered as a ridiculous anomaly, but it
appears from Vattel that these sort of societies, resident within and circumscribed by
another territory, though in some measure independent of it, frequently exist, and that
the degree of independence may be infinitely varied; and however barbarous there
Indians may be considered, the treaty under which they migrated to and reside in this
country is binding. (P. 31 note 27)
However, Good (1994: 20, note 6) further notes that the Upper Canadian land registry system
was not fully formed at the time of the Haldimand Proclamation, nor for at least a decade and a
half later. Instead, at the time of this Proclamation, Canadian property law was governed by
French feudal custom. After changes in 1791 and again in 1796 colonial officials seized upon
irregularities in the Haldimand Proclamation (versus the new registry system customs for land
grants) as a reason to treat this land grant as something less than fee simple deed. And though
there are suggestions that the views toward the document of Haldimand, Simcoe and other
colonial officials was changed over time, Harring (1998: 219, note 33) concludes: “There can be
no question that both Simcoe and Haldimand intended to satisfy the Indians that they were being
granted lands, that is, given their lands to own. If they did not actually intend to convey such
title, then they appear to have intended to perpetrate a fraud upon the Six Nations.” See also
page 67 of this same source, where it is noted that in 1816 Under-Secretary of State for the
colonies, Henry Goulburn, admitted that “the grant on the Grand River which was, after the
peace of 1783, made to the Five Nations and their posterity forever, is a grant as full and as
binding upon the government as any other made to individual settlers.”
112
In addition, while both parties agree that about 45,000 acres, or 4.8% of the original
Haldimand Proclamation land grant, is contained in the Haudenosaunee Six Nations Grand River
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Figure 2. The map shows the Haudenosaunee Six Nations Confederacy Grand River Territory
(the Haldimand Tract, outlined in red) and the Haudenosaunee Six Nations Reserve (in purple
and white).
The Haudenosaunee Six Nations have been persistent in pursuing their claims to this land
through petitions, protests, international appeals, 113 and various legal actions 114 (when

reserve, Canada claims that it owns the underlying title to this land, as well. See, for example,
Borrows (1999) on the Canadian Supreme Court rulings on Aboriginal title.
113
In the early 1920s the HSN sent one of their Chiefs –Cayuga Chief Deskaheh-- to Britain in
order to request that King George III speak to Canada about its obligations to the HSN –
obligations Canada inherited from the British Crown through the British North America
Act/Constitution Act of 1867 (Constitution Act, 1867; Woo, 2003; Awkwesasne Notes, 2005).
Though Deskaheh was unable to meet with the King and returned without having accomplished
his objective, the Canadian government retaliated against the HSN by outlawing the HSN’s
traditional government –the Haudenosaunee Confederacy Council—and sending the RCMP to
raid the homes of Confederacy Council Chiefs. THE RCMP jailed many Chiefs, took over their
council house, broke into the safe, stole several Wampum belts (treaties), built a Canadian army
barracks on HSN lands and announced that a “free election” would be held to replace the
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available 115). The Haudenosaunee have also filed 29 different land claims through the Canadian
land claims process (see Figure 3), only one of which has been resolved. More claims would
have been filed on additional lands (see Figure 4) but the Canadian government has prevented
the Haudenosaunee from filing additional claims since the latter filed a 1995 lawsuit against the
Canadian and Ontario governments. The lawsuit has merely asked for an accounting of how the
Canadian and Ontario governments claim to have acquired Haudenosaunee lands, and what the
Canadian and Ontario governments have done with Haudenosaunee lands, resources and trust
funds 116 (see Figure 5). Once this suit was filed, the Canadian government ended the
Haudenosaunee’s ability to file new claims, closed the claims already filed, and cut off funding
for further land claims research (SNGR, 2006a: 8, 34).
traditional government (Woo, 2003; Akwesasne Notes, 2005). According to Leroy Hill, Cayuga
sub-Chief, only 13 or 14 people voted (with several voting twice, apparently, to cast a total of 27
votes) Ahooja’s (2008a), and with that, Canada brought “democracy” to the Haudenosaunee Six
Nations reserve. As for Deskaheh, after his various trips to Europe and appeals to European
countries he was denied re-entry into Canada and he eventually died in upstate New York
without ever having seen his family again (his family members in Canada were told that they
would not be able to return to Canada if they left to visit him).
114
Some of those taken in recent decades include filing 29 claims to parcels of Haldimand tract
lands with Canada’s Specific Claims Commission from 1980-1995 (the Specific Claims
Commission was created by Canada in the late 1970s in response to international pressure), and
filing a lawsuit against Canada in 1995, which demanded an accounting of what Canada did with
all HSN lands, rents, resources, and trust funds. In response to this lawsuit the government of
Canada prevented the HSN from filing additional land claims, closed the HSN claims that had
been filed, and cut off funding for HSN land claims research (SNGR, 2006a: 8, 34).
115
Under the Indian Act, from 1927 to 1951 it was illegal in Canada for Native nations to hire
lawyers to bring claims against Canada, and illegal for any lawyer to accept monies from a
Native nation for such purposes. (Mathias and Yabsley, 1991; Harring, 1998a; SNGR, 2006a: 5)
116
According to the Haudenosaunee Six Nations, though their trust accounts (managed by the
Canadian government) should contain upwards of $400 billion in revenues from leased lands,
resource extraction, and any legitimate (or even illegitimate) land sales, the trust fund only
contained $2.3 million in May 2004 (SNGR, 2006a: 1; SNGR 2006b). On the $400 billion that
should be in the Six Nations trust funds, see: Toronto Star (2006a), Marion & Canadian Press
(2006), Burman (2006a), Best (2006b). In fact, this $400 billion estimate is incredibly low,
compared to the well-documented instances of Crown theft of Six Nations trust funds, and
compound interest owed to the Six Nations for these thefts. See: Six Nations Lands and
Resources (2010).
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Figure 3. The orange areas represent lands the Haudenosaunee have registered under claim
through the Canadian land claims process. The area that is orange and transparent represents
an estimate of what the Canadian government claims to have obtained from the Haudenosaunee
in 1841 (more on this claim in the text, below). Two of the Haudenosaunee claims lie outside the
Haldimand Tract and are not shown in this map. A tiny area in bright green represents the
single area of land within the Haldimand Tract that is not contested by the Haudenosaunee.

Amidst all of these efforts by the Haudenosaunee Six Nations to have their land title and treaty
rights recognized and honored, or at least to get some sort of accounting from the Canadian and
Ontario government, both governments have remained steadfast in their refusal to provide any
additional legal documentation or historical evidence to justify their claims to ownership of the
Grand River Territory. Instead, the Canadian and Ontario governments have consistently
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engaged in a broad range of behaviors and activities aimed at preventing the HSN from asserting
their land, treaty, resource and self-government rights. 117 Further, the Ontario government has

Figure 4. The areas in transparent pink represent land claims that have yet to be filed. The
Haudenosaunee were prevented from filing additional land claims when they started a lawsuit
against the Canadian and Ontario governments in 1995, merely asking for an accounting of how
Canada claims to have obtained, and what Canada and Ontario have done with, Haudenosaunee
Six Nations lands, resources and trust funds. The Canadian government also cut all funding for
Haudenosaunee Six Nations land claims research and halted all progress on Haudenosaunee
registered claims (the areas shown in orange in Figure 3) in response to this 1995 litigation.

pushed ahead with approval for numerous settlement, development and extraction projects on
lands under Haudenosaunee claim –including the sites under development in 2006 and the
117

For example, on the Canadian government’s efforts to deny these rights to Native nations
more generally, see: Joffe (2010).
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mandated quotas for settlement and development in 2005 (see Figure 6), both of which helped
spark the 2006 Haudenosaunee Six Nations protest.

Figure 5. The table shows a small sample of the various ways in which Haudenosaunee Six
Nations trust funds were used –without Haudenosaunee permission—quite literally to build
Canada. The Haudenosaunee Six Nations estimate that some $400 billion dollars are missing
from their trust fund accounts (calculated with compound interest) (Six Nations Lands and
Resources, 2010).
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Figure 6. The area in dark purple represents the areas projected to have heavy settlement and
development under Ontario’s 2005 Places to Grow Act, which mandates settlement and
development quotas in areas outside of Ontario’s Greenbelt (represented by areas in three
different shades of green, surrounding the Greater Toronto Area). The town of Caledonia, the
site of the 2006 conflict, can be seen within the Haldimand Tract, near the top right corner of the
Haudenosaunee Six Nations Reserve. As can be seen from the map, Caledonia is one of the
areas within the Haldimand Tract slated for heavy settlement and development.

3) The Land Under Protest in 2006 and Its Related Land Claims
This section is concerned with summarizing the completing claims to ownership on the land
under protest in 2006. 118 The small, 40-acre plot of land that was reclaimed by Haudenosaunee
118

Unfortunately there is not room here for an extended discussion of each of the parcels of
Haudenosaunee Six Nations lands, the history behind these lands, the claims made upon them by
both the Haudenosaunee and the Canadian and/or Ontario governments, and the full legal
arguments made by each party in relation to these claims, though such an analysis has already,
for the most part, been written.
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protesters in 2006 is a portion of two larger, overlapping land claims filed by the Haudenosaunee
Six Nations in 1987 and 1989. The first registered claim on this land was filed with the claim on
the Hamilton-Port Dover Plank Road, an area of land consisting of approximately 10,407 acres
(see Figure 7).

Figure 7. The Hamilton-Port Dover Plank Road land claim, shown in orange, was registered
with the Canadian land claims process in 1987. The red dot within the orange claim represents
the approximate location of the 40-acre plot of land under protest in 2006.
According to Haudenosaunee oral history and historical documentation, Crown officials
repeatedly approached the Haudenosaunee along the Grand River in the 1830s, requesting that
the Haudenosaunee sell this stretch of land to the Crown so the latter could build a road running
from Hamilton to Port Dover. 119 The Haudenosaunee Six Nations repeatedly refused to sell the
land, but consistently offered to lease the land half a mile on each side of the road to the Crown
for this purpose, and stipulated that the lease revenues should be paid into the Haudenosaunee
119

Crown officials reportedly began construction on the road in 1834, before the Haudenosaunee
had even been approached, much less agreed to a road through their lands. The construction
sparked complaints by the Haudenosaunee Confederacy Council, who complained that timber
was being cut without Haudenosaunee permission and without compensation being paid to the
Haudenosaunee. See, for example, Tully (2009); Canada, Legislative Assembly (1843: 5, 27).
According to this latter source, Indian Agent Sir John Colborne was motivated to get a surrender
in a deal with the Grand River Navigation Company, telling the company that if it got it’s stock
up, Colborne would get a surrender for the Hamilton-Port Dover Plank Road lands (pp. 5, 6, 10,
16, 25).
70

trust funds annually (SNGR, 2006a, 2006b, and 2008). 120 Crown officials eventually agreed to
lease the land form the Haudenosaunee, but within a few years the former began treating this
lease as if it had been a sale. To this extent, the Crown began selling lands and issuing patents
for lands within the half mile on either side of the road (SNGR, 2006a & 2006b; Six Nations
Lands and Resources, 2008). 121 Yet, to this day, Canadian officials have failed to produce
documents demonstrating that this tract of land was ever knowingly or willingly surrendered to
the British Crown or the Canadian government. 122 Instead, the government had relied upon nonNatives’ historical assertions of ownership over the land, as well as the purported “General
Surrender” of 1841, which relates to the second registered claim filed on the land.
This second registered claim on the land (relating to the purported “General Surrender” of
1841) is a slightly more complicated claim, in large part because the extent of the land
supposedly being surrendered to Canada was never defined in the written document and no map
was ever included. Thus, the estimated area of land covered in this purported document of
surrender varies, but for the purposes of this discussion we will stick with the Canadian
government’s estimates as shown in Figure 8.

120

For example, Crown official, Marcus Blair, stated in January of 1835, the land would be
“utterly impossible to buy” because “the Indians will not surrender to us in perpetuity.” A lease
for “a moderate number of years” was the alternative suggested by Blair (SNGR, 2006b).
121
The actual process of attempting to dispossess the Haudenosaunee of these lands was actually
much more complex than can be described here.
122
Further, a July 2, 1862 map by the Department of Crown lands shows the Haldimand tract
and some of the alleged surrenders of Haudenosaunee Land, but does not show the HamiltonPort Dover Plank Road lands as having been surrendered (Canada, LAC, Item 382, Map
400/290). The same lack of a surrender is shown on a map that was purportedly leaked to a Six
Nations newspaper from Indian Northern Affairs Canada in September 2006 (see Canada, Indian
and Northern Affairs Canada, N.d.).
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Figure 8. The area outlined in pink highlighter on this map –minus the area colored in light
purple—represents one estimate of the area covered by the purported “General Surrender” of
1841, as shown on page 6 of the Archives of Ontario file: Native Bands, Reserves and Land
Claims Files: Six Nation Band – Unsold Surrendered Indian Reserve Lands April 10/89, RG 1568, box 233946, D 4-2-4. 123
123

The above map does not show the top third of the Haudenosaunee Six Nations Grand River
lands because less than 10 years after the Haldimand Proclamation set aside the entire 950,000
acres for the sole use of the Haudenosaunee “for ever,” Crown officials began whittling away at
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In the 1840s, the Haudenosaunee Six Nations Confederacy Grand River Territory was overrun
by non-Native squatters, many of whom were actively encouraged to settle on Haudenosaunee
territory either directly by Crown officials or indirectly through clear but unofficial Crown
policy. 124 Official Crown policy had long outlawed encroachment on Native lands, 125 and

the tract through whatever means possible. To this extent, Crown officials claimed that the top
third of the territory was granted only in error, and thus never legitimately granted. There are a
number of reasons why this argument is inaccurate, but these issues go beyond the scope of the
present work.
124
On direct encouragement of Crown officials, see: (SNGR. 2006a; Woo, 2003; Harring, 1998;
Podur, 2006). Johnston (1964: xlii) notes that white people were already living in the
Haudenosaunee Grand River territory when those lands were set aside for the sole use of the
Haudenosaunee in 1784. Further, there may be some evidence that the Crown continued to grant
fee simple tracts of land within Haudenosaunee Territory to loyalists for several years after 1788.
For example, on July 23, 1788 one such grant was given to James Holmes, who was allowed to
choose whether he wanted to live in Johnstown on the Grand River (In Haudenosaunee lands) or
at the head of the Bay of Quinte (also Haudenosaunee lands). See: Ontario, Archives of Ontario,
Grant of 700 acres to Loyalist James Holmes. July 23, 1788). More research is needed to
determine the full extent to which this practice occurred. On indirect encouragement through
unofficial Crown policies of refusing to prosecute squatters on Native lands, see Podur (2006)
and Harring (1998: 44-45), the latter of whom notes that despite widespread knowledge of
official Crown policy on squatting, non-Natives routinely squatted on Haudenosaunee lands
because the Crown’s “unwillingness to remove” squatters was well known. When squatters were
threatened with removal from these lands, they responded in outrage, and quickly filed petitions,
attended Legislative Assembly hearings, and even brought cases to court. Many of these efforts
regularly resulted in the awarding of land patents to non-Natives who had squatted illegally on
Native lands. For more on these efforts, and to see just how far squatters were willing to go to
gain legal title to the lands they coveted, see, for example: Canada, Legislative Assembly (1853,
1843, and 1837: 4), Canada, House of Assembly (1837: 392-402), and Harring (1998a: 40-46,
61).
125
For example, the Royal Proclamation of 1763 set very strict conditions under which nonNatives could obtain and/or settle upon lands held by Native nations and promised Crown
enforcement of these conditions. And in 1794 the Upper Canadian government, finding that
squatters were endemic throughout the country and on both Indian and non-Indian lands,
“formed an unambiguous legal policy regarding squatters,” through which land surveyors were
expected to report cases of suspected squatting and squatters, if found guilty, were to be removed
immediately (Harring, 1998a: 42). Further, in 1812 Upper Canada issued its Proclamation on the
Indian Lands, which set penalties of 10 pounds for the first offense of squatting on
Haudenosaunee lands, and penalties 20 pounds for the second offense and every offense after
that. The proclamation also required that every non-Native person living on Haudenosaunee
lands report to William Claus, Superintendent General of Indian Affairs (Harringa, 1998: 43).
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repeated Crown promises (as well as Crown fiduciary duty) to the Haudenosaunee required that
the Crown remove non-Native squatters on Haudenosaunee territory. But in practice, though the
Crown prosecuted non-Natives when they squatted on non-Native lands, it put little time and
resources into prosecuting non-Natives who squat on Native lands (Podur, 2006; Harring, 1998a:
54, 41). Instead, the Crown officials used the presence of squatters on Native lands to try to force
surrenders from Native nations (Harring, 1998a: 54). 126 The motivations for doing so
historically are not so dissimilar from the motivations for doing so today, i.e., to profit politically
and economically from the dispossession of the Haudenosaunee Six Nations. Historically,
Crown officials sought to profit politically by accommodating close to a million non-Native
settlers moving into Upper Canada between 1790-1851 amidst a land shortage (Harring, 1998a:
41, 44 note 53); 127 to populate Upper Canada with white settlers (Ibid: 49); 128 and to placate a
voting population of non-Natives hungry for “free” land and willing to fight bitterly against any

And in 1837 the Upper Canadian Legislative Assembly passed a series of laws intended to
punish squatters, including the 1839 Act of Provincial Parliament, 2nd Victoria, 15 (passed
protecting unsurrendered Indian Lands) (Canada, Legislative Assembly, 1853: 1; Harring,
1998a: 97) --though, according to Harring, these same laws supposedly protecting Native
peoples and their lands also treated Native peoples as dependents, and prohibited them from all
sorts of things, including making agreements regarding the leasing or sale of their lands or the
sale or lease of “timber, stone, hay, and soil” on those lands.
126
“By the 1820s Canadian authorities were permitting squatter occupation of the Grand River
lands as one element of a strategy to force the Six Nations to cede their lands to the crown. … in
the legal chaos that followed …mere occupation of the land [was] sufficient to accord a
substantial legal claim” on the land by non-Native squatters, under colonial law (Harring, 1998a:
61).
127
According to this source, the population of Upper Canada increased from 10,000 in 1790 to
951,000 in 1851. Meanwhile, today Canadian and Ontario officials are seeking to accommodate
three to five million new settlers amidst a potential labor shortage in the Greater Toronto Area
(see above discussion of the conflict, this chapter).
128
The source notes that the Upper Canadian government was “intent on occupying Upper
Canada with settler/farmers” and thus was “unwilling to even pretend to enforce” laws against
non-Native squatting on Native lands. Meanwhile, today the Canadian and Ontario governments
seek to settle and develop Haudenosaunee lands with non-Native residents and businesses.
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politicians who sought to enforce anti-squatting laws (Ibid: 42, 44). 129 Crown officials also
sought to profit economically, and reasoned that the value of these lands, and surrounding lands,
would be greatly increased once squatters did the heavy labor of cutting the timber, clearing the
lands and making them ready for cultivation (Harring, 1998: 49). These same activities --which
destroyed the subsistence value of the land for the Haudenosaunee by driving game away,
destroying wild foods and plants and removing all timber without compensation to the
Haudenosaunee-- immiserated the Haudenosaunee and (theoretically, at least) made them more
easily coercible when land surrenders were demanded. 130
Despite the horrendous losses to Native peoples of lands, subsistence and culture, all of these
dispossessive activities were self-servingly and paternalistically justified as “benevolence” on the
grounds that they were necessary for “civilizing” the “Indian Race” through forcibly assimilating
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Only whites could vote, and only property-owning whites could run for office; thus, only
white concerns needed to be placated by politicians. When Mohawk John Brant won an election
to the House Assembly in 1832 this was challenged on the basis that those who voted for him
were mainly squatters or Indians, the former of which did not own property and the latter of
which only owned property communally, and this did not count as owning property for the
purpose of voting or holding office (Harring, 1998a: 57). See also: Canada, Legislative
Assembly (1858: 121-123), which states: “it must be remembered in dealing with these lands
that the sympathies of the Country at large are with the squatters.” While Native people can vote
today, Canadian and Ontario officials have sought to satisfy the much more numerous nonNative population, particularly those sectors of the population (such as the financial and business
elite) whose livelihoods are based on the settlement and development of Native lands (see the
first section of this chapter).
130
Government reports that were concerned with this destruction (i.e., that squatters “clear cut
thousands of acres of valuable oak forests and moved on”) were generally concerned not because
it cheated Native peoples of their resources, revenues, subsistence, and so forth, but because it
“cheated lumber companies” of revenues, or it cheated settlers of better means and social
standing “who cannot be expected to join in the squatting or settle on the interior lots
afterwards.” According to these reports, squatting was bad primarily because it meant that
wealthy settlers and land speculators lost quality lands to “a poorer and inferior class of settlers”
before the lands ever reached the market (Harring, 1998a: 43-44, 55). Similarly, the non-Native
settlement and development (or resource extraction) on lands under Native claim today are seen
to increase the value of the land and force Native nations into extinguishing their land, treaty and
aboriginal rights to the lands with little or no compensation (see chapter 4).
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them into white ways (Reid, 2004; Mathias & Yabsley, 1991; RCAP, 1996; Harring; 1998a: 41,
61). 131 For example, one Report in the Journal of the Legislative Assembly of Upper Canada
(1858) argued that:
The younger portion of the Indian Race may be led to form new and civilized
habits, but in our opinion all that can be done for those now advanced in life, is,
so far as may be possible, to give them the means of support in exchange for the
land they occupy so unprofitably. (P. 121-23)
Another urged:
That complete protection of such [Indian] property can only be looked for as the
result of that change which shall assimilate the Indians with people accustomed
from infancy to the idea of separate and individually appropriated property, where
each is, under Law, the protector of his own possessions… (Canada, Legislative
Assembly, 1847; Harring, 1998a: 41)
Other common stereotypes and alleged justifications at the time held that Native peoples were
“improvident” and lazy people who “had a natural aversion to labour,” were dependent upon
government payment of annuities, 132 and were merely wasting the lands they held by refusing to
put them to good use through clearing and cultivation (Harring, 1998: 54-55). 133 These same

131

This same rhetoric is also widespread among non-Native residents and Canadian/ provincial
officials today, though equally widespread is the outright denial that such lands belong to Native
nations at all. Both forms of justification are clearly visible in the Caledonia conflict, as will be
further demonstrated in chapters 4 and 6.
132
Annuities are annual revenues owed according to treaty agreements relating to the sharing (or
alleged surrender) of lands. “This reliance [on annuity payments] has doubtless had the effect of
encouraging their natural indolence and improvidence; of keeping them a distinct people; of
fostering their natural pride and consequent aversion to labour; and of creating an undue feeling
of dependence upon the protection and bounty of the Crown.” (Canada, Legislative Assembly,
1847; Harring, 1998a: 54). Of course, the forcible transformation of Native peoples from
independent sovereign peoples into a state of dependency had considerable strategic value for the
British Crown, since by creating Native dependence upon the British Crown the latter was able
to claim that Native sovereignty was subordinate to (and even subsumed by) British/Canadian
sovereignty. See, for example, Lenzerini’s (2006: 157-59) discussion of sovereignty as it was
formulated in early international law.
133
This was an entirely false characterization of Haudenosaunee and other Native peoples who
were highly efficient at agricultural (remember, it was Native people and their generosity and
abundance of agricultural produce that helped the first several European settlements survive).
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stereotypes and civilized/uncivilized dichotomies were also used to portray settlers who illegally
squatted on Native lands –and destroyed Native subsistence-- as “honest and hard workingfarmers,” and to portray Native peoples who complained about illegal squatting as scheming
victimizers. 134
It was against this background and amidst these “justifications” that Crown officials
encouraged and/or refused to prosecute squatting on the Haudenosaunee’s Grand River lands in
the 1830s and 1840s. When repeatedly pressured by the Haudenosaunee to fulfill treaty
promises and remove the squatters, the Crown engaged in a half-hearted campaign against the
squatters on Haudenosaunee lands: paying the illegal squatters financial “compensation” for their
alleged losses out of the Haudenosaunee trust funds (Canada, Legislative Assembly, 1853).
Many of the squatters who received compensation to leave the Haudenosaunee lands later
refused to leave and/or sought additional compensation on the basis that they had been “injured”
by living in a “semi-wilderness state” that had deprived them of roads and markets (Ibid). Those
who persisted were eventually awarded the right of preemption in November of 1840, meaning
that they had first claim towards purchasing the lands upon which they had illegally squat (Ibid).
Meanwhile, the Haudenosaunee were never compensated for the unpaid rents, for the loss of
valuable resources, or for the wanton destruction of their lands and subsistence by the nonNative squatters (Ibid). Instead, they were forced to pay those who had squat illegally on their
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For example, illegal squatters were frequently portrayed as “innocent victims” who had fallen
prey to scheming Natives who mislead the squatters into believing they could lease the land.
Harring (1998a: 42-45, 49-50) notes that such accusations were “dishonest” and entirely
unfounded, particularly given the fact that most squatters had no leases and knew they were
squatting illegally.
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lands for the destruction they had caused, and were in many ways forced to fund their own
further immiseration, 135 something which was quickly used against them.
In 1840, after being ordered to obtain a surrender of Haudenosaunee lands, Chief
Superintendent of Indian Affairs Samuel Jarvis wrote a letter to the Haudenosaunee Confederacy
Council blaming them for the presence of non-Native squatters on their lands, insisting that the
Crown could do nothing to remedy the situation, and accusing them of barring progress and
posing a nuisance to the province and the public by keeping their land in a natural state. 136 Jarvis
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Haudenosuanee trust funds were further used –without Haudenosaunee approval or often
knowledge-- to fund the surveying of lands, the laying out of village sites, for roads and other
“improvements” that were desired by non-Natives, and for various other activities of the Indian
department, including the salaries of Indian Department officials. Further, Though Crown
officials insisted on holding and managing Native trust fund accounts, Native peoples such as the
Haudenosaunee were charged for this “service” –and were often charged at more than twice the
rate of these services elsewhere [Canada, House of Assembly (1837: 392-402); Canada,
Legislative Assembly (1858: 107)]. In other words, the Haudenosaunee were forced to fund their
own colonial dispossession and near-destruction as a distinct people.
136
Jarvis (1841a) wrote, in part:
The Lieutenant Governor is of the opinion that very great difficulties will be found in
any medium course between the expulsion of all intruders or non-interference, as
experience has shewn that with all the anxiety to do justice, and with all the care
exercised to prevent injury to Indian interests, the interference of the Indians
themselves, continually, has created new difficulties, to which there seems to be no end,
and yet the Government is expected to compromise its own character by adjudging what
is right and wisely recommended by the Indians, or what, on the other hand, may be
capriciously or corruptly counseled by them.
The Lieutenant Governor is of the opinion that there can be no remedy found for the
continuance of this unsatisfactory and embarrassing state of affairs while the lands
remain general property under the circumstances which it is no reproach to the Indians
to say that they cannot manage the estate for the general interests of the tribes.
The Lieutenant Governor therefore considers that it would be very much for the
benefit of the interests of the Indians if they surrendered into the hands of the
Government the whole tract [except for a small, unidentified portion for their use] …
which at present is not only unproductive to the Indians, but absolutely useless to them
in every point of view, and which is considered by the public a bar to the improvement
and prosperity of the districts in which it is situated, and in fact a nuisance which the
public have a right to call upon Government to abate.
Harring (1998: 52 and 41) suggests that both the claim that Upper Canada could do nothing to
remedy the situation, and the claim that the Haudenosaunee were, themselves, to blame for the
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insisted that the only plausible course of action in response to repeated Haudenosaunee
complaints about illegal squatters on their lands (Harring, 1998: 50-52, 41-42) would be for the
Haudenosaunee Six Nations to surrender all of their land except a small plot, which would be
reserved for their own use. Ten days later, after having received word that the Haudenosaunee
were upset by the tone of his letter and by the Crown’s repeated breach of its treaty agreements
and fiduciary duty to the Haudenosaunee, 137 he wrote a second letter, insisting that his first letter
had been “altogether misinterpreted” (Jarvis, 1841b). Arguing that he only wanted to “protect
the true interest of the Indians,” Jarvis repeated and elaborated upon the accusations in his first
letter 138 and insisted that the Haudenosaunee must surrender to the Crown all but a tiny plot of
their land. Jarvis gave the Chiefs three days time to document their agreement to this surrender -knowing full well both that the Chiefs were unlikely to agree to Jarvis’ demands and that even if
they had wanted to do so, it would have been impossible for the 50 or more Confederacy Chiefs
mass presence of squatters were completely false. For example (41): “The government’s
professed inability to protect Indian lands belies both logic and reality, a fact the Six Nations
pointed out at the time. No crime is more easy to detect than squatting, which, by definition, is
open and prolonged.” Further, (52) the Haudenosaunee had provided the government with a list
of names and locations of squatters on their lands when they demanded their removal.
137
Including treaty promises and fiduciary duty to remove illegal non-native squatters from
Haudenosaunee lands.
138
For example, while repeating the accusations that it was the Indians own fault that white
people had illegally crowded onto their lands and claiming that nothing could be done to remove
them, Jarvis also claimed that the Indians had taken large payments from non-Natives in
pretended sales to them (large payments which the Natives were now “wholly incapable of ever
refunding”). [Of course, these accusations were patently false (Harring, 1998a: 52)]. Jarvis
further suggested that the Six Nations would benefit from the sale of their lands because the
monies would be deposited into a fund for them that would earn interest and increase
continually. He stated that he was not suggesting that any Native person should be forcibly
removed from his/her lands, but that all lands not in use should be surrendered so as not to cause
further injury to their non-Native neighbors. Finally, he made yet one more promise that, if the
Haudenosaunee just agreed to this surrender of virtually their entire tract of land, the Crown
would ensure “that any further trespass or intrusion, of any nature whatsoever, upon the reserved
tract, whether committed without or with the approbation of the Indians, either singly or
collectively, will meet with the strongest disapprobation of the Government, and that the party
offending shall be immediately removed and punished according to the law.” (Jarvis, 1841b).
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(many of whom lived a great distance from the Haudensoaunee Grand River Territory) and all of
the people whom the represented, 139 to come to a consensus on the matter within three days time.
Stating that he would be at the Onondaga Council House in three days, Jarvis further threatened
that if the Chiefs could not come to an unanimous agreement in favor of Jarvis’ proposition, the
Crown would take over the Haudenosaunee Six Nations affairs and do what it wanted with
Haudenosaunee lands:
I am informed, and believe from my own observations, that the above plan
proposed meets with the approbation of the most intelligent, industrious and
worthy of the Indians, and I am fully satisfied that their true interest requires its
adoption.
Those who are opposed to it must therefore reflect that any private division in
the Council, from whatever cause proceeding, cannot prevent the Government
from interfering in seconding the wishes of the industrious and from promoting
the wealth and prosperity of the Nation as a body.
In case any further divisions should take place in Council, and by declining
amicably to meet the views of the Government, the Indians should continue to
thwart the measures devised as most conducive to their interest, I am
apprehensive that the Government will be compelled, however reluctantly, to take
into their own hands the exclusive management of their affairs, and as Chief
Superintendent it will be my duty, immediately upon my return, to recommend
such a course, to prevent the public property of the Six Nations from being
sacrificed to the avarice and rapacity of individuals. (Jarvis, 1841b)
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At the time, there were at least 50, and possibly as many as 88 chiefs living throughout the
Haudenosaunee territories, of which the Grand River Territory/Haldimand Tract is but one, with
the rest being located throughout Ontario, Quebec, New York State and even Wisconsin. For
example, Holmes (2009b: 9), notes that there were 88 chiefs in January, 1845. As noted above
in the brief background on the Haudenosaunee Confederacy, the Chiefs were literally
representatives of the people and had no power whatsoever to make decisions regarding the
alienation of lands. Williams (1982) further remarks upon the European colonists continual
inability to comprehend this sort of non-hierarchical, democratic governance structure, and
constantly wanted to portray and treat Haudenosaunee Chiefs (and Native chiefs in general) as
princes with unlimited power over their people. This preference is likely both in part because of
the European’s inability to comprehend democracy at the time (Di Nunzio, 1987), but also the
fact that pushing their agendas upon Native people would be much easier if they only had to
convince one supreme power, rather than the entire populace –or, at least, if they only had to cut
off the head of the sovereign in order to control the body, as was done with the Mexica (Aztec)
and other Empires in South America.
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Three days later Jarvis arrived as promised (threatened), but found only six people at the
Onondaga Council House (not all of whom have since been confirmed to be Chiefs). Because
most if not all of these men had been born and raised speaking their own Haudenosaunee
languages 140 in a culture based on oral, rather than written history and in which Chiefs are
servants of the people enmeshed in this traditional culture, it seems highly likely that none of
these men could read the English document presented to them. Further, all of these men would
have had understood that in Haudenosaunee culture the women are the titleholders to the land,
decisions could be made without consulting all of the people, and the alienation of land was
contrary to the Haudenosaunee Great Law. 141 Thus, though three-to-five of the men who were
present at the longhouse on that day signed the document, they immediately protested that the
document had been misrepresented to them, that they had not known what they had been signing,
and that they were all opposed to the surrender. 142 Further, even if these men had all be Chiefs,
the signatures of three-to-five men, at a time when there were fifty or more Haudenosaunee
Chiefs, 143 does not constitute an agreement --particularly when all of these men, as well as the
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Each Haudenosaunee nation (Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga, Cayuga, Tuscarora and Seneca)
have their own language, though there is some overlap in the languages and some fluent speakers
of one language can understand other languages).
141
The alienation of lands is prohibited in the laws of most Native nations throughout North
America, as is also true of the Haudenosaunee Great Law of Peace. On this point relating
generally to Native nations, see McNeil (2001-2002); on this point relating specifically to
Haudenosaunee law, see the above background on the Haudenosaunee, as well as Akwesasne
Notes (2005).
142
The Chiefs said the document was presented to them as some mandate from the Queen of
England, not the officials of Canada, and that they had no choice in the matter (certainly this
latter impression was Jarvis’ intention, as per the threats to this extent in his January 15, 1841
letter).
143
Holmes (2009b) notes that there were some 88 Haudenosaunee chiefs around 1844.
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full Haudenosaunee Six Nations Council, immediately protested to Jarvis and petitioned the
Queen to have the document invalidated (Jarvis, 1841c). 144
The Haudenosaunee have continued to protest this fraudulent surrender since this date, and in
1843 the Governor General of Upper Canada acknowledged the invalidity of the document
(McDowell, 2008: 113-14), as did Jarvis, himself, that same year (Jarvis, 1843) and again the
following year (Holmes, 2009a), 145 and as did later Superintendent Generals of Indian Affairs
(Canada, Legislative Assembly, 1853). 146 Despite these acknowledgements, Jarvis appears to
have continued to impress upon the Haudenosaunee the belief that the surrender had been valid
and mandatory (Jarvis, 1844), 147 and that the only matter up for discussion was which
previously-undefined area of land would be reserved for the Haudenosaunee.

144

Though full Council of Chiefs requested that Jarvis present their petition to the Queen, it does
not appear that Jarvis ever did so.
145
Holmes is citing: Jarvis, Samuel P. Chief Superintendent of Indian Affairs to Six Nations
Chiefs, February 7, 1844. LAC RG 10 Vol. 717 pp. 243 Reel C-13, 411.
146
In this source, superintendent General of Indian Affairs R. Bruce acknowledged in July 1851
that the 1841 “General Surrender” did not obtain a surrender from the Haudenosaunee, though he
also tried to imply that the document did authorize the Government to take over parts of the
Haudenosaunee’s affairs (which is inaccurate, since a fraudulent document cannot authorize
anything). “This agreement having created great dissatisfaction, and been repudiated by a large
majority of the Chiefs and Indians, never received the formal sanction of the Government.” In
addition, Bruce noted that, though he disagreed with the Six Nations’ refusal to surrender their
lands, the government had to pay the highest respects to the rights of the Indians, and thus "even
when different from them in opinion, with reference to the precise extent of their proposed
reserve, it felt constrained to yield to their ascertained wishes.”
147
In his draft letter, Jarvis notes that the Governor General had reviewed the Haudnosaunee’s
petition, and then proceeds to blame the Haudenosaunee for the over-abundance of non-Native
squatters on their territories (“It is a fact which the Six Nations Indians cannot deny that three
fourths of the people occupying their lands have been invited to purchase and settle on them by
the Indians themselves and in many instances by the very Indians who now complain of the
inconvenience which has been thus occasioned”). He further notes that the “surrender to the
Crown of a large tract of their waste lands in 1841 was a wise measure and should have been
strictly attended to by the Indians. The sale of these lands will in the course of a few years place
the Indians in a sate of comparative affluence.” Though it is unclear what final draft of the letter
was ever sent (if any), this seems to be evidence that, still in 1844, Jarvis was giving no
acknowledgement to the Haudenosaunee that the government had already acknowledged the
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4) The Canadian and Ontario Governments’ Arguments, and the Historical Fact Pertaining to
the Hamilton-Port Dover Plank Road Land Claim and the “General Surrender” of 1841.
There are four general parts to the Canadian government’s claims that the Haudenosaunee gave
up (or the Canadian government obtained) all title and rights to the lands under protest in 2006.
In this section I will first summarize the most detailed part of this claim. I will then briefly
describe some of the laws and precedents relating to the surrender or extinguishment of Native
rights and title to lands in order to further demonstrate that fallacious quality of this first part of
Canada’s claim. Finally, I will briefly explain the other three parts of Canada’s claim on this
land –and the insurmountable evidence that contradicts these arguments.
The Canadian and Ontario governments have persistently cited the purported “General
Surrender” of 1841 as a legitimate document of surrender through which the British-Canadian
government gained title to a huge portion of Haudenosaunee Grand River Territory. For
example, in the Crown’s 1996 Statement of Defense against the Haudenosaunee Six Nations
lawsuit, the Canadian government stated:
On January 18, 1841 the Six Nations in Council agreed to the surrender of all of
their lands, with certain exceptions, with a view to those lands being disposed of
for the benefit of the Six Nations.
Following the surrender, a faction of the Six Nations sent the government
petitions objecting to the surrender….(Canada, Attorney General, 1996, paras. 67
and 68) 148

1841 surrender as invalid. After all, one would think that if the Haudenosaunee had been
notified of this fact prior to this letter draft, Jarvis would not still be writing of the 1841
surrender as a wise move (since there would have been no surrender to speak of).
148
On the protests of the Chiefs who signed once they learned what it was they had signed, see
Jarvis (1841c). In fact, virtually all of the existing Haudenosaunee Chiefs protested and
petitioned against this surrender. Not only did these chiefs number far more than the number of
men who had signed the document, but they also were acting on discussions about the surrender
that they had had in Council and in consultation with the Haudenosaunee people they
represented. The representation by Canada of those protesting the surrender as a faction --and the
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This assertion has been repeated again and again by the Canadian and Ontario governments. For
example, it was a key point of contention between Natives and non-Natives during the 2006
protest, and more recently the Archives of Ontario --in consultation with the Ontario Ministry of
Aboriginal Affairs and the Government of Canada-- made the assertion that:
On January 18, 1841, the “Chiefs and Warriors of the Six Nations Indians” met in
“full Council assembled at the Onondaga Council House” and agreed to surrender
all of the remaining Haldimand Tract land for sale or lease, except for those parts
of the Johnson settlement occupied by the Indians. (Ontario, Archives of Ontario,
2011) 149
In their 1996 response to the Haudenosaunee Six Nations 1995 lawsuit, the Canadian
government also argued that: “no Six Nations lands were sold without the consent of the Six

implicit suggestion that everyone else was in favor of the protest—is of interest here, both
because it is reflected in the Canadian government’s rhetoric around the 2006 protest (labeling
the Haudenosaunee Confederacy Council and the protesters as a faction), and because it is an
outright lie. Those who protested the surrender were not a faction, they were the Haudenosaunee
Council and people. And those who signed the document were not the Council, they were a
faction (a tiny faction of people who days later stated that the document had been misrepresented
to them, that they did not know what they had signed and that they were strongly opposed to any
such surrender).
Just as historically Canada treated those few –however small in number—who went along with
Canada’s will as the legitimate leaders of the Haudenosaunee Six Nations, so in 2006 did Canada
treat the colonially-imposed but virtually unsupported Six Nations Band Council as the
legitimate leadership of the people. And just as historically Canada referred to the
Haudenosaunee people and their traditional government as a mere “faction,” so, in 2006, did
Canada treat the Haudenosaunee protesters and their traditional government as a radical faction –
though the hundreds of protesters who descended upon the site to halt the police raid on April
19th belies this suggestion. In fact, this has consistently been Canada’s approach toward
traditional Native governments within Canadian borders who refuse to go along with Canada’s
plans for taking Native lands, rights and resources and for forcibly assimilating Native peoples.
This will be discussed in some more detail below, and in chapter 4.
149
Though the Archives is clearly quoting something, it does not cite the source –which,
regardless, is entirely incorrect in its assertion. The Chiefs did not meet on the matter in the
mere three days given for them to do so, and they most certainly did not meet in “full council”
nor agree to the document in “full council” on January 18, 1841. Instead, a mere handful of
people –not all of whom have been confirmed to be chiefs—were present at the Onondaga
Council House, some of whom signed the document, stating that it was misrepresented to them
and they had not known what they were signing.
84

Nations Council” (Canada, Attorney General, 1996 at 103), and that the invalid 1841 surrender
had been affirmed in an 1843 petition and an 1844 document containing the minutes of a council
meeting:
This Defendant says that the Six Nations consented to the sale of these lands.
The consent was given after the Six Nations had thoroughly discussed the matter
at various Council meeting between 1840 and 1844…. [T]he Six Nations
consented to the sale of these lands at a Council meeting held on December 18,
1844. (Canada, Attorney General, 1996, para. 115)
The circumstances surrounding 1841 “General Surrender” document have already been
discussed above and considerable evidence has already been provided to show that the
proceedings of this attempted surrender were coercive; that the surrender document was
misrepresented to those who signed it; that only a tiny handful of people (not all of whom have
been confirmed to be Chiefs) signed the document --out of 50 or more Chiefs whose signatures
would have been required; that the Haudenosaunee did not even have time to meet and discuss
the issue; 150 and that the Upper Canadian government, itself, later admitted numerous times that
the document did not actually obtain a surrender, was invalid, and as such, never received the
formal sanction of the Upper Canadian government. All of these facts were available long
before the Canadian government’s 1996 Statement of Defense.
The 1843 petition upon which the Canadian government relies for “affirmation” of the 1841
“General Surrender” is actually a petition protesting that very surrender. At the time the
Haudenosaunee wrote the 1843 petition, they had heard nothing back from their 1841 petition to
the Queen of England (who likely never received it from Jarvis). They do not appear to have
been informed that the government had denounced and agreed not to recognize the “General
Surrender” of 1841 (as evidenced in Jarvis’ draft letter of 1844). They were thus under the
150

This is particularly true given the great distance away that many of their chiefs –and people—
live from each other and the Onondaga council house on the Six Nations reserve.
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impression –just as clearly Stated in Jarvis’ January 15, 1841 letter-- that the government was
taking their lands regardless of their opposition and protests, and that all they could do was plead
to keep certain portions of their lands. As such, the Haudenosaunee wrote their 1843 petition in
a tone of bargaining and pleading: they pleaded to retain certain of their lands (lands south of the
Grand River, plus the various tracts near Brantford) 151 and attempted to leverage their pleading
with the argument that the government had already taken --and/or the Haudenosaunee had
already “given”-- the remainder of their lands, so they should at least be able to keep these
(Holmes, 2009). 152 In other words, the document reveals the reality that had become all too clear
to the Haudenosaunee –they were losing their lands to a government that took what it wanted,
did not keep its treaty promises, had no consideration for Haudenosaunee traditional governing
processes, and did not care that the Haudenosaunee protested or objected vehemently against
these actions.
The 1844 document that the Canadian government also cites as an “affirmation” of the 1841
“General Surrender” is a very abbreviated summary of a meeting between the Haudenosaunee
and Canadian officials which spanned a couple days (December 13th and 18th, 1844). This
meeting summary, referred to as “meeting minutes,” was written by an Upper Canadian colonial
official who was part of an Indian Department contingent ordered to secure lands from the
Haudenosaunee. 153 The “meeting minutes” do not detail the discussions during the meeting, and
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The Haudenosaunee had always made clear that they wanted to retain Oxbow bend,
Johnson’s settlement, Eagle’s nest, the Mohawk Flats, Martin’s settlement, and other tracts of
land near Brantford, and to lease these lands to non-Natives for short, 21-year periods, so that
they would have some annual revenues coming in from the land and, when the Haudenosaunee
population grew, would be able to use it for their future generations.
152
Holmes is citing: Petition of the Chiefs and Sachems of the Six Nation of Indians residing on
the Grand River, undated ca. June 1843. Library and Archives Canada. Vol. 624, pp 241-245.
153
Canada. Library Archives Canada. RG 10 Vol. 144, pp 83271-83279. Meeting minutes,
Onondaga Council House, December 13 and December 18, 1844.
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do not give voice to any points, arguments or statements made by the Haudenosaunee Chiefs at
the meeting. Instead, it contains only the Crown’s proposal as to which lands the
Haudenosaunee will reserve for themselves, and an agreement that the Haudenosaunee can lease
or sell the Brantford area lands that they had already expressed an interest in leasing in their
1843 petition. To this extent, the 1844 proposal by the Crown reflects a response to the pleas in
the 1843 petition from the Haudensoaunee (in which the Haudenosaunee believe that their land is
being taken from them without their consent and all they can do is plead and attempt to bargain
to keep certain lands within the boundaries of their reserve). For example, the Crown is clearly
responding to the 1843 petition pleas of the Haudenosaunee when it argues that the lands pleaded
for in that petition are too much, and that the Haudenosaunee should satisfy themselves with
keeping less than that. 154 (The Crown also slips the term “sale” into the agreement when it
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In their 1843 petition, the Haudenosaunee pleaded to keep all of the lands on the south side of
the Grand River, as well as the various Brantford tracts of land. In this 1844 proposal, the
Crown argues that –though the Haudenosaunee should have a free choice in this matter—it is not
in their interest to keep such a large portion of land. The Crown instead argues that, instead of
keeping all of the lands on the south side of the river, the Haudenosaunee can/should really only
keep half (or less) of these lands –i.e., those within Tuscarora Township. For example:
The Commissioner is instructed by Command of his Excellency the Governor General
to bring under the reconsideration of the Chiefs of the Six Nations of Indians in Council
the lands to be set apart as a territory for the future residence of them selves and their
people and the leasing or selling of such parts of their lands on the Grand River known
as Oxbow, Eagles Nest, Martin and Johnson settlements.
While his Excellency is desirous that their choice should be free on the reserve as he
does that it should be in all other matters connected with their own property yet he does
not consider that their interest would be promoted in extending the tract to become their
future [illegible] residence from the west side of the Plank Road to Burtch’s Landing or
that of leasing of the places aforementioned.
But his Excellency believes that it would promote the welfare of the tribes by having
the reserve confined to the Township of Tuscarora (according to the boundary about to
be established. A sketch of which is herewith submitted). [No sketch is contained in
this document]. (LAC RG 10 Vol. 144, pp 83271-83279. Meeting minutes, Onondaga
Council House, December 13 and December 18, 1844).
By the time this Crown proposal had been made, the Haudenosaunee had been dealing with
British-Canadian government officials for centuries, and knew full well that the language of
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suggests that the Brantford tracts of land could be set aside for “leasing or selling” –though it is
clear the Haudenosaunee only wanted to lease these lands.

155

). As a document responding to the

1843 Haudenosaunee petition, the 1844 proposal does not acknowledge the invalidity of the
1841 General Surrender, but proceeds as if that surrender was a done deal and as if the only issue

“free choice” and “in their interest” was not meant literally, but was language of manipulation
and coercion (note the extensive use of references to the Indian interest in the 1841 letters written
by Samuel Jarvis to the Haudenosaunee, for example). A whole dissertation chapter (or
dissertation) could be written on the manipulative use of language by non-native government
officials historically and today, but that will have to be a work for another time.
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By slipping the word sale into the discussion, the Crown appears to be setting the stage for
future fraudulent dispossession of even these lands. While the Haudenosaunee knew full well
the difference between leasing and selling plots of land, and had always maintained that they
wished to lease their land, not sell it, Crown officials –unbeknownst to the Haudenosaunee-often treated leases as sales, and would grant title to land based on leases. Non-Native settlers,
similarly, picked upon this and also treated leases –even short, 21-year leases—as sales, thus
causing infinite problems for the Haudenosaunee when individual non-Native leaseholders
subdivided and/or sold lands that had been clearly leased to them. See, for example, Journal of
the House of Assembly of Upper Canada, 1836, November 8, p. 396, in which a number of nonNatives sought to have the government recognize their title to/ownership of land based on the
fact that they had each obtained a lease from an Native person for 21-years or less. Others did
not even had leases, only their word that they had gotten permission from individual Natives to
live on and farm a particular area of land. Some of the leases had been confirmed at Indian
Councils, while others had not, and some of them were purportedly confirmed by (deceased)
Joseph Brant. The Assembly notes that they don’t know whether Brant acted in good faith in
confirming leases, but that they have not seen evidence that he did not. Further, they reason that
and that the Six Nations would have to be bound by the acts of their agent, and so they hold that
all leases purportedly confirmed by Brant would be sufficient for granting title. A number of
people without this confirmation were also granted title (a matter discussed more thoroughly in
future hearings of the Assembly) –despite the fact that all of these agreements were leases, not
sales.
The after-the-fact treatment of Native leases as sales was so prevalent among non-Natives that
even contemporary writers confuse the difference. For example, Sidney Harring, in his seminal
book White Man’s Law (1998 Toronto: University of Toronto Press) consistently treats the two
different types of agreements as synonymous (and as sales), reflecting the historical attitudes
towards Native land rights.
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for debate was which previously undetermined lands will be reserved by the Haudenosaunee out
of all of the lands being taken. 156
Thus, clearly both the 1843 petition and the 1844 meeting minutes encouraged the
Haudenosaunee to believe that their lands had been virtually all taken from them by a unilateral
action of the Canadian government in 1841, and that the only thing the Haudenosaunee could do
was attempt to save as much of this land as possible through pleas and bargaining attempts.
Despite the obvious fraud and coercion, the Canadian government routinely uses these 1843 and
1844 documents as “evidence” that the 1841 “General Surrender” was valid. Yet, neither the
1843 petition nor the 1844 meeting minutes are documents of surrender. Neither document
requests consent or affirmation of surrender, and in neither document do the Haudenosaunee
explicitly agree to a surrender. 157. The 1844 document does not even mention the word
“surrender,” nor does it use comparative terminology. Thus, rather than aiding in the legitimacy
of an otherwise admittedly illegitimate document of surrender, both documents appear to
represent an ongoing fraud perpetrated upon the Haudenosaunee.
What’s more, despite the Canadian government’s ongoing omission of historical evidence
that the “General Surrender” of 1841 was illegitimate and invalid, it remains true that, even if the
1841 “General Surrender” document had not been declared invalid by the Upper Canadian
government, it certainly would be declared as such by any honest judge in any of Canada’s high
courts today. To lend support to this assertion, it seems worthwhile to briefly review some of the
laws and precedents relating to surrenders of Native lands and the extinguishment of Native
156

There are a number of other problems with this document in relation to the Brantford tracts of
land that the Haudenosaunee had repeatedly set aside for leasing, but here I will stay focused on
the tracts of land under protest in 2006.
157
Much less do they agree to it in a public meeting of the full Haudenosaunee Council that was
advertised in advance and called for the explicit purpose of granting a surrender of land (a
requirement under the Royal Proclamation of 1763, discussed further below).
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rights on and/or title to these lands. After that I will even more briefly mention the other, much
more easily refutable, aspects of Canada’s claims to have obtained this land.
Under Canadian constitutional law, 158 the extinguishment of Native title, rights and/or
interests on lands within Canadian borders can only be achieved in only two ways: 1) prior to
1982, through constitutionally-applicable (i.e., federal) legislation that expresses clear and plain
intent to extinguish Native title and rights, 159 and 2) through a voluntary agreement with Native
nations.
Legal Scholar Kent McNeil (2001-2002) has examined the various limits involved in the first
method of extinguishment and has concluded that extinguishment under this method never
occurred, because there are no known federal statutes that could have achieved it. Thus, a
voluntary agreement with the relevant Native nation(s) is the only means through which Canada
can legitimately claim to have obtained ownership to lands within Canada’s borders under
Canadian law.

158

Which involves some highly problematic, and unfounded, assumptions of Canadian
sovereignty over First Nations lands and peoples. These assumptions and their fictitious nature
will be discussed more in chapter 5.
159
In R. v. Sparrow [1990], the Supreme Court of Canada held that the “existing rights”
protected by section 35(1) of Canada’s Constitution Act, 1982, includes those rights that had not
been extinguished prior to 1982, either through agreement or through federal legislation
expression a clear and plain intent to extinguish Native title and rights. For more on clear and
plain intent, see: R. v. Sparrow [1990] at 1099 and Calder et al. v. Attorney-General of British
Columbia, [1973] at 404. Only the federal Parliament (from 1931-1982) or the Imperial
Parliament (possibly up to 1860) have constitutional authority to interfere with property rights,
the federal executive branch does not (McNeil, 2001-2002: 310-11, 315, 320, 322, 324). Thus,
provincial legislation could not (cannot) achieve the extinguishment of Native title or rights
(McNeil, 2001-2002; Lambert, 2009). McNeil (2001-2), however, points to a disturbing
possibility that title can also be extinguished in courts, as was the case in Chippewas of Sarnia
Band v. Canada (Attorney General) (2000 and 2001).
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However, not all purportedly voluntary surrenders are equal, and legal scholars, 160
government reports, 161 and even the Supreme Court of Canada 162 have increasingly recognized
that the English/written versions of treaties purporting to obtain surrenders from Native nations
frequently did not reflect the oral agreements made between Native nations and Crown officials,
nor did they reflect the understandings or intentions of Native nations who had entered into them.
In fact, it has become clear that in a large number of treaties of purported surrender, the
intentions of many Native nations was not to surrender or alienate land at all, since the alienation
of land is prohibited by the traditional laws of most (if not all) Native nations throughout present
day Canada (McNeil, 2001-2002: 304-08 and corresponding notes; Venne, 2002; Hutchins,
2009; Royal Commission on Aboriginal People, 1996: 459; Pape, 2009). 163 Instead, history has
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McNeil (2001:305-7 and accompanying footnotes); Macklem (2002); Hutchins (2009); Pape
(2009); Venne (2002).
161
Reference here is to the Hon. Sidney Linden in Report of the Ipperwash Inquiry (Queen’s
Printer for Ontario, 2007), Vol. 2, pp. 109-110. Also see: Royal Commission on Aboriginal
Peoples (RCAP) op cit. (1996 at 459).
162
For example, see: R. v. Badger, [1996]; R. v. Marshall, [1999]; Mitchell v. Peguis Indian
Band, [1990]; R. v. Paulette [1977] (all of which are also discussed in McNeil, 2001-2002, who
also provides an overview of relevant lower court rulings on this topic).
163
Under these traditional laws of Native nations, land is seen not as a commodity that can be
bought, sold, traded or given away, but as a sacred gift given by the Creator not only to the
present generation of people, but to the past and future generations, as well as to all plant and
animal life –all of which has an equal right to the land that nurtures it. Hutchins has noted that
this has also been recognized by the Inter-American Court (Hutchins, 2009: 455-6). See also:
Akwesasne Notes, 2005 on these aspects of the Haudenosuanee Great Law of Peace. Thus, as
legal scholar Kent McNeil has noted, since “Aboriginal parties to treaties would presumably
have acted in accordance with their own laws, they cannot have intended to surrender their entire
interest to the Crown if that would have violated these laws.” (McNeil, 2001: at 307. But see:
304-8). See also: Hutchins (2009), who further notes:
So to suggest that First Nations negotiating with Crown representatives for recognition,
protection and security are not only ceding, releasing and surrendering their territory as
a “fungible commodity” (the term used by Chief Justice Lamer in Delgamuukw) in
European eyes, but in so doing we also severing themselves from their systems of
Aboriginal law and the elements of the practices, customs and traditions encompassed
in that body of law is, I would submit, a most improbably assertion and one that has
never been satisfactorily explained through Canadian jurisprudence. (P. 447)
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shown overwhelmingly that Native nations intended to share their lands with newcomers, and
that this is the understanding many Native peoples had when making treaties with Crown
officials. As Justice Sidney B. Linden noted in the Report of the Ipperwash Inquiry (2007):
Every treaty in Ontario supported the expectation that treaty lands outside of
reserve[s] would be shared. Promises made by Crown representatives encouraged
these expectations, but despite these promises, colonial and Canadian authorities
referred to these lands as “surrendered lands.” … Although, in making treaties
with the Crown [Native nations] agreed to give up their exclusive title to these
lands, they never intended to abandon them. They continue to regard these lands
as a major source of their sustenance, and as fundamental to their identity. The
promise of continued access to these lands was a crucial condition of their consent
to the treaties. (P. 109-110) 164
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In fact, the words “cede, release, surrender” and so forth are also not translatable into many
Native nations. See, for example: Venn (1997); Cardinal & Hildebrandt (2000:58), both of whom
found that the Elders had difficulty understanding the meaning of the words “cede, release,
surrender” and, according to the latter source, were incredulous and in disbelief once these terms
were explained to them.
Additional evidence that Native nations did not intend to alienate land, but instead to share it
with the new immigrants, is also found in the practice many Native nations had of retaining
hunting, fishing and other rights on the lands supposedly alienated from them. Agreements over
the retention of such rights frequently –but not always-- made it in to the written/English
versions of treaties, further demonstrating that the Native understanding and intention behind
these treaties was that all parties agreed to share the lands. Implicit in these agreements to share
was the presumption that all people would refrain from behaviors that destroyed the lands or
made them uninhabitable for present or future generations, as well as for plant and animal life –
and this understanding also sometimes found its ways into the written/English forms of treaties
through promises that Native nations would be able to continue their way of life.
Canadian courts have increasingly recognized the intentions of Native nations to share –not
surrender—their lands, and to retain rights to continue their way of living upon them. For
example, the Supreme Court of Canada found in the Mikisew Cree [2005, op. cit.] case that
despite a written treaty of surrender for the Mikisew Cree lands (Treaty 8) which had provisions
specifically allowing the Crown to take up lands within the treaty area for various purposes, the
Mikisew Cree had clearly intended to retain their rights to hunt, trap and fish throughout these
traditional territories, and thus the Crown was required to consult with and accommodate the
Mikisew Cree before engaging in activities that would adversely impact their rights. The treaty,
the Court held, was merely a beginning, and not an ending to the Crown’s fiduciary duty to the
Mikisew Cree. Mikisew (2005 para 54); see also: Hogg (2009: 14-15); Hutchins (2009: 453).
See also: Halfway River First Nation v. British Columbia (Ministry of Forests) [1999] 4
C.N.L.R. 1 at para 134 (cited in McNeil, 2001: p. 308 note 29).
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Crown officials apparently routinely took advantage of these perceptions of Native peoples
and regularly (and even egregiously) misrepresented the written versions of treaties to Native
peoples in treaty negotiations. 165 Because of this, in more recent years, Canadian Courts have
recognized the discrepancies between the written/English versions of treaty agreements and the
oral agreements that were made by holding: that treaties must be “interpreted as the parties,
especially the Aboriginal parties, would have understood them at the time;” 166 that treaty
promises have to be placed “in their historical, political, cultural contexts to clarify common
intentions of the parties and the interests they intended to reconcile at the time;” 167 that any
“ambiguities or doubtful expressions in wording of a treaty must be resolved in favour of the
Indians;” that “any limitations which restrict the rights of Indians under treaties must be narrowly
165

For example, an examination of the oral agreements and negotiations around Canada’s
numbered treaties --purported treaties of surrender-- reveals “not one reference” to the alienation
of land in treaties 1-7, despite the fact that the written/English version of treaties claim Native
nations ceded, released and surrendered their lands [Hutchins, 2009 (citing Morris, 1880). See
also: and McNeil (2001:305-7 and accompanying footnotes); Venne (2002). For the similar
misrepresentations in Treaties 8-11, see: R. v. Paulette [1973] 6 W.W.R. 97 (N.W.T.S.C.), in
which Morrow J. remarked: “…it is almost unbelievable that the Government party could have
ever returned from their efforts with any impression but that they had given an assurance in
perpetuity to the Indians in their territories that their traditional use of lands was not affected”
(quoted in Macklem, 2002)]. Instead, the oral negotiations and agreements were full of
assurances by the Queen (made by officials on her behalf) that she would protect the Native
peoples from anything that would adversely impact their way of life, that she would not take
anything from them that would do so, and that the land was large enough for all to share
[Hutchins (2009: 436). See also: Venne (2002), McNeil (2001). Further, some of these
negotiations made no mention of land at all. For example, according to speeches given around
Treaty Seven, and according to Elders who were alive when the treaty was negotiated, the entire
purpose of the agreement was to establish peace and to address problems internal to the five
Native nations that were a party to it. As Hickey et. al. (1987: 105) note: “Not one elder
mentions that the treaty had anything to do with giving up land or sharing it with white people.
Rather, Treaty Seven is an agreement that was made to establish peace, to stop Indians from
killing each other, and to put an end to the disruptions caused by liquor.” See also, Harring
(1998: 27), who notes that British colonists drafted treaties in English so they could evade giving
real interpretations of them and could cheat indigenous peoples.
166
McNeil (2001: 307); R. v. Badger [1996]; R. v. Sioui, [1990]; R. v. Marshall [1999]; Mitchell
v. Peguis Indian Band [1990].
167
See also, Feder and Isaacs, (2007) in their discussion of R. v. Morris.
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construed;” 168 that “treaties and statutes relating to Indians should be liberally construed and
uncertainties resolved in favour of the Indians;” and that “Indian treaties ‘must therefore be
construed, not according to the technical meaning of its words to learned lawyers, but in the
sense in which they would naturally be understood by the Indians.’” 169 Further, courts have
allowed the use of Native oral histories as evidence –on equal footing with written documents-in court, thus recognizing that written treaty documents were often prepared in advance (to
achieve specific Crown aims that may or may not have been discussed verbally) and were, from
the perspective of Native nations, of little relevance in negotiations with the Crown. 170
In the context of these court rulings, it is clear that the “General Surrender” of 1841, as well
as the 1843 and 1844 documents would have to be considered in the historical, political and
cultural contexts of the time, which would show a long history of fraudulent, misrepresentative,
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R. v. Badger [1996] at para 41. See also: O’Reily (2009: 387) and Hutchins (2009: 444-45).
See also Hall (N.d.), on the Supreme Court of Canada ruling in R. v. Sioui [1990].
170
R. v. Badger [1996] at paras. 52-56; Hutchins (2009: 447-8). Hall (N.d.), further notes that
the force of treaties “lies in what was actually said, often in aboriginal languages, at the time of
negotiation.” At least one former government official has cited this precedent (of admitting
evidence from native oral histories into court proceedings) as a potential reason for the Canada’s
government’s constant stalling when it comes to resolution of outstanding Native land claims.
As the former Commissioner of Canada’s Indian Specific Claims Commission and Carlton
University Professor, Jane Dixon-Gilmore, noted:
One of the most important forms of evidence that communities can bring to vindicate
their claims is the testimony of elders. And I sometimes fear that the government is
only too well aware that, if they just wait a little longer, the corporate memory of
communities dies.
Dixon-Gilmore, quoted in: Aboriginal Peoples Television Network (APTN). 2011. Ottawa
stalling on claims tribunal so elders die out: ex-commissioner. APTN National News. May 18.
[video and blurb, available: http://aptn.ca/pages/news/2011/05/18/ottawa-stalling-on-claimstribunal-so-elders-die-out-ex-commissioner/. In this sense, the Canadian land claims process,
itself, could be seen as coercive, as Epstein (2002: 51-52) has noted:
We should note that land claims negotiations themselves are usually the result of
unwanted incursions or development activities on indigenous lands, which force
indigenous peoples to reach a land claims settlement or face the consequences of
development activities which proceed with or without consent or the indigenous
peoples. Insisting on surrender under these circumstances is a clear instance of duress.
169
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and coercive dealings on the part of the Upper Canadian government and/or Upper Canadian
Indian Department officials. 171 These documents would also have to be interpreted according to
Haudenosaunee understandings and intentions, 172 the former of which demonstrates that the
Haudenosaunee were clearly coerced and mislead, and the latter of which was always for the
Haudenosaunee to retain their lands. Any doubt to this intent, further, would have to be resolved
in favor of the Haudenosaunee, and Haudenosaunee oral histories can demonstrate beyond a
shadow of a doubt that it was always the Haudenosaunee intent to retain –and merely lease out-the Grand River lands that were under protest in 2006. As Cayuga sub-Chief Leroy Hill has
noted on the matter:
We know the government, uh, doesn't have a document where Six Nations agreed
to sell that [Kahnonstaton]. They don't have that document where Six Nations
agreed to sell that parcel of land in Caledonia. They don't have the agreement.
What they're doing is, they're analyzing discussions and minutes in meetings and
saying, "Look at, he said this..." That's not how our government works. You can
say anything in a meeting. That's --minutes in a meeting is altogether different
from agreeing to sell you something. Where's the agreement? What are the terms
and conditions? Where did the money go? They cannot produce that. And we
know it.
… [W]hat Six Nations knows is that we agreed to lease that land along, along
that highway. … We agreed to lease it, short term. And the thinking of our chiefs
back then was that, "We'll get these non-Natives to come in here and clear up
some parcels of land for farming then kick them out once we need to expand."
That was the thinking. "And we'll collect rent. They can, they can clear the land
for farming, and we'll, we'll collect rent. When we need to expand, we'll expand."
(Ahooja, 2008b)
Despite the numerous court rulings that would force an interpretation of these historical
documents in the Haudenosaunee’s favor, were the case to be resolved in court, the Canadian
171

The above discussion, and in particular some of the above notes, provide ample evidence for
this assertion. Much more evidence on the Upper Canadian government’s fraudulent dealings
with Native peoples can be found in the history surrounding virtually all other tracts of
Haudenosaunee Grand River lands, as well, but such an examination is beyond the scope of this
dissertation and will have to be reserved for future work instead.
172
Haudenosaunee understandings, and Native understandings more generally, will be discussed
more thoroughly in Chapter 3.
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and Ontario governments have persisted in pushing for extremely narrow interpretations of these
documents that rest on overly-legal technicalities so that they can continue claiming that the
Haudenosaunee legitimately surrendered their lands in 1841 (and “affirmed” this decision in
1843 and 1844). This problematic gap between Canadian Supreme Court rulings and Canadian
and provincial government practice –which will be further examined in Chapter 4-- has been
remarked upon by scholars such as Anthony Hall (N.d.), who has noted:
In spite of the high constitutional character of treaties in Canada, these deals were
often viewed cynically by those non-Indians responsible for both making and
implementing these agreements as relatively cheap and expedient ways to ease
natives off most of the lands of Canada so that these resources could be opened
for exploitation by other groups and interests. The tendency on the part of federal
and provincial governments so far has been to continue this cynicism by
interpreting Treaties as narrowly and legalistically as possible, while holding to
the position that natives "ceded, surrendered and yielded" all their Aboriginal
rights and titles to their ancestral lands through these instruments.
This narrow and one-sided view of treaties essentially as real estate deals by
which native groups sold all their interest in vast parcels of land for small original
payments and small continuing payments - usually $5 per treaty Indian per year has produced a huge schism of perception. On the one hand is the view of treaties
as legal instruments that extinguished Aboriginal rights. On the other hand is the
view of treaties as instruments of relationship between peoples who agree to share
the lands and resources of Canada as co-existing but relatively autonomous
communities. Seen from this latter perspective, treaties didn't extinguish rights but
rather confirmed rights through Crown recognition that Aboriginal peoples have
the capacity to make and enforce their own laws and thus to act as self-governing
participants on the international stage. Bridging the gap between these 2 views of
treaties, either as a solvent or as a confirmation of Aboriginal rights, poses a huge
challenge to the people and law makers of Canada.
The three other arguments made by the Canadian (and Ontario) governments regarding the
land under protest in 2006 are considerably more transparent, and require only an abbreviated
consideration here. The first of these three arguments is that there are no outstanding debts and
obligations owed to the Haudenosaunee by the Canadian government, 173 and that, if there are
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In Canada’s legal argument against the Haudenosaunee Six Nations in 1996, and in response
to the Haudenosuanee protest in 2006, Canada argued that, since it was not in existence prior to
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outstanding debts and obligations, the Ontario government is responsible for them, not the
Canadian government. Not surprisingly, the Ontario government says that it is the Canadian,
and not the Ontario, government that is responsible. The latter actually makes the more accurate
case. Under the Constitution Act of 1867, s. 111, the Canadian government inherited all of the
outstanding debts and liabilities of the British Crown –including debts and liabilities to Native
nations. 174 And under section 91(24) of that same Act, the Canadian government is designated
as the sole Canadian governing body with jurisdiction over matters relating to Indians and Lands
reserved for Indians (Canada, Constitution Act, 1867; Wilkins, 2002). This matter will be
addressed in more detail in Chapter 4.

1867, it could not have been in a fiduciary relationship with the Haudenosaunee Six Nations
before that time; and thus, it could not be held accountable for any obligations, debts or liabilities
owed to the Haudenosuanee Six Nations that arose before 1867. [Attorney General of Canada
(1996), Coyle (2006)]. However, elsewhere it has been acknowledged that Canada did, indeed,
have a fiduciary responsibility to the Haudenosaunee (Archives of Ontario, 2011).
174
Section 111 of the Act states that “Canada shall be liable for the Debts and Liabilities of each
Province existing at the Union.” In other words, Canada inherited the liabilities of the British
Crown (and/ through) the provinces, though there were a few limits to this inheritance. One of
these limits was that, when it came to the debts of Ontario and Quebec, who were large debtor
provinces at the time of Confederation, section 112 of the Act limited the amount of these large
debts inherited by Canada to $62,500,000. Any debt above and beyond this $62 million that was
held by either Ontario or Quebec at the time of Confederation remained the liability of Ontario or
Quebec. However, under section 91(24) of the Act, Canada is the sole Canadian governing body
with jurisdiction over “Indians and Lands Reserved for the Indians.” This means that only the
federal government –and not the provinces—can hear the merits of, determine the validity of,
and negotiate, litigate, or in some other way resolve the outstanding obligations, debts and
liabilities to Native nations, whether these debts accrued before or after Confederation. Thus,
Canada cannot pass on to the provinces any outstanding obligations, debts or liabilities owed to
First Nations, because these clearly fall under sole federal jurisdiction. In fact, the Canadian
government had to be well aware of this fact both in 1996 (when they filed their statement of
defense) and 2006 during the Haudenosaunee protest, because in 1991 the Canadian government
acknowledged as much when it reversed itself and began to allow Native nations to file preconfederation claims through Canada’s specific claims process --thus acknowledging that it was
responsible for these claims. Prior to 1991, pre-confederation claims could not be heard. On this
reversal, see, for example, Six Nations of the Grand River 2006, page 5; and Six Nations of the
Grand River 2008, page 2
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The second of these three additional arguments is the Canadian government’s assertion that
the Royal Proclamation of 1763, which mandated that certain procedures be adhered to in
obtaining surrenders of Native lands was 1) a unilateral act that Crown officials did not have to
adhere to, 2) repealed by the Quebec Act of 1774 (Canada, Attorney General, 1996 at 7-10). The
momentum behind the creation of the Royal Proclamation of 1763 was the desire and necessity
to quell disputes between Native nations and the Crown, whose subjects had been encroaching
upon Native territories without Crown sanction through squatting, shady and fraudulent dealing,
and other activities aimed at gaining Native lands for the purpose of speculation/ profit. These
activities led to an almost infinite number of grievances voiced by Native peoples against the
Crown, as well as to a constant threat of the outbreak of hostilities on the part of disgruntled
Native peoples. Through extensive consultation with numerous Native nations, 175 the parties
were able to come to an agreement upon a boundary line separating Native from non-Native
territories. In its attempts to mitigate the grievances of Native nations and prevent the creation of
future grievances, the Proclamation prohibited non-Natives from settling on or purchasing
territories on the Native side of the boundary, and further laid out a number of rules and
regulations for the legally acquiring Native lands. Thereafter, lands could only be legitimately
acquired under British law by the Crown or Crown agents, in public meetings with the Native
nation(s) in question that had been called specifically for the purpose of discussing a surrender of
lands, and had been publicly advertised well in advance as being meetings that would take place
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For example, see: Borrows (2002), who argues that the Royal Proclamation of 1763 can only
be understood when examined together with the Treaty of Niagara of 1764. Borrows also argues
that “the full legal consequence of the Royal Proclamation is to bind the Crown to ensure that
Aboriginal and treaty rights of the First Nations, including their right to govern themselves, are
not undermined,” (quoted in: Asch (2002: xiii). See also, Nammack, 1969, p. 93 and Good, p. 6,
note 12, who both note that the Royal Proclamation was a response to grievances voiced by the
Haudenosaunee
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for that specific purpose. 176 Though the document was intended to regulate only the behaviors of
subjects of the Crown (which, it recognized, Native peoples were not), and was intended to
prevent disputes between Native peoples and the colonists, the Crown both wanted and needed
the agreement of Native nations in the determination of the Proclamation’s boundaries, and in
determining and agreeing to many of the other provisions in the document. Further, as a
document created out of negotiations and agreements between the Crown and dozens of Native
nations, the Proclamation established a fiduciary responsibility on the part of the Crown to police
its own subjects and prevent unauthorized encroachments into the lands of Native peoples (Hall,
N.d.; Guerin v. The Queen, [1984]). Thus, the Proclamation is a document that depended upon
negotiations with, and the agreement of, a large number of Native nations –all of whom expected
the Crown to fulfill its duty to them as was established in the Proclamation.
The Canadian government’s claims that the Proclamation was not binding nor not in effect
when Haudenosaunee lands were taken were made to allow that argument that, if the
Proclamation was no longer in effect and/or Crown officials were not bound by its terms, then
purported surrenders might be considered valid even if they were obtained through questionable
means. In fact, one lower court had previously made this argument (claiming that the Royal
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These regulations were beneficial to Native peoples in preventing government officials or
random non-Native people from finding any Native person and getting him (through
intoxication, bribes or trickery) to sign a document purporting to surrender lands over which he
had no authority –a practice that was quite common prior to the enactment of the Proclamation.
Though numerous secondary sources report that the British Crown’s rules and regulations for
land transfers were rarely (if ever) followed (Woo, 2003; Akwesasne Notes, 2005; SNGR 2006a;
SNGR 2006b; Nammack, 1969; Good, 1994: 7 note 14; Harring, 1998a: 28; Harring. 1998b), the
Proclamation at least theoretically offered some legal recourse to Native nations who were
wronged in this way. Thus the Proclamation has been referred to, even by bodies of the
Canadian government, as the “Indian Bill of Rights” with the force of a statute analogous to the
Magna Carta (Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 1993, pp. 15-16). See also, Paul
(N.d.), which notes that the Royal Proclamation of 1763 “was regarded by the Indians as their
charter.”
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Proclamation of 1763 had been repealed by the Quebec Act of 1774) 177 and a judge in the same
court later relied on parts of the argument when he justified dispossessing Native peoples of their
lands, that they unquestionably held legal title to, on the basis that their rights had been
extinguished by the adverse possession of non-Native peoples settled on their lands. 178
However, the Canadian government’s arguments are not supported by the existing evidence. For
example, claims that the Proclamation was a unilateral document are historically inaccurate, as
are claims that the Proclamation was not binding on colonial authorities. As McNeil (20012002: 320) has pointed out, the Proclamation was part of Imperial legislation, which was binding
on all colonial officials and could not be altered or repealed by local legislative bodies. And
even if parts of the Proclamation were repealed by the Quebec Act of 1774, the parts of the
Proclamation relating to Indian affairs could not have been repealed or altered by colonial
officials, since Imperial authorities retained control over Indian affairs in Canada until at least
1860, 179 and perhaps until as recently as 1931. 180 Further, there is a virtually insurmountable
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McNeil, 2001-2002, p. 320, citing: Ontario (Attorney General) v. Bear Island Foundation,
[1989] 2 C.N.L.R. 73 at 85-88,68 O.R (2d) 394 at 410-13.
178
McNeil, 2001-2002, pp. 320-21, (citing: Chippewas of Sarnia v. Canada (Attorney General)
(2001),51 O.R. (3d) 641, [2001] I C.N.L.R. 56 (C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused [2001] 4
C.N.L.R. iv., at paras 185-219). Though McNeil notes that in this case, the court did not
specifically rule on the correctness of this assertion. Further, there was considerable
disagreement on this point among the different judges who heard different stages of this case,
and both a motions judge and the Ontario Court of Appeal noted that the Chippewas land rights
had not been extinguished by the Upper Canadian government because either they did not have
the authority to do so (motions judge), or they did not demonstrate the requisite intent to do so
(motions judge and Court of Appeal). [[However, the court failed to cite the provision of the
Quebec Act that allegedly repealed the Proclamation (Reynolds, 2009, pp. 100-101), and in this
same case the Supreme Court of Ontario argued that the Royal Proclamation of 1763 was in
effect in the 1840s (McNeil, 2001-2002: 329).]]
179
McNeil (2001-2002: 320) notes that “the Imperial government retained control over Indian
affairs in the province of Canada until 1860 [which] probably would have prevented the
legislative assembly in the province from enacting statutes prior to that time that extinguished or
authorized the extinguishment of Aboriginal title.” This was also corroborated in the Chippewas
of Sarnia case (Ontario, 1999) where Campbell J noted that the “1834 and 1859 statutes could
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body of evidence that the Royal Proclamation of 1763 continued to be in effect: for example, the
Proclamation has been affirmed and/or cited in British and Canadian law consistently long after
the 1774 Quebec Act, including in 1793, 181 1796, 182 1797, 183 1803, 184 1805, 185 1812, 186 1835, 187
1839, 188 1847, 189 1858, 190 1888, 191 1993, 192 and the 2000s. 193 In fact, the Royal Proclamation
continues to play an important role in both understanding Native land titles and in the
formulation of new treaty agreements. Evidence of this can be found in Canada’s own Charter
of Rights and Freedoms (1982) section 25, which states that the guarantees in the Charter:

not apply to Indian lands because Indian rights were “within the exclusive imperial authority and
beyond colonial legislative power” (also quoted from McNeil, 2001-2002, p. 321).
180
McNeil (2001-2002: 324) notes that, though s. 91(24) of the British North America Act of
1867 (also known as the Constitution Act of that same year) gave Canadian federal authorities
jurisdiction over “Indians and Lands reserved for Indians,” “this jurisdiction could have been
subject to provisions of Royal Proc of 1763 prior to Satute of Westminster of 1931.”
181
The Simcoe Patent of January 14, 1793 (applying specifically to Six Nations land granted
under the Haldimand Proclamation).
182
Public Notice May 5, 1796 (leases had to be sanctioned by the crown first) (SNGR, 2006a: 3).
183
March 10, 1797 directions to President Russell (Ibid).
184
April 17, 1803 speech by William Claus (that Proclamation of 1763 was still in effect) (Ibid).
185
Public Notice April 10, 1805 (Ibid).
186
Proclamation February 1, 1812 (Ibid). In fact, in its statement of defence the Canadian
government did recognize that the similar, and less often cited, Governor’s Instructions from
1812 were binding on the Crown, but it attempted to make the argument that: “a court is not
bound to enforce strict compliance with [this] policy,” (Attorney General of Canada, 1996: at
106).
187
Public Notice of November 20, 1835 (SNGR, 2006a: 4).
188
Act May 11, 1839 (Ibid).
189
A report in Appendix I. to Journals, House of Assembly, Canada, 1847, headed "Title to
Lands and Tenure of Land," cited in Paul, Daniel, op. cit.
190
Journal of the Legislative Assembly, 1858, App A21, REPORT, page 121-123191
St. Catherine’s Milling v. Queen (1888).
192
Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (1993: 24), which notes that the Quebec Act did
not replace the Royal Proclamation of 1763, because the latter contained “a saving provision
ensuring that the restoration of French law would not have harmful effects on ‘any Right, Title,
or Possession derived under any grant, Conveyance, or otherwise howsoever, of or to any Lands
within the said Province’.”
193
In the Chippewas of Sarnia (2001) case, the Supreme Court of Ontario argued that the Royal
Proclamation of 1763 was in effect in the 1840s (see also: McNeil, 2001-2002: 329).
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of certain rights and freedoms shall not be construed so as to abrogate or derogate
from any aboriginal, treaty or other rights or freedoms that pertain to the
aboriginal peoples of Canada including
(a) any rights or freedoms that have been recognized by the Royal
Proclamation of October 7, 1763; …
Thus, clearly the Royal Proclamation of 1763 has continued to play an important role in
Canadian law. But even if the Royal Proclamation had been repealed (which is unlikely), the
Canadian government is still bound by the recent high court rulings already mentioned --rulings
requiring that treaties be placed in their historical, political and cultural contexts and interpreted
in the terms Native peoples would have understood at the time, as may be evidenced through
Native oral history, and according to the intentions of both parties; and that ambiguities or
uncertainties be resolved in favor of the Native peoples, that any limitations on Native rights be
narrowly construed, and that treaties be liberally construed in favor of the affected Native
peoples.
The third additional argument that the Canadian government made in an attempt to get around
accountability to the Haudenosaunee for violations of lands, resources and treaty rights is the
argument that the Haldimand Proclamation was not a treaty but a unilateral document to which
the Canadian government could adhere, or not adhere, at will. Though the historical facts
surrounding the Haldimand Proclamation clearly demonstrate that it was recognized by Upper
Canadian courts as a binding treaty until the early 1800s, 194 after this time, shifts in international
law, accompanied by historical revisionism, led some Canadian courts to accept this argument as
factual. These shifts in domestic and international legal attitudes towards the rights of
Indigenous peoples will be discussed in Chapter 5, where it will be shown that the faulty and
ahistorical nature of these arguments, as well as the arguments made by the settler state
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See the above discussion on the Haldimand Proclamation, and the accompanying notes.
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governments forming the old British Empire (including the United States, Canada, Australia and
New Zealand), are fatally flawed.

5) Motivations Behind the 2006 Haudenosaunee Protest
Clearly the loss of lands that had been set aside for future Haudensoaunee generations was a
major motivation behind the protest. In 2005 and 2006, construction projects were underway in
three cities bordering the reserve, of which the Caledonia site was only one. There were also
several other reasons behind the 2006 protest; and even if the Canadian and Ontario governments
wanted to hold fast to their position on the 1841 “General Surrender,” they should not have been
willing or able to ignore these other issues. The first of these other issues was Native nations’
international human rights and domestic rights to consultation and accommodation. These rights
were being thoroughly ignored in the approval of construction projects and the mandating of
settlement and development quotas on lands under registered claim by the Haudenosaunee Six
Nations.
A states’ duty to consult Indigenous peoples prior to making decisions that might affect them
is “firmly rooted in international human rights law,” and “derives from the overarching right of
indigenous peoples to self-determination” (UN Human Rights Council, 2009). But states have
more than just the duty to consult Indigenous peoples prior to making decisions that might affect
their rights: international human rights law has increasingly integrated and come to depend upon
a higher standard of Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC). 195 In fact, FPIC is a human rights

195

A few of the international human rights bodies and reports that have recognized FPIC as an
international human right include: UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(2009); International Labor Organization (1989: art. 4); UN Commission on Human Rights
(2006, at 4, para. 11); United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2008:
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standard that Human Rights Council members are required to uphold (Joffe, 2010: 190; Gunn,
2007:82), and Canada was either lobbying to be on, or actually sitting on this Council in 2006
when Haudenosaunee people were demanding that Canada fulfill its duties to consult with them
under Canadian law. 196 And while the Canadian government has come under increasing
criticism in recent years for its ongoing violations of the international human rights of indigenous
peoples, 197 the duty to consult and accommodate Native nations prior to planning projects that
might affect their outstanding land, treaty and aboriginal rights is also enshrined under Canadian
law through various Supreme Court of Canada rulings –some of which had just been handed
down in the year before the 2006 protest. 198 Further, in recognition of the excessively slow land
claims and court processes in Canada, the Supreme Court ruled that the Crown (the Canadian
and provincial governments) have the duty to consult regardless of whether First Nations claims
to land title or outstanding rights have been proven in court (Haida Nation, 2004: para 53).

articles: 10, 11(2), 19, 28(1), 29(2), 32(2)); United Nations Development Group (2008); UN
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (1997: Annex V at para 5).
A number of states have also implemented FPIC, or recognized indigenous collective rights to
their lands. Recently Columbia’s Constitutional Court unconditionally affirmed Indigenous
Peoples rights to FPIC (Intercontinental Cry, 2011), and the Constitutional Court of Guatemala
recognized an indigenous community’s collective property rights to their lands, and ordered the
Guatemalan government to “take the necessary measures for issuing and land title to the
community.” (Indian Law, 2011). In addition, early reports back from two court rulings in
Argentina (Scandizzo, 2011) suggest that courts in that country have also upheld the right of
Indigenous peoples to consultation as defined and outlined in the International Labor
Organizaiton’s Convention 169 on the Rights of Indigenous and Tribal People (op cit., articles 6,
7, 15), as well as the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (op cit., articles 10, 19, 29,
32).
196
Canada was on the Human Rights Council from June 2006-June 2009 (see: UN Human
Rights Council. Membership of the Human Rights Council (2006-2012)).
197
Two of the most recent of these criticisms can be found in: Joffe (2010) and UNCERD
(2012). A more thorough discussion of this topic can be found in Chapter 4.
198
Haida Nation v. British Columbia [2004]; Taku River Tlingit First Nation v. British
Columbia, [2004]; Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada, [2005].
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Prior to initiating their protest, the Haudenosaunee knew full well that the Canadian and
Ontario governments were violating their rights to consultation under Supreme Court of Canada
rulings and international human rights laws. To this extent, they had involved themselves in
numerous activities aimed at getting the Canadian and Ontario governments to fulfill this duty to
consultation and accommodation prior to approving or mandating settlement and development
projects on lands under Haudenosaunee claim. The fact that they were not successful, and that
both Canadian and Ontario governments demonstrated a determination to disregard, ignore and
egregiously violate Haudenosaunee international human rights and domestic rights, was a major
motivation behind the 2006 protest. The Haudenosaunee knew they were in the right, both in
this regard and in regard to the 1841 “General Surrender.”
Another issue motivating the 2006 protest was that of self-government. In 1924, in response
to the Haudenosaunee’s attempts to draw international attention to Canada’s ongoing violations
of their rights, the Canadian government outlawed the traditional Haudenosaunee Confederacy
Council and forcibly imposed upon the Haudenosaunee a federally funded, created and
controlled system of government. The Canadian government justified the move in the name of
“democracy,” but it was more apparently an anti-democratic maneuver for the purpose of
silencing the Haudenosaunee and limiting their abilities to hold Canada accountable for
violations relating to their land, resource, treaty and trust fund rights. 199 Though the forcible
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After raiding homes, arresting several chiefs, and breaking into the Haudenosaunee
Confederacy Council’s council house where the RCMP broke opened a safe and stole several
Wampum belts (treaties), the RCMP built a barracks on the reserve and announced that a “free
election” would be held to determine the new government. According to Cayuga sub-Chief
Leroy Hill, this action by Canada was seen as being so illegitimate among the Haudenosaunee
people that only 13 or 14 people voted in the election (with several voting twice to cast a total of
27 votes) (Ahooja, 2008a). The irony, of course, is that the Haudenosaunee Confederacty
Council is one of the oldest, longest-standing, continually existing participatory democracies on
earth. And, like other Native nations, it served its people far more democratically than the
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imposition of colonial systems of government upon Native peoples is technically legal under
Canada’s Indian Act, (Canada, Indian Act, 1985; Mathias & Yabsley, 1991), it is an egregious
violation of the international human right of all peoples to self-determination. 200 This
international human right is one of the founding purposes of the United Nations, as recognized in
colonial that was forcibly government imposed upon it. Despite this, Native Lands, Inc.
researcher Phil Monture has pointed out that the Haudenosaunee were experiencing a number of
problems with self-governance at the time the RCMP raided the Six Nations reserve. These
problems include various allegations of corruption among some of the traditional chiefs, and
Monture points out that there was already pressure for change among some of the
Haudenosaunee themselves. Yet, a forcibly-imposed system of government of Canada’s own
design was clearly not what was desired, as demonstrated from the numbers of people who
participated in the first (and in all subsequent) Band Council election(s) (Conversation with Phil
Monture, May, 2012).
More generally on the point about participatory democracy in Native nations’ traditional
systems of governance, Bradford Morse (quoted in Canada Senate (2010) has noted:
My experience and understanding is that, prior to the Indian Act, or where the Indian
Act regime is not applied, First Nations were global leaders in democracy. Democracy
in my mind does not mean elections with ballots; it means the voice of the people in the
selection of their leaders and in the decision-making of governments. First Nations were
extraordinarily democratic… (32)
Conversely, Indian Act governments in general have been recognized to be virtually the opposite
in terms of democracy and/or accountability to their communities, as Menno Boldt noted in the
same hearing (Canada Senate, 2010: 69):
Any analysis of power in Indian communities must take into account the important fact
that virtually all authority and funds of band/tribal councils come through [Canada’s
Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (DIAND)]. Thus, although
band/tribal chiefs and councillors must seek the vote of their people, their mandate to
govern comes from DIAND. This puts elected Indian officials (chiefs and councillors)
and the appointed bureaucrats in an inevitable position of political subordination to
DIAND officials, rather than to the people who elect and appoint them. As a
consequence of this historical status, Indian leaders’ responsiveness and accountability
to their people has not been institutionalized.
Or as Senator Gerry St. Germain has also noted (quoted in: Gooder & Powless, 2010: 1):
Under the Indian Act, electoral accountability primarily lies between the elected
officials and the minister of Indian Affairs, not between the elected officials and the
citizens.
200
Article 1 of both the ICCPR and the ICESCR, supra note 1, state that “[a]ll peoples have the
right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.” See also: Anaya, supra note 22
(“The Human Rights committee has confirmed that the self-determination provision in article 1
has bearing upon the obligations of states toward indigenous peoples under the covenant[s]”);
Vienna Convention, articles 26 & 27, supra note 8
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the United Nations Charter (1945, article 1; see also: Harvard Law School, 2010) and is also
widely considered to be customary law (law that is binding on all states regardless of whether a
state has become party to a particular agreement). 201 It has even been considered as such a
foundational human right as to be a prerequisite to the exercise of all other human rights, and
thus to be a peremptory norm (a norm from which no derogation is permitted), or a part of jus
cogens (the “compelling law” that all countries must follow). 202
Canada’s problematic record of violating the international human rights of indigenous peoples
has been well recognized. Perhaps less recognized is Canada’s violation of its own laws
pertaining to the rights of indigenous peoples. For example, the right of self-determination for
indigenous peoples has also been at least partially recognized by the Canadian government as a
right that is protected under section 35 of Canada’s Constitution (Canada, Minister of Aboriginal
Affairs and Northern Development, 1995; Joffe, 2010: 180, note 328). 203 Despite this
recognition, the Canadian government has sought to drastically limit the right of Native nations
to self-determination (Canada Minister of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development, 1995),
ignoring the fact that human rights are “inherent and inalienable” rights (Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, 1948, preamble) that cannot be limited or restricted by states or other
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Reference Re Session of Quebec [1998 at 114] (self-determination is a part of customary
international law), Joffe (2010: 133), Anaya (2004: 97-98), D’Amato (1997: 136-138) (on the
1975 Helsinki Accords having become customary international law).
202
Human Rights Council (2009 at 41) (self-determination is a prerequisite to all other human
rights); Joffe (2010: 132-33); Anaya (2004: 75); Lâm (2006 at 155) (self-determination is a
peremptory norm, or part of jus cogens).
203
Some have been more cautious in asserting that the right to self-government is recognized and
protected by section 35(1) of the Constitution, noting that this issue has not been specifically
addressed by Canadian courts (Macklem, 1982/2001: 117; RCAP, 2010: 38).
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parties. 204 Thus, the Canadian and Ontario governments’ persistent refusal to recognize the
Haudenosaunee Confederacy Council, or to engage in nation-to-nation negotiations with this
governing body, is a persistent, ongoing violation of the Haudenosaunee right to selfdetermination. This, too, was a major motivating factor behind the 2006 Haudenosaunee protest
in Caledonia. 205
A final motivating factor in the 2006 protest that must be mentioned is the combined issue of
sovereignty and jurisdiction. The Haudenosaunee Confederacy, like many other Native nations
in North America, was recognized as a sovereign, independent confederacy of nations by
Europeans who came to the Americas in search of lands and riches (Berman, 1992: 128-29, 133;
Cote, 2001: 15-16; O’Reilly, 2009: 377-78, 387; Gunn, 2007: 66; Harring, 1998: 10; Kades,
2008, note 75; Johnston, 1986: 14; Williams, 1982: 3, 5, 58, 62; McNeil, 2001-2002: 10;
Borrows, 1999). This sovereign, independent status was immortalized in nation-to-nation treaties
between these European nations and the Haudenosaunee, 206 and the Haudenosaunee insist that
they have never surrendered this sovereign nation status –whether willingly or otherwise—and
can, therefore, be nothing less than a sovereign nation today. 207 Thus, according to the
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“In international human rights instruments, human rights are recognized as inherent and
inalienable. They are not defined as contingent on State-co-operation or as requiring joint
exercise with the State,” Joffe (2010: 181).
205
It is also a violation of numerous other human rights of the Haudenosaunee, and these issues
will be considered in more detail in Chapter 4.
206
Such as the Two-Row Wampum and the Covenant Chain treaties of friendship and noninterference (Berman, 1992; Lyons, 1992; Akwesasne Notes, 2005).
207
“[W]e never surrendered to anybody. Never have. 1924 comes along and an elective system
was imposed on us. One of those reasons why they imposed that elected system on us is because
they did not want to give us an accounting of money --our money-- up and down the tract that
was embezzled from us. That money was taken and never benefited Six Nations the way our
ancestors intended it to be. We entered into an agreement of leases and sales to be held in trust
by the Crown for the benefit, for the perpetual benefit of our people, for our health and our
welfare. Instead it was used to build institutions from McGill University to the railway that cut
across Canada, all sort of things, built Canada's infrastructure on Six Nations' money. And today
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Haudenosaunee, all matters of disagreement between the Haudenosaunee and non-Native
governments in Canada –whether these governments are local, provincial or federal—need to be
resolved through nation-to-nation negotiations with the federal government.
Though Canadian law does not recognize Native sovereignty, under s. 91(24) of the Canadian
Constitution Act of 1867, the federal government is the sole Canadian governing body that has
jurisdiction over matters relating to “Indians or Lands reserved for Indians.” Thus, under
Canadian law, the federal government should have been involved in negotiations with the
Haudenosaunee in order to resolve the various problems experienced by the Haudenosaunee in
relation to their treaty, land, consultation, self-government and other human rights. What’s
more, under international law, the justifications used by Canada (as well as the United States,
Australia and New Zealand) for allegedly asserting sovereignty over Native lands and peoples
have become increasingly problematized, with several international human rights bodies calling
for the nullification of all laws that rest upon these justifications. For example, the United
Nations Economic and Social Council (1989) has condemned the legal justifications relied upon
by Canada and these other settler states as having “no legal standing,” and proclaimed that any
laws or precedents based upon these concepts must be called into question and adjusted
accordingly:
The concepts of ‘terra nullius’, ‘conquest’ and ‘discovery’ as modes of territorial
acquisition are repugnant, have no legal standing, and are entirely without merit
or justification to substantiate any claim to jurisdiction or ownership of
indigenous lands and ancestral domains, and the legacies of these concepts should
be eradicated from modern legal systems. (Para. 40b at 10)

we have to go out there and we're told, "you're no good Indians, you're living on the tax
payers....” (Mohawk Chief Allan MacNaughton, quoted in: Hughes, 2007) .There is considerable
evidence, and compelling legal argumentation, that supports this assertion of sovereignty. See
for example the discussion in Chapter 5.
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Aside from its longstanding history of relying upon “legal fictions” to justify its claims to
sovereignty over Native peoples, for more than a year prior to the 2006 protest, the federal
government consistently refused to engage in discussions with the Haudenosaunee (discussions
that might well have prevented the protest). It also refused to get involved with discussions
surrounding –or acknowledge its responsibility and sole jurisdiction to resolve— the 2006
protest until two months into the protest (when a failed police raid and mobs of angry nonNatives finally forced the federal government’s hand on the issue –at least temporarily 208). This
issue of sovereignty will be examined more thoroughly in Chapter 5.
In the face of these numerous, ongoing violations of land, resource, treaty and human rights
(which will be examined more thoroughly in Chapters 4 and 5) motivating the 2006
Haudenosaunee protest, the remainder of this dissertation will be focused on understanding how
it is that 1) Supreme Court of Canada rulings, Canadian Constitutional law, and international
human rights laws that the Canadian government is legally bound to uphold can be so
persistently, egregiously, and discriminatorily violated for one category of people within borders
of Canada; 2)
the vast majority of non-Native Canadians sit back and say nothing while this happens; 3) such
large numbers of non-Native Canadians are either passively complicit in these abuses, or are
active supporters and/or promoters of them; 4) in their complicity or active support and
promotion of these ongoing constitutional and international human rights violations, large
numbers of non-Native Canadians persist in ignoring outright Haudenosaunee grievances, and –
208

Though these events forced federal involvement in discussions/negotiations with the
Haudenosaunee traditional government aimed at resolving the protest, federal efforts to this
extent were short lived, and ended almost as soon as large-scale public attention aimed at the
2006 protest and conflict dissipated. Three years after the initial start of these talks, it seems
fairly safe to say that there have been no real talks between the federal government and the
Haudenosaunee Confederacy Council for more than a year, and likely closer to two years.
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despite mounting evidence supporting the Haudenosaunee grievances-- justify their purposeful
ignorance through negative (and sometimes outright racist) characterizations of Native peoples
as exaggerators, sore losers, opportunists, criminals, liars, terrorists, and so forth. In order to best
answer these questions, the next two chapters will take a brief detour from the specific story of
Haudenosaunee land claims, and will venture into an examination of problematic patterns of
thought and behavior that are inherent in the western worldview and that, I argue, can account
for a large potion of this willful ignorance and denial of the ongoing abuses and violations that
have been, and continue to be perpetrated against the Haudenosaunee, as well as Native peoples
throughout Canada.
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Chapter 2:
The Long History of Trauma and the Psychopathology of Western Society

It may perhaps seem at first sight an unnecessary complication to investigate the
genesis of each historical formation. But since every historical phenomenon,
human attitudes as much as social institutions, did actually once ‘develop’, how
can modes of thought prove either simple or adequate in explaining these
phenomena if, by a kind of artificial abstraction, they isolate the phenomena from
their natural, historical flow, deprive them of their character as movement and
process, and try to understand them as static formations without regard to the
way in which they have come into being and change? … The psychogenesis of
the adult makeup in civilized society cannot, therefore, be understood if
considered independently of the sociogenesis of our ‘civilization’. By a kind of
basic ‘sociogenetic law’ the individual, in his short history, passes once more
through some of the processes that his society has traversed in its long history.
~ Elias 1998, 43, 42
We are not less the offspring of our ancestors because their bodies have been
buried. Our society, like all others, is the product of its entire antecedent history,
with all the human generators thereof. …. Despite the real pitfalls of historical
moralizing, the logic seems plain that what we approve in past conduct will be
repeated in the future.
~ Jennings 1976, vii
If you know your history,
Then you would know where you’re coming from.
Then you wouldn’t have to ask me,
Just who the hell do I think I am.
~ Marley 2002
In his work on the “civilizing process,” Norbert Elias argued that this process, as it occurred in
the history of any society, is passed down to each individual in that society through the
socializing process. In this latter process, the whole history of one’s society and culture is
reproduced, in abbreviated form, and internalized in the individual (Elias, 1998: 41-42, 53-54).
Thus, what each person does in any given situation is not simply a product of the choices that a
person makes in the moment, i.e., it is not merely a produce of responses personal, innate
feelings of pleasure or displeasure (Elias, 1998: 53). Rather, these choices reflect the imprint of
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society on the inner self, and must be contextualized within the historical sociogenesis of one’s
society, as well as the manner through which these processes were reproduced by others, and
internalized by the individual, in his or her lifelong socialization process (Elias, 1998: 41-42, 5354). According to Elias, these sociohistorical processes are so fundamental to the development
and operations of society and the individuals within it that they should be considered as “a
fundamental law of sociogenesis and psychogenesis” (Elias, 1998: 54).
Though these sociohistorical patterns are of such fundamental importance in determining all
that a society and its members are and do, Elias (1998: 49-50) also notes that once these patterns
are established in a given society, they no longer remain in the consciousness of that society or
its members. For example, though they generally believe Western society to be superior to other
societies and cultures, few Westerners would link this belief to their own sociohistorical
“civilizing” process; nor would they link to these processes their “ritualized or institutionalized
feelings” of disgust, shame, displeasure, fear, or distaste that are often provoked by the behaviors
of Westerner or non-Westerner “others” who were differently socialized (Elias, 1998: 53-54).
Both of these unconscious processes can be observed in recent comments made by Oprah
Winfrey on her recent tour of India. When Winfrey managed to offend a whole country with her
remarks on international television that “I heard some people in India eat with their hands still?”
(Sergio, 2012; Sen, 2012), she was, unfortunately, unconscious of the sociohistorical processes
linking Western assumptions of superiority to the “rise of the fork” in Western society (Elias,
1998: 51-54). As a result, she generalized to the whole world her own society’s preferences, and
her own society’s views of “progress” and “civilization.” In her obliviousness to these
sociohistorical processes, she failed to predict the offended response that she would provoke
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among an entire nation, enraged that it needed to defend its own equally valid traditions against
Western ignorance (Sergio, 2012; Sen, 2012).
Like Oprah, many non-Native residents responding to the 2006 Haudenosaunee protest were
unconsciously reproducing patterns of thought and behavior that had long ago been established
in Western society and into which they had been socialized. The impact of these processes of
sociogenesis and psychogenesis is profound, and since these processes are constantly,
unconsciously reproduced, “so long as the structure of human relations is not fundamentally
altered” (Elias, 1998: 53), it should be clear, as Elias argued, that we need to understand these
past processes –and bring them to consciousness—if we are to understand our own societies and
the behaviors of individuals within them (and especially if we wish to change them). To this
extent, this chapter will provide an overview of some of the problematic patterns of thought and
behavior that have long been prevalent in Western society for the purpose of gaining a better
understanding of the range of non-Native (government and resident) responses to the 2006
Haudenosaunee protest (which will be examined in chapters 4 and 6). Once identified, many of
these problematic patterns of thought and behavior will be traced back to various points in the
history of Western society.
Aside from identifying these patterns, I argue that many of the sociohistorical processes
associated with these problematic patterns of thought and behavior –as with the Western
“civilizing process” as a whole-- were highly traumatizing to individuals and to Western society
in its entirety. As such, many of the problematic patterns of thought and behavior that arose out
of these processes reflect various attempts to cope with these repeated, severely traumatizing
events, often through repression and denial rather than through acknowledgement and healing.
Western society’s failures to recognize these events as traumatizing and/or to “work through,”
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resolve, and heal from these past traumatic events, has resulted in massive, societal and
individual, transgenerational trauma, and has led to the institutionalization and ritualization of
unhealthy, and even psychopathological, coping mechanisms. These coping mechanisms have
been so widespread in Western society for so long as to constitute not only integral parts of
Western society and the Western cultural worldview, but to form the very essence of this society
and cultural worldview, and the very foundation upon which these have been built. Their
understanding is, therefore, of utmost importance in understanding how and why many (but not
all) non-Native residents responded to the 2006 Haudenosaunee protest in the unhealthy ways
that they did, as will be discussed further in chapter 6. However, it is important to note, here,
that the argument that follows here and in chapter 6 is not that the people are psychopathological,
it is that their society is.
PROBLEMATIC PATTERNS OF THOUGHT AND BEHAVIOR IN THE WESTERN
CULTURAL WORLDVIEW
[T]he understanding of the racial question does not ultimately involve
understanding by either blacks or Indians. It involves the white man himself. He
must examine his past. He must face the problems he has created within himself
and within others. The white man must no longer project his fears and
insecurities onto other groups, races and countries. Before the white man can
relate to others he must forego the pleasure of defining them. The white man must
learn to stop viewing history as a plot against himself.
~Deloria 1969, 175
In Hitler’s Willing Executioners Daniel Goldhagen asks, How could average,
everyday ordinary churchgoing Germans, who we all know were fully
acculturated twentieth-century Western civilization people, get u in the morning,
walk outside, shoot women and children in cold blood, and then come back in the
evening and have supper as though they were doing nothing more than making
widgets? How could people act in such a cold-blooded manner? Well, all we
have to do is follow the real story of Western civilization and we’ll see that there
has been episode after episode of people getting up in the morning, going out and
murdering people.”
~ Mohawk 1997
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In his new book, Civilization: the West and the Rest, Niall Ferguson (2011) argues that Western
civilization came to dominate the world because it developed of six “complexes of institutions
and associated ideas and behaviors” that other societies and cultures lacked: competition,
science, medicine, property law, consumption and the Western work ethic (Ferguson, 2011: 12).
Though Ferguson presents his book as being “not a history of the West but a history of world, in
which Western dominance is the phenomenon to be explained”(p. xxv), he quickly dismisses the
bulk of non-Western human societies and their histories as irrelevant, 209 and approaches his topic
in the same Western-centric fashion as generations of Western scholars before him. 210 As such,
Ferguson fails to interrogate one of the basic assumptions made by Western-centric thinkers –
i.e., the assumption that, because Western society launched imperialistic, colonial, and genocidal
ventures that decimated entire populations and cultures in the pursuit of wealth and world
domination, it must be true that all societies would have wanted to do this, but were simply
incapable of doing so due to inferiority or weakness. 211 This assumption is illustrated early on,
as Ferguson asserts in his preface that his book “offers a meta-narrative of why one civilization
transcended the constraints that had bound all previous ones,” which had been “incapable of
providing their inhabitants with any sustained improvement in the material quality of their lives”
(pp. xxv-xxvii [emphasis added]). But in failing to interrogate this assumption (or even recognize
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Ferguson notes that the earth’s population today makes up less than 7% --or 1 out of 14-- of
all human beings who have ever lived, and wisely warns his readers that “we ignore the
accumulated experience of such a huge majority of mankind at our own peril”(p. xix. See also
pp. xviii-xx). However, he quickly dismisses the bulk of this accumulated experience (and the
rich oral histories of surviving indigenous societies) when he argues that history is only
concerned with civilizations “because without written records the historian is thrown back on
spearheads and pot fragments, from which much less can be inferred” (p. xxvii).
210
Including the Sociology greats: Max Weber, Emile Durkheim and Karl Marx.
211
See, for example, Ferguson: “[I]t was not just Western superiority that led to the conquest and
colonization of so much of the rest of the world; it was also the fortuitous weakness of the
West’s rivals”(p. 13).
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it as an assumption) Ferguson fails to recognize that he is projecting the dominant cultural values
of the present onto past (as well as present-day) non-Western societies. In other words, he is
engaging in the cultural-centric historical revision, common among dominant groups, that was
recognized and problematized by Stanley Diamond (1974) decades before, when he noted that:
“as civilization accelerates, its proponents project their historical present as the progressive
destiny of the entire human race” (p. 1).
While certainly it is true that the Western world spent centuries developing the mentality, the
behavior patterns, and the most efficient and effective technology and techniques for conquering,
dominating, destroying, massacring, and exploiting lands and peoples all around the world, it is
not at all the case that the bulk of humanity or the vast majority of human societies had ever
desired or attempted to achieve such goals. In fact, evidence to the contrary abounds. 212 For
example, despite the general assumption that other societies were simply too weak or too inferior
to the West to achieve world dominance, the technologically more advanced Chinese sailed
around the world at least as early as 1424 --more than half a century before Columbus. They did
so not for the purpose of dominating, colonizing, enslaving, massacring and/or forcibly
exploiting other lands and peoples, but for the purpose of establishing networks of mutually
beneficial trade with the peoples of Africa, the Americas, and Australia. The type of atrocities
and destruction characteristic of Western ventures was nowhere a part of the Chinese mentality
or behavior in their own ventures (Menzies, 2004). 213 And contrary to Ferguson’s assertions that
non-Western cultures were simply “incapable of providing their inhabitants with any sustained
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As Diamond (1974: 18) notes, “Whatever else we may say about men as political beings, it is
clear that the great majority of them have viewed the exercise of political power as either
irrelevant to, or destructive of their daily concerns.”
213
Ironically, in their travels around the world the Chinese avoided Europe entirely, viewing
Europeans as backward people who had nothing of value to offer in trade.
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improvement in the material quality of their lives,” throughout the Americas the majority of
human societies were self-sufficient and self-sustaining societies whose members enjoyed a
higher quality of life than many Europeans at the time (Mann, 2005; Diamond, 1974; Drinnon,
1990; Canny, 1979; Williams, 1982; Jennings, 1976; Mohawk, 1992: 143-45). In fact, the
disparity between the quality of life among Native peoples in the Americas and the European
colonists who settled there was so great that colonists constantly fled to live among Native
societies, and even colonial efforts to impose martial law and/or to hunt down and execute
deserters (as a warning to the rest of the colonists) failed to deter further desertion (Drinnon,
1990: xxv, 30; Canny, 1979: 30-34). This sort of widespread desertion from European colonial
ventures to Native societies was not limited to European ventures in the Americas, but was also a
factor in Ireland and, more generally, everywhere Europeans had an opportunity to closely
interact with members of indigenous societies (Diamond, 1974; Canny, 1979). Meanwhile,
Native peoples persistently refused not only to live in European settlements, but to adopt
virtually any aspects of European culture; and they did so not because they were unable to
comprehend the vastly superior world of the European, but because their own cultural
worldviews existed in complete opposition to many, if not most, European patterns of thinking
and behaving in the world. 214 (This included the shocking and appalling European practice of
attacking and indiscriminately massacring entire villages 215). As Black Elk (1983) notes:
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Rousseau was among those who observed this phenomenon, noting that:
It is an extremely remarkable thing for all the years that Europeans have been
tormenting themselves to bring the savages of the various countries in the world to their
way of life that they have not yet been able to win over a single one, not even with the
aid of Christianity; our missionaries sometimes make Christians of them, but never
civilized men. Nothing can overcome the invincible repugnance they have of adopting
our morals and living in our way. If these savages are as unhappy as it is claimed, they
are, by what inconceivable depravity of judgment do they constantly refuse to civilize
themselves by imitating us or to learn to live happily among us—whereas one finds in a
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Now, none of these “enlightened” Europeans ever got around to asking the
savages whether there might, in fact be a reason why Natives fancied using stone
tools and such. … And so it has become a tradition in Europe to view virtually
everyone else as underdeveloped, backward…. The standard of measure seems to
me to be that the more compulsive a culture can become in terms of gathering up
and rearranging material, the more “advanced” it is considered to be. The more
relaxed, at peace, and willing to leave material things (beyond real needs) alone a
culture can be shown to be, the more “backward” it is considered. … I mean,
consider the implications of a tradition which compels its people to march across
half a continent, engage in a major war to steal the land from my people, engage
in genocide in order to preserve their conquest, and all primarily so they can dig
gold out of a small portion of that land, transport it back across the continent, and
bury it again at Ft. Knox! The virulence of the disease Sitting bull spoke of is
truly staggering (P. 143-45)
Ferguson is not unique among Western scholars in his one-sided, self-congratulatory
glorification of Western society, his downplaying of its more problematic aspects, 216 his
warnings against “romanticizing” (i.e., finding anything good about) non-Western cultures,
and/or in his complete disregard for non-Western, non-Empire forms of human societies –i.e.,

thousand places that … Europeans have voluntarily taken refuge among these natives,
spent their entire lives there, no longer able to leave such a strange way of life….
(quoted in Diamond, 1974: 24-25).
See also: Drinnon (1990), Means (1983), Deloria (1972), Mohawk (1992), Mann (2005).
215
Mann (2005: 60) notes Native peoples’ “unwillingness to match the European tactic of
massacring whole villages,” and more generally writes about the incompatibility of European
ways with Native cultures. Jennings (1976: 147-170) compares Native forms of warfare to
European forms of warfare; and Black Elk (1983: 141-42) mentions that Native societies treated
warfare more as a sport, in that they did not wantonly slaughter other peoples.
216
For example, Ferguson appears to present the massive-scale genocide perpetrated upon the
indigenous peoples of Africa, the Americas and Australasia as having been a conquering and
conversion to the Western way of life that was “achieved ultimately more by the word than by
the sword” (p. 5). At the same time, he criticizes the West’s ongoing conquests via the war in
Afghanistan and Iraq not on the basis that both are immoral wars causing incalculable
destruction of innocent lives, homes and infrastructure, but on the basis that there is not more
manpower, enthusiasm, and funding for the wars (pp. xvi-xvii). He also argues that the “days of
Western predominance are numbered” --not because Western society is an unsustainable society
that has destroyed its own economies and is destroying the planet and all life on it, but because
“the Rest” have now adopted Western ways (once monopolized by the West), and the latter “has
literally lost faith in itself.”(Quoted from the dust jacket description of the book).
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the bulk of all human societies that have ever existed. 217 By persisting in this blindly selfaggrandizing, and solipsistic form of analysis, Ferguson (like Western scholars more generally)
also –and perhaps more importantly-- fails to question the mentality, morality and wisdom of a
culture that both desired and proceeded to engage in what was perhaps the most massive
campaigns of genocide and atrocities the world has ever known–killing as efficiently and
effectively as the technology would allow at the time, all in order to further its greed for wealth
and power. 218 Yet this, above all else, is what needs to be interrogated, particularly since the
morality, mentality and wisdom of Western culture has changed very little since that time, while
its capacity for destroying all life on the planet has increased exponentially.
The rest of this section will be concerned with examining some of the problematic patterns of
thought and behavior endemic to the Western cultural worldview. In the spirit of departing from
the widespread, longstanding self-aggrandizement of Western culture, much of the following
discussion will be somewhat critical of these patterns of thinking and behaving in Western
society and the Western cultural worldview, and will focus on creating a framework for Western
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In almost the same breath that Ferguson dismisses the bulk of humanity’s historical
experience, he warns his readers against “the temptation to romanticize history’s losers” (p.
xxvi), which, given his dismissal, appears to be an effort to discourage any examinations of these
other societies: finding anything good about them at all is immediately equated with
“romanticizing” them.
218
“Nothing was more destructive of man than the early settlements on this continent.” (Deloria,
1969: 177-78). “The destruction of the Indians of the Americas was, far and away, the most
massive act of genocide in the history of the world” (Stannard, 1992: 3). Stannard holds that 8
million Native peoples were killed within the first 21 years of Columbus’ appearance in the
Caribbean, and that 90-95% --or about 19 out of every 20-- of the tens of millions (if not more
than a hundred million –see Mann [2005: 102]) of people living in the Americas at that time
were killed over the proceeding centuries. Mann (2005: 101) further cites a mortality rate of
95% in the first 130 years of European “contact”/invasion. Both Mann (2005: 102) and
Stanndard (1992: 33) state that central Mexico, alone, had a population of more than 25 million.
While many accounts of Native population decline downplay the role of human violence in this
mass genocide, other accounts do not. In addition to the above sources, see also: Hanke (1959),
Todorov (1982), Drinnon (1990), Mohawk (2000 & 1997), Trudell (2003 & 2001, track 18).
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society’s critical self-reflection –a long-avoided pattern that is desperately needed in this time of
unprecedented extinction and destruction. As will be demonstrated, many of these patterns, on
their own or in interaction with other patterns, involve self-reinforcing rationalizations that have
long kept westerners from critically and realistically evaluating the true impact of their society
on themselves and the rest of the world.
Before beginning, it seems worthwhile to make two quick notations. First, because all of
these patterns overlap, interrelate and reinforce each other, the full impact of any one of them
cannot be fully understood without also understanding all of the other patterns and their
interactions and interrelations. As such, it is difficult to separate and isolate these problematic
patterns from each other and/or from the context of their cultural worldview. However, since the
separation of individual phenomena from the contexts in which they occur and from other
phenomena to which they are inextricably bound, and the examination of these extracted and
decontextualized phenomena in isolation, is a fairly long-standing requirement of academic,
scientific and other work within the Western cultural worldview, I will do my best to draw out
certain of these patterns that are of predominant interest in this story and to examine them
separately.
Second, it seems worthwhile to note that, because the Christian church was such an influential
force in the history of the West and in the formation of the Western cultural worldview, many
parts of this examination will be concerned with various actions and/or trends within or by the
Christian church which contributed to these less than positive patterns of thinking and behaving
in the Western worldview. The focus on, and criticism of, the many immoral undertakings by
the Christian church is not intended as an attack on or a blanket dismissal of Christianity,
Christians, or any derivative religion and its members. Certainly, many constructive and positive
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initiatives have been undertaken by Christians (though it is somewhat less clearly the case for the
institutionalized Christian Church as a whole). Therefore, in all of the following discussion, it is
only my intent to begin the above-mentioned process of critical self-reflection, something which,
though fairly uncommon within Western society, is urgently needed and should not be seen as
contrary to the interests of the majority of people, groups, and religions within any society. As a
prominent Christian leader once noted, in a statement that applies equally well to Western
society as it does to Christianity:
If you want to make religion a constructive force in society, religions must begin
with an honest admission of those moments when they haven’t been a
constructive force, when they’ve been a destructive force. And the thing that
frustrates me to no end is when religious leaders get up and give the impression
that religion has always been on the side of good and virtue. It hasn’t. Let’s be
honest (Father John Pawlikowski, President, International Council of Christians
and Jews, quoted in: Carroll, 2007).
Indeed, let’s be honest.

Social Relations of Domination
[D]omination is increasingly a matter of colonizing the internal world of the
dominated classes, a feat that cannot be accomplished by force but only through
messages, codes and the dissemination of images and information. … Put simply,
domination requires the establishment of an entire way of life as standard and
expected, the identification of the dominated with the dominators, and the subtle
establishment of the prevailing ideology as natural and inevitable, indeed
commonsensical. When domination reaches the internal world of the actors,
resistance is almost unthinkable. …[T]he power holding people to the existing
system is deep and multileveled, and… we often obey as a matter of reflect for the
simple reason that our very identities are formed by the dominant framework to
the extent that we are powerless to do anything else.
~ Litowitz 2000, 524, 528, 529
The methods of establishing control over another person are based upon the
systematic, repetitive infliction of psychological trauma. They are the organized
techniques of disempowerment and disconnection. Methods of psychological
control are designed to instill terror and helplessness and to destroy the victim’s
sense of self in relation to others.
~ Herman 1992, 77
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You cannot enslave a mind that knows itself, that values itself, that understands
itself.
~Wangari Maathai, quoted in Hytrek 2012, 87
Social relations of domination are not unique to Western culture. Expressed through hierarchical
social relations in which a relatively small portion of the population exercises military, political,
economic, social, religious and/or other forms of control over the remainder of people within a
given area, social relations of domination have been present in many cultures and societies
throughout history, and have been present in every large-scale society that has existed. Such
relations are foundational elements in the Western cultural worldview, in large part because
Western culture is a result of, and has been built upon, the conquest, destruction and
homogenization of other cultures. This was true throughout the Mediterranean by the rise of the
Greek city-states, where successive waves of conquest for trade, wealth, and/or power had
completely destroyed local cultures and made any continuity of culture impossible (Mohawk,
1997). This was also true throughout Western Europe by the late Middle Ages, when centuries of
Crusades, Inquisitions and witch-hunts successfully, and quite purposefully, destroyed virtually
all of that remained of these cultures; 219 tortured and killed (as heretics, heathens, witches, etc.)
all who resisted; and consolidated all people under the centralized, hierarchical domination of
monarchs and the Church. This was true during the European invasion and colonization of much
of the world from the fifteenth to nineteenth centuries, when (often privately-funded) explorers
plundered indigenous peoples for land, resources, slaves, and anything else that could be turned
into fame and fortune; and when missionaries moved in an attempt to convert (not infrequently
by force) whoever remained after the plunder. And this remains true today, as Western societies
219

There are still some remaining pockets of indigenous peoples in Western Europe who have
managed to continue their traditional cultures, such as the Sami people in northern Europe, who
live in areas inhospitable enough as to not have been appealing to would-be conquerors.
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continue to rely on the forcible exploitation of land, resources and labor abroad, and Western
settler states, intent on existing or expanding through the forcible expropriation of indigenous
lands and resources, continue policies and practices at home that perpetuate the disruption and
destruction of the remaining indigenous cultures.

Universalism: Acceptance, Domination, and Rejection
Every culture, every class, every century, constructs its distinctive alibis for
aggression. …[T]raditional reasons why certain pugnacious activities are
appropriate, ethical, even commanded by nature, amounts to a recognizable
cultural style.
~ Gay 1993, 35
[In hierarchical social relations of domination] each new class which puts itself
in the place of one ruling before it, is compelled, merely in order to carry through
its aim, to represent its interest as the common interest of all the members of
society, that is, expressed in ideal form: it has to give its ideas the forms of
universality, and represent them as the only rational, universally valid ones.
~ Marx 1972, 138
With some exceptions, 220 the homogenization or transformation of culture throughout the ancient
period and the early Middle Ages was not the purpose of the successive waves of conquest that
destroyed local cultures of Western Europe (Diamond, 1974; White, 1961). 221 Even though
some of these early campaigns of organized, armed aggression were undertaken for the purpose
of the expansion of societies that had outgrown their own territories, or the expansion of the
power of an aspiring king or emperor, they were also just as frequently undertaken for the sole
220

Such as the Moorish attempt to conquer the Franks in the early Middle Ages, and likely there
are earlier examples as well.
221
“[C]ivilizations other than that of the contemporary West have been ethnocentric, imagining
themselves to represent the height of human achievement. The Egyptians, Chinese, Greeks,
medieval Islam, the Romans, the Feudal European church, all defined themselves as peerless, a
notion that was concentrated in but by no means confined to the upper strata of their respective
societies. But the purpose of imperialism, as engaged in by pre-industrial societies, was political
and economic control. Other cultures may have been judged strange or inferior, but it was not
explicitly assumed that the imperial mission was to transform society in the image of the
dominant power, even when that occurred to some degree” (Diamond, 1974: 36).
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purpose of plundering wealth and resources, and possibly capturing humans as slaves. Peoples
conquered by expanding societies were often able to continue practicing their own cultures and
religions (or what remained of them), so long as they paid taxes or whatever else was required to
the conqueror(s). This was true under the Roman Empire, where conquered peoples, particularly
those in the rural and outlying regions, often continued to practice their own cultures, follow
their own laws, and worship their own gods through their own forms of religion --so long as, or
to the extent that, these were not seen as a threat to Rome, and so long as they also made
sacrifices to the Roman Gods and fulfilled the other requirements of Empire (Keal, 2003: 69;
Tigar & Levy, 2000: 27-28, 34-37; Osborne, 2006: 114-17; Mohawk, 2000: 48, 52-61). Though
Roman society did have some provisions allowing for former enemies to become citizens of
Rome, or for non-Romans to make claims generally reserved for citizens under Roman law, the
universalism present in the Western cultural worldview can be best attributed to Christianity.
One of the earliest interpretations of the teachings of Jesus Christ envisioned two distinct
forms of universalism that the Western cultural worldview has long since conflated and been
unable to separate. The first was a universalism that accepted anyone and everyone who wished
to be included in the Christian Church. Many Christians at the time were opposed to this sort of
universalism, since it opened the religion to non-Jews. The second was a universalism that was
applied to everyone who joined Christianity and, later, even to people who did not. Under this
second type of universalism, first envisioned by Paul, all Christians were required to follow a
single doctrine which dictated how people were to worship and what rules people were to follow.
This was a universalism of domination and, for Paul, failure to follow this code of behavior and
thought would result in ejection from the Church, as well as eternal damnation. In other words,
this was a universalism of judgment and rejection for the slightest deviation from domination.
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Though, as Osborne (2006) wrote, “[t]here was no obvious reason why Christian communities
should not practice their religion in their own way… Paul was determined that this should not
happen”(p. 117. See also pp. 118-19).
It is unclear whether Paul noticed the contradictions in positing, on the one hand, an accepting
and inclusive religion that allowed people of any social class or circumstance to join and, on the
other hand, a judgmental and rejecting religion that ejected people outright for deviations in
thought or deed from the expected protocol. If he did, that didn’t stop him from creating rules in
his doctrine of a universally-accepting religion that were not universally accepting at all. For
example, at a time when women were working in virtually all professions and holding positions
of status in both Roman society and the early Christian church, Paul created rules of sexual
behavior which deemed women as temptresses who should thus be submissive and quiet in
church (Osborne, 2006: 118).
Regardless of what Paul thought (or didn’t think) about these contradictions, they likely
didn’t matter much during the early years of Christianity. During its first few centuries, when
followers of Christianity were periodically persecuted, there were so many different sects --each
with its own ideas and practices regarding worship under the Christian faith—as to make
unlikely Paul’s vision of uniting (or, perhaps, conquering) all followers under a single doctrine
(Osborne, 2006: 113-33). This changed, however, with the religion’s legalization and then
institutionalization as the official (and only legal) religion of the Empire (Mohawk, 2000: 64).
With this, the religion was transformed from the egalitarian reform movement that had originally
“exhibited an ability to respect women, nature and people of varying cultures”(Mohawk, 2000:
64), to a hierarchical and authoritarian tool of empire-building (or preservation) that quickly
became oppressive towards various categories of people and life (Mohawk, 2000: 64, 66-70;
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Osborne, 2006: 122). Women were deemed unclean, their sexuality a threat to male spirituality,
and they were expelled from church ritual duties (Mohawk, 2000: 64, Federici, 2004: 37).
Peoples of other faiths were “demonized as agents of Satan whose objectives were … the
conquest of the minds of all people,” and the Church set out on its own such conquest, punishing
the practice of other religions under penalty of death (Mohawk, 2000: 64). And even the natural
world was reconceptualized, under Aristotelian ideas incorporated into Christianity around the
fourth century B.C.E., as a hierarchy of living creatures created for the use and abuse of humans
(Serpell, 1999: 44). 222 As these views became institutionalized in the religion, the universalism
of acceptance and inclusion became deeply intertwined with the universalism of domination,
judgment and rejection. The Western cultural worldview has not been able to separate these two
concepts since.

Dualism, Separation, and Alienation
Newton “revolutionized” physics and the so-called natural sciences by reducing
the physical universe to a linear mathematical equation. Descartes did the same
thing with culture. John Locke did it with politics and Adam Smith did it with
economics. Each one of these “thinkers” took a piece of the spirituality of human
existence and converted it into a code, an abstraction. … Hegel finished the
process of secularizing theology –and that is put in his own terms; he secularized
the religious thinking through which Europe understood the universe. Then Marx
put Hegel’s philosophy into terms of “materialism.” That is to say, Marx
despiritualized Hegel’s work altogether. Again, this is in Marx’s own terms. And
this is now seen as the future revolutionary potential of Europe. … Christians,
capitalists, Marxists, all of them have been revolutionary in their own minds. But
none of them really mean revolution. What they really mean is a continuation.
They do what they do in order that European culture can continue to exist and
develop according to its needs. … [E]very revolution in European history has
served to reinforce Europe’s tendencies and abilities to export destruction to
222

The idea of the separation of man from all other living things and the natural world was also a
part of Paul’s doctrine, which, along with the separation of man from woman, he had adopted
frmo the Old Testament, reportedly in an attempt to make the religion more appealing to Jews
(Osborne, 2006: 118-119).
127

other peoples, other cultures and the environment itself. I defy anyone to point to
an example where this isn’t true.
~ Means 1983, 21, 26, 24
Nothing can be truly understood except in relation to everything else. Thus, the
universe can be understood as a total of all its parts, but the understanding of any
of the parts does not produce an understanding of the universe. In fact, unless the
interaction of the universe is understood, a true understanding of any single part
within it can never really be arrived at.
~ Black Elk 1983, 147
Social relations of domination always necessarily involve some degree of dualism and
separation. One can only be dominant in relation to others who are subordinate, and one can
only be superior in relation to others who are inferior. But dualism and separation in Western
culture developed historically into a much more extreme form than that which was practiced, or
even contemplated, in many other cultures, including large-scale, hierarchical societies. For
example, Mies (1986) (relying heavily on Merchant [1989]) argues that, while patriarchal
societies in China, India, and Arabia exhibited some separation between man and woman, human
and nature, and conquerors and conquered peoples, this separation was nowhere near complete:
In the old patriarchies (China, Indian, Arabia), men could not conceive of
themselves as totally independent from Mother Earth. Even the conquered and
subjected peoples, slaves, pariahs, etc., were still visibly present and were not
thought of as outside the oikos or the ‘economy’ (the hierarchically structured
social universe which was seen as a living organism). And women, though they
were exploited and subordinated, were crucially important as mothers or sons for
all patriarchs (P. 74-75)
Some supporting evidence for these assertions can be found in Menzies (2004), who notes
that the Chinese sailed around the world at least as early as 1421 for the purpose of establishing
mutually beneficial and respectful trade relations with the coastal peoples of Africa, North and
South America, and Australia. In establishing these mutually respectful relations, the possibility
of dominating and subjugating other peoples was nowhere a part of the mentality or actions of
the Chinese. Similarly, White (1961) has argued that while colonization in ancient Greece
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changed local cultures, often making them dependent upon the city-states that colonized them,
the main point of this colonization was to establish trade relations. As such, colonies were often
not undertaken in areas where there was considerable opposition among local cultures. The idea
that colonized or conquered peoples were not conceptualized as being completely separate from
the conquering peoples is also present to some extent in the works of Diamond (1974: 5),
Mohawk (2000: 48), and Keal (2003: 69). 223 And according to Serpell (1999) the idea that
humans were connected to the natural world and needed to treat animals with an ethic of respect
and avoid their unnecessary suffering had been a consistent fixture in human societies for over
500,000 years, and “[i]n all of the ancient agrarian civilizations –Greece, Egypt, Mesopotamia,
Assyria, and Indian—the killing of animals in a nonsacrificial manner was considered a crime
morally equivalent to manslaughter” (pp. 44-45).
Merchant (1989), Mies (1986: 74-75), and Mohawk (1997) all suggest that the change --this
separation-- in Western society took place in the modern era, with the rise of science and
technology, and with the beginning of European expansion around the world. But this separation
actually developed in a much earlier period --the end of the fourth and beginning of the fifth
centuries—when St. Augustine integrated the ideas of Paul and Aristotle into his writings and the
teachings of the Church. 224 It continued throughout the early Middle Ages and into the
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The former of whom notes: “In the beginning, conquest and domestic oppression were
indistinguishable. As the earliest societies that bean to consolidate as states expanded
territorially, local peoples were conquered and incorporated as lower-class subjects or slaves into
the evolving polity. We find this pattern everywhere….”(p. 5).
224
Osborne (2006: 122) notes that previous scholars –both in Greece and Rome-- had integrated
the ideas of Aristotle and other Greek philosophers (as well as ideas from other cultures) into
Christianity. Likewise, Serpell (1999: 45) does not specifically attribute this shift to Augustine,
but states that these changes took place around the 4th century with the integration of Aristotle’s
writings into the religion. However, Osborne (2006) also notes that “apart from the Bible,
Augustine’s City of God was the most widely read book in medieval Europe”(p. 114), and
Mohawk (2000: 68-70), Serpell (1999: 45), and Osborne (2006: 113-133) have attributed the
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present. 225 As already noted above, the ideas adopted and promoted by Augustine included the
idea that women were inferior to men and, as tempters of men, were unclean and even unholy;
that some people (perhaps the majority of people) were natural slaves; that people of other faiths
were suspect, if not evil; and that the natural world existed for the use and abuse of human
beings.
However, Augustine moved beyond the separations in Aristotle’s philosophy, and set the
stage for much of the brutality, inhumanity and dehumanization that was to come in later
centuries when he promoted two additional ideas. The first was the idea of the existence of a
separate class of humans. Augustine argued not only that some humans were natural slaves, but
that some people, like dwarfs, giants and wild men, if they existed, were not human at all, or at
least were not descendants of Adam (Drinnon, 1990: 51). With this argument, Augustine
demonstrated a willingness to dehumanize categories of people he had never before encountered,
investigated, or spoken to, simply on the basis of a hypothetical difference in appearance and/or
in life style. The second was a combination of the ideas that “an abstract entity called ‘evil’”
existed in opposition to that entity called ‘good’ (Osborne, 2006: 127, 129); that all of humanity
was inherently evil, as evidenced by the sins of Adam and Eve; and that an omnipotent and
promotion of various of the above-discussed ideas to Augustine. So I have here attributed to him
the integration of these ideas into Chirstianity. He was not the first writer to introduce many of
these ideas into Christianity, but he was likely the most influential in his time and throughout the
early Middle Ages. Though there is some evidence that many of the ideas integrated into the
Bible were borrowed from other cultures, at this point in time these ideas, adopted into Western
thinking, also became Western ideas.
225
On the regulation of women and sexuality being propagated in the teachings of the Church
throughout this period, see Federicci (2004: 37-38). Similarly, Serpell (1999) presents the shift
away from humane treatment of animals, which began in the fourth century, as a shift that
continued throughout this period and into modernity. In addition, as mentioned in the note above,
Augustine’s book City of God was the second most popular book read throughout the early
Middle Ages, next to the Bible –which suggests that these ideas continued to have considerable
relevance, though circumstances of the period prevented their implementation on the scale that
science and technology has made possible today.
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vengeful God had divided humanity into ‘the good’ (those select few who were sent to earth to
do special works, lived in the City of God/ Jerusalem and were predestined to survive judgment
day 226) and ‘the evil’ (those who lived in the city of Evil/ Babylon, and were predestined to be
destroyed on judgment day) (Mohawk, 2000: 69; Osborne, 2006: 130-32). Because good and evil
was in every human, a person, according to Augustine, needed “to live through the good in his
soul and mind,” and separate himself from the evil of his “thoughts, deeds and desires of flesh,”
which could then be made inert (Osborne, 2006: 132, 127; see also, 113-33). And because man’s
fate was already predestined, “the role of the true Christian was to fear God, to suffer, and to
await his judgment” (Osborne, 2006: 132), while living in unquestioning submission to the
Church authorities –the only humans on earth who could influence the outcome (Mohawk, 2000:
68-69). 227
Thus, through this logic, Christian man was to actively strive to separate himself from, and
repress, significant parts of himself –i.e., those parts deemed evil, and those parts constituting
his free will. The latter was to be replaced by the absolute submission to other human beings.
Because Augustine saw these human beings (Church officials) as having a special ability to
communicate with and interpret the word of God, Christian man was also separated from, and
subordinated to, them, and thus the Church (Mohawk, 2000: 70). 228 Hence, in addition to
Christian man’s separation from woman, non-Christian peoples, and the natural world; by the
early fifth century Christian man was also separated from himself, the Church was separated
from Christian man, and the word of God was separated from God.
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Presumably, of the two categories that Augustine created, he saw himself falling into this one.
With these arguments, St. Augustine successfully had the proponent of free will, Pelaguis,
excommunicated from the Church.
228
In some cases only Church authorities were allowed to read the Bible.
227
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Universal Intolerance, Dehumanization and Rewriting “the Word of God”
‘[T]here may not be so much difference between the anti-Semite and the
democrat. The former wishes to destroy him as a man and leave nothing in him
but the Jew, the pariah, the untouchable; the latter wishes to destroy him as a Jew
and leave nothing in him but the man, the abstract and universal subject of the
rights of man and the rights of the citizen.’ In both cases the oppressor is
unwilling to recognize and accept a human difference. What the self-righteous
person cannot tolerate is inaction toward evil. “To live and let live” is, for him,
not a prescription for decent human relations but a pact with the devil.
~ Szasz 1970, 272 (quoting Sartre, 1977: 57)
They see only one truth: their truth. Human beings must become like them, think
like them and adopt their values, which they insist are universal, or be banished
from civilized society. All other values, which they never investigate or examine,
are dismissed.
~ Hedges 2009, 7
Bombs over Baghdad
New World Order is an Old World lie.
Fighting for “peace,” watch them all die.
Dragging in God, as they turn violent
God says nothing. He just remains silent.
~ Trudell 1992, track 6
If the institutionalization of Christianity made the Church a tool of Empire-building, the fall of
Rome made it an inheritor of Empire –both in the Church’s ideological (re)interpretation of
Scripture, and in its continued accumulation of authority and material wealth throughout the
early Middle Ages (Tigar & Levy, 2000: 40-41, 43, 104; Osborne, 2006: 122). 229 Aspects of the
mentality of Empire survived the decentralization of Western European society (and the
decentralization of the Church) as the Church became a feudal lord that collected homage from
229

In the same pages, Tigar & Levy also note that in its appointment of Charlemagne as Emperor
of the Holy Roman Empire, the Church established the mythical belief that “the Roman Empire
had been prophesied in Scripture… [and that] the Church temporal was logically, historically,
and as veritably as the Scripture, the successor to the Roman Empire, a view maintained by men
as diverse in time and temperament as Pope Leo III and Dante.” Similarly, on Osborne notes
that “there was a serious strand of Christian thinking that saw the building of the empire as the
necessary precursor to Christ’s arrival on earth –Christiainty began to absorb the history of
empire into its own story.”
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tillers, nights, petty nobles and lesser lords, and amassed extensive land and wealth from donors
or later through Church-sponsored conquests, making it one of the largest landowners in Europe,
as well as the dominant ideological force of the period (Federici, 2004: 33-34; Mohawk, 2000:
67; Osborne, 2006: 113; Tigar & Levy, 2006: 35-36, 40, 42, 49). In its pursuit of further
consolidating Church power, those with exclusive access to the “word of God” began making a
number of adjustments to this word, which were adopted into Church doctrine and practice.
Aspects of the mentality of Empire, and the aspirations of empire-building combined in ways
that created a new form of universalism: a universal intolerance. Whereas, under the writings of
Augustine and Paul the universalism of acceptance and inclusion opened the religion to all who
willingly converted, within a few centuries of the fall of Rome the Church was engaged in
attempts to make conversion mandatory –sponsoring conquests by Charlemagne and the
Normans, as well as later Crusades, Inquisitions and witch-hunts (Mohawk, 2000: 70, 79, 81, 23;
Tigar & Levy, 2000: 40). 230 And whereas, under these same writings, the universalism of
domination and rejection contained in Church doctrine was applied to all Christian converts,
within this same period the Church began actively applying Church doctrine to non-converts. To
both of these ends, the sixth century plague was blamed on the failure of non-Christians to
follow Church doctrine, the Church claimed jurisdiction in secular courts over all matters related
to the welfare of the soul, heresies were attacked, skeptical questioning was suppressed, libraries
were burnt, and laymen were forbidden to read the Bible (though most were illiterate anyway).
The Church began sponsoring missions to bring Church doctrine to various parts of Western
Europe, as well as sponsoring conquests, Crusades, Inquisitions and witch-hunts to forcibly
230

On the appointment of Charlemagne as emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, Tigar & Levy
(2000:40) note that: “The Empire, built by extraction of homage from lesser lords, had little
claim to be holy, and no claim at all to be Roman. Within a few years after Charlemagne’s death
in 814, it also had ceased to be an empire.”
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convert, punish, terrorize or murder those who refused (Mohawk, 2000: 71, 79, 81, 83; Tigar &
Levy, 2000: 40-41; Berman, 1983: 27, 52-68). 231 The extension of Church doctrine –and
judgment—to even those who had not chosen to follow the religion, combined with the
separations created by the Church between Christian man and himself, his God, and everything
else, created a new sort of universalism that reinforced these separations: i.e., a universal
intolerance towards non-Christians, and towards all who were not behaving or thinking
according to the expectations of Church doctrine.
The mentality of Empire and aspirations of empire-building also brought about several other
changes. For example, though Paul had originally preached equality, charity, inner
contemplation, and faith as the bases for salvation, and had argued that material poverty, rather
than wealth, power, or status led to spiritual richness, the Church had become one of the major
institutions now engaged in the daily exploitation of the poorest majority of society, as well as
the suppression of peasant revolts against its military-dictatorship style of exploitation (Osborne,
2006: 117-18; Federici, 2004: 33-34; Tigar & Levy, 2000: 49-50; Mohawk, 2000: 79). Both Paul
and Augustine had also preached that charity and arbitration, not litigation, should be practiced
in disputes, but the Church sponsored a continuous legal learning throughout the early Middle
Ages and by the end of the period it had produced a number of legal manuals that combined
Canon and Roman law into a “divine” law, attempting to assert its jurisdiction over commerce
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The latter source (Berman, 1983: 27, 52-68) notes that many of the peoples of western Europe
welcomed at least some aspects of the teachings of the Church as they were presented to them,
arguing that: “when Christianity first came to the Germanic peoples of western Europe, it was
presented as an otherworldly faith, concerned with the sacred and the saintly and having
relatively little to say to the existing military, political and economic power structure, except to
devalue it.” However the The History Channel (2007) notes that many tribal leaders were
beheaded or otherwise murdered in Charlemagne’s conquest of forcible conversion. See also
Mohawk (2000: 79).
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and other secular concerns as a means of consolidating its power and its empire (Tigar & Levy,
2000: 42-44, 49-50, 102-104). 232
Church doctrine had also long forbidden usury and had looked upon the lifestyle of merchants
as immoral (Tigar & Levy, 2000: 42-46, 102, 104), but Roman law promoted and protected the
interests of merchants. Throughout much of the period, when trade was virtually non-existent
and the wealth and power of the Church was deeply invested in maintaining the feudal hierarchy,
the Church continued to oppose merchant trade –not, according to Tigar and Levy (2000),
because it went against Church doctrine, but because it threatened social stability and thus
Church power: “If ancient doctrine taught that trade was sin, the new political reality taught that
traders threatened the feudal system” (p. 49). However, the Church, itself, participated in usury
as thousands of Church officials, including the papacy, acted as creditors and debtors to the
rising merchant class. As the latter rose and its accumulated wealth increased, Church officials
recognized the value of merchant wealth in building “cathedrals and universities and liv[ing] in
the style to which they had become accustomed,” and employed considerable legal talent in
sifting through the Church’s legal doctrine to find a way around even the most onerous of these
prohibitions (Tigar & Levy, 2000: 49, 45, 46). 233
While all of these revisions in “the word of God” had adverse impacts on life in the early
Middle Ages (impacts which have reverberated throughout the centuries), perhaps the most
destructive of the revisions during this time period came in the Pope Urban’s 1095 decision to
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Here I am using Berman’s (1983: 14) timeline, which places the end of the early Middle
Ages/ Dark Ages, around 1050-1100.
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“More legal talent was spent in devising a way around these prohibitions than in drafting their
terms, particularly as the Church’s position as creditor grew. … The merchant had no need to
defy the Church’s proscriptions and thereby risk his soul: there was enough written doctrine on
in the Church’s own storehouse to find a way around the most onerous proscriptions. The
Church was especially likely to tolerate evasion on the part of the wealth, since it stood to benefit
when they succeeded in business.” (Tigar & Levy, 2000: 46)
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mobilize a Crusade of pillage and plunder against non-Christians (primarily Muslims). Claiming
to speak the will of God, but mostly speaking on behalf of the Church’s greed for wealth and
power, 234 Urban called upon any who would volunteer to unite and attack the “accursed race,”
“wicked people,” “unclean nations” and “infidels,” who “worship[ped] demons,” and had
“invaded the lands of these Christians” (the “race chosen and beloved by God).” Urban further
alleged that these non-Christians had destroyed or appropriated the Churches and defiled the
alters, committed unmentionable acts of rape against women, as well as acts of murder, torture,
enslavement and various atrocities against the eastern Christians (Tigar & Levy, 2000: 65-66;
Mohawk, 2000:83; The History Channel, 2000; Munro, 1895: 5-8; Halsall, 1997; Gerish,
N.d.). 235 After reminding his audience of the over-population and lack of fertile land in western
Europe, 236 promising a utopia in the holy land, and encouraging would-be Crusaders to enrich
themselves by conquering and dividing up the Turk’s land and wealth amongst themselves, the
Pope further promised eternal salvation to all who died in battle (Mohawk, 2000:81-85; The
History Channel, 2005; Tigar & Levy, 65-67). 237
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Urban primarily wanted to open markets in Jerusalem to Christian merchants, end the private
wars and looting by knights and nobles which targeted merchants and hurt trade, preoccupy this
group with another endeavor outside of western Europe, and unite western Europe under a new,
common Christian European identity headed by church leadership; though, as Tigar and Levy
(2000: 65-66) point out, “[t]here were religious reasons for undertaking the Crusades as well.”
(See also: Mohawk, 2000: 83-85; The History Channel. 2005).
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The exact wording of Urban’s 1095 speech did not survive, but numerous versions of the
speech exist, recreated through first person accounts (all written sometime later) and/or from
correspondence after the Crusaders captured Jerusalem and reflected on the purposes of the
Crusade. For several different versions of this speech see Halsall (1997).
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“Let none of your possessions detain you, no solicitude for your family affairs, since this land
which you inhabit, shut in on all sides by the seas and surrounded by the mountain peaks, is too
narrow for your large population; nor does it abound in wealth; and it furnishes scarcely food
enough for its cultivators.” (Quoted in: Munro, 1895; see also: Mohawk, 2000: 83)
237
Tigar & Levy (2000: 66-67) suggest that promises of salvation, along with the call to arms,
were primarily directed at knights and petty nobles –the class of people who had been robbing
merchants and/or charging them large fees to traverse their lands.
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By commanding a holy war, allegedly in the name of God, Urban and successive Popes
engaged in what one might today call Orwellian double-speak, transforming some of the most
fundamental aspects of Church doctrine that were to be followed at all times --i.e., the ten
commandments-- into a list of items that were really only to be followed some of the time. The
God who forbid murder, stealing, and coveting anything that belongs to another, and the God
who commanded that all should love their neighbors, was transformed into the God who
commanded murder, coveting, and stealing; who promoted a hatred of non-Christian others; and
who now promised salvation for all who committed these very offenses (The History Channel,
2005; Mohawk, 2000: 82-83). 238 Similarly, the God who punished “us”(Westerners, Christians)
for transgressions against Church doctrine became a God who punished “them”(non-Westerners,
non-Christians) for everything, and for simply being something other than Christian. Further,
though not apparent to the general population at the time, the God who frowned upon usury and
trade became the God who commands wars in the interest of merchants and usurers; and the
religion that had promoted faith, charity, and personal reflection became the religion that
promoted trade, commerce and material wealth. As Tariq Ali stated:
If there had been no Islam, just east and west Christianity, exactly the same thing
would have happened, but they would have had to find a different ideology. They
probably would have said ‘These are not proper Christians, we’re the true
Christians’ like religious fundamentalists of all hues say. (Quoted in: The History
Channel, 2005)
The Pope’s speech furthered the separation between Christian men and everything else.
Playing upon the separation between man and woman, adults and children, and humanity and
beastliness (which included both animals and nature) (Gerish, N.d.), the Pope created a degraded
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Depending upon one’s point of view, the Pope also broke the commandment forbidding the
bearing of false witness against others through his propagandic speech against the Turks/
Muslims, which greatly exaggerated the mayhem and atrocities committed by the Turks.
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image of the Turks/Muslims as peoples so inferior as to constitute an exception to God’s
commandments against killing, stealing, coveting, and so forth. Not only did they now constitute
an exception to these commandments, but God (according to Urban) had mandated that
Christians commit these forbidden acts against the Turks/Muslims and had promised immediate
forgiveness of all sins of, and eternal salvation for all who died in, the fight (Halsall, 1997:
version 1). 239
Not surprisingly, the permissions and command to commit atrocities against Muslims was
immediately translated into permission to commit murder, plunder and other atrocious acts
against any and all “other” people –including Jews and even other Christians (Gerish, N.d.), 240 as
Crusaders with permission to dehumanize others did so to everyone who was not them. Before
they even left Western Europe, Crusaders massacred at least (and likely well over) a thousand
Jews living along the Rhine River, and took their belongings to fund their participation in the
first crusade (Carroll, 2007). Every “subsequent crusade would be prefaced with a pogrom, or
massacre, of Jews” (Mohawk, 2000: 84-86). Jews, Christians and Muslims, women, children
and elderly were all indiscriminately killed in cities along the path of the Crusaders: everyone
was killed in Antioc and Maarat an-Numan, and after slaughtering 20,000 people in the latter
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“All who die by the way, whether by land or by sea, or in battle against the pagans, shall have
immediate remission of sins. This I grant them through the power of God with which I am
invested. O what a disgrace if such a despised and base race, which worships demons, should
conquer a people which has the faith of omnipotent God and is made glorious with the name of
Christ!” (Quoted from: Halsall, 1997 version 1)
240
Who notes that eastern Christians, as victims of Muslim enemies who were so
hypermasculine (and beastly) as to tarnish everything they touched. They were also, alternately,
presented as effeminate –closer to humanity because of their Christianity, and in need of saving
by Christian men, but not truly human because they were feminine. The same source also points
out that though Western Christian men were considered human, the private wars they had
previously been waging within because Western Christendom caused them to be presented as
“more like animals than they should be” were they not warring against fellow Western Christians
(Gerish, N.D.: 4-5).
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location Crusaders reportedly boiled or roasted and ate the bodies of adults and children who had
been killed. The Crusaders also attacked villages that were entirely Christian, and reportedly
chopped babies into pieces, roasted and ate them in Nicea. In Jerusalem, the Crusaders
slaughtered some 30,000 Muslims, burned Jews in their synagogues, and interpreted their
success in taking the city as God’s will, and a sign that God was on their side. The various claims
among Crusaders to have had visions and/or to have found ‘holy relics’ were also interpreted as
signs that God was on their side, and that the indiscriminate slaughter, atrocities and cannibalism
were all acts done with the approval of, and under the guidance of God (Mohawk, 2000:85-86;
The History Channel, 2005).
Thus, the pattern set forth by the Church of rewriting the word of God, coupled with the
various conflated forms of universalism and the numerous separations between Christian man
and the rest of the world gave way to the creation of a new form of separation that has also, long
since, characterized the Western cultural worldview: our separation from reality.

Cultural Amnesia, Speaking for God, and Magical Thinking
I believe that philosophy was used by Western civilization to obscure the act of
plunder by cloaking it in fancier terms. Aristotle could have said, ‘We’re evil
exploiters, and we’re going to conquer these people; we have the arms to do it,
and we’re going to do it without any bad conscience whatsoever because we have
the power and we can get away with it.’
He could have said that, but he didn’t. Instead, he developed a rationale for
one culture ruling another. What he said was, ‘We’re a community of very bright
people, and we need someone to do all the drudgery. We’ll make these other folks
do it because if they don’t, we real bright people won’t have any time to sit under
a tree and think about how smart we are. We’d have to be hoeing the garden,
washing the dishes, and all the rest. But we need time to think, and if we think
long and hard enough, we’ll come up with all the answers.’
~ Mohawk 1997
The decline of magical thinking is hard to reconcile with the obsessivecompulsive neuroses that Freud identified as a central process in the personality
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of modern Western man. Correlatively, magical thinking is replacing religion in
the Western consciousness, rather than the other way around.
~ Diamond 1974, 45
“[T]ruth” changes so fast in European minds; [their] answers … are only stopgaps, only temporary, and must be continuously discarded in favor of new stopgaps which support the mathematical models; which keep the models alive.
~ Means 1983, 21
The revisions to Church doctrine during the early Middle Ages would probably not mark the first
time in the history of human society that the pursuit of wealth and political power motivated the
manipulation of laws, religious doctrine, and/or history. It would, however, mark the
development of an important pattern in Western society, one that would drastically impact the
direction in which the Western cultural worldview developed in the future. This pattern of
rewriting of history, law and religious doctrine to justify the pursuit of wealth, power and
empire-building reappears again and again throughout the history of Western society, and it has
had far-reaching and devastating consequences for all of humanity, the effects of which we
continue to experience today.
Throughout the history of Western society, this pattern has gone hand in hand with another
pattern: widespread willful amnesia. Though there were a number of factors that prevented
challenges to these doctrinal changes in the early Middle Ages (some of which are described
above), such factors are no longer present --or required-- today. Yet, despite the fact that
Westerners have long had the freedoms to remember the past and challenge the revised and
illegitimate versions of history, religion, law and/or reality that are presented to us, 241 we
continue to follow in the pathways of our ancestors by willfully adopting erroneous beliefs
regarding the world around us and the consequences of our actions (or those of our leaders) in
241

How long we, in the US, will continue to have these freedoms is another matter, given the
2011 National Defense Authorization Act which will allow all present and future leaders of the
country to indefinitely detain anyone who challenges their actions or their versions of reality.
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this world. When Western leaders rewrite history, the law, or religious doctrine in their pursuit
of empire-building and of political or financial gain for themselves or the classes they represent,
large numbers of people willfully discard from memory all versions of history –and even the
present-- that conflict with these new, official versions. They blindly support –or are at least
indifferent to-- the new “truth,” and often engage in rabid verbal rhetoric or even physical attacks
against all who challenge this alleged “truth.” 242 In North America, the majority of the people go
along with whatever version of history, law, religion or “facts” that Western leaders are endlessly
promoting at the time. Thus, history, the law (including the US and Canadian Constitutions) and
religious doctrine are rhetorically rewritten again and again to favor whatever the new political
fad is being promoted at the time and/or to turn the masses against whatever new target has been
selected for war. 243
The willful cultural amnesia of Western society, combined with Western leaders’ persistent
revision of history, law, and religious doctrine, has contributed to other problematic patterns in
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Many such attacks were repeated over and over again in response to the opposition to the
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The new version of “truth” created by Western leaders
(particularly in the U.S.) blamed Afghanistan, and Iraqi president Saddam Hussein, for the
September 11th attacks that were perpetrated by a handful of extremists. Such irresponsibly
inaccurate rhetoric, and the immoral actions it sought to justify, served to condemn hundreds of
thousands of Afghans and Iraqis to loss, suffering, torture and death. US leaders further
presented a new, official version of history which claimed that “Muslims” (not just extreme,
fundamentalist Muslims) hate us for our “freedoms” (rather than for the past several decades of
CIA intervention, economic sanctions, militarily-imposed no-fly zones, and U.S. support and
control of CIA-backed dictators, etc., etc.). Meanwhile, new versions of these “freedoms” were
created which did not include freedom of speech, freedom to protest, or even freedom to travel,
drive or ride the subway unmolested by police. Within the U.S., assertions of these sorts of
freedoms now stand in as signs of being “against us” and for “them,” of being unpatriotic, of
sympathizing with terrorists and of perhaps even being a terrorist oneself.
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Since the end of World War II, in particular, the United States government has never ceased
to be at war –whether officially and overtly, or unofficially and covertly. The targets have
changed, but the persistent drive to dominate and exploit other peoples for the political and
financial ends of the US government and its corporate leaders has not, except in its increase in
intensity and overtness.
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Western culture: magical thinking and purporting to speak for God. Though these two patterns
frequently overlap and in many ways resemble each other, they are not always one and the same
thing. Magical thinking occurs in all kinds of ways throughout Western society without making
any reference to God.
It is important, in this brief discussion of magical thinking trends in the Western culture, to
differentiate the Western pattern of magical thinking, and its origins, from the accusations of
“magical thinking” that Western academics (particularly Anthropologists) have generally been
leveled against so-called “primitive” societies. The type of so-called “magical thinking” that
arises from one’s connection with all things, in which one finds answers to questions, gains
valuable wisdom, or even receives messages or visions through meditation or self-reflection, is a
process that has been honored in virtually every religious system and culture around the world
throughout history. The Christian religion is no exception. The original teachings of
Christianity promoted this type of inner contemplation as the means to salvation, and the Church
still sometimes designates acts as miracles or people as saints. Regardless of anyone’s views on
these designations and on the existence of miracles or saints, the acts and people that are
generally so-designated are those that have been beneficial to other people in some ways. Thus,
this type of thinking, even for those who disagree with it, is far more constructive than
destructive. And the type of meditative reflection and self-reflection that corresponds to this way
of thinking --whether interpreted as meditative self-discovery or messages received from an
other-worldly power—similarly result in constructive revelations and actions. For example, this
type of meditative reflection and self-reflection can provide individuals and groups with new
ways of thinking about and/or being in the world around them, and/or can provide them with
new ways to survive adversity and trauma (including the adversity and trauma of totalitarian
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domination, disconnection, and repression). Thus, these forms of thinking are not destructive and
they do not deviate from the basic, shared, moral proscriptions held by the vast majority of
humanity throughout human history. Instead, they generally result in (or are aimed at) healing
and making whole that which has been fragmented, degraded, or traumatized, or are aimed at
protecting against threats of trauma and destruction.
In contrast, the type of magical thinking of concern here is that which often arises as the result
of the destructive processes of Western society, and which preys upon people’s insecurities and
psychological despair by promoting a continuation or escalation of destruction. This type of
magical thinking frequently constitutes a maladaptive way of coping psychologically with the
adversity and trauma that is inherent in various destructive processes of Western society. Siding
with the perpetrator of crimes or oppressions is an example of one such maladaptive coping
mechanism that will be discussed in a later section. Chris Hedges (2002) discusses another
example of this type of magical thinking, and of one of its many root causes in western society:
Economic dislocations bring with [them] destruction of communities, destruction
of families, substance abuse, domestic abuse, all of the attendant problems that
come when communities break down, and people retreat from this reality based
world –which frankly almost destroys them, almost has destroyed them—into a
non-reality based belief system. And all totalitarian systems are non-reality-based
systems: a world of magic, of historical inevitability, a world where god
intervenes on your behalf. (P. 104)
David Harvey (2003) further discusses economic dislocation, and other forms of dislocation, as
being an inherent part of capitalism, and thus Western society, in his discussions of accumulation
by dispossession.
One of the most destructive forms of magical thinking involves the claim to have a message
from God which is used to justify the infliction of pain and suffering upon other people or life
forms, and which clearly transgress the most basic moral principles that are shared by most
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religions and by virtually all cultures in the world –i.e., proscriptions against killing, stealing,
lying, abusing, exploiting, and so forth. This type of magical thinking abounded during the
Crusades and was influenced to some extent by the economic dislocation of people living in
Western Europe in the early Middle Ages. During this time, Western Europe was plagued by
famine, sickness, and continual warfare and conquest. All of these were referenced and utilized
by Pope Urban II in his statements regarding the misery and suffering of the peoples of Europe.
These references were used first to remind people of their own misery, and then to unite and
mobilize them around an immoral and Utopian (Mohawk, 2000) series of wars by appealing to
their self-interest:
Let none of your possessions detain you, no solicitude for your family affairs,
since this land which you inhabit, shut in on all sides by the seas and surrounded
by the mountain peaks, is too narrow for your large population; nor does it
abound in wealth; and it furnishes scarcely food enough for its cultivators. Hence
it is that you murder one another, that you wage war, and that frequently you
perish by mutual wounds. Let therefore hatred depart from among you, let your
quarrels end, let wars cease, and let all dissensions and controversies slumber.
Enter upon the road to the Holy Sepulchre; wrest that land from the wicked race,
and subject it to yourselves. That land which as the Scripture says "floweth with
milk and honey," was given by God into the possession of the children of Israel.
Jerusalem is the navel of the world; the land is fruitful above others, like another
paradise of delights. (Robert the Monk’s account of the Pope’s speech, quoted in
Halsall, 1997)
And:
The possessions of the enemy, too, will be yours, since you will make spoil of
their treasures and return victorious to your own; or empurpled with your own
blood, you will have gained everlasting glory. For such a Commander you ought
to fight, for One who lacks neither might nor wealth with which to reward you.
(Balderic of Dol., quoted in Halsall, 1997)
This call to arms, presented as a call commanded by God for all to engage in ruthless slaughter
and plunder of other people, launched Christian Crusaders into a mentality of magical thinking,
in which they believed that they could do no wrong because all that they did or thought was
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approved of and supported by God. 244 Spurred by the Pope’s call, the Crusaders took the
initiative to go beyond even what the Pope requested, massacring Jews up and down the Rhine
River and making spoil of their treasures in order to fund their march to fight the Muslims
(Carroll, 2007). They indiscriminately slaughtered people in their path of all religions and ages
because they believed they were fighting a holy war. During difficult times when their beliefs to
this extent wavered (such as when it appeared that their own lives were in danger at Antioc),
some among them would claim to have ‘uncovered’ various relics that were claimed to be holy
relics --and thus signs that their massacres and atrocities were supported and called for by God,
and that God was fighting with them against their enemies.
Almost a millennia later, Western leaders still invoke God when calling for crusades against
“Godless communists,” “narco-terrorists,” and other alleged incarnations of “evil” –such as
George W. Bush’s call for a crusade against Muslim extremists, in which he claimed that he was
acting on instructions from God, who was on “our” side (MacAskill, 2005). 245 Not surprisingly,
these calls to war –spurred on by the alleged discovery of weapons of mass destruction, rather
than alleged holy relics-- have led to the justification of indiscriminate murder and atrocities
against the populations of Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Sudan, Libya, and so forth, as well as
against Arab, or “Arab-looking” people throughout Western society. Whereas trauma of
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Of course, many scholars today have noted the wide variety of secular motivations for the
Pope’s call for a crusade, none of which were holy, and virtually all of which egregiously
contradict the most fundamental religious and moral teachings regarding how Christians are to
treat other people. Some of these motivations have already been discussed above. See also:
(Tigar & Levy, 2000: 65-66, 68; Mohawk, 2000: 83-85; The History Channel, 2005)
245
"President Bush said to all of us: 'I am driven with a mission from God'. God would tell me,
'George go and fight these terrorists in Afghanistan'. And I did. And then God would tell me
'George, go and end the tyranny in Iraq'. And I did. And now, again, I feel God's words coming
to me, 'Go get the Palestinians their state and get the Israelis their security, and get peace in the
Middle East'. And, by God, I'm gonna do it." (Former Palestinian foreign minister, Nabil Shaath,
quoted in: MacAskill, 2005).
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repeated conquests and economic dislocation were factors in the original Crusades, trauma from
the 9/11 attacks and politically-induced fear and paranoia induced widespread fanaticism
favoring the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. In both cases the underlying motivation for the
crusade has less to do with God than it has to do with plundering wealth from other people,
politically dominating a strategically-positioned territory and its resources, and uniting and
consolidating Empire. The most fundamental aspect of this form of magical thinking –in
purporting to speak for God when calling for the commission of atrocities against other people—
is that it knows no moral boundaries. It is completely divorced from the moral prescriptions of
virtually all religions and cultures, which prohibit killing, theft, torture, abuse, exploitation, and
so forth.
Other forms of magical thinking abound in Western society, most of which are far less
destructive than those claiming God has endorsed and commanded mass atrocities, but which are
still, nonetheless, destructive. Virtually all of the various expressions of Western magical
thinking have arisen out of the separation from, and universal intolerance of, other people, the
natural world, and oneself, 246 as well as from the resulting experiences of alienation, despair and
various other psychological difficulties. Often these very psychological difficulties arise,
themselves, from our separation, alienation and intolerance. In these separations, we have lost
touch with the cycles of life. Our consumer culture worships youth (which sells products), while
the elderly are discarded, ignored and forgotten. In denying parts of ourselves, and basic aspects
of life, we flock to anti-aging cures which are supposed to make us look younger, live longer,
and appear more desirable in consumer culture’s image. The same can be said for a variety of
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Having lost all of these connections, it is little surprise that Western society has, in many
ways, also lost some connections with morality; and it is little surprise that individuals in western
society routinely experience despair, isolation, alienation, and other psychological difficulties
which make them susceptible to various types of destructive magical thinking.
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other self-help programs and products which promise amazing results through unrealistic means.
Since consumer culture only recognizes our worth as human beings in our surface appearances,
or in what we own, rather than reject this culture, our alienation and disconnect from ourselves
and the world around us drives us to consumer various material items that we don’t need and
only use temporarily (until these are out of fashion, which will be almost immediately) in a
desperate attempt to demonstrate that we have worth as human beings. And when we become
exhausted from our perpetual and losing mobilization to prove our worth as human beings
through material consumption and various “cures,” we fall into even greater despair, and
experience even greater psychological difficulties, as all that we have attempted to separate,
repress, and reject bubbles up from our subconscious, reminding us of the symbolic violence that
has been done to our lives and our relationships with the world around us, with others, and with
ourselves. Meanwhile, another ready-made, magical cure awaits us in the various medications
for depression, ADHD, ADD, panic and anxiety disorders, and the scores of other ‘disorders’
that have been created in, and are largely unique to western society. In the despairing chaos that
is western society, it’s little wonder that doomsday cults and other forms of magical escapism
abound.

Projection, Inability to Respect Difference, Lack of Empathy and Incapacity for Critical SelfReflection
Islam is accused of violence as if Christianity is innocent.
~ Caroll 1997
[Freud] argued that so far as they are not justified by real exploitation or real
persecution, people making an enemy will adopt the psychological maneuver of
projection. They defend themselves against their unacceptable thoughts or wishes
by expelling them from their own mind to the outside world, onto the convenient
Other. This mechanism provides a highly supportive way of living with one’s
failings; it permits the denial that one is subject to these failings in the first place
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and then opportunely rediscovers them in strangers or adversaries, real or
imagined … Once the transposition from self to others has been made, the search
for villains is bound to prove an agreeable diversion from self-reproach. And the
aggressive acts that follow are likely to be all the more furious because a certain
measure of uneasiness may be surging up from the depths. Can it be that one is
no better than one’s victims? It is a terrible thought, to be kept at bay.
~ Gay 1993, 69-70
Admission of fundamental incorrectness in anything has never been demonstrated
to be a European cultural characteristic. A way must be found out of such an
impasse.
~ Black Elk 1983, 157
The ideological separation between good and “evil” parts of ourselves, combined with the
universal intolerance of the Church, both contributed to and utilized our individual and
institutionalized separation from reality. In order to escape the negative parts of themselves, our
Western Christian ancestors had to constantly repress and/or attack aspects of who they were.
Unable to fully eliminate these aspects in themselves that exist in every human being, they
engaged in the next closest thing: psychologically projecting these undesirable aspects of
themselves onto other people. By psychologically projecting onto external others what they
hated and despised within themselves, they alleviated some of their (consciousness of their) own
anxieties relating to their inability to eliminate the “evil” within. The evil within became the evil
in “them,” and their anxiety, which remained, could be partially alleviated by avoiding,
attacking, dominating or killing the targets of their projections –and thus symbolically
conquering the undesirable aspects of themselves and achieving a form of pseudo-salvation. But
because they could never really be freed from these undesirable aspects of themselves, their
attacks upon the targets of their projections –even when these attacks resulted in death and near
extermination of those targets-- could only ever result in temporary alleviation of their anxiety,
fear, hatred, despair, and/or in temporary pseudo-salvation. This is because, even if the old
targets were completely exterminated, the undesirable parts that they were trying to repress,
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attack, and exterminate within themselves remained, as did their need to engage in psychological
defense mechanisms for denying these aspects of themselves and dealing with their anxiety
related to the existence of these suppressed aspects. Thus, new targets would be needed for these
psychological mechanisms of separating, repressing and rejecting entire aspects of who they
were, and who all human beings are. In this way, Tariq Ali’s remarks on the Crusades ring true
on many levels, and are worth repeating:
If there had been no Islam, just east and west Christianity, exactly the same thing
would have happened. But they would have had to find a different ideology.
They probably would have said: ‘These are not proper Christians, we’re the true
Christians,’ like religious fundamentalists of all stripes say. (The History Channel,
2005) 247
Thus, the violence perpetrated upon other peoples –heretics and non-Christians during the
early Middle Ages and then the Crusades—was primarily a result of the violence that Western
Christians were first required to commit against themselves when they were indoctrinated
(voluntarily or by force) into the Church’s universalisms of domination, rejection, and
intolerance, as well as the attempted separations between themselves and other people, the
natural world, their God and even various aspects of themselves. In attempting to maintain these
separations and forms of intolerance, Western Christians constructed an extremely fragile
cultural worldview that was threatened by all non-Christians, as well as by other Christian
peoples who were not actively engaged in the same symbolic self-flagellation against various
parts of themselves. Seeing these other people accept within themselves those human aspects
that Western Christians were so vehemently attacking and denying in their own persons was
threatening to Christians. It was also threatening to their cultural worldview, which held that
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Likewise, David Loy (2002) has remarked on the recent war on terror: “If there were no
Afghanistan, it would have needed to be invented. (Perhaps it was? Evidently most of the
September attackers, like bin Laden himself, were from Saudi Arabia, which has been a major
source of support for al Queda. But there was no talk of attacking Saudi Arabia).” (p. 260)
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such parts of oneself (if not rejected, suppressed and projected onto others) would lead to eternal
damnation. Because of their attacks on themselves, and their attacks on others (in a futile attempt
to save themselves from attack), these Christians had already become engaged in perpetration
even before they set out on their various Crusades. It is thus no wonder that they displayed a
complete lack of empathy for those against whom they committed murder, plunder, abuse,
torture and other atrocities –and thus a complete lack of morals (except for those pseudo-morals
present in their episodes of magical thinking). They had been conditioned and compelled to both
ignore and attack the pain and suffering of others because they were first, and perhaps primarily,
ignoring, repressing and attacking the pain and suffering of themselves. As McFarlane & van der
Kolk (2006) have noted in their clinical work around trauma and post traumatic stress disorder,
in order for people to be able to confront and face the pain and suffering of others, they must first
be able to do so for themselves. The failure to be able to do the first is a result of a failure to do
the second:
Clinical work has taught us that the ability to tolerate the plight of victims is, at least
in part, a function of how well people have dealt with their own misfortunes.
When they have confronted the reality of their own hurt and suffering, and
accepted their own pain, this generally is translated into tolerance and sometimes
even compassion for others. Conversely, as long as people deny the impact of
their own personal trauma and pretend that it did not matter, that it was not so
bad, or that excuses can be made for their abuses, they are likely to identify with
the aggressors and treat others with the same harshness with which they treat the
wounded parts of themselves. Identification with the aggressor makes it possible
to bypass empathy for themselves and secondarily for others. (P. 36).
This behavior pattern has been a part of Western society for so long that most of us project
“undesirable” parts of ourselves onto others on a daily basis without having a clue that this is
what we are doing, and often without being able to recognize or believe it if someone pointed it
out to us. When we look at someone we don’t know and decide that we don’t like his/her for
various reasons, we are engaging in projection. When we stereotype groups of people and
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negatively judge individuals from these groups for the characteristics that we imagine they have,
we are engaging in projection. Often when we feel slighted or envied by strangers, co-workers,
or acquaintances, we are engaging in projection. We engage in projection on a routine basis with
our acquaintances, family members, close friends and intimate partners. And while projections
can sometimes result in sympathy for or empathy with others, such as when we care for others
during their difficult times and imagine their suffering, the predominant occurrence of projection
in Western society is negative –i.e., the type of projection that allows us to hate, dislike, dismiss
and perhaps even verbally or physically attack other people for the motives, thoughts, ideas,
characteristics we imagine them to have, or even the things that we imagine they are doing.
When, as individuals, we act upon these projections without realizing that they are
projections, our actions can have embarrassing, insulting and destructive consequences for our
interpersonal relationships or careers. When, as groups or societies, we act upon these
projections without realizing that they are projections, our actions can have much more
destructive, deadly, and even genocidal consequences for those targeted in these projections.
They also have dire consequences for those doing the targeting, since the action of victimizing
others furthers their detachment from themselves, others, and the world around them, and
potentially deprives both victims and victimizers of personal identity and a sense of community
(Kelman, 1973: 51-52).
There are two other patterns in the Western cultural worldview that are closely related to
these patterns of separation, intolerance, and projection: our inability to tolerate difference, and
our incapacity for critical self-reflection. By projecting the rejected parts of ourselves onto
others, we become intolerant of difference. In our intolerance, we are unwilling to treat peoples
or cultures that are different with respect. And since these separations and all other patterns in
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Western society stem from social relations of domination, we can’t comprehend different people
or cultures as being equal: they must be either inferior or superior to us (See for example, Keal,
2003: 56-61 and 185-216). Further, since, in our universal intolerance, we see everything that is
not like the idealized parts of ourselves as inferior, this is also how we see those people or
cultures that do not represent these ideals. (Though, in many ways, these peoples or cultures
cannot represent our ideals, not only because they have different ideals, but also because we
project all the negative parts of ourselves onto them.) Moreover, since this imagined
“inferiority” (i.e., difference) triggers our own anxieties about the existence of repressed and
rejected parts of ourselves, we are almost psychologically incapable of just letting the difference
be. Instead, we have to change it, dominate it, repress it, punish it, kill it or in other ways
“improve upon” it (all in order to avoid acknowledging that “it” is really us). We frequently do
so by attempting to force other people to conform to our religion, our cultural worldview and our
way of life, and thus to share our psychological impairments. Frank Black Elk (1983) has made a
similar observation regarding Christians, Capitalists and Marxists:
are all proselytizers; that is, seeking to gain recruits, more recruits. All of them
want me to change; none of them care to support who I am. … I, and my people,
are just so much more material to be accumulated and rearranged into something
we weren’t and never wanted to be. (P. 146)
With all of these cultural patterns and psychological defense mechanisms built up around us
to prevent us from fully realizing who we are as human beings and in relation to others and the
world around us, it is little wonder that we have a difficult time seeing these patterns. Thus,
another characteristic of the Western cultural worldview is a virtual incapacity for critical selfreflection. It is not that we are biologically unable to engage in these self-reflective processes; it
is that we are culturally conditioned –by layers and layers of psychological defense mechanisms
passed down through the generations-- not to do so. Many of us don’t even realize that there is
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anything to critique, since we don’t see the patterns that we engage in on a daily basis at the
individual, group and societal levels (and since we are so busy projecting undesirable parts of
ourselves onto others, and then trying to “improve” these others). If we do not see these cultural
patterns and/or parts of ourselves that we have rejected, individually and/or as a cultural
collective, then it is impossible to address, correct, or otherwise improve upon who we are as
individuals or as a cultural collective. Instead of actual personal or cultural growth, we reinforce
our individual and cultural pathologies of projection, separation, intolerance, domination,
rewriting history, collective amnesia and magical thinking--- cultural patterns which are always
reinforced only to the detriment of ourselves, other peoples and all life on the planet.

Scapegoating and Human Sacrifice
To be sure, men have always had their methods of producing deviants, enemies,
subhuman humans. But only in the modern world has betrayal of the Other
become exalted as the supreme proof of loyalty to the group. … Only through
participating in the ritual destruction of the Other, only through committing
existential cannibalism, is man admitted to membership in the modern State. …. It
follows that man’s refusal to sacrifice scapegoats –and his willingness to
recognize and bear his own and his group’s situation and responsibility in the
world—would be a major step in his moral development. …. [O]ur ancestors
were, and we remain, existential or spiritual cannibals. As a rule, we live off the
meaning others give their lives, validating our humanity by invalidating theirs.
…. Can we create meaning in our lives without demeaning the lives of others?
~ Szasz 1970, 283-286
If only it were all so simple! If only there were evil people somewhere, insidiously
committing evil deeds, and it were necessary only to separate them from the rest
of us and destroy them. But the line dividing good and evil cuts through the heart
of every human being. And who is willing to destroy a piece of his own heart?
~Alexander Solzhenitsyn, quoted in Loy 2002

Scapegoating and human sacrifice have existed in a number of different cultures throughout
history and, despite the widespread refusal of Westerners to acknowledge the presence of the
latter, both have remained prominent practices in Western society. Both of these practices are so
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important and fundamental to who we are within our Western cultural worldview that one could
even argue, as I am here, that they are indispensable, and that, without them, we would have no
collective identity and nothing to unify us as anything more than “a violent conglomerate of
individuals, not a people” (Deloria, 1969: 185). 248
Though some Westerners have preferred to attribute scapegoating and various forms of
sacrifice to “savage” or “primitive” peoples (for illustration, see Frazer, quoted in Szasz, 1970:
260), 249 scapegoating is so prevalent in Western society that that examples of its recognition
abound. For example, from the beginning of its study as a discipline, Sociologists have
implicitly recognized the existence of scapegoating in their recognition that deviance performs
essential functions in (Western, industrialized, hierarchical 250) society. Durkheim found that
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“All the white man has succeeded in creating in his time on this continent had been a violent
conglomerate of individuals, not a people.” Admittedly, this may be less the case for Westerners
in Europe than it is for Westerners living in settler-states throughout the European Diaspora. The
difference might only be in degrees, however, and this topic will taken up indirectly in the next
sub-section on individualism.
249
From Frazer’s 1922 study of magic and religion (The Golen Bough: A Study in Magic and
Religion):
The notion that we can transfer our guilt and sufferings to some other being who will
bear them for us is familiar to the savage mind. It arises from a very obvious confusion
between the physical and the mental, between the material and the immaterial. Because
it is possible to shift a load of wood, stones, or what not, from out own back to the back
of another, the savage fancies that it is equally possible to shift the burden of his pains
and sorrows to another, who will suffer them in his stead. (quoted in: Szasz, 1970: 260)
Similarly, Keal (2003), Todorov (1982) and others have remarked upon the attitudes of
Europeans towards Native nations that engaged in ritual human sacrifice
250
It is important to keep in mind that many Western Sociologists have long made
generalizations about their culture and then applied these generalizations to all other cultures.
The necessity of deviance in society is one such instance of ethnocentrically projecting the
dynamics of western society onto other cultures, particularly when we consider that most Native
cultures in the Americas, prior to the European invasion, had no police forces, and were without
repressive forms of government. As Forbes (2008) remarks on the contrast between Native nonNative “civilizations”:
[A] civilization is (it would appear) a society in which there are so many evil or violent
or dishonorable people that the police, soldiers, and other armed forces of control must
almost equal the total population in numbers.
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deviance clarifies moral boundaries, affirms that the cultural norms and values of the group
defining deviance are seen as “good,” and affirms that those violating these norms and values are
seen as the opposite of good. In this way, deviance unites people within a given group around
these shared common norms and values and (more importantly) against those who have been
labeled as violators of the moral boundaries of the group, i.e., as “deviant”(Durkheim, 1982;
Garland, 1990: 23-46) In support of Durkheim’s assertions, Kai Erikson (2005) found that,
though certain deviant behaviors were virtually eliminated over time, the Puritans of
Massachusetts Bay colony defined a steady portion of their population as deviant by defining
new acts as deviant, and thus making examples of how not to behave for the rest of the colony.
Likewise, both Thomas Szasz (1970) 251 and Howard Becker (1963) 252 have found that deviance
is not the related to the act that a person commits, but is a consequence of the label that is placed
upon a person by the society in which he lives (or, one might add, is placed upon another society
or culture by a society or culture that wishes to oppose it, for whatever reason). In other words,
Western society’s requirement that its members create (and then destroy via sacrifice) scapegoats
in order to form a collective identity (in which we define ourselves as “good” by rejecting others
that we have defined as “bad” and “evil”), has been well observed by Western scholars. So has

On the other hand, I believe that a true civilization is a society where people are
“civil”; that is, where they behave so well toward each other that they do not need
police or other armed systems of control. (P. 46, emphasis in original).
251
“[D]eviance is not, as is often erroneously believed, a defect exhibited by, or contained in the
personality of, an individual actor…; it is, instead, an inevitable consequence, and indeed an
integral part, of the construction of social compacts or groups” (Szasz, 1970: 279).
252
“[S]ocial groups create deviance by making rules whose infraction constitutes deviance, and
by applying those rules to particular people and labeling them as outsiders. From this point of
view, deviance is not a quality of the act the person commits, but rather a consequence of the
application by others of rules and sanctions to an ‘offender.’”(Becker, 1963: 9, emphasis in
original).
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the tendency to ensure conformity to desired patterns of behavior by creating a fear of the
punishments associated with non-conformity.
Sociological studies of deviance are not the only place where implicit examples of
scapegoating are found. These examples also abound in our every day experiences, and are
prevalent in instances and expressions of nationalism, racism, sexism, xenophobia, homophobia,
campaigns against Native treaty rights, and all forms of anti-s and -isms. Scapegoating is present
in small towns or rural communities, as well as large cities. We encounter it in our workplaces,
in our circles of friends, and even in our families. 253 In particular, we find forms of
scapegoating in political campaigns at local, state and national levels, where demonizing various
groups of people, and even declaring domestic “wars” upon them has long been a tool for
unifying large sections of the population in order to consolidate one’s support and power as a
candidate (or incumbent). 254 Scapegoating is always present, often on numerous levels, in any
war, and it often seems that the more hateful the propaganda produced against the “enemy” or
various “enemies,” the more solidly the support for the war congeals, the more the pressure to
conform with this support, and the more vehement the rejection of those who speak out against
this scapegoating. 255
Thus, though many Westerners might be reluctant to admit it when they, themselves, are
engaged in scapegoating (and, in fact, might not even recognize it in these instances, given the
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See, for example: Laing, R.D. 1972. The Politics of the Family and Other Essays. New
York: Vintage Books.
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A number of scholars have written on this process in relation to the drug war, the war on
terror, the red scare, McCarthyism, and so forth. One excellent study on the topic is John
Helmer (1975) Drugs and Minority Oppression, which details the various wars on drugs in the
United States, situating them within economic turmoil, political opportunism, and scapegoating
of various minority groups.
255
A recent example of this in the US can be found in George W. Bush’s attempts to silence
opposition to the “war on terror” by asserting that people and countries “are either with us or
against us”(and implicitly, for the terrorists), (CNN, 2001).
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general lack of critical self-reflection in Western society), most today would accept and admit
that scapegoating is widely practiced in Western society today. And though some might still
cling for comfort to the unrealistic idea that “savage” or “primitive” societies have engaged in
more --or worse-- forms of scapegoating, others will readily admit that, not only is scapegoating
practiced all around us, all the time, in Western society, but participation in scapegoating, in
many instances, has become mandatory. As Thomas Szasz (1970) has noted, “[t]o refuse to
persecute the socially accredited scapegoat is interpreted as an attack on society itself” (p. 288).
Like scapegoating, human sacrifice is also widespread in Western society. However, it is
rarely recognized for what it is, and most Westerners would deny that such a thing exists within
their culture because they prefer to imagine that it is more advanced and sophisticated than other
cultures. This failure to recognize the presence of human sacrifice is a reflection of many of the
problematic cultural patterns already identified above, including separation and projection, the
inability to tolerate difference, and the inability to engage in critical self-reflection. For example,
Keal (2003) notes complete lack of critical self-reflection among Spaniards, who viewed as
inferior Native South American cultures that practiced human sacrifice (killing hundreds of
people a year), but thought nothing of torturing and massacring hundreds of thousands of Native
South Americans for gold or for fun:
Ultimately the Spaniards were apparently incapable of comparing themselves in a
negative way with the Indians. They were, for instance, repulsed by the highly
ritualized killing involved in sacrifice, but were totally uncritical of the random
massacres perpetrated by themselves. (Pp. 60-61. See also: Todorov, 1982)
Forbes (2008) has made similar observations:
Various terms, such as “wild,” “savage” and “barbarian” have been used
frequently to refer to violent, crude, brutal, cruel, destructive and aggressive
behavior. Ironically, such terms have often been used by European writers to
refer to non-European peoples whose customs were different and therefore
(because of that element of difference) called “wild” or “savage.” The irony
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stems from the fact that few, if any, societies on the face of the earth have ever
been as avaricious, cruel, violent and aggressive as have certain European
populations. (P. 23)
Further examples of this lack of critical self-reflection abound throughout Western society,
including in the present alleged wars “on terror,” in which the number of innocent civilians
slaughtered, maimed, and tortured at the hands of U.S. troops is hundreds of times greater than
any death or suffering caused by alleged terrorists. The victims of the former are frequently
referred to by administration officials as “collateral damage,” which is clearly a modern
euphemism for human sacrifice, though the existence of human sacrifice continues to be
vehemently denied (at least in mainstream society). 256 not in Christian fundamentalist circles).
Despite these general impairments in Western culture, critical self-reflection does
occasionally surface. To this extent, some scholars have acknowledged the existence of human
sacrifice in ritualized and non-ritualized forms in Western society, such as in the death penalty
(Harding, 2000; Smith, 2000) 257 and in war (Gaston, 1961), 258 while others have argued that
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This denial is less clear in Christian fundamenalist circles. See, for example, the 2009 film
Waiting for Armageddon, which documents the push among Christian fundamentalists for
escalating war against Muslims in the Middle East. According to their fundamentalist doctrine,
these Christians believe that the death and destruction of Muslims is a sign of –and will cause—
the Rapture, in which they will be called by God to everlasting salvation in heaven while the rest
of humanity suffers and burns on earth. (And, in some cases, is slaughtered by these saved
Christians, who return to earth with Jesus, armed with swords, and proceed to massacre everyone
who is not saved for some reason or another).
257
The former source notes:
The ritual slaughter of humans for sacrificial purposes has an ancient provenance. Few
members of modern society would be inclined to believe that killing humans for
sacrificial purposes continues. Of those, most probably envision it only being practiced
by individuals who belong to "uncivilized," or non-"First-World" cultures. Upon closer
scrutiny, however, it becomes apparent that this is a misconception because the past and
present practice of capital punishment includes a thinly disguised manifestation of the
ritualized killing of people, otherwise known as human sacrifice. (Harding, 2000: 175176)
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cannibalism (at least symbolic cannibalism) is still widespread in Western society (and
cannibalism, of course, presupposes human sacrifice) (Szasz, 1970: 284-88; Forbes, 2008). A
few scholars, arguing that human sacrifice is basically the rationalized, ritualized killing of
human beings by social institutions, insist that there is “hardly any form of violence cannot be
described in terms of sacrifice” (Harding, 2000: 182, 177; Girard, 1977: 1, 306).
Given this view of institutional ritual controlled by the authorities in a hierarchical society, it
is easier to see how all forms of state or state-sanctioned killing could fall into the category of
human sacrifice. This becomes even more clearly the case when we consider the religious
characteristics of Western secularism, such as the worship of consumption and material goods, a
blind faith in the ability of science and technology to solve all of the world’s problems, and an
unfounded belief that all that Western society is and does constitutes human “progress” towards
a future utopia with Western society leading the way to progress and utopia (Mohawk, 2000 &
1997; Means, 1983: 21-22; Black Elk, 1983; Diamond, 1974: 39, 41; Szasz, 1970: 275; Mies,
1986: 74-76). We now kill our sacrificial victims at the altar of Western progress, science,
technology, and material accumulation. We do so not to bring them closer to us or to bring
ourselves closer to a spiritual God, as have other societies before us (Szasz, 1970: 260-89). 259
Rather, we do so to expel negative aspects of ourselves that are projected onto others, so that we
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“On an ethnological plane, war may be considered a destruction rite involving (1) wanton
economic destruction, and (2) human sacrifice” (quoted from the abstract). Possibly also see:
Horowitz (1991).
259
See Szasz, p. 260-289 reports that in some historical societies the humans sacrificed in rituals
were treated extremely well by the whole society before and during the sacrifice ritual, which
was conducted to bring the society closer to God and/or the sacrificed; though in other historical
societies the sacrificed was despised or tormented prior to or during the sacrifice ritual). See
also: Forbes (1992). Others have argued that human sacrifices were not done for the purpose of
getting closer to the victim, and involved ritualized torture of the victim prior to sacrifice
(Harding, 2000; Smith, 2000).
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can be unified in our imagined goodness as we pursue unending consumption and material
accumulation at the expense of other peoples and other life on the planet.
In this way, war and capital punishment are not the only forms of ritualized human sacrifice.
All forms of imperialism and colonialism, whether undertaken through traditional military means
or modern, economic ones, constitute forms of human sacrifice. Further, human sacrifice can be
constituted in any instances in which state authorities or corporate elites purposefully engage in
behavior that results in the death of other people. But it could also be constituted in some forms
of non-lethal punishment. Police brutality and military training can also constitute forms of
human sacrifice, the former of which involves a ritual through which men and women are trained
to sacrifice themselves for the goals of politicians and wealthy elites. Penal sanctions against
innocent young black men for the assault, rape and/or murder of privileged white women (such
as the Central Park jogger) can also be characterized as human sacrifice, as whole sections of the
lives of the wrongfully punished are lost in prison. Likewise, the evictions of millions of people
from their homes, jobs and access to subsistence has taken on new heights during the recent
financial crisis, could constitute a form of human sacrifice, as can all forms of economic
dislocation that leaves victims with nothing so that the wealthy few in society might accumulate
even more. In this latter form, the “society” benefiting from these repeated, ongoing sacrifices
consists of only the smallest handful of elites, leaving the rest of us as potential sacrificees. Jack
Forbes (2008) has linked all of these forms of sacrifice together, and has gone so far as to refer to
these not simply as human sacrifice, but as cannibalism without ceremony:
Cannibalism, as I define it, is the consuming of another’s life for one’s own
private purpose or profit. … The deaths of tens of millions of Jews, Slavs, etc., at
the hands of the Nazis, the deaths of tens of millions of blacks in slavery days, the
deaths of up to 30 million or more Indians in the 1500s, the terribly short life
spans of Mexican Indian farm workers in the US, and of Native Americans
generally today, the high death rates in early industrial centers among factory
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workers, and so on, all clearly attest to the fact that the wealthy and exploitative
literally consume the lives of those that they exploit. … It is simply raw
consumption for profit, carried out often in an ugly and brutal manner. There is
no respect for a peon whose life is being eaten. No ceremony. No mystical
communication. Only self-serving consumption. (P. 25).
Hence, perhaps the only differences between what is generally considered to be human
sacrifice by Westerners and the various forms of human sacrifice that routinely occur in Western
industrial society involves 1) who is doing the sacrificing and 2) the sheer number of victims
killed and/or dispossessed of their livelihoods. In terms of the latter, Western society is the
undisputed leader of the practice, historically and today. The Inquisition provides an excellent
illustration of this, and will carry us into the discussion on primitive accumulation, or taking
more than is needed.

Accumulation by Dispossession, or Taking More Than Is Needed
European states are like stomachs, requiring a [constant] diet of infidels.
~ Gay 1993, 68
Anger and violence are not the only smokescreens for fear. Different fears call
for different smokescreens. Probably the most common one is the security to be
gained from obtaining and using power. Money and property might be called
congealed power. Of course a certain amount of such congealed power is
necessary to live, especially in today’s hyper-commodified world, but when their
pursuit has become the main goal of life, that life is dominated by disguised fear.
The fact that this psychopathology is now so widespread and acceptable does not
make it any the less problematic, of course; it just indicates a psychopathological
society.
~ Loy 2002
Previously in the chapter Tariq Ali was quoted in his observation that, had there been no Islam,
the Crusades would still have occurred, just under slightly modified justifying ideology (quoted
in The History Channel, 2005). As history has shown, Ali couldn’t have been more correct in his
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observations. Aside from aiding in the slaughter of Jews 260 and ignoring the indiscriminate
slaughter of non-Western Christians (and Muslim women and children) during the first Crusade,
the Church became involved in an official Crusade against Western Christians in 1209, when
Pope Innocent III launched the Albigensian Crusade against Cathars from the town of Albi in
what is now the south of France (Federici, 2004: 33 note 16). The Church had battled against
heresy from the early to late Middle Ages, but this seems to have marked the first official war on
Western Christians who did not conform to official Church doctrine. However, it was definitely
not the last. 261 Just over two decades later, with the Crusades still ongoing, Pope Gregory IX
launched the Inquisition, an institutionalized war on heretics –i.e., everyone who did not strictly
conform to official Church doctrine—which was created for the purpose of exterminating the
Christian Cathars and Waldenses who preached against the corruption of the Church Federici,
2004: 33 and note 16).
Anyone examining the above-discussed patterns in the Western cultural worldview, including
the widespread entrenchment of the patterns of projection, scapegoating and human sacrifice,
would be hard pressed to come to a different conclusion from Ali. But in addition to these
above-discussed patterns, there was another reason why the Crusades and the domestic wars that
followed were inevitable: the drive for accumulation by dispossession by Church (and,
increasingly, secular) authorities driven by the mentality of Empire-building. As previously
noted, the underlying purposes of the Crusades were to consolidate the wealth and power of the
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According to Jacoby, not only did Bishops refuse to protect Jews who had not converted to
Christianity from the Crusaders, but priests actually led the Crusaders into the Jewish
neighborhoods so they could kill the Jews (Carroll, 2007).
261
For example, in 1234 the Bishop of Breman called for a crusade against his tenants who
refused to pay tithes (Federici, 2004: 34), and other examples can readily be found.
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Church 262 by taking for the Church land, wealth, and souls possessed by other people but
imagined --through magical thinking and a disconnection from reality-- to belong to the
conquering Crusaders and Christendom. This pattern of taking what belongs to others –here
referred to as the processes of accumulation by dispossession, 263 or of taking more than is
needed—is a part of the mentality of Empire which had already been a long-established pattern
in the Western cultural worldview by this time. It was during the Inquisition that this pattern
really rose to prominence, allowing for the accumulation of land and wealth on an unprecedented
scale, and paving the way for exponentially more accumulation by dispossession during the later
period of imperialism and colonialism. Because this pattern is perhaps one of the pentultimate
problematic patterns in Western society, a quick overview of the events surrounding the
Inquisition is worthwhile.
As mentioned above, by the time of the Crusades, the Church was already well-entrenched in
these patterns of taking more than is needed, and doing so at the expense of other people. The
Church had been silent on slavery once it became a state religion under the Roman Empire, and
this silence continued long after the fall of the Empire, as did slavery (Federici, 2004: 23; Tigar
& Levy, 2000:36). 264 The Church was also a major participant, and a major institutional power
in the daily exploitation of serfs under the manorial system which treated serfs and their
possessions as little more than property of the manorial lord (Federici, 2004: 33-34, 23-25;
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The main motivations for the Crusades have been said to be securing and expanding trade
networks, ending attacks on merchants, and uniting western Europe under a common Christian
identity headed by the Church –all of which were objectives that were in the interest of the
Church and its solidification and expansion of empire (Tigar & Levy, 2000: 65-66, 68; Mohawk,
2000: 83-85; The History Channel, 2005).
263
Following Harvey’s (2003: 137-82) definition of the term.
264
Slavery continued through at least the seventh century, and was never fully abolished
according to Federici (2004).
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Mohawk, 2000: 67, 78; Tigar & Levy, 2000: 49-50, 38-39; Osborne, 2006: 117-18). 265 But the
Church was also responsible for numerous additional constraints on and exploitations of the
serfs, as Federici (2004) notes:
By the 11th century the Church had become a despotic power that used its alleged
divine investiture to govern with an iron fist and fills its coffers by endless means
of extortion. Selling absolutions, indulgences and religious offices, calling the
faithful to the church only to preach to them the sanctity of the tithes, and making
of all sacraments a market, were common practices from the pope to the village
priest, so much so that the corruption of the clergy became proverbial throughout
Christianity. Things degenerated to the point that the clergy would not bury the
dead, baptize or grant absolution from sin unless it received some compensation.
Even the communion became an occasion for a bargain, and “[I]f an unjust
demand was resisted the recalcitrant was excommunicated, and then had to pay
for reconciliation in addition to the original sum.”(P. 34; see also pp. 25-28; The
History Channel, 2005b)
Sometimes the tithes charged by the Church equaled as much as one-tenth of a serf’s income,
and Church lawyers and administrators reportedly lived like princes as the masses of serfs and
peasants struggled to survive (Federici, 2004: 27). Though the Church continued to preach about
the virtues of an impoverished lifestyle, many Church officials had practiced anything but this.
Instead, these teachings were intended to maintain the Church’s privileged position in two ways:
first, by extracting further wealth from rich lords and nobles who were attracted by guarantees of
salvation through impoverishment, and second, by keeping serfs docile amidst the exploitation
they suffered at the hands of their feudal lords and the Church, itself (Federici, 2004: 34 note
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Serfs were required them to get permission from (and pay a fee to) their lord for marriage,
trade, travel, transmitting land to future generations, and many other basic aspects of life, and
feudal lords exercised numerous “rights” over serfs’ property and persons, including the “right to
the first night,” or the right to sleep with the wife of a newly-wed serf on their wedding night.
Despite these various constraints upon their lives, Federici (2004) argues that serf women had
more freedom under the manorial system than they later came to have once “freed” to labor
under capitalism.
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19). 266 Thus, the Church’s sole authority to commune with God, and its ability to revise history,
law and Church doctrine, had left it in an immensely powerful position by this time, materially
and hegemonically.
In response to the often unbearable exploitation of the manorial system, and the pervasive
corruption and inflammatory, hateful preaching of Church officials, various popular movements
arose in the 11th, 12th and 13th centuries –generally categorized under the Millenarian movement
or the Heretical movement-- which condemned the corruption of the Church and sought to create
an entirely new set of social relations. While the Church preached (hypocritically) about
apostolic poverty, many of these sects practiced it. They also opposed hierarchical and
exploitative social relations and many actively worked towards the creation of communal forms
of life that rejected all forms of authority, resisted commerce and trade, and challenged Church
and secular authorities. The Cathers, a heretical sect, tolerated other religions, provided safe
havens for Jews, treated women as equals, and created networks of schools, safehouses and selfdefense (Federici, 2004: 31-35, 38). 267 Like most of these movements and sects, the Cathars
challenged secular and Church authorities, arguing that God did not speak through corrupted
clergy, that sacraments were not valid when administered by such clergy, that Purgatory was
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“[T]he Church exalted poverty as a holy state and engaged in distributions of alms, trying to
convince the rustics to accept their situation and not envy the rich. … The exaltation of sancta
pauperas (“holy poverty”) also served to impress on the rich the need for charity as a means for
salvation. This tactic procured the Church substantial donations of land, buildings, and money,
presumably to be used for distribution among the needy, and it enabled it to become of the
richest institutions in Europe. But when the poor grew in numbers and the heretics started to
challenge the Church’s greed and corruption, the clergy dismissed its homilies about poverty…”
(Federici, p. 34, note 19).
267
“[I]n the Church women were nothing, but here they were considered equal; they had the
same rights as men, and could enjoy a social life and mobility (wandering, preaching) that
nowhere else was available to them in the Middle Ages. In the heretical sects, aove all among
the Cathars and Waldenses, women had the right to administer sacraments, preach, baptize and
even acquire sacerdotal orders.” (Federici, 2004: 38).
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merely an invention of the clergy seeking to extort more wealth by selling indulgences, and that
people should not pay the tithes charged by the Church, because material aspects of worship did
not matter, only inner belief did. The Cathars further argued that they were the “true” church
because they were not corrupted like the Catholic clergy (Federici, 2004: 31-35).
Despite some of the various oddities of the different Millenarian and Heretical movements, 268
they had widespread appeal among groups from all sectors of feudal society. But they were
particularly popular among the impoverished urban and rural masses. The heretical movement
was one of the most popular because it addressed (and opposed) both the ideological and
material conditions forced upon the masses at the time. In this regard, the heretical movement, in
particular, has been credited as providing the organizational structure for much of the social
unrest that had been fomenting, and that would continue to intensify over the next few centuries
(Federici, 2004: 33). 269
By the end of the early Middle Ages, and likely long before that, many serfs throughout
Western Europe were involved in what James C. Scott (1990) has termed the arts of resistance.
Peasants asserted that they were free men, not serfs; serfs avoided taxes and fees by refusing to
bake bread, grind grain, or engage in other subsistence activities in the lord’s facilities (which
they were required to use, then taxed for using); and workers fled feudal manors and took up
residence in the towns. Other peasants and workers who remained in the feudal manor often
refused to show up to work the lord’s fields, or showed up late and took numerous breaks so that
268

See Federici, pp. 21-59, who mentions the various self-flagellative, apocapyptic, and/or
prophetic characteristics of some of the Millenarian sects, and of the broad range of sexual
beliefs among the heretical Cathars --from complete abstinence and refusal to consume any
(animal) food that was the result of procreation, to beliefs that sexual intercourse was necessary
as the best way to achieve innocence. Characteristic of their tolerance for other religions, the
Cathars tolerated this broad range of beliefs and practices among their own.
269
Federici (2004) has referred to the heretical movement as “the most important oppositional
movements of the Middle Ages”(p. 33).
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the crops were not harvested. While Church and secular authorities likely viewed these
behaviors as a low-level rebellion, many peasants and serfs likely viewed them as mere
assertions of their rights, though many among the latter also participated more outright
rebellions, such as the 1251 uprising in which peasants and town workers burnt and pillaged rich
neighborhoods and demanded better working conditions (Federici, 2004: 26-29, 32). These latter
actions were more the exception than the rule among peasants and workers, and though they may
seem extreme, in the context of the indiscriminate slaughters promoted in the ongoing Churchordered Crusades, and the new assaults that arose in the Inquisition, these actions could be
argued to have fit neatly into the range of acceptable social behavior at the time. The main
difference, of course, being that they were not ordered by the wealthy or powerful, but were
levied against them.
Under the Crusades the Church had called for and led a series of, often indiscriminate, attacks
against everyone who was not Western Christian. Sensing the increasing threat to its hegemonic
and material powers posed by the Millenarian and Heretical movements, the Church now began
to focus its attacks on everyone who was not obedient to Church doctrine. To this extent, it
began charging virtually every form of social or political resistance with heresy. It rewrote
Church doctrine, which once viewed poverty as apostolic and virtuous. Now only voluntary
poverty was virtuous and “deserving” of salvation and help from the Church, while all other
forms of poverty were suspicious or even indications of laziness (Federici, 2004: 34 note 19).
Public preaching was also outlawed by anyone who did not first obtain a license from a local
bishop, and measures were taken to confiscate the property of anyone accused and convicted of
heresy. To simplify this dispossession process, Pope Innocent III revamped the legal system that
had required accusers to prove their claims against the accused, or face punishment themselves.
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Wanting to encourage, rather than hinder would-be accusers, he created a system that allowed
secret accusations and that accepted “sufficient belief” in place of proof (The History Channel,
2005b). The Church also modified its stance on the death penalty, granting secular authorities the
moral authority to judge, draw blood, and execute people, so long as they did so “justly.”
Eventually, by the mid-13th century, the Church had endorsed the use of torture (which it
rationalized as benevolence) on accused heretics, leading to the production of numerous torture
manuals, as well as torture fanatics who enriched themselves through repeated claims to have
found fictional devil-worshiping sects and tortured 90% of their accused into making confessions
(Federici, 2004: 35, 33; The History Channel, 2005b).
With these tools in hand, early in the 13th century, a Crusade was called against the Cathars in
Albi, and soon an Inquisition was called targeting the Waldenses, the Cathars and all suspected
heretics. In the early stages of these attacks, the meetings of both groups were raided by Church
and secular authorities, some of whom executed meeting attendants on the spot. After these
repeated attacks forced the groups to go underground and made them more difficult to find, the
Pope decided that on-the-spot executions were less helpful to the Church than capture, torture,
and forced confessions, which would save at least some souls of the accused. In this way, over
the next 150 or so years, the Church and its secular allies succeeded in annihilating the Cathars
and Waldenses, and eradicating nearly every trace of their doctrines throughout Europe (The
History Channel, 2005; Federici, 2004: 33 and note 17). But they did not succeed in eliminating
heresy altogether; nor did they succeed in eliminating the growing dissent and rebellion among
rural and urban workers of all types, which came to resemble “true wars” by the 15th century
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(Federici, 2004: 44, 25). 270 This dissent and rebellion was seen as a further threat to Church and
secular wealth and hegemony, and it increasingly attracted the eye of the Inquisition, turning the
Church-secular alliances in the war against heresy into an all out class war to protect the wealth
and power of the few through the slaughter of the accused masses (Federici, 2004: 33-34).
The crackdown of authoritarian intolerance against worker and peasant dissent was
accompanied by increased religious persecution against Jews, Muslims, and dissenting factions
within the Church, 271 as well as against women, animals and the earth (Carroll, 2007; The
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Throughout the 14th century various forms of resistance and rebellion abound. The famine of
1315-22 and the first round of plague from 1347-52, which eliminated over a third of the
population of Europe, created a tremendous labor shortage that served as an additional
impediment to secular and Church accumulation, and an additional lift for workers’ power.
Secular authorities responded to these challenges with new oppressive measures, such as
freezing wages and creating a maximum wage, mandating work by all able-bodied people and
enforcing this mandate through a capitation tax, forbidding workers to leave their present
employment without permission from their employer/master, mandating that anyone who
worked steadily in agriculture until the age of twelve would be forever forced to work only in
that occupation, and passing other measures attempting to reduce workers nearly to the status of
slaves (or to actually replace them with slaves). Merchants exercised complete control over
urban workers, and forbid them from holding any kind of meeting, forming associations,
carrying tools of trade (or other arms), or striking, and routinely spied on, tortured and executed
workers through merchant-controlled town government tribunals (Federici, 2004: 37, 40, 43-45;
Tigar, 2000: 165-66).
These various constraints on peasant and worker freedoms were met with collective resistance
and outright rebellion by peasants and workers, who refused to pay taxes, ignored orders, and
increasingly took up arms against the upper classes in their struggles, such as the armed urban
rebellion in Flanders in 1377, a “whirlwind revolution” in France in 1379-1382, the English
Peasant Uprising of 1381, various uprisings in Paris, and Taborite communism in Bohemia
(which was armed for self-defense) (Federici, pp. 34-35, 44-45; Tigar P. 166). Throughout this
period, Church and secular authorities responded to growing unrest by expanding the reach of
the Inquisition and increasingly persecuting all forms of rebellion or dissent as heresy, punishing
the workers in the Flanders as rebels and heretics, leading another crusade against the Taborites
in Bohemia, and asserting Church control over marriage, sexuality of rich and poor alike
(Federici, pp. 34, 36, 40).
271
Many Jews in southern France were attacked and slaughtered in 1320 by a mob of fanatical,
would-be crusaders, aided by local consulates. Their counterparts in Spain were forced to
choose between conversion to Christianity or expulsion from Spain. Many who converted were
eventually massacred in riots or in the Inquisition after having risen to positions of prominence
in their communities and then been accused by resentful Christians of secretly practicing
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History Channel, 2005b; Federici, 2004: 30, 34, 40, 44, 32 note 15; Mies, 1986: 80-81; St. Clair,
2010). 272 The old teachings about women, animals, nature and non-Christian peoples, based in
the writings of Aristotle and St. Augustine, were revived in writings of Thomas Aquinas
(Serpell, 1999: 45-47; Mohawk, 2000: 89). Further, the labor shortage resulting from the famine
of 1315-22 and the plague of 1347-52 (which eliminated over a third of the population of
Europe) was seen as a threat to social, political and economic stability for the Church and its
secular allies, causing the Church to exert its control over marriage and sexuality by declaring
any form of contraception as heretical and prosecutable by secular authorities (Federici, 2004:
36, 37, 40, 44; Mies, 1986: 83-84; Tigar, 165; Ferguson, 2011: 4). In this vein, non-procreative
sex, herbal medicine, and the general independence of women all came under attack (Mohawk,
2000: 90-91) and the propaganda of the Inquisition, which had already annihilated many of the
heretical sects, was ratcheted up to produce new levels of social hysteria around a whole new
host of fictitious and fantastical evils, now associated with alleged sorcery or witchcraft. As
Federici (2004) notes:
By the mid-14th century, the Inquisitor’s reports were not longer content with
accusing the heretics of sodomy and sexual license. Now heretics were accused
of animal worship, including the infamous bacium sub cauda (the kiss under the
tail), and of indulging in orgiastic rituals, night flights and child sacrifices. (P. 40)

Judaism and attempting to seduce Christians to do the same. Many additional Jews fled the
persecution in Spain towards the end of the 15th century only to face a new round of religious
bigotry in Portugal, which was reportedly worse than Spain, causing many Jews to return to the
latter. Muslims in Spain were also forced to convert, and, like the Jews, were eventually
attacked as false converts who were “beyond conversion” because they ‘carried the sin in their
blood, not their belief’. Dissenting groups within the Christian Church, itself, were likewise
attacked. Some Franciscans who attempted to return to the original teachings of Christianity
were hung and the rest were forced back into the folds of the Church (Carroll, 2007; The History
Channel, 2005b; Federici, 2004: 34, 32 note 15).
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St. Clair (2010) notes the rise of animal trials around the 13th century, but does not
specifically attribute this to the Inquisition.
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Women constituted the immediate focus of the attacks against witchcraft, since they were,
according to one manual on identifying and extracting confessions from witches, more
susceptible to superstition and quicker to waiver in their faith than men. They were also: addicted
to “evil” superstitions, “more impressionable and ready to receive the influence of a disembodied
spirit,” in possession of a slippery tongue, unable to hide the evil they know from other women,
intellectually like children, and otherwise imperfect animals that always deceive and that sought
to vindicate their weakness through witchcraft, and so forth Kramer & Sprenger, 2005: 103-09).
But the real reason for this extensive, centuries-long attack on women, according to some
writers, was that the church and secular authorities created and used “the witch-hysteria to find a
scapegoat for all problems and disturbances and the unrest of the poor people, and to divert the
wrath of the people from them against some poor women”(Mies, 1986: 82). 273 Indeed, may of
the acts punishable as witchcraft had not previously been recognized as crimes, but were forms
of accepted collective behavior that now seemed to pose a threat to the interests of the rising
social, political and economic elite (Federici, 2000: 170). Still, divert wrath they did as the
merchant class in 14th century French and Italian municipalities essentially legalized rape of
working or lower class women, even in the case of gang rapes. According to Federici (2004), the
move was intended to displace tension between classes with tension between the sexes.
Rebellious working-class males, resentful that economic circumstances had forced them to delay
marriage for many years, became preoccupied with the legalized assaults on women (Mies,
1986: 79; Federici, 2004: 36) rather than actions aimed at changing the system that had
impoverished them. Groups of up to 15 men routinely broke into homes and dragged women

273

See also the graph in Federic, (2004: 175), which demonstrates that during the decades from
1550-1630, when the price of food had escalated (relative to stagnant, capped wages), witch
trials were at their highest point.
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through the streets without making any attempt to hide their crimes or their identities. According
to some, over half of the men in urban areas engaged in this type of behavior, forever disgracing
scores of women who, once raped, were forced either to leave town or to join the ranks of
increasingly despised prostitutes (Federici, 2004: 47-48). The human suffering created by these
actions was preferred to the alternative, according to Federici (2004):
Not surprisingly, the authorities viewed the disturbances caused by such policy
(the brawls, the presence of youth gangs roaming the streets at night in search of
adventure and disturbing the public quiet) as a small price to pay in exchange for
a lessening of social tension, obsessed as they were with the fear of urban
insurrections…. (P. 48; see also)
The sadistic, torturous, anti-woman mentality required for such depravity, inhumanity, and
disconnect from the world, is further demonstrated through a brief glimpse into the world of
those who made their livingoff of finding, interrogating, torturing, and trying witches. 274 Such a
glimpse is found in St. Clair (2010):
In 1598, the suspected sorceress François Secretain was brought before the
inquisitional court at St. Claude in Jura Mountains of Burgundy to face charges of
witchcraft and bestiality. Secretain was accused of communing with the devil and
having sex with a dog, a cat and a rooster. The blood-curdling case is described
in detail by her prosecutor, the Grand Justice Henri Boguet, in his strange
memoir, Discours des Sorciers. Secretain was stripped naked in her cell, as the
fanatical Boguet inspected her for the mark of Satan. The animals were shaved
and plucked for similar examinations. Secretain and her pets were put to various
tortures, including having a hot poker plunged down their throats to see if they
shed tears, for, as Boguet noted in his memoir:
All the sorcerers whom I have examined in quality of Judge have never
shed tears in my presence: or, indeed, if they have shed them it has been
so parsimoniously that no notice was taken of them. I say this with regard
to those who seemed to weep, but I doubt if their tears were not feigned. I
am at least well assured that those tears were wrung from them with the
greatest efforts. This was shown by the efforts which the accused made to
weep, and but the small number of tears which they shed.
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Mies (1986: 84) notes that lawyers, jurists, urban and rural authorities, the Church and the
executioners all profited, but there also “grew up a whole army o smaller fry who made a living
out of the burning of witches.”
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Alas, the poor woman and her animals did not weep. They perished together in
flames at the stake. (P. 6)
In this way, over the next several centuries, possibly millions of women were accused,
arrested, tortured and executed for the alleged crime of witchcraft in what was not only an
assertion of male-dominated authority over women, but an assertion of male, bourgeois,
Christian-dominated authority over the masses of Christian and non-Christian people, animals
and the earth (Mies, 1986: 81, 74-111; Federici, 2004: 170, 174; Merchant, 1989). 275 All of this
was for the purpose of allowing Church and secular elites to accumulate wealth at the expense
of, and through the dispossession of, everyone and everything else.
In many ways, the witch-hunt sprang out of the Inquisition, and the Inquisition sprung out of
the Crusades (and the Crusades sprung out of the mentality of Empire and conquest). The latter
indiscriminately dispossessed Jews and eastern Christians of their lives, property, and wealth in
the quest to also dispossess first Muslims and then heretic sects. While the plunder of the
Crusades was not systematic or centralized, the amount of wealth that was accumulated for
Church and secular authorities was considerable. Of course, the Crusades were driven by more
than just the wealth that could be immediately accumulated through plunder and pillage; they
were also driven by a push to create the conditions that would allow for an ongoing accumulation
of wealth well into the future. To these ends, they were aimed at controlling trade routes and
275

The poor and working class rebellion was led by women (see Mies, 1986: 81; Federici, 2004:
170, 174). Estimates on the numbers of women killed during the witch hunts vary, having been
drastically revised downward in recent years. Mies (1986: 83) argues that millions were killed.
Mohawk, (1997) says that possibly millions were killed. Federici (2004: 169), says that in just
two centuries in several European countries, hundreds of thousands of women were killed.
Meanwhile, Monaghan (1999) states that “[a]t the very least, 100,000” were killed; Lemieux
(2007: 20) argues for an extremely conservative 50,000; and Ferguson (2010: 63) provides yet a
lower estimate of a mere “12,000-45,000 people, mostly women” who were killed throughout all
of Europe, as well as in North America, over the seven centuries in which the witch-hunt existed
(and in which the production of numerous volumes on finding, identifying and torturing witches
were published –including 29 different editions of just one of these: the Malleus maleficarum).
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expanding eastern trade; uniting feudal lords under a system of centralized trade and contract law
headed by the Church; and consolidating Church power by eliminating alternative forms of
accumulation by dispossession that were not controlled by the Church (Tigar & Levy, 2000: 42,
62, 65-68; 50-51).
In contrast, the Inquisition, like the witch-hunt, was centrally-run by Church and secular
authorities. These authorities more directly benefited from the dispossession of Jews, Muslims,
non-obedient Christians, and women from their wealth and property (Federici, 2004: 12;
Mohoawk, 2000: 91; Mies, 1986: 86-87; The History Channel, 2005b; Carroll, 1997). Several
writers have further argued that the witch-hunt provided the early capital accumulation necessary
for European colonial adventures abroad and the formation of nation states at home (Mohawk,
1997; Mies, 1986: 85-88; Federici, 2004: 12). 276 Thus, like the Crusades, the Inquisition and the
witch-hunt served the purpose of immediate accumulation by dispossession (which may well
have been its primary purpose). The witch-hunt (like the Crusades and even more so than the
Inquisition) also served the purpose of establishing the long-term conditions necessary to allow
an ongoing accumulation of wealth into the future. By scapegoating and ritually sacrificing
women, Church and secular authorities attacked the main instigators and leaders of the rural
rebellions against the enclosures, as well as the largest percentage of workers in urban areas
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For example, Mies (1986: 86) notes that “in some cases the cities and their princes used
witch-pogroms and confiscations as a kind of development aid for their ruined economies” or to
fund wars, and “[t]he hope of financial gains can be seen as one of the main reasons why the
witch hysteria spread and why hardly any people were acquitted” (pp. 86-87). Similarly, Federici
(2004:12 and 169 note 13) notes that, though the vast majority of those targeted in the witch hunt
were poor, single, divorced or widowed women, the witch-hunt in the 16th and 17th centuries
served as a form of primitive accumulation of capital, adding: “the persecution of the witches, in
Europe as in the New World, was as important a colonization and the expropriation of the
European peasantry from its land were for the development of capitalism.” See also The History
Channel (2005b) on the coveting of others’ wealth as a driving force behind both the witch-hunt
and the Inquisition.
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(Federici, 2004: 174, 30-31; Mies, 1986: 81). 277 They also destroyed much of the collective
organizing capacity of the dispossessed masses that flooded the cities in search of work and food.
As mentioned above, the scapegoating of women created a ready target for urban male angst.
The privileging of men in the occupations further quelled male participation in rebellions against
social relations of domination. And the fear of witches --or of being accused of witchcraft— kept
people from challenging accusations against their neighbors, and destroyed alternative social
arrangements, alternative forms of authority, alternative methods of healing, and alternative ways
of living, thinking, and alternative earning a living (Federici, 2004: 30-31, 34, 36, 44, 46-47,
174; Tigar & Levy, 2000: 167; Mies, 1986: 80-81). 278 Thus, through scapegoating women, the
rising bourgeois elite was also able to transform the impoverishment of women from a symbol of
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The latter source is noting the “meticulously thought-out legal procedure” characterizing the
witch trials, i.e., the ritual.
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Up to the 15th century, single women had made up the bulk of urban working population, and
had been free to work in numerous occupations, trades and professions. As dispossessed men,
women and families flooded the cities, desperate for work or food, the attack on women justified
the further dispossession of urban women from the professions, trades and most occupations.
Women were also demonized and harassed in many of those occupations that remained open to
them. For example, some female weavers were threatened with excommunication if they did not
produce work fast enough or if they produced work deemed substandard). And, until about
1450, prostitution had been legal, socially accepted, and actively supported by many
municipalities, which managed and funded brothels (using tax dollars) as a legitimate means of
employment for single women and of relief to the numerous young men who were forced to
refrain from marriage for economic reasons. Prostitutes even marched in Church processions
carrying their own banners. This all changed with the Church’s assertion of its authority over
marriage and sexuality, its outlawing of any and all forms of contraception, and the
Church/secular attack on women and witchcraft. See sources cited in the text for more on this.
On the destruction of alternative social arrangements, Diamond (1974) argues that in the
quest to dominate, all alternatives are seen as a threat:
Civilized peoples and civilized disciples have, therefore, been particularly sensitive to
political action on the part of “backward” peoples which created the possibility of
autonomous societies and alternative cultures. In the mind of the imperialist, the world
is small, and loss of control in one area threatens the whole. (P. 2)
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the destructive, anti-social and even demonic 279 nature of the new social, economic and political
relations of domination that were being imposed upon the masses, into something that was
supposedly natural, normal, and/or justified based on the behavior of these women, themselves
(Taussig, 1980; Federici, 2004: 170). In this way, “women’s bodies, their labor, and their sexual
and reproductive powers were placed under the control of the state and transformed into
economic resources,”(Federici, 2004: 170) as were, less spectacularly, the bodies and labor of
men.
By destroying or removing all possibilities for survival independent of the new social
relations of domination, the rising bourgeois elite was able to create the conditions for
establishing hegemony over the masses. The masses were subjugated and tamed into obedience
(or killed) by Church and secular authorities over a millennium, 280 and more than ever before
law became a tool for maintaining this obedience. To this end, the codification and
centralization of law that had begun at least as far back as the Crusades (Tigar, 2000: 42, 62;
Mohawk, 2000) exploded during the witch-hunt as the sons of the rising bourgeois elite flocked:
to the law faculties … ‘attracted … out of greed for money and ambition.’ They
were able, through complicated and learned interpretations of the authoritative
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Taussig, Michael. 1980. The Devil and Commodity Fetishism in South America. 4th Ed,
University of North Carolina Press (cited in Federici, p. 170) observed that, when faced with the
imposition of these same conditions, indigenous peoples in Colombia and Brazil saw these new
monetary relations as deadly and possibly the result of devil worship by the European colonizers.
280
Whereas the feudal lords and Church authorities once took a portion of the product of the
serfs’ labor (that which was surplus to his/her subsistence), the bourgeois class now took the
entire product of the workers’ labor and returned to them only a portion, which might or might
not be enough for their subsistence. The masses were thus dispossessed not only of their property
and means of subsistence, but also of their labor power and their life force, which no longer
belonged to them, but to the bourgeoisie who purchased it (if any did) (See Marx, 1867/1987 and
1932/1972a; Harvey, 2003: 137-82). That this was a prime function of the witch-hunt is partially
evidenced in Federici, who finds, for example, that the witch-hunt simply did not take place in
areas where the enclosures did not take place, or in areas where people lived predominantly
under collective land tenure and kinship systems (Federici, 2004: 171).
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texts, to prolong the trials so that the costs of the trial would go up. (Mies, 1986:
84).
Others sought their fortunes in bureaucratic or freelance positions as executioners, witch hunters
or Inquisitors who often got paid per witch and could prolong their employment and enhance
their status by finding “lots of witches to prove their jobs were necessary” (Mies, 1986: 86-87).
Thus, whereas the Crusades produced massive leaps and gains towards centralizing law and
developing contract law (Tigar & Levy, 2000: 42, 62), and the Inquisition produced leaps and
gains in imposing the Church as the sole authority on medicine and healing, the witch-hunt far
surpassed the hegemonic powers of both of these through the creation of a rationalized,
bureaucratic infrastructure geared towards identifying, trying, prosecuting and punishing witches
–what one might refer to as the “witch-hunt industrial complex.” 281
Like all bureaucratic-industrial-complexes, the witch-hunt industrial complex developed an
inherent tendency towards self-preservation: reproducing itself and constantly expanding its
domain in order to continue existing merely for the sake of existing. Thus, it is likely out of this
dramatic expansion of the legal system that we find animals increasingly hauled into secular and
ecclesiastic courts (starting around the 13th century). The trying of animals (and even insects) for
alleged crimes expended considerable effort, time, and money –much of which was likely
collected through taxes, fees, and the dispossessions of the ongoing Inquisitions and witch-hunts.
Much like the accused or convicted witches, during their interrogation or after their conviction,
according to St. Clair (2010), animals:
were subjected to the same ghastly forms of torture and execution as were
condemned humans. Convicted animals were lashed, put to the rack, hanged,
beheaded, burned at the stake, buried alive, stoned to death and drawn and
quartered. … The heads of the condemned, especially in cases of bestiality, were
281

Like the Military-Industrial Complex (See: Eisenhower, 1961) and the Prison-Industrial
Complex (Davis, 1998).
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often displayed on pikes in the town square adjacent to the heads of their human
co-conspirators. (Pp. 2-3)
The expansion and bureaucratization of the legal system also allowed for the increasing
criminalization of additional portions of the urban working or poor masses. By the end of the 15th
century, a large portion of those who could not be accommodated by the limited employment
opportunities in the towns (and who had been expropriated from their means of subsistence in
the country) were scapegoated and dehumanized by the new bourgeois power elite. The latter
referred to the former as “’savages,’ ‘beasts,’ and ‘incorrigibles,’ in need of harsh discipline”
(Lanier & Henry, 2004: 71-72), and new Poor Laws were passed that separated the unemployed,
desperate masses into categories of “deserving” and “undeserving” poor (drawing upon the
Church’s earlier distinction) (Lanier & Henry, 2004: 71-72; Wikipedia, 2011). 282 Those seen as
most threatening to the new social relations –unemployed, able-bodied men, women and even
children-- were categorized as “undeserving” and subject to penalties for countless new offenses
under the Poor Laws, hundreds of which were punishable by execution. As was the case with
the witch-hunt and the Inquisition before it, investigators of these alleged offenses often relied
upon torture to extract confessions or bought witnesses to levy accusations. Those who escaped
execution were sent to workhouses, or prisons (Lanier & Henry, 2004: 70-72).
In many ways, these legal persecutions of men, women, children and animals reinforced the
old separations and disconnections. Through scapegoating and the ritual sacrifice of others, a
climate of fear and division was created and maintained, in which the masses were subservient to
the new bourgeois class and/or subject to potential punishment, torture, and death. These
persecutions also reflected a tendency among some members of the rising bourgeoisie towards
282

The latter source notes the legal persecution of the poor as early as the mid-14th century, and
the codification of periodic laws for this purpose starting towards the end of the 15th century
onward).
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paranoia and sadism in their enactment of violent punishments upon others. As can be noted
from the above discussion, punishments appear to have been enacted not only as a means of
domination, but as a means of absolving themselves for their own guilt and immorality in these
enactments by projecting it onto punished, “Othered” people. In their treatment of other humans
as animals, and their inhumane treatment of animals, the bourgeoisie’s disconnection from
others, nature, their God, their Church and themselves are clearly visible. These disconnections
were further both enhanced and institutionalized as they were forcibly and hegemonically
imposed upon everyone and everything that was within reach of their new social relations of
domination.
It wasn’t just the legal profession that was dramatically expanded under the witch-huntindustrial complex. A dramatic expansion and bureaucratization of science, technology and the
medicine also took place, and the poking, prodding, and torture of women’s bodies laid the
groundwork for considerable advancements in science and medicine, including the development
of a new scientific method (Mies, 1986: 83, 87). As Mies (1986) notes:
The persecution and burning of midwives as witches was directly connected with
the emergence of modern society: the prefessionalization of medicine, the rise of
medicine as a ‘natural science’, the rise of science and of modern economy. The
torture chambers of the witch-hunters were the laboratories where the texture, the
anatomy, the resistance of the human body—mainly the female body—was
studied. One may say that modern medicine and the male hegemony over this
vital field were established on the base of millions of crushed, maimed, torn,
disfigured and finally burnt, female bodies. (P. 83)
The advancements in science, technology and medicine that took place under the witch-huntindustrial complex were not long restricted to witches. Like the bodies of women accused of
being witches, the bodies of the poor, of animals, and the earth itself, were also prodded, poked,
tortured and dissected. The old separations found in the teachings of Aristotle and St. Augustine
were further intensified through the teachings of Thomas Aquinas, which paved the way for the
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new moral climate in which animals were routinely abused and dissected in public –without
anesthesia—as “scientists” displayed their knowledge throughout Europe (Serpell, 1999: 45-46).
The intensification and institutionalization of these old separations allowed the new bourgeois
class to forcibly break the old taboos against mining, and “the same violent means” used in the
prodding and torturing of bodies (i.e., “science” 283) was turned on the earth in order to learn her
secrets and take her treasures (Mies, 1986: 75; Tigar & Levy, 2000: 62; Mohawk, 1997; Szasz,
1970: 281; Diamond, 1974: 3, 39; Sheldrake, 1994: 9-60, 179). 284 To this extent, the new men of
science in this era argued that the earth and nature:
must be ‘bound into service’, made a ‘slave’, put ‘in constraint’, had to be
‘dissected’; much as a ‘woman’s womb had symbolically yielded to the forceps,
so nature’s womb harboured secrets that through technology could be wrested
from her grasp for use in the improvement of the human condition’. (Mies, 1986:
88; Merchant, 1989: 169).
Mies (1986) further elaborates:
The rise of modern science, a mechanistic and physical world-view, was based on
the killing of nature as a living organism and its transformation into a huge
reservoir of ‘natural resources’ or ‘matter’, which could be analysed and
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Which, in western society, is often mere superstition masquerading as science. As Diamond
(1974: 48), noted, “pure science itself has become a superstition, and… the superstitions of the
primitive past are being understood as systems of belief that reflect a multidimensional reality.”
Black Elk (1983: 155) is similarly critical of what is passed off as “science” in western society.
Contrasting this with the perhaps superior indigenous ways of understanding the world, he notes
that at least the Lakota “call their spirituality spirituality, not science.” See also, Deloria (1969:
188-189).
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These connections are most explicit in Mies (1986: 75), Merchant (1989) & Sheldrake (1994).
Tigar & Levy (2000: 62) note that the systematic exploitation of mines and forests allowed for
the accumulation of surplus capital, that was reinvested into fueling the growth of trade and the
rise of bourgeois social relations of domination –i.e., capitalism. Mohawk (1997) notes that “the
war on magic was a psychological war on nature.” Meanwhile, Szasz (1970: 281) is more
methaphorical, drawing parallels between the mining of the earth in the late Middle Ages and the
mining of society today for “mad men.” Diamond (1974: 3, 39) is similarly metaphorical,
discussing the ways in which colonialism transforms other cultures into raw materials, and
discards as worthless anything that can not be “endlessly mined” for the benefit of some
bourgeois aspect of Western society.
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synthesized by Man into his new machines by which he could make himself
independent of Mother Nature.
Only now, the dualism, or rather the polarization, between the patriarchs and
nature, and between men and women could develop its full and permanent
destructive potential. From now on science and technology became the main
‘productive forces’ through which men could ‘emancipate’ themselves from
nature, as well as from women. … [W]e cannot understand the modern
developments, including our present problems, unless we include all those who
were ‘defined into nature’ by the modern capitalist patriarchs: Mother Earth,
Women and Colonies. (P. 75)
In this way, the old separations, and all of the above-discussed patterns, were institutionalized
in the new bourgeois social relations of domination, and everything other than orthodoxChristian, bourgeois man was attacked, dispossessed, and transformed –both in the bourgeois
mind and in this new, predatory system-- into raw materials to be used and abused in bourgeois’
interests of capital accumulation (by dispossession). The witch-hunt --even more so than the
Inquisition and the Crusades before it, and like the ongoing warfare, conquest and various social
persecutions since-- was a tool for mining society, for extracting from it every little bit of
potential capital, for exploiting this capital to its fullest, for discarding everything else, and for
attacking everything that got in the way of this capital accumulation. Like warfare, conquest,
scapegoating, persecutions, and other forms of social dislocation which are still ongoing today,
the “witch-hunt was business”(Mies 1986: 87). 285 And business in Western society has
maintained a long history of separating and exempting itself from moral concerns, since these are
incompatible with the successful exploitation, extraction, and accumulation of capital (except so
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Mies, page 87, who continues:
The blood-money of the witch-hunt was used for the private enrichment of bankrupt
princes, of lawyers, doctors, judges and professors, but also for such public affairs as
financing wars, building up a bureaucracy, infrastructural measures, and finally the new
absolute state. This blood-money fed the original process of capital accumulation,
perhaps not to the same extent as the plunder and robbery of the colonies, but certainly
to a much greater extent than is known today.
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far as these moral concerns can be used as capital, i.e., used to manipulate large portions of the
masses into compliance with the goals of capital accumulation by dispossession).
Just as indigenous peoples throughout the Americas would later fight against the theft of their
lands, their enslavement, and the violence and genocide that was perpetrated against them by
European colonists –and just as they would come to view the European’s monetary relations as
destructive and evil (Federici, 2004: 170; Taussig, 1980) -- so, too, did European women and
men fight, first against the oppressions of the feudal lords and the Church, and then against the
oppressions of the rising commerce economy and its enclosures, persecutions, social dislocations
and other devastating effects. But when manipulated by the creation of false moral concerns
(regarding women and witches, the poor or non-Christian people), or ready-made scapegoats,
and pseudo privileges for some, the European masses then, as now, were unable to resist the urge
to turn on each other, and to project their anger, pain, fear, desolation, and paranoia onto others
who had too little social power to fight back. As Mies (1986) and Federici (2004) have
remarked: “The persecution of the witches was a manifestation of the rising modern society and
not, as is usually believed, a remnant of the irrational ‘dark’ Middle Ages”(Mies, 1986: 83), and:
capitalism was the counter-revolution that destroyed the possibilities that had
emerged from the anti-feudal struggle –possibilities which, if realized, might have
spared us the immense destruction of lives and the natural environment that has
marked the advance of capitalist relations worldwide. (Federici, 2004: 21-22)

Individualism, the Destruction of Culture, Anxiety, Narcissism and Self-Aggrandizement
Today Europe is still feeling the effects of the submersion of its original tribes
following the demise of the Roman Empire. Western man smashes that which he
does not understand because he never had the opportunity to evolve his own
culture. Instead ancient cultures were thrust upon him while he was yet
unprepared for them. …. Because tribes and groups had been unable to survive,
the common denominator, the individual, became the focal point of the revolt.
Instead of socially oriented individuals, the Reformation produced self-centered
individuals. Social end economic Darwinism, the survival of the fittest at any
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cost, replaced the insipid brotherhood of Christianity not because Christianity’s
basic thrust was invalid, but because it had been corrupted for so long that it was
no longer recognizable. …. Because there was no way the individual could relate
to his past, he was told to relate to the other world, leaving this world free for
nationalistic exploitation –the real forger of identity.
~ Deloria 1969, 177, 176
An individual has not started living until he can rise above the narrow confines of
his individualistic concerns to the broader concerns of all humanity.
~ Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.
Italian scholar Italo Mereu argues that the Roman Inquisition “left deep scars in the history of
European culture, creating a climate of intolerance and institutional suspicion that continues to
corrupt the legal system to this day” (Federici, 2004: 33 note 17). 286 Certainly, considerable
evidence exists supporting Mereu’s case. But the Roman Inquisition was just one of a series of
phases of the Inquisition that, together, spanned more than seven centuries and inflicted
considerable violence and atrocities on various peoples (as well as animals, nature and the earth).
Further, the activities of the Inquisition overlap with --but do not include-- the massacres, torture,
and atrocities committed against non-Christian and eastern Christian peoples during the Crusades
and/or the various conquests before them. Nor do these activities include the full extent of the
atrocities committed through the witch-hunt, the criminalization of the poor, or the Enclosures
and the dispossession of the masses in Europe and the Americas. Thus, it would not be much of a
stretch to argue that all of these activities, like the Roman Inquisition, left deep scars in the lives
and cultural worldviews of all who survived them (as well as all who perpetrated them), and that
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The quotation is part of Federici’s (2004) summary of Mereu’s (2003) Historia de la
Intolerancia en Europa (Spanish Edition). Spain: Ediciones Paidos Iberica. Federici’s summary
continues: “The legacy of the Inquisition is a culture of suspicion that relies on anonymous
charges and preventative detention, and treats suspects as if already proven guilty.” To this
extent, one can clearly see this same legacy in North America today, such as through
Guantanamo Bay and various other US military prisons around the world, in the 2011 National
Defense Authorization Act, and even in Canada’s response to the 2010 G20 meeting of heads of
state in Toronto.
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these trauma-induced scars were defining in many ways for Western culture and the directions in
which it developed. More than this, in looking back over the various massacres, conquests,
enslavements, exploitations and dispossessions that span for over a millennium of European
history, one might come to the conclusion that, rather than merely being “deep scars in the
history of European culture,” these activities, in large part, lie at the core of what defines
Western culture –i.e., of what Western culture is. Unlike scars that can be differentiated from the
rest of a cultural worldview, these activities are at the very center of the Western cultural
worldview, which has been built, for millennia, around promoting and justifying these very
activities, as well as other, increasingly more devastating and destructive, patterns of behaving
and thinking in relation to the rest of the world (including other peoples, animals, nature, the
earth and even parts of one’s self). 287
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While many adherents of western culture may balk at this suggestion, its truth has long been
apparent to non-western peoples, as can be confirmed through an examination of numerous
accounts of history and colonization written from their perspective. For example, Vine Deloria
Jr. (1969: 179) noted of the culture that Europeans brought with them to the New World:
As far as we could determine, white culture, if it existed, depended primarily upon the
exploitation of land, people and life itself. It relied upon novelties and fads to provide
an appearance of change but it was basically an economic Darwinism that destroyed
rather than created.
And Russell Means (1983: 24) has likewise noted of western culture:
You can’t judge the real nature of the European revolutionary doctrine on the basis of
the changes it proposes to make within the European power structure and society. You
can only judge it by the effects it will have on non-European peoples. This is because
every revolution in European history has served to reinforce Europe’s tendencies and
abilities to export destruction to other peoples, other cultures, and the environment
itself. I defy anyone to point to an example where this isn’t true.
See also, James Serpel’s (1999: 40) account of the western cultural worldview’s approach to
animals and non-human life, which he argues is an extremely atypical exception to the attitudes
and practices towards animals in 500,000 years of human history:
Our culture has a 700-year history of condoning and even promoting widespread and
systematic animal abuse—a tradition that still thrives in a number of socially accepted
practices such as factory farming, sport hunting, rodeos, rattlesnake roundups, and so
on. … [O]ur culture’s peculiarly anthropocentric worldview appears to be highly
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This argument should not be shocking or surprising. These activities – the conquests,
enslavement, and bondage; the Crusades; the Inquisition; the witch-hunt; the Enclosures; and the
various other dispossessions of people from the land, from their access to subsistence, and from
their status as human beings to a status of less than human “’savages,’ ‘beasts,’ and
‘incorrigibles,’ in need of harsh discipline”— destroyed the original indigenous cultures
throughout Europe, and repeatedly destroyed all of the local, self-sufficient cultures that rose up
to replace them (Mohawk, 1997; Deloria, 1969: 175-77; Diamond, 1974: 2; Lanier & Henry,
2004: 71-72). 288 This destruction was, in fact, one of the main purposes of these various
activities, as Empire-building required control over the masses, and the masses, as members of
local, self-sufficient cultures, frequently united to fight against their subjugation to Empires
controlled by others. Thus, the destruction of any form of collective mentality was also an aim
of these activities, and scapegoating various (and numerous) categories of people served to
divide the masses through fear, as well as through the meting out of punishments and privileges
that shifted blame away from those who had created the misery of the masses in the first place.
The destruction of culture and the collective mentality, both resulted from, and resulted in,
trauma. Though this holds true for all of the above-discussed problematic patterns of thought

atypical, and is probably therefore vulnerable to being overturned by more humane,
zoophilic, and ecocentric moral philosophies. (P. 48)
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Many of Europe’s original cultures had been destroyed repeatedly by the fall of the Roman
Empire, according to Mohawk (1997) (Mohawk, how the conquest). As Deloria (1969) further
notes:
More than a thousand years before Columbus … Christianity swept across the
conquerors like the white man later swept across North America, destroying native
religions and leaving paralyzed groups of disoriented individuals in its wake. Then the
combination of Christian theology, superstition, and forms of the old Roman civil
government began to control the tamed barbaric tribes. Gone were the religious rites of
white tribesmen. Only the Gothic arches in the great cathedrals, symbolizing the oaks
under which their ancestors worshiped, remained to remind them of the glories that had
been. (Pp. 175-76)
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and behavior in the Western cultural worldview, it is even more so with the destruction of culture
and the creation of individualism. The destruction –or even destabilization—of culture is always
traumatic. Cultures exist to bind human beings to one another in positive ways, providing social
support, knowledge and information, identity, self-esteem, a means for acquiring and distributing
goods and resources, and a worldview for contextualizing group and individual experiences
within the present, past and future, and within an enduring, meaningful universe (Devries, 2006;
Solomon et al., 2000). 289 As such, a primary purpose of culture is to integrate members into the
collective, to help them progress orderly through the life cycle, and to protect members and the
group as a whole from traumatic events by providing them with the required social support to
buffer trauma’s impact. Culture thus also functions to provide its members with collective
grieving and healing processes that help them to regain control over emotions, behaviors, and
lives; to readjust to new circumstances; to link more intimately to the community; and to
reintegrate into the society. 290 In other words, culture provides its members with resilience,
validation, restitution and rehabilitation, and it helps its members to manage the horror of trauma
(DeVries, 2006: 410). When culture is destroyed, in whole or in part, it frequently becomes
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Some of these necessary functions of culture are no longer observable in Western “culture.”
Perhaps to this end, rather than using the term “culture,” some have used the term “human
societies,” and have included (a critique of) Western society in their analysis. (McFarlane & van
der Kolk, 2006).
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Ibid. For example see Devries 400-411, such as page 404:
In traditional societies, … customs can help by providing a structure, a poultice for
these sores. They provide a grieving process for people who, if left to their own
devices, would not do so, and who thereby might be at risk for developing PTSD.
Culture, with its customs and rituals, is thus a key participant in returning a person to
normal functioning by moving the person from shock to grief, and ultimately to nonbereavement. In the absence of culturally regulated processes, this reestablishment of
normality is less likely to occur.
See also: Diamond p. 254 (“Primitive cultures realize the major function of culture which is to
make men human, and at the same time keep them sane. That is what civilization, as we know it,
is failing to do”); McFarlane and van der Kolk, p. 25, and also p. 30 (on the need for type of
social support that empowers victims to regain control over their lives).
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incapable of performing its restorative, integrative, rehabilitative, healing functions, and this can
leave individuals entirely on their own and without the tools they need to survive and heal from
trauma. As DeVries (2006) notes:
[W]hen cultural patterns, identities, and relationships are lost, life becomes
unpredictable. Under normal stressful conditions, a grieving process with the aim
of leaving the old and adjusting to the new takes place. With trauma, however,
other patterns are activated—conservative impulses … at the group level, and
psychopathological reactions (depression, paranoia, and aggression) at the
individual level. Culture helps protect against these processes. In its absence,
loss, regression, and harm occur. (P. 411) 291
McFarlane and van der Kolk (2006), analyzing German society, similarly remark on the adverse
affects produced when a culture fails to acknowledge and provide healing mechanisms for
victims of trauma:
[I]n the aftermath of World War I, the inability to face [trauma’s] effects on the
capacity of the veterans to function effectively in society, and the social
intolerance of their “weakness,” may have substantially contributed to the
subsequent rise of fascism and militarism. The impossible war reparations of the
Treaty of Versailles, motivated by a lust for revenge by the Allies, humiliated
Germany. The German nation, in turn, dealt mercilessly with its own war
veterans, who were accused of being moral invalids. This cascade of humiliations
of the powerless set the stage for the ultimate debasement of human rights under
the Nazi regime, the extermination of the weak and the different, and the moral
justification for the subjugation of “inferior” people –the rationale for the ensuing
war. (Pp. 33-34)
Thus, when culture is lost or damaged, individuals are less able to deal with the traumas they
encounter because they no longer benefit from the positive, socially integrative, healing aspects
of culture. As such, they are more vulnerable to negative, and even psychopathological coping
strategies, such as alienation, paranoia, projection, denial, narcissistic survival strategies, and
dissociative delusions concretized as the new “reality” (DeVries, 2006: 410-11). They are also
vulnerable to the manipulations of politically-opportunistic others, who can easily magnify
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On these psychopathological reactions, see also, McFarlane and van der Kolk (2006: 26):
“Some traumatized people deal with their encounter with unpredictability and meaninglessness
by converting to fundamentalist political or religious sects that have rigid codes of behavior,
exclusionary criteria for belonging, and a designated group of outsiders who embody evil.”
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traumatized individual’s feelings of fear, anger, hatred, distrust, and other psychopathological
mechanisms for dissociating from and denying pain and injury (Hutchinson & Bleiker, 2008).
Dealing with trauma in this defensive, denying, and dissociative manner prevents a full
acknowledgement of all of the emotions associated with the trauma and creates long-term
individual and collective behavioral patterns that are built around fear, anxiety, resentment and
other “violent ways of configuring community” (Hutchinson & Bleiker, 2008: 391, 387). Such
an approach to dealing with trauma not only prevents healing from the trauma, but perpetuates
the trauma, encourages the production of new traumas, and/or causes a continual reproduction of
the old traumas, expressed in new ways (Pelcovitz et al., 1995; Breslau et al., 1995; McFarlane
& vander Kolk, 2006: 31-33). 292 In addition to the barriers to healing that arise when cultures are
destroyed or destabilized, this destruction and/or destablization is itself traumatic. In its wake,
individuals are often doubly traumatized and vulnerable (DeVries, 1996; Solomon et al., 2000).
Interestingly, all of the psychopathological coping processes discussed in the above paragraph
were already integral parts of the Western cultural worldview by the fall of the Roman Empire,
and they have only become much more central to this worldview since that time. This suggests
that these patterns of thought and behavior were both the result of societal trauma and the cause
of new traumatic symptoms through the reproduction of the old traumas and/or the creation of
new traumas. Indeed, several scholars have speculated that the social relations of domination and
exploitation that are characteristic of Western society are not merely the result of greed for
wealth and power but are mechanisms through which the perpetrators of exploitation and
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For example, Pelcovitz et. al. (1995) found that adolescents who had been abused reproduced
the perpetration of their abuse in their relations with peers, without an awareness of doing so.
Breslau et. al. (1995) found that traumatized people tend to unconsciously place themselves in
situations that may retraumatize them). While McFarlane & van der Kolk (2006) discuss a more
complicated form of traumatic reenactment in society.
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domination seek to cope with their own paranoia, fear and anxiety (Loy, 2002; Diamond, 1974;
Szasz, 1970; Sartre, 1977; Martinot, 2003a). For example, we have already examined, in an
above section, some of the ways in which projection and scapegoating are practiced –on an
individual and societal level-- as defense mechanisms that allow us to denying parts of ourselves
that we do not want to acknowledge. We have also discussed the process of human sacrifice as a
way of attempting to control feelings of fear, anxiety, and guilt by attacking and purging from
society of something that has come to symbolize these feelings. Diamond (1974: 9) develops
these ideas further, arguing that the separation of the dominating (perpetrating) group from the
earth, others, and all connection to their subsistence creates significant anxiety among members
of this group, as well as fear of what will happen to them were those that they exploit and
oppress to rebel:
Conspicuous extortion from worker and peasant was a confirmation of power; but
power, so reified, not only confirmed social status, it also displaced anxiety about
the actual powerlessness of the privileged, which was a result of the loss of their
direct command of the environment. The sheer accumulation of wealth, the
antithesis of primitive customary usage, was thus compensatory, a sign of the fear
of impotence. It is a response of the alienated in pursuit of security; the
manipulation of people is substituted for the command of things. As civilization
spreads and deepens, it is ultimately man’s self, his species being, which is
imperialized. … [i]mperialism is, among other things, a complicated exercise in
cultural narcissism. (Pp. 9-10, 26)
In this fear, paranoia and anxiety, resulting from their simultaneous separation from and
dependence upon those they exploit, members of the dominating (perpetrating) group seek to
extract even more surplus from those they exploit by increasing the oppression and exploitation
that is inflicted upon them. This, in turn, fuels further discontent among the exploited and
further guilt among the exploiters, which in turn fuels further paranoia, fear, anxiety and
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insecurity that the exploiters then seek to deny, avoid or control through further exploitation.293
Some of the results of this sort of trauma, as they relate to the 2006 Haudenosaunee protest, are
examined in chapter 6.
It is not, however, only the perpetrators who adopt negative coping strategies and who seek to
reinforce the system of exploitation and destruction. Once local cultures are destroyed, in whole
or in part, their members are left traumatized and in search of ways to deal with the unbearable
emotions related to their trauma(s). Without the positive, socially integrative and reconstitutive
healing mechanisms that are integral parts of most traditional cultures, these vulnerable people
may have neither the ability, nor the social support, nor the motivation to reconstruct their
worldviews and identities in positive ways. They may instead resort to dependence upon the
same psychopathological coping mechanisms as the perpetrating group. When the perpetrating
group seeks to impose by force their own cultural worldview upon those they have victimized –
as was the case throughout the periods of European history discussed above—many vulnerable
members of the exploited group may willingly embrace this new worldview in an attempt to deal
with their own trauma. This is particularly the case when privileges are meted out to some of
them (such the privileges allowing European men to rape lower-class women without
punishment, and the exclusion of working class women from the majority of occupations during
the late Middle Ages, as just two examples), and punishments are meted out to others. In such
circumstances, those who do not willingly accept the forcibly-imposed cultural worldview can be
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“Even if we acknowledge the necessity –due to population pressure, scarcity of land, water
and other resources—for political constraints in the earliest stages of state formation, there is no
inherent reason for it to have taken the oppressive form that it did except for the burgeoning
anxiety of those removed form direct production about their economic and political security. …
Their anxiety about not being self-supporting, along with the anticipation of such resistance,
seems to constitute the motive for the upper classes’ elaborate extortion of wealth form the direct
producers” (Diamond, 1974: 8-9).
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persecuted, punished, tortured and even killed without the creation of much resistance among the
masses. John Trudell (2001b) explains this dynamic from his perspective:
So the Church, by 1100 AD or 1000 AD, it decided that it was now going to mine
this resource –I mean, ‘save the souls of the heathens’. So Church created
Inquisition. And basically the Inquisition was, number one, it was to change the
perceptual reality of the descendants of the tribes of Europe. Alright? And so
they were terrorized and brutalized for 500 years in order to do this. But the way
the Church rationalized this was, they were going to save –they wanted to
possess-- the souls of the heathens and the pagans. See, they wanted to possess
their souls in the name of their Lord. Alright. So this war was about possessing
the souls of the descendants of the tribes of Europe. And in order to possess their
souls, they had to alter their perceptional reality. So if you thought differently
than the Church wanted you to think, bingo, you were killed. And you were
tortured and your property was taken. And if somebody accused you, basically
you were guilty if you were accused. And you know, incidentally, during the
torturing process, you’d probably say someone else’s name now, so someone else
is going [to be tortured]. So they killed as efficiently as they possibly could with
the technology they had at hand at the time. And they did it for 500 years. By the
time Columbus got here it had probably been going on for 400 years. ….
When the Church was doing all of this … the descendants of the tribes of
Europe … finally figured out: “Well, hold it. If I want to stay alive and be a
descendant of anything, I’m going to have to accept these people.” So they
embraced the Church, because they had to embrace what they feared; they had to
love what they feared in order to survive. And what they had to love –the thing
that they had to love that they feared was possessing them. So it’s like love and
fear and possession as a perceptional reality kind of became intertwined at that
time and the human beings have not been able to sort it out yet. So that affected
everyone in some kind of a way that’s not been healthy for us as human beings.
Thus, despite their resistance, the local cultures of European men and women were attacked and
destroyed, and the surviving, traumatized members of these cultures were persecuted, tortured
and killed over a seven hundred year period. It is unfathomable that the survivors were not
traumatized, having lost family members, friends, and neighbors, and having been terrorized into
submission by the constant, ongoing threat of persecution (as heretics, witches, or, later, the
“undeseriving” poor). All resistance was repeatedly squashed, and the only way to survive these
various persecutions was to adopt the mentality of the persecutor (or, what we would today call
the colonizer).
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Today, the Western worldview’s historical revisions present this violent colonization of
Europe as the “freeing” of the masses from the supposedly oppressive bonds of traditional
societies --similar to the “freeing” of the serfs from the land (and their only possible means of
self-sufficient subsistence) under the Enclosures and the rise of capitalism (Marx, 1867/1987:
668-69). 294 The latter has been recognized as a counter-revolution that destroyed the possibilities
for collective, non-oppressive social organization which arose in the anti-feudal struggle –
“possibilities which, if realized, might have spared us the immense destruction of lives and the
natural environment that has marked the advance of capitalist relations worldwide” (Federici,
2004: 21-22). The former should be similarly recognized as counter-revolutionary, not only for
its role in destroying the anti-feudal struggle, but also for its role in destroying the collective
knowledge and practices necessary to heal from the anti-social and psychopathological
consequences of trauma, and for its role in capitalizing on the resulting devastation and
vulnerability that was left in the aftermath of these destructions.
What replaced the cultures that were destroyed was a form of monoculture, first controlled by
the Church, then by alternating alliances of Church authorities and feudal lords who eventually
included the rising merchant class in their alliances until the latter group emerged victorious in
its ability to shape this new monoculture and its hegemony (Tigar & Levy, 2000; Berman, 1983
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“Free labourers, in the double sense that neither they themselves form part and parcel of the
means of production, as in the case of slaves, bondsmen, &c., nor do the means of production
belong to them, as in the case of peasant-proprietors; they are, therefore, free from,
unencumbered by, any means of production of their own. …. Hence, the historical movement
which changes the producers into wage-workers, appears, on the one hand, as their emancipation
from serfdom and from the fetters of the guilds, and this side alone exists for our bourgeois
historians. But, on the other hand, these new freedmen became sellers of themselves only after
they had been robbed of all their own means of production, and of all guarantees of existence
afforded by the old feudal arrangements. And the history of this, their expropriation, is written
in the annals of mankind in letters of blood and fire.”
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& 2003; Shiva, 1997; Korn, 2002). 295 Shaping this new hegemony, the rising bourgeois elite
borrowed concepts from the anti-feudal struggles in order to present itself not as the counterrevolutionary force that it was, but as the champion of the masses. The anti-feudal rhetoric of
freedom and equality was universalized to generate support for the bourgeois cause, while the
bourgeoisie manipulated these concepts to its own, intolerant ends of winning their struggle
against the feudal aristocracy and attacking everyone who opposed or threatened bourgeois
interests. 296 Bourgeois efforts towards creating more elaborate bodies of contract and property
law served to institutionalize these attacks and give them the appearance of legitimacy,
particularly as bourgeois ideologies about individual rights and responsibilities (i.e., and an
individual’s responsibility to control his/her own destiny) 297 replaced collective and egalitarian
moral ideologies that had been prominent in the anti-feudal struggle (Federici, 2004; Mies, 1986;
Shiva, 1997: 104; Serpell, 1999: 42; Marx, 1972; Berman, 1983: 29-30; McFarlane & van der
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The imposition of monocultures upon culturally diverse peoples is traumatic, in part because
of the destruction of local cultures, and in part because of the external control that is exerted over
local affairs. See, for example, Korn (2002) and Shiva (1997), the latter of whom notes:
When homogenization is imposed on diverse social systems through global integration,
region after region starts to disintegrate. The violence inherent to centralized global
integration, in turn, breeds violence among its victims. As conditions of everyday life
become increasingly controlled by outside forces and systems of local governance
decay, people cling to their diverse identities as a source of security in a period of
insecurity … [and] diverse peoples who have lived peacefully together start to look at
each other with fear. (P. 102-03)
296
“During the time that the aristocracy was dominant, the concepts of honour, loyalty, etc. were
dominant; during the dominance of the bourgeoisie the concepts of freedom, equality, etc. ….
[E]ach new class which puts itself in the place of one ruling before it, is compelled, merely in
order to carry through its aim, to represent its interest as the common interest of all the members
of society, that is, expressed in ideal form: it has to give its ideas the forms of universality, and
represent them as the only rational, universally valid ones.” (Marx, 1972a: 137, 138)
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Such ideas are relatively new in worldviews, and came about with the rise of science and
technology as the new “religion” of the west, and the separation of law from the Church and –to
an even greater extent—from morals. See, for example: Berman, pp. 29-30; McFarlane & van
der Kolk, pp. 26; Loy, p. 266; DeVries, p. 399.
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Kolk, 2006: 26; Loy, 2002: 266; DeVries, 2006: 399). 298 The new individualistic ideologies
were further advanced through the heavy bourgeois investment in science and technology, which
was geared towards the maximization profits, as well as the replacement of religion with science
as the new authority on virtually all matters (Merchant, 1989; Miews, 1986; Federici, 2004;
Shiva, 1997; Ferguson, 2011; Tigar, 2000; Sheldrake, 1994: 5).
Because of the widespread affects that this new hegemony has had on Western society and the
Western cultural worldview both then and now, a few of the ideas central to this hegemony are
worth considering in a bit more detail here. Of particular concern are bourgeois ideas about
freedom, equality, and individual rights and responsibilities. All three concepts involve dualistic
and/or Orwellian meanings, which arose within the Western mentality of separation, domination,
universalism, and intolerance. As such, the bourgeois ideologies of freedom, equality and
individualism are neither free, nor equal, nor individualistic in any true sense of any of these
words. After all, the bourgeois concepts of equality and freedom arose out of the counterrevolution that violently destroyed the ideology of collective, egalitarian living, and the
universally intolerant relations of domination that were imposed upon the masses replaced
alternative social arrangements with forced conformity in the new monoculture. The only real
forms of individualism that arose during this period consisted of two contradictory parts. First,
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The latter four sources note that the concept of an individual responsibility to control his or
her own fate is a relatively new concept, which does not exist in most non-Western cultural
worldviews. Shiva (1997) notes Western society’s need to transform nature and human societies
from “self-organizing, living system[s] to a mere raw material for human exploitation, needing
management and control” –processes which necessarily destroy self-governance and collectivity.
Serpel (1999: 42) points out that egalitarian moral ideologies were incompatible with the
exploitation of animals in medieval Europe. These same egalitarian moral ideologies, which are
common to most communal or collective organizing efforts, are also incompatible with capitalist
exploitation. Though the capitalist class has long used the concepts of freedom and equality as its
rallying cry, it has never meant for these concepts to be extended in more than a symbolic way to
any outside of its class (see, Marx, 1972a).
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the collective rights to the commons were replaced with an individual bourgeois’s rights to
purchase, enclose, and use property however he/she saw fit, regardless of the wishes of the
masses and regardless of the adverse impacts of this use on others (or nature/ the earth 299).
He/she further had the right to keep all profits from this property for himself (with the exception
of taxes/ protection monies paid to the Church or consolidating sovereigns). Second, and in
contrast, the masses that owned no property lost all collective and individual rights to the
commons and became individually responsible for finding another way to earn a living. The
many who failed to do so, largely because they could no longer support themselves on the land
and there was only limited work in the towns, were blamed and prosecuted for this “failure”
under the Poor Laws, or through the witch-hunt and Inquisition that sought to destroy collective
forms of living outside of the new monoculture. 300 Thus, members of the bourgeoisie had
virtually unlimited rights in relation to their property and virtually no responsibilities to anyone
else. Meanwhile, the masses, who owned nothing but their labor power, had virtually unlimited
responsibilities to find a purchaser of this labor power, and virtually no rights whatsoever to fail
at this task (even when there were no jobs) or to earn a living outside of the new monocultural
relations of domination. In this way, the new “individualism” was really (only) about giving
merchants individual rights to earn and keep all profits from various forms of exploitation, to
control and use the government as a tool in this exploitation (Marx, 1972a: 147-48, 150-52;
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Merchant (1989) and Mies (1986) both argue that protection and sharing of the earth was
recognized as a responsibility prior to the rise of the bourgeois class and its expansion of the
fields of law, medicine, and science and technology.
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In terms of the Poor Laws, Marx (1972a: 145) notes that King Henry VIII (King of England
from 1509-1547) had 72,000 “vagabonds” (landless unemployed) hanged. In terms of the
witch-hunt and Inquisition, Federici (2004) provides extensive evidence that these were basically
attacks on people who sought to form self-sufficient, collective communities, or on individual
women who practiced herbal medicine, or engaged in other non-approvied ways of earning a
living.
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Harvey, 2003: 145; Gramsci, 1972; Litowitz, 2000), and to persecute individual non-conformists
among the masses while also imposing upon these latter a responsibility to cover the costs
associated with the bourgeoisie’s pursuit of profits (accumulation by dispossession). 301 The vast
discrepancies in the rights and responsibilities of bourgeois individualism then were much the
same as they are today.
Despite the obvious lack of equality or freedom, from the perspective of the masses,
individualism in Western society has long been associated with freedom and equality in the
Western worldview. In part, this is a reflection of the self-centered and solipsistic mentality of
the wealthy classes in Western society: the new social relations of domination represented (and
still represent) a freedom and equality of rights for them. And, to some extent, by drawing upon
rhetoric of universal acceptance and the societal patterns of delusion and rewriting history, they
were able to convince the traumatized, alienated and rootless masses that this freedom and
equality could also apply to anyone among them who worked hard and played by the rules (their
rules) of the system. We see repeated evidence that this ideology is ingrained in the Western
cultural worldview. For example, Orwell (1936: 44, quoted in Litowitz, 2000: 529) 302 observed it
in the 1930s:
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Individually, workers and the unemployed covered the costs through their suffering from the
trauma of the loss of their culture, their dispossession from the land and their subsistence, the
employment and living conditions into which they were forced in urban areas, the low wages
they earned, and/or the punishments they incurred when they failed to find work –even if this
failure was due to a lack of available work, rather than some fault of their own. Collectively, the
masses covered costs in their suffering from their trauma and their dispossession from the land
and their subsistence; in their suffering from the effects of the bourgeois exploitation and
pollution of nature, the water and the earth; and in their tax payments to a government that has,
since, consistently passed legislation and enforced laws in favor of the bourgeois class and
against the interests of the masses.
302
The quote is from Orwell’s Keep the Aspidistra Flying.
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[H]aving no money, they still lived mentally in the money-world---the world in
which money is a virtue and poverty is a crime … [t]hey had accepted the moneycode, and by that code they were failures.
And Chris Hedges wrote about it in 2005:
We watch impassively as the wealthy and the elite, the huge corporations, rob us,
ruin the environment, defraud consumers and taxpayers and create exclusive
American oligarchy that fuses wealth and political power. We watch passively
because we believe we can enter the club… it is greed that keeps us silent. (P.
168)
These beliefs –and the act of desperately clinging to them despite all evidence to the
contrary— reflect the fear, doubt and insecurity of the masses whose cultural safety net for
dealing with such feelings, and for collective thinking, organizing and acting, has been
decimated by centuries of the dominating class’ universal intolerance, violent repression, and
forcible colonization (See for example: Marx, 1972a: 163-64; Marx, 1972b: 185, 190; Mies,
1986: 76-77; Trudell, 2001a & 2003). 303 Desperately wishing to escape their position among the
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Though the dominating class has long held that all can be a part of their class, this is an
entirely unrealistic proposition, as Marx observed two centuries ago. It is not possible for all to
be bourgeoisie because the bourgeoisie depend upon the exploitation of the masses, and because
the bourgeoisie routinely cast out their own members into the ranks of the proletariat. Mies
(1986: 76-77) likewise notes that “in a contradictory and exploitative relationship, the privileges
of the exploiters can never become the privileges of all” and that as long as the exploitation of
some is occurring, no one can speak of liberation. Similarly, Trudell (2001a) argues that the
masses of society are being mined, just as the earth is being mined. In both cases, toxins are left
over from the mining process. And in the colonizing mining of human beings, these toxins are
our fears, doubts and insecurities:
The poison, the toxic that is left over from the mining of the being part of human …
through the intelligence of the human, are in all the fears and doubts and insecurities
that we have in our lives –without our own personal reality-- about who we are…
That’s the pollution and the toxic left over from the mining of the being part of human.
That’s the pollution that’s left over, see, and in that kind of a haze, … we don’t see
ourselves clearly. We do not see and recognize clearly who we are. And we’re never
encouraged to. We’re encouraged to be “good citizens,” or “good” this religion, or
“good” that religion, or good… workers, good [whatever]. But we’re never encouraged
to be real about human beings. IN a way, we’re never really encouraged to be good to
ourselves. See, we’re mentally and psychologically oppressed and manipulated so that
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exploited, oppressed, colonized masses, and left with only psychopathological coping
mechanisms for the traumas inflicted upon them, huge proportions of “individuals” among the
masses desire to become the oppressor, as a means for escaping their own oppression. As such,
they chose to identify with the oppressor, as a vicarious means of escaping their fears, doubts
and insecurities –i.e., the intolerable emotions left unresolved from numerous past, present, and
trans-generational traumas. But escaping their oppression/ colonization either symbolically, or
in actuality (which, as noted, is virtually impossible) both require the sacrifice of others. Thus, in
our traumatized state of intolerable fears and anxieties, and our state of mental separation and
alienation from others (and ourselves), we grasp desperately to the individualistic mentality that
has convinced us our own freedom from –and our ability to achieve a state of equality with-- our
oppressors is possible. We thus ignore the lager picture of mass exploitation, government
corruption, and widespread pain and suffering inflicted domestically and internationally by the
current social relations of domination. We sacrifice everyone else –or, at least, everyone
different from us—to the system in hopes of saving ourselves.
Both of the above authors who observed the desire of the masses to identify with, and
become, part of the oppressor/dominating class also observed this phenomenon of attempting to
sacrifice others in an attempt to escape one’s own desperation and despair. When two characters
in his novel, Nineteen Eighty-Four, were charged with the crime of loving another more than

we seek things to gratify ourselves, but that doesn’t mean we’re being good to
ourselves.
And the mining process to me, you know, it’s the civilizing process itself. Because
somewhere in there, it’s like someone’s eating the spirit. Our spirit is being converted
into an energy to run something. Alright? And it’s like it’s eating our spirit. See and,
you know, everyone has their religions and their stuff, but see it makes me wonder, how
do we participate in this spiritual reality, if we live in a mechanism now where the
human has been conditioned and trained to eat its own spirit, and turn it into fuel for this
system. (Trudell, 2001a)
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they loved their oppressor, Big Brother, and were faced with the punishment of rats eating their
face, both betrayed and symbolically sacrificed the other in a desperate attempt to save
themselves. As one character remarked:
Sometimes… they threaten you with something—something you can’t stand up
to, can’t even think about. And then you say, ‘Don’t do it to me, do it to
somebody else, do it to so-and-so.’ …You think there’s no other way of saving
yourself, and you’re quite ready to save yourself that way. You want it to happen
to the other person. You don’t give a damn what they suffer. All you care about
is yourself. … And after that, you don’t feel the same toward the other person any
longer. (Orwell, 1949: 284) 304
Similarly, Hedges remarked upon the utility of identifying and attacking external enemies as a
means for creating temporary (psychopathological) bonds with our neighbors, and a temporary
escape from our own pain and suffering. He also remarks upon the delusional character of these
thought and behavior patterns, contextualizes these patterns in the present rise of the Christian
right, and examines how these patterns have been intensified in the recent, ongoing economic
turmoil. For example, in terms of externalized scapegoats and social bonds, Hedges (2002)
writes:
The enduring attraction of war is this: Even with its destruction and carnage it can
give us what we long for in life. It can give us purpose, meaning, a reason for
living. … The communal march against an enemy generates a warm unfamiliar
bond with our neighbors, our community, our nation, wiping out unsettled
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Many writing about Orwell’s novel, and perhaps even Orwell himself, equated a forced love
for Big Brother/ the oppressor with a forced love of the collective over love for the individual.
But authoritarian governments and dominating classes are hardly the collective, in fact they rely
upon the destruction of the collective, and the atomizing of individuals who, in their isolation
and alienation from everything including themselves, desperately reach out for and embrace the
oppressive forces that abuse them in hopes of gaining some tiny shred of security and protection
from their own, internal and intolerable traumatic symptoms. All the dominating classes need to
do is provide the masses with some hope –or at leas some delusion of hope—of escaping their
oppression. And the dominating classes do this, gladly, because it expands their control over the
masses, and thus alleviates their own anxiety, fears, and paranoias relating to their own
unresolved trauma of perpetration against the masses.
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undercurrents of alienation and dislocation. War, in times of malaise and
desperation, is a potent distraction. (Pp. 3, 9; BookTV, 2012) 305
All of these forms of escapism (and psychopathological coping) require the existence or
creation of others, which the Western cultural worldview has long provided via its universal
intolerance; its delusions of separation; its scapegoating and human sacrifice; and its narcissistic
projections onto created “others.” Thus, on the one hand, Western society has gone to great
effort to create external others, and convince itself that it is a unique society because we have
more freedoms compared to other, non-Western peoples. These latter, we are told, are enslaved
by the rigid, limiting bonds of traditional society which obliterate all distinction among
individuals (Durkheim, 1933). Yet, particularly in the context of indigenous societies, nothing
could be further from the truth (as will be seen in the next chapter). Our unfounded belief to the
contrary is only a result of Western society’s narcissistic projections onto other peoples
(Diamond, 1974: 26; Keal, 2003: 82; Szasz, 1970; Sartre, 1977; Langer, 1987: 35-50), which, as
mentioned in the discussion above, are a form of psychopathological (and delusional) coping
mechanisms that arise out of trauma in the absence of positive, integrative, rehabilitative, healing
practices. Moreover, we are regularly encouraged to project our enslavement onto them, while
pretending their freedom and individuality belong to us. And this delusion keeps us striving to
become part of the dominating class while turning us away from all collective forms of living,
organizing, and being in the world. This, in turn, keeps us engaged in Western pseudo
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See also, Loy (2002: 254) on the topic: “once Reagan’s “evil empire” was history, people
whose “goodness” depended on its “badness” felt adrift. A new enemy was needed, but Iraq,
China, and the war on drugs didn’t really fill the shoes. This new holy war on worldwide
terrorism is much more promising. … [W]e don’t feel we are good unless we are fighting against
evil. We can feel comfortable and secure in our own goodness only by attacking and destroying
the evil outside us. …this is why we like wars: they cut through the petty problems of daily life,
and unite us good guys here against the bad guys over there. … The meaning of life becomes
clearer.”
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separations from others, nature, and parts of ourselves, and keeps us engaged in the universal
intolerance and rejection with which we are taught to view these allegedly separate parts (See for
example, Loy, 2002: 250; DeVries, 2006: 411).
On the other hand, and at the same time, our alleged freedoms are the product of our being
terrorized into conformity in virtually every aspect of our lives. Western society has gone to
great extents to create non-conformist (internal or external) others among us. The absence of
integrative, rehabilitative, healing rituals that a healthy culture provides is not only compensated
for with destructive forms of bonding against hated others, but also through an almost
compulsive consumerism, through which we attempt to fill our internal voids with the temporary
acceptance of conformity through consumption. We thus mistake the alienation of our trauma
and the destructiveness of our culture with individuality; and we confuse the process through
which we internalize of our own colonialism, and become Foucauldian participants in the
oppression of ourselves, others, and nature, all in the alleged name of “freedom.” 306 But the
only freedom for the vast majority of internally-colonized Westerners is not in whether or not we
chose to conform, but in how we chose to conform, or what sort of individuality we chose to
purchase and display through the material products we place on and around us –something
members of the Frankfurt school noticed decades ago (Horkheimer, 1996; Hormheimer &
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On the destructiveness of Western culture, see for example: Hedges (BookTV: 2012), who
argues that in the US we have no culture other than “commercialized junk” or unification
through hatred and that we have lost all sense of community. See also: Wise (2005: 145), who
discusses “the unspoken and horrifying truth of white privileged: namely, that in order to access
it, one first has to give up all the meaningful cultural and personal and communal attributes that
once kept our various peoples alive in Europe and in our journeys here.” Or see Deloria
(1969:185, 188), who notes that: “For many Indians, the white had no culture other than one of
continual exploitation. … All the white man had succeeded in creating in his time on this
continent had been a violent conglomerate of individuals, not a people;” and also noting: “White
culture destroys other culture because of its abstractness. As a destroyer of culture it is not a
culture but a cancer.” Finally, see Litowitz (2000: 542) who notes that “domination is
increasingly a matter of colonizing the internal world of the dominated classes.”
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Adorno, 1997; Marcuse, 1964). As Marx (1972c noted of capitalist society: “In bourgeois
society capital is independent and has individuality, while the living person is dependent and has
no individuality” (p. 347). Thus, even the alleged non-conformists are frequently conforming
through consumption of a pre-packaged non-conformity. They are also just as quick to reject as
outsiders to their group –i.e., all who have not purchased and displayed the appropriate genre of
clothing or accessories—as the “mainstream” conformists.
In summary, we struggle to avoid intolerable feelings resulting from the trauma of our
oppression and colonization (and even to deny our oppressed and colonized state) in two ways.
The first is through seeking temporary, superficial acceptance or approval of our choices as
consumers, which we have so confused with temporary acceptance/approval of ourselves as
persons that many Westerners say they don’t know who they are. Many then spend incalculable
time, effort and (often) money on further consumption through which they hope to “find”
themselves. This pseudo-escape route, like the route of the purposeful conformist, requires
engaging in and perpetuating lies about who we are on a daily basis in our presentation of
ourselves to bosses, coworkers, strangers, potential mates, and even friends, family members,
intimate partners, and ourselves. In many of these relationships, we are required to lie about who
we are in order to become more acceptable to others, who will judge us harshly, as we them, for
nonconformity. In all of these ways, we perpetrate perhaps the ultimate violence against
ourselves and others, sacrificing both to support the delusions of the system. As Forbes (2008)
noted:
When people learn to lie they no longer have a face. That is, they do not have a
single personality and character. They become like a chameleon, changing color
as opportunity or circumstances demand. Such a person cannot have any moral
strength, because the latter demands a unified face. This, incidentally, is what
some modern psychology teaches –accommodation, learning how to disguise or

202

even destroy one’s own self in order to become acceptable to one’s corporate
supervisors, colleagues, spouse, children, neighbors, and so on. (P. 43)
The second way that we struggle to avoid intolerable feelings resulting from the trauma of our
oppression and colonization (and even to deny our oppressed and colonized state) is through
identifying with the dominating, oppressor group, and seeking to become a part of it, thus
legitimizing the system of oppression and turning ourselves into perpetrators. This pseudoescape route also requires engaging in and perpetrating lies about who we are in relation to other
people and other life on the planet, in relation to the pain and suffering of other people and other
life forms, and in relation to who and what is responsible for this pain and suffering. We engage
in these lies, and identify with the perpetrator, because we have lost access to and knowledge of
healthy coping and healing mechanisms. By identifying with the perpetrator, we at one and the
same time: separated from our own pain and suffering by projecting it outward upon others and
separated from other people (and other life forms) and their pain and suffering, which we ignore
and dismiss. We further ignore and dismiss all of this intolerable pain and suffering (of
ourselves and others) by 1) taking on the privilege of blaming others, like the perpetrator, and 2)
enacting this privilege by blaming the victims for their own plight in order to “restore a sense of
self-efficacy.” Ascione (1999) summarizes part of this process as it relates to abused children:
The psychological mechanism of identification with the aggressor suggests that
when a child is victimized, he or she may seek out a more vulnerable victim to
victimize including younger children or pets---powerlessness is frightening and
demoralizing, and, unfortunately, exerting control over another can restore a sense
of self-efficacy. (P. 55. See also: McFarlane & van der Kolk, 2006: 35; Kelman,
1973: 58) 307
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See also, McFarlane & van der Kolk (2006):
Western society’s “reactions [to trauma] seem to be primarily conservative impulses in
the service of maintaining the beliefs that the world is fundamentally just, that people
can be in charge of their lives, and that bad things happen to people who deserve them.
Bearers of bad tidings are generally considered dangerous; thus, societies tend to be
suspicious that victims will contaminate the social fabric, undermine self-reliance,
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Yet, like the negative consequences involved in (the psychopathological coping mechanisms of)
seeking acceptance through compulsory consumption, the attempt to deny one’s own pain and
suffering and the pain and suffering other others is likewise psychopathological and destructive
of both ourselves and others in at least two ways. The first being that, by denying the pain and
suffering of others and/or ourselves, we are extending and exacerbating –rather than healing—
the intolerable feelings and symptoms of our own unresolved trauma. McFarlane and van der
Kolk (2006) discuss this first harm:
Clinical work has taught us that the ability to tolerate the plight of victims is, at
least in part, a function of how well people have dealt with their own misfortunes.
When they have confronted the reality of their own hurt and suffering, and
accepted their own pain, this generally is translated into tolerance and sometimes
even compassion for others. Conversely, as long as people deny the impact of
their own personal trauma and pretend that it did not matter, that it was not so
bad, or that excuses can be made for their abuses, they are likely to identify with
the aggressors and treat others with the same harshness with which they treat the
wounded parts of themselves. Identification with the aggressor makes it possible
to bypass empathy for themselves and secondarily for others. (P. 36. See also:
Lifton, 1975: 187-88) 308
Secondly, we are reproducing old traumas and creating additional new traumas for ourselves and
for others. This is the case both because traumas that are exacerbated rather than healed are

consume social resources, and live off the strong. The weak are a liability, and, after an
initial period of compassion, are vulnerable to being singled out as parasites and carriers
of social malaise. (P. 35)
And Kelman (1973):
Both regimentation and oppression create a feeling of powerlessness, a loss of personal
agency, a deprivation of a sense of identity. Violence can offer a person the illusion
that he is in control, that he is able to act on his environment, that he has found a means
of self-expression. It may be the only way left for him to regain some semblance of
identity, to convince himself that he really exists. The sad irony is that violence is a
response to dehumanization that only deepens the loss that it seeks to undo; it is an
attempt to regain one’s sense of identity by further destroying one’s sense of
community. (P. 58)
308
Lifton (1975: 187-88) notes that Vietnam veterans learned that they had to “rediscover the
Vietnamese as human beings, in order, as they put it, to “become human again themselves.”
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frequently reenacted over and over again, producing new traumas (McFarlane & van der Kolk,
2006; Bar-On et al., 1998), and because, by identifying with the perpetrator, we ourselves
become perpetrators, thus creating a whole new set of traumas for ourselves which arise from our
(physical, or even mental and symbolic) perpetration against others (see for example: Kelman,
1973: 36-38, 46-47, 50-52; Lifton, 1975; McNair, 2005; Grossman, 1996; Diamond, 1974: 8-10,
26; Martinot, 2003; Baldwin, 1965: 47).
In either case, our behavior and thought patterns serve only to legitimize and reinforce the
social relations of domination that oppress us and alter our perceptions of reality. In our
mentality of pseudo freedom, we desperately continue reaching for an illusive individuality; and
in our mentality of pseudo individuality, we continue desperately reaching for an illusive
freedom. We narcissistically reject other peoples and their collective ways of life, mistaking our
bondage for freedom and superiority, and their collectivity for bondage and inferiority. Our
colonized, alienated mentality thus automatically eliminates threats to Western society’s social
relations of domination, 309 while also eliminating our ability to change these relations of
domination and end our own oppression. We continually strive to become part of the
dominating/capitalist class, despite the virtual impossibility of our upward social mobility. Our
illusions in this regard reinforce and legitimize the social relations of domination that immiserate
us because striving to dominate others (which we are told is the pathway to “success”) only
serves to enrich these dominating others, as does our compulsive over-consumption of material
goods in the hope of appearing more successful and socially mobile than we are. And in both
cases we chase something outside of ourselves, further legitimizing the idea that happiness,
309

Federici (2004:170-71), notes the “fear and repulsion” with which the dominating class views
the “communal forms of life that had been typical of pre-capitalist Europe,” and the use of the
witch hunt, in part, as a tool for destroying this collective resistance to the new social relations of
domination.
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purpose and fulfillment are only found outside of us through consumption of material goods or
“advancement” in social status, all of which only further immiserate and alienate us from who
we truly are and from any possibility of healing from our own pain and suffering.

The Myths of “Progress” and “Civilization”
[F]aith in progress … justifies Western civilized men to themselves. … For
[Western man] cannot surrender the notion of progress without destroying the
rationale for his entire civilization. No matter how critical he may be of the
realities of his society, he clings to his progressivism as he would to his sanity. It
is the notion of progress that mediates his alienation, and makes it possible for
him to construct a reality which he does not actually experience.
~ Diamond 1974, 39
But since the retardation of moral progress, while it is actually taking place, is
invariably hailed as itself moral progress, genuine advancement in our
spirituality must depend on the proper resolution of psychological and social
problems which we have not even confronted, much less mastered. In the
meantime we ought to judge all Great Moral Programs, especially if backed by
the power of Churches or States, by the inverse of the Anglo-American decisionrule for judging defendants: immoral until proven otherwise.
~ Szasz 1970, 275
Various terms, such as “wild,” “savage” and “barbarian” have been used
frequently to refer to violent, crude, brutal, cruel, destructive and aggressive
behavior. Ironically, such terms have often been used by European writers to
refer to non-European peoples whose customs were different and therefore
(because of that element of difference) called “wild” or “savage.” The irony
stems from the fact that few, if any, societies on the face of the earth have ever
been as avaricious, cruel, violent and aggressive as have certain European
populations.
~ Forbes 2008, 23
Civilization is a limitless multiplication of unnecessary necessities.
~Mark Twain, quoted in The Free Dictionary 2012
The Western concepts of “progress” and “civilization” are myths, or forms of magical thinking
(and denial) in the Western cultural worldview that date back at least to ancient times, and have
been consistently reproduced and recreated in every era of Western history. For example, the
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concept of progress in the Western worldview dates back perhaps several thousand years, and
consists of the ideology that utopia –a state in which all of the world’s problems are solved-- is
possible and that human beings can arrive there by following a single, linear pathway. This
pathway requires sacrifices along the way of those people and things that stand in the way of this
utopia-bound “progress” but, we are told, these sacrifices are necessary and justified by the end
goal (which is mythical and unrealistic, and can be reached) (Mohawk, 1997). 310 Richard
Drinnon (1990) has linked this concept to the Judeo-Christian view of history as a “linear,
continuous, irreversible Time of perpetual progress, in which place is largely irrelevant” and
“time is reified, and has little or nothing to do with cycles of organisms”(p. xxiii); while John
Mohawk (1997; 2000: 137, 96-97, 8) has traced this concept, as it is most commonly expressed
today, to Plato’s pursuit of the ideal and his belief that human intelligence can uncover the single
pathway both to truth and to an ideal, utopian world (while all other pathways or belief systems
are erroneous). According to Mohawk (2000 & 1997) utopian religions and ideals of progress
were incredibly popular in the two centuries before and after Christ, when “rootless, urban
populations who had no consciousness of place” that had lost all cultural continuity and
connection to their spirituality in “successive waves of conquest” were in the midst of a spiritual
crisis (see also: Osborne, 2006: 116-17). Since that time, this concept has been a largely popular
coping mechanism and a deeply entrenched part of the Western cultural worldview, as have the
spiritual crises that precipitated its popularity.
Indeed, the existence of constant spiritual crises is not only a defining aspect of Western
civilization, but a central goal and byproduct of its expansion. Numerous Western scholars have
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Mohawk (1997) notes that the concept of progress involves a “belief system that says that
what [its adherents] are doing is not only not wrong, but has to be done in order to create a world
which will be able to solve all of human kind’s problems.”
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remarked upon this, describing these spiritual crises as a lack or moral restraint, a lack of social
integration, an iron cage, or some other malady associated with modernity (Loy, 2002: 226;
Szasz, 1970: 275; Bauman, 2000; Christie, 2000; Berman, 1994: 143; Chompsky, 2011; Weber,
1980: 182; Kelman, 1973; Deloria, 1969 & 1992). 311 But these crises existed long before the
modern period, as much of this chapter has been aimed at showing, and as has also been
recognized by many others (see for example: Mies, 1986; Federici, 2004; Merchant, 1989;
Forbes, 2008). For example, John Trudell (2001b & 2003) has traced the spiritual destruction of
the peoples of Europe back several hundred years before the arrival of Columbus in the
Americas, and has referred to the spiritual crisis at that time as “the virus,” or the disease that
was eating the spirit of Europeans when they began their invasions of other lands. 312 Vine
Deloria, Jr. (1992: 63) has remarked upon the centrality of this concept to the Western
worldview, the ethnocentric nature of the concept, and its formative role in guiding the direction
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For example, Loy (2002: 266) notes that: “…the West has gradually lost faith in any
transcendental world or transcendental dimension, creating a spiritual crisis that has taken a long
time to ripen and may be far from over,” while Weber (1980: 182) argued that: “For the last
stage of this cultural development, it might well be truly said: ‘Specialists without spirit,
sensualists without heart; this nullity imagines that it has attained a level of civilization never
before achieved’.”).
312
“But the time Columbus got here in 1492 –see, people have many opinions about him: who he
was or what he was but, whatever. See, he was really like the virus. And the spirit was being
eaten by disease. And it affected the perceptional reality of the human. See, so when Columbus
and them got here and we told him who we were, they didn’t know. We said, “We’re the people.
We’re the human beings.” But they didn’t know, because it wasn’t a part of their perceptional
reality … the idea of a human being and people in that kind of a way was no longer a part of
their perceptional reality. … So by the time Columbus got here the descendants of the tribes of
Europe had gone through [400 years] of having their spirit just completely attacked. … So they
became spiritually and physically now the possession of something else. Before it was just
physically. Now they had become spiritually the possession of someone else. So they had no
clarity about reality. So by the time Columbus got here, see, they didn’t know what it meant to
be a human being anymore. It was just not a part of their spiritual perception or relationship to
reality. They were possessed, they were owned, they were property.” (Track 18)
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of European historical development. 313 Russell Means (1983: 21-22, quoted in a previous
section) has similarly remarked upon the longstanding nature of these crises, noting the
“European materialist tradition of despiritualizing the universe,” which Westerners often
consider “revolutionary.” Means further links the spiritual crises that are created through the
ongoing despiritualization of the universe “to the mental process of dehumanizing another
person” --another permanent fixture in the Western cultural worldview:
The European materialist tradition of despiritualizing the universe is very similar
to the mental process which goes into dehumanizing another person. … And what
each process of dehumanization has in common for each group doing the
dehumanizing is that it makes it alright to kill and otherwise destroy other people.
… In terms of the despiritualization of the universe, the mental process works so
that it becomes virtuous to destroy the planet. Terms like “progress” and
“development” are used a cover words here the way “victory” and “Freedom” are
used to justify butchery in the dehumanization process … Ultimately, the whole
universe is open –in the European view—to this sort of insanity.
Most important here, perhaps, is the fact that Europeans feel no sense of loss in
all this. … And it’s very difficult, or impossible, to convince a person there’s
something wrong with the process of gaining when they lack the spiritual wisdom
to feel a loss for what is being destroyed along the way. (Pp. 22-23; see also Mies,
1986: 77) 314
Indeed, conditions in Europe prior to the invasion of the Americas largely reflect the results
of these despiritualization and dehumanization processes, as has been noted by Jennings (1975:
77-78) 315 and Forbes (2008: 77-78) –the latter of whom has also noted the devastation and
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“The very essence of Western European identity involves the assumption that time proceeds
in a linear fashion; further it assumes that at a particular point in the unraveling of this sequence,
the peoples of Western Europe became the guardians of the world. The same ideology that
sparked the Crusades, the Age of Exploration, the Age of Imperialism, and the recent crusade
against Communism all involve the affirmation that time is peculiarly related to the destiny of
the people of Western Europe. And later, of course, the United States.” (P. 63)
314
Means, op. cit. pp. 22-23. See also, Mies, p. 77: (“Our understanding of scholarly work or
research follows exactly the same logic as that of the colonizers and scientists: they cut apart and
separate parts which constitute the whole, isolate these parts, analyse them under laboratory
conditions and synthesize them again in a new, man-made, artificial mode”).
315
”Since Europeans began to emerge from endemic wars and epidemic diseases of medieval
times, they have acquired an outlook in which the present seems better than the past and the
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destruction of these processes, as well as “the morbid, fearful strain in European culture. …the
European’s justified fear of his own kind.” 316 It seems worthwhile to provide the reader with a
very brief overview of these conditions before continuing to discuss the ways in which the
Western concept of progress has been used as a (psychopathological) coping mechanism for
denying, perpetuating and reproducing this trauma of despiritualization and dehumanization.
As mentioned in a previous section, prior to setting out on a series of invasions of other
peoples’ lands around the world, European society was characterized: by massive corruption
among its spiritual and secular authorities; by extensive violence, brutality and repression; and
by excessive inequality leading to gluttony among the wealthy, on one hand, and literal
starvation, disease and death for large portions of the masses, on the other (see for example:
Mohawk, 2000: 98, 95). In terms of the latter, Stannard (1992) remarks that: “The rich ate, and
ate to excess, watched by a thousand hungry eyes as they consumed their gargantuan meals. The
rest of the population starved” (p. 57). In fact, food prices fluctuated constantly, and in France in
the seventeenth century, when access to food was far easier than the previous two centuries, it
was still the case that “each ‘average’ increase in price of wheat or millet directly killed a portion
of the French population equal to nearly twice the percentage of Americans who died in the Civil
future will be an improvement over the present. In this perspective, and against mountains of
evidence, large-scale catastrophe becomes inconceivable. …” (Jennings, 1975: 77-78)
316
“The nature of European warfare and oppression must surely depress one who manages to
realize that the slaughter of 70,000 Saxons, or of 200,000 Cimri and Teutons, or of 1,000,000
Albigensians, or of 75,000 Parisian Protestants, or of 20 million Jews, Gypsies, and Slavs, and so
on, ad infinitum, is not a recital of mere numbers but of millions upon millions of cases of
individual humans suffering from the wounds of death or the tortures of imprisonment or the
trauma of losing loved ones. It is apparently easy for European historians to treat such gross
horrors as if they were merely part of a dramatic scenario which never actually took place, but if
we pause and assimilate the fact that, indeed, each brutal killing or burning at the stake or rape
did occur, then we must understand perhaps the morbid, fearful strain in European culture. The
fear of evil, in other words, should be understood as being based upon no mythical character
(Satan), but rather upon the European’s justified fear of his own kind.” (Forbes, 2008: 77-78,
emphasis in original).
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war” (Stannard, 1992: 57-58). Poverty was such a widespread and persistent aspect of French
society that, just as the Inuit, Igloolik and Aivilik have 31 different words to describe snow, so,
too, did the French have an extensive vocabulary to describe “every nuance of
poverty”(Elements Online Environmental Magazine, 2012; Stannard, 1992: 60). 317 Similar
poverty rates existed throughout Western Europe, making the dense, malnourished urban
populations extremely vulnerable to recurring epidemics of disease 318 and to high infant, child
and adult mortality rates (Stannard, 1992: 57-61). 319
In such an environment of despair, suffering and death, it comes as little surprise that there
was also extensive violence, brutality and repression. The same mentality that despiritualized
social life, dehumanized the masses, and produced recurring famine also brought recurring riots
(Stannard, 1992: 59); and since this despiritualization destroyed moral restraints, there was little
that could be done to quell the regular theft, violent perpetration, and the frequent mass hysteria.
The latter resulted in violent conglomerates of people, temporarily united in hatred, pursuing and
punishing near-random scapegoats, and even, not uncommonly, engaging in acts of cannibalism
317

The French “had a battery of formal terms to describe precise levels of indigence: pauvre, le
vrai pauvre, le mauvais pauvre, pauvre valide ou invalide, pauvre honteux, indigent, misérable,
nécessiteux, mendiant de profession, mendiant de bonne foi, mendiant volontaire, mendiant
sédentaire, and more. At the top were those who ‘at best lived at subsistence level, at worst fell
far below,’ while at the bottom were those described as dans un état d’indigence absolue,
meaning that ‘one had no food or adequate clothing or proper shelter, that one had parted with
the few battered cooking-pots and blankets which often constituted the main assets of a workingclass family.’ Across the whole of France, between a third and half the population fell under one
of these categories of destitution, and in regions such as Brittany, western Normandy, Poitou,
and the Massif the proportion ascended upwards of two-thirds. In rural areas in general, between
half and 90 percent of the population did not have land sufficient for their support, forcing them
to migrate out, fall into permanent debt, or die” (Stannard, 1992: 60).
318
Stannard, p. 57, suggests that massive, deadly epidemics may have recurred every 25-30
years, and (p. 60) that plagues occurred regularly in Italy during the summers.
319
Plagues occurred regularly in Italy during summers and massive, deadly epidemics may have
recurred throughout Europe every 25-30 years. “[A]n individual’s life chances in Europe’s
pesthouse cities were so poor that the natural populations of towns were in perpetual decline that
was offset only by in-migration from the countryside” (Stannard, 1992: 57, 58-61).
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after killing their targeted individual(s) (Stannard, 1992: 59-61). 320 In Spain, the “military elite of
Europe,”generation after generation of persistent warfare had left a grouping of people
traumatized not only by the violence of constant warfare, but also by the violence “of its soldiers
off the battlefield” (Mohawk, 2000: 121). 321 Spain was not unique in this regard. Much of
Western Europe was filled with “violence, squalor, treachery, and intolerance,” which was also
reflected not only in relations among adults, but also in child-rearing practices that sought to
subjugate and break the will of children through liberal amounts of physical punishment and
humiliation, as well as through an ethic of forcibly-imposed obedience so strong that courts
would execute unruly children over 16 if parents felt unable to impose the duty to obey upon
them (Stannard, 1992: 57; Williams, 1982: 10).
The terror and devastation that plagued Western Europe in the late Middle Ages was merely a
continuation of the same from the early Middle Ages and the ancient period, as much of this
chapter has already shown. Thus, just as the concept of progress gained wide popularity as a
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For example, Lawrence Stone (1977. The Family, Sex and Marriage in England, 1500-1800.
New York: Harper & Row, quoted in Stannard, 1992: 59-60) notes that Europe “was a place
filled with malice and hatred, its only unifying bond being the occasional episode of mass
hysteria, which temporarily bound together the majority in order to harry and persecute the local
witch” (pp. 98-99). Further, “in Milan in 1476 a man was torn to pieces by an enraged mob and
his dismembered limbs were then eaten by his tormenters. In Paris and Lyon, Hugenots were
killed and butchered, and their various body parts were sold openly in the streets. Other
eruptions of bizarre torture, murder, and ritual cannibalism were not uncommon. … Such
behavior, nonetheless, was not officially condoned, at least not usually” (Stananrd, 1992: 61).
See also, Mohawk (2000: 125-26) remarking upon the cultural amnesia that allowed the Spanish
conquerors, disgusted by human sacrifice and suspected cannibalism among the South American
Empires, to forget their own history of cannibalism during the Crusades.
321
The effects upon societies of sending soldiers to war, and the high rate at which soldiers
traumatized by violence of war reenact wartime violence in peacetime civilian life, have been
remarked upon frequently over the past decades, particularly in the past five-to-ten years as
soldiers returning from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and suffering from post-traumatic
stress disorder, perpetrate violence upon other civilians. A few of the many news articles,
reports and documentaries on the topic include HBO (2011), Goode (2009), Carey (2007), and
Cassata (2012).
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(psychopathological) coping mechanism for the “rootless, urban populations” of ancient Rome
who were suffering from the destruction of their cultures and the despiritualization of their lives
(Mohawk, 1997; Osborne, 2006: 116-17), so, too, has it continued to serve as a tool for denying,
avoiding, repressing or otherwise attempting to control feelings of anxiety, insecurity,
disequilibrium, disintegration and/or alienation. Richard Drinnon (1990: xxiii) has made a
similar observation, interpreting the concept of progress as a result of Westerner’s attempts to
“leave the growth-and-decay cycle of their own bodies behind.” Both Jennings (1975) and
Forbes (2008) have also remarked upon the fears Europeans emerging from the late Middle Ages
had of the wars and plagues of past centuries, and even of their own kind. And Mohawk (2000:
9), Gay (1993: 69) and Loy (2002: 266) have all remarked upon the Western attempt to achieve a
(false but seductive 322) security or “power-security” through the Western conception of progress,
and Canny (1973) likewise remarks upon this insecurity:
The sixteenth century colonizer was a proud, disdainful person, but he was also
insecure and needed to remind himself constantly of his own superiority by
looking to the imputed inferiority of others. (P. 597)
Along these same lines, Diamond (1974) and Szasz (1970) have commented on the existence of
numerous, unresolved conflicts and social/psychological problems within Western society,
which Western man seeks to avoid or deny through his conceptions of progress and his allegedly
superior position in the world. For example, Szasz (1970) argues that:

[G]enuine advancement in our spirituality must depend on the proper resolution
of pshychological and social problems which we have not even confronted, much
less mastered. (P. 275)
And Diamond (1974) notes:
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“There is a certainty to this line of thought that is seductive, but ultimately flawed” (Mohawk,
2000: 9).
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Caught in the contradictions of society, Westerners see themselves as ciphers of
history; incomplete and always waiting to be completed. Disintegrated by the
extreme division of labor, by competition for goods and services and status
rivalries, they obsessively anticipate integration. The idea of progress is, above
all, the precipitant of unresolved social and personal conflicts in modern
civilization, conflicts that feed on themselves. It is the awareness of this conflict,
along with the effort at resolving that creates the sense of unresolved movement
towards specific goals which are defined as progressive. … [C]ompelled by their
conflicts, Westerners are always trying to find concrete evidence for their
superiority; they feel that they represent the West, the logical inheritance of the
past, civilization itself. (Pp. 40, 41-42, see also pp. 8-10, 39-42)
Others have also noted the role of this Western concept of progress in overcoming the shock
and insecurity experienced by Europeans when they stumbled upon the existence of lands and
peoples not previously accounted for in their cultural worldview (Keal, 2003: 61-64; Todorov,
1982: 241). 323 This “discovery” “unsettled conceptions of ‘knowledge’” long held by Europeans,
including a deeply embedded inability to tolerate difference, and conceptions of progress that
allowed for only one “true” way of viewing the world and/or of arriving at a mythical utopian
society of the future (Keal, 2003: 64, 61-65; Mohawk, 2000: 137, 9). 324 Confronted with
different cultures and perceptions of the world, the Europeans largely refused to engage with this
difference --a refusal that served as “a way of avoiding really knowing” (Keal, 2003: 64). Unable
to treat difference as equal, and holding deeply-entrenched concepts which required that
everything fit somewhere in a hierarchy of inferiority/superiority (Keal, 2003: 58, 60, 64-65, 75;
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As noted in the above section on Individualism and the destruction of culture, threats to a
group’s cultural worldview produce considerable anxiety and can be traumatizing. See, for
example: de Vries (2006), McFarlane & van der Kolk (2006), Solomon et al. (2000), Schimel, et
al. (2000), Goldenberg et. al. (2001), Arndt et. al. (2002).
324
The latter source notes the Western belief that “true answers, when found, must necessarily be
compatible with one another and form a single whole” (p. 9); and provide the following example:
“When Cortes had urged Moctezuma to embrace Christianity and abandon indigenous practices,
the emperor replied that the religion of the Spaniards would not be appropriate to his people. It
would not have occurred to the Christian West to discuss such an idea, since the Christian
utopian enterprise was founded on the belief that there could be only on Truth, one right way.”
(P. 137)
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Todorov, 1982: 42, 146; Diamond, 1974: 41), the Europeans’ common internal struggle was
perhaps most presciently summarized by Bernardino De Sahagún when he stated simply that
“either it is the natives who tell their ’idolatries’ or it is the Holy Writ copied out into his own
book –one of these voices tells the truth, the other lies”(Keal, 2003: 61; Todorov, 1982: 241). As
they clung desperately to their rigid beliefs in their own security and superiority, the only
possible conclusion Europeans could draw was, according to their view, predetermined and
unavoidable. Any other conclusion would destroy the rationale for their entire civilization
(Diamond, 1974: 39) and thus would leave them standing “naked before the world” (Deloria,
1992: 112). 325 Hence, they determined that their culture, their view of the world, and their
interpretations of languages, traditions, and cultures that they could not (and would not attempt
to) understand was the only “true” view. Canny (1973) notes the lengths to which the English
who invaded Ireland went in order to maintain this perception against empirical evidence to the
contrary:
Those who came to Ireland had a preconceived idea of a barbaric society and they
merely tailored the Irishman to fit this ideological strait jacket. There were, of
course, many aspects of Gaelic life that did not so easily fit this model, but the
English refused to make any adjustment, lest, perhaps, it disturb their own
position at the top of the ladder of cultural development. (P. 597)
Clearly, then, Western culture’s obsessive-compulsive need to fit the world into its own,
misguided vision of linear progression, through which Western society leads the world towards
some future Utopia, is highly delusional –as remarked upon by scholar after scholar (Diamond,
1974: 39-42; Means, 1983: 27-28; Szasz, 1970: xii; Hedges in BookTV, 2012; Mies, 1986: 74-77;
325

“The Christian religion and the Western idea of history are inseparable and mutually selfsupporting. To retrench the traditional concept of Western history at this point would mean to
invalidate the justifications for conquering the Western Hemisphere. Americans in some manner
will cling to the traditional idea that they suddenly came upon a vacant land on which they
created the world’s most affluent society. Not only is such an idea false, it is absurd. Yet without
it both Western man and his religion stand naked before the world.”
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Keal, 2003: 58; Federici, 2004: 14; Loy, 2002: 266; Black Elk, 1983: 156). And Western
society’s insistence upon the validity of this progressive construct, despite all evidence to the
contrary, is as delusional as it is predaceous. In terms of the first, the first, obsessive-compulsive
delusion has served as a mechanism for denial, avoidance, intolerance, dualism, magical
thinking, self-aggrandizement and a number of other problematic (psychopathological) patterns
of thought and behavior in the Western cultural worldview. It has allowed Europeans to avoid
engaging with difference, and thus to remain in a bubble of delusion, considerably disconnected
from reality. Without dealing with the reality before them upon their encounter with different
peoples –much less within their own societies and minds 326—they failed to deal with the
longstanding existence of pervasive, endemic trauma throughout their societies, towns, families
and individual experiences, and thus not only did they fail to resolve and heal this trauma, but
they perpetuated and reproduced this trauma in their interactions with others inside and outside
of their own societies, all in an attempt to avoid, deny, repress and control intrusive and
intolerable feelings of anxiety, fear, paranoia and so forth (see: Baldwin, 1965: 47; Wise, 2005:
1).
In terms of the second, the insistence upon the validity of the first, the Western concept of
progress, as part of a larger grouping of psychopathological coping mechanisms, served to justify
numerous offensive attacks upon members of its own society, other peoples, other life forms and
the earth itself (Mies, 1986: 74-77; Federici, 2004; Szasz, 1970; Gay, 1993: 47, 69; Mohawk,
1997 & 2000: 137; Hedges, 2008: 156; Diamond, 1974: 25; Szasz, 1970: 238; Deloria, 1992: 5455; Baldwin, 1965; Hanke, 1959; Horsman, 1981; Jennings, 1976; Black Elk, 1983; Means,
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Indeed, as John Trudell (2001b and 2003) and Russell Means (1983) have noted, the spirit
was being eaten by the disease.
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1983; Trudell, 2003, 2001a & 2001b). 327 In doing so, it came with a ready-made rationalization
for its predations, presenting these perpetrations against (or sacrifices of) other peoples and life
forms as normal, inevitable, and necessary “in order to create a world which will be able to solve
all of humankind’s problems”(Mohawk, 1997 & 2000: 137; Means, 1983: 21-22; Diamond,
1974: 1; Loy, 2002: 266; Gay, 1993: 47; Tocqueville, 2000; Horsman, 1981; Drinnon, 1990). It
also came with a ready-made justification for Westerners’ participation in these predations, by
positing that Europeans were the “most advanced” people and thus the ‘chosen’ group for
leading the world to this future utopia (Deloria, 1992: 63; Keal, 2003: 65; Gay, 1993: 69; Mies,
1986: 74-75; Means, 1983: 27-28). 328 Meanwhile the Western crimes and perpetrations have
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For example, Gay (1993: 47) notes that Darwin, in the Descent of Man, argued against caring
for those in need, because their extinction was inevitable. Mies (1986: 74-77) notes: “the
progress of the European Big Men is based on the subordination and exploitation of their own
women, on the exploitation and killing of Nature, on the exploitation and subordination of other
peoples and their lands.” And Mohawk (2000: 137) mentions that: “The perfect world that Plato
thought human intelligence had the capacity to create found its most political expression in the
mid-sixteenth century as an argument to justify the horrors of rape, murder, torture, robbery, and
genocide, which were, for the Indians, the lived experience of conquest,” while Hedges (2008:
156( goes yet further, arguing that: “The belief that we can achieve human perfection, that we
can advance morally, is itself an evil. It provides a cover for criminality and abuse, a
justification for murder. It sanctifies war, murder and torture for an unattainable absolute.”
328
Deloria (1992: 63) notes the assumption implicit in the Western concept of progress that “at a
particular point in the unraveling of this sequence, the peoples of Western Europe became the
guardians of the world,” while Gay (1993: 69) notes the Western “rage to improve the world
whether it wanted improvement or not.” Keal (2003: 65) points out that “By implication,
Europeans had access to truth and if they had not already done so could escape ignorance. They
were consequently superior beings while the other was trapped in ignorance and inferior. This
made it easier to discount non-European beliefs and customs.” Mies, (1986: 74-75) notes that the
concept of progress is “unthinkable without the one-sided development of technology of warfare
and conquest. All subsistence technology… henceforth appears to be ‘backward’ in comparison
to the ‘wonders’ of the modern technology of warfare and conquest.” Meanwhile, de Tocqueville
(2000) provides a plethora of examples of this sort of delusional, predatory thinking as it was
used to justify or hide the crimes of European descendants in the United States. See, for
example, the following statements: “Would one not say, on seeing what takes place in the world,
that the European is to men of other races what man himself is to the animals?”(P. 303); “the
Negro hardly feels misfortune; violence had placed him in slavery, the habit of servitude has
given him the thoughts and ambitions of a slave; he admires tyrants more than he hates them and
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been dishonestly reframed and/or concealed altogether. But the Western concept of progress
could not have ‘achieved’ all of this devastation, destruction, exploitation, dispossession, murder,
mayhem, pain, suffering and misery entirely on its own. It relied upon the use of another, even
more powerful, but closely related and inextricably intertwined concept: civilization.
Like the concept of progress, the concept of civilization can also be traced back to ancient
times. At this time, the term “civilization” was used to indicate those inside the Greek city-states
or the Roman Empire, while the term “barbarian” encompassed everyone outside (“including
Egyptians and Persians” in ancient Greece) (Jennings, 1976: 6-7; Keal, 2003: 69). 329 Thus then,
as now, the concept of “civilization” was used dichotomously, counter posing the “civilized”
with the “barbarian” (or, later, the “savage,” the “Wildman,” or simply the wild/nature), and
containing the presumption of cultural, technical and moral superiority/inferiority (Jennings,
1976: 6-7, 9-10). The use of this dichotomy provided the “civilized” insiders with a sense that
they existed “at the top of the evolutionary ladder”(Jennings, 1976: 9-10), 330 and to some extent
served to justify the exploitation (demanding tributes, taxes) of the outsiders. However, the form

finds his joy and his pride in servile imitation of those who oppress him”(P. 304); “The conduct
of the Americans in the United States toward the natives, on the contrary, breathes the purest
love of forms and legality … with marvelous vacility—tranquility, legally, philanthropically,
without spilling blood, without violating a single one of the great principles of morality in the
eyes of the world. One cannot destroy men while being more respectful of the laws of
humanity”(P. 325).
329
The former source notes: “From very ancient times self-consciously “civilized” people have
favorably compared themselves with their neighbors. The Greeks invented the term barbarian to
apply to outsiders—even such as Egyptians and Persians—and the Romans were not slow to
adopt the idea. As W.R. Jones has remarked, ‘The antithesis which opposed civilization to
barbaraism was a highly useful cliché, and one which served equally well as a means of selfcongratulation and as a rationalization for aggression.’” (Pp. 6-7)
330
“Whatever efforts are made to objectify its definition, civilization necessarily implies not only
technical but moral superiority over the stages assumed to be lower on the evolutionary scale.
Civilization is rarely conceived of in terms of empirical data, and although its phenomena might
vary as widely as those of ancient Sparta and Victorian England, its essence is always its status
on the top of the evolutionary ladder.”
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of exploitation, the extent of this superiority/inferiority dichotomy, and the expected behavior of
the former (“civilized”) towards the latter (“uncivilized”) were all conceived of quite differently
in ancient times than they were in the Crusades of the late Middle Ages (see for example: White,
1961; Keal, 2003: 68, 69; Mohawk 2000; Osborne, 2006; Tigar & Levy, 2000; Deloria, 1992:
63; Gay, 1993: 69; Diamond, 1974: 8). 331 By the latter time, the ideology of
superiority/inferiority, and of forcible exploitation, were much more deeply embedded in the
everyday thinking and behavior of the Crusaders, who had pillaged, plundered and murdered
Muslims, Jews and eastern Christians, using a form of this superiority/ inferiority dichotomy as a
justification or rationalization for their behavior. Similarly, during the Inquisition, witch hunt, the
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White (1961) argues that Greek city-states did not follow the imperialist/colonialist model
followed today by western society, because Greek colonization was primarily carried out for the
purpose of trade –gaining things for the city states that were produced in rural areas—and was
not carried out in areas opposed to it. To this end, while Greek colonization certainly created
relations of dependency, it was carried out in a less exploitative way than the forcibly-imposed
relations of colonization of later centuries (which were generally also characterized by mass
murder and environmental destruction orchestrated on the part of European colonizers). On the
use of the term in ancient Rome, see: Mohawk (2000) and Osborne (2006), who both note that,
while the Roman Empire could be incredibly brutal to citizens and non-citizens alike, noncitizens (falling outside of “civilization”) retained considerable autonomy. Tigar & Levy (2000)
makes a similar point about Roman law and the possibility of becoming a citizen/ “civilized,” as
does Keal (2003: 69), noting that: “The Romans distinguished barbarians as those who did not
live under Roman law; but by submitting to Roman law ‘barbarians’ could gain citizenship and
admission to civilization.” Further, Keal argues that in ancient Greece, barbarians were simply
those who did not speak Greek, and that though Augustine saw Wildmen as inferior, he also
argued that “even the most repugnant of men—barbarian, heathen, pagan, and heretic—had to be
regarded as objects of Christian proselytisation, to be seen as possible converts rather than as
enemies or sources of corruption, to be exiled, isolated, and destroyed” (p. 68). Thus, it was not
until medieval times, and perhaps late medieval times with the start of the crusades, that western
Europeans began to determine that they were “the guardians of the world” (Deloria, 1992: 63)
and it was their duty “to improve the world whether it wanted improvement or not” (Gay, 1993:
69). However, contrast this with Diamond (1974): “it is always useful to remember that in
Athens, at the height of its cultural achievement, there were at least three slaves to every free
man. The fact is reflected in the classic utopian projections of civilization, and instanced in the
work of Thomas Moore, where it is assumed that a special class of the disenfranchised will
engaged in the “black labor.” And in Plato’s Republic, that prototypical apology for the state, the
workers and farmers constitute lower orders of being”(p. 8).
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mentality of the Crusades first turned inward, facilitating advances in the techniques of torture,
exploitation and accumulation by dispossession, only to turn outward again against all nonWesterners whose lands were invaded by Europe. 332
Also like the concept of progress, the concept of civilization evolved over the centuries in
ways that have not been beneficial or healthy for humanity as a whole (much less for plant and
animal life on the planet, or the planet itself). Today there are a variety of ways in which the
term “civilization” is defined and used, from indicating the culture or society of a specific region,
people, or time period (such as Mayan Civilization or Roman Civilization) or indicating a
populated or urban area and/or the comforts associated with such an area (Jennings, 1976: 10;
Miriam-Webster Dictionary, 2012; Free Dictionary, 2012; American Heritage Dictionary, 2009;
Harper Collins English Dictionary, 1991; Dictionary.com, 2012). But the first entry, and the
primary definition for the term in each of these dictionaries, as well as the implicit meanings of
the term as it has been and is most often used, contains clear connotations of the
superiority/inferiority dichotomy inherent in Western concepts of progress. The links between
the terms progress and civilization became tighter during the 1700s with the rise of “stages of
development” theories which attempted to categories the cultures of the world according to
hierarchical stages of societal development. According to these theories, Western culture was, of
course, at “the top of the evolutionary ladder,” and thus “civilized” (Jennings, 1976: 10). Such
meanings are still visible today in the definition of the term civilized, which is always defined
vaguely and non-empirically in ways that convey the idea of intellectual, cultural and moral
“refinement” and through the use terms such as “advanced,” “high level,” “highly
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Further examples of ways in which these myths have been reproduced and recreated in
different historical eras can be found in: (Mohawk, 2000; Drinnon, 1990; Jennings, 1976; Keal,
2003: 67-68; Horsman, 1981; Slotkin, 1973; Bodley, 1999; Elias (1998); Hitchen, 2001).
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developed”(Miriam-Webster Dictionary, 2012; Free Dictionary, 2012; American Heritage
Dictionary, 2009; Harper Collins English Dictionary, 1991; Dictionary.com, 2012; Jennings,
1976: 9-10). 333 None of these terms or ideas in such definitions is empirical. Each is relative, and
is a matter of subjective interpretation. The same is true of many of the elaborations provided,
some of which include criteria such as: “complex” cultural, religious, legal, political and social
organization and/or institutions; “progress in the arts and sciences;” intellectual, cultural and/or
moral “refinement;” and the use of record-keeping and/or writing. 334
Despite the intended meaning of the term (which is implied but rarely stated outright), these
elaborations fail to distinguish one society from another, particularly when considered from the
perspective of members of non-Western societies. After all, the indigenous societies throughout
the Americas that were invaded by Western Europeans would have certainly all considered
themselves to have complex systems for keeping records (including oral history); complex
cultural, religious, legal, political and social organization; “advanced” art; “refinement”
intellectually, culturally and morally; and elaborate forms of science and/or knowledge. Further,
there are numerous sources of empirical evidence to support these views (some of which will be
discussed more in chapter 3).
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The latter source notes that “[c]ivilization is rarely conceived of in terms of empirical data…”
“1. An advanced state of intellectual, cultural and material development in human society,
marked by progress in the arts and sciences, the extensive use of record-keeping, including
writing, and the appearance of complex political and social institutions” (American Heritage
Dictionary, 2009); “1. an advanced state of human society, in which a high level of culture,
science, industry, and government has been reached; 2. those people or nations that have reached
such a state” (Dictionary.com, 2012); “1. a society in an advanced state of social development
(e.g., with complex legal and political and religious organizations)” (FreeDictionary, 2012); “1a.
a relatively high level of cultural and technological development; specifically: the stage of
cultural development at which writing and the keeping of written records is attained” (MerriamWebster, 2012); “1. (Sociology) a human society that has highly developed material and spiritual
resources and a complex culture, political, and legal organization; an advanced state in social
development” (Harper Collins Dictionary, 2009).
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As illustration, in terms of art and “refinement,” the Chinese traveled around the world in the
early 1400s (and possibly before this) to trade not with the Europeans, who were seen as
backwards and having nothing of interest or value, but with the peoples of Asia, Africa and both
American continents, whose cultures produced art and other refined products coveted by wealthy
Chinese (Menzies, 2004. See also: Stannard, 1992; Mann, 2005). When it came to politics and
governance, David Stannard (1992) and other writers (Williams, 1982; Mann, 2005) have noted
that the vast majority of Native societies throughout the Americas –some numbering into the
thousands—functioned as participatory democracies, many of which operated on the basis of
consensus, an incredibly complex method of decision-making. Further, these societies little-tono crime, no police and no jails, but were governed by extremely complex systems of law that
were intricately linked to spirituality (religion), culture, and the organization of social life (see,
for example: McAdams, 2012b; Akwesasne Notes, 2005; Mann, 2005). And when it came to
science and knowledge, Native societies were intricately familiar with the workings of the plant,
animal and natural world around them, holding far more knowledge about these things than
Western scientists do today. Further, Native societies were able to live on their lands for
thousands of years without destroying the air, water, earth and life around them upon which they
were dependent --something Westerners have yet to learn. This is evidenced in the fact that
Western scientists remain baffled by various ancient rock formations, mounds and so forth
throughout North and South America which demonstrate incredibly advanced understandings of
astronomy; and it is also becoming common practice among Western botanists, zoologists,
ecologists, and environmental scientists to seek out the knowledge of indigenous elders in order
to broaden their understanding of ecological systems, plant and animal behavior, and other
aspects of the natural world. (See also: Means, 1983; Black Elk, 1983; Cajete, 2000). In fact, the
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only possible case in which it could be argued that some Native societies did not fit these vague
and non-empirical definitions of “civilization” is in the criteria of written language –a criteria of
only one of the five dictionaries. 335 Yet, several Native societies had this as well. Aside from the
better-known Mayan and Aztec writing systems, numerous other Native nations in the Americas
also had some form of writing, such as the died beads and strings of the Inca (called Quipu), the
petroglyphs of the Ojibwe and Míkmaq, and the wampum beads, strings, and belts of the
Haudenosaunee (Miller, 2009: 39; Hirst, N.d.; Wikipedia, 2012a; MacroHistory, 2007-2011). 336
Since most if not all societies would consider themselves to be refined and their cultures to be
complex, we see clearly the point that both Jennings (1976: 6-10) and Keal (2003: 67, 72) have
made: that there is no clear, empirical definition for the term “civilization.” And yet, most
Westerners know exactly what is intended by the term, as well as by its various elaborations
(“advanced,” “complex,” “high level,” and “refined”). For Westerners, these terms are intended
to refer to us, our culture, our society, and every culture or society that looks and acts just like us.
Similarly, for many Westerners (particularly in North America), this term and its various
elaborations are decidedly not meant to refer to those people and societies who do not look, think
or act like Westerners do. This narcissistic component to the civilized-uncivilized dichotomy has
335

Three of the five definitions do not mention writing at all. Though the American Heritage
Dictionary (op. cit., 1) mentioned writing, the definition makes clear that writing is only one
form of record keeping (extensive use of record-keeping, including writing”). Thus, only the
Merriam-Webster Dictionary actually makes “the keeping of written records” one of the criteria
for “civilization.”
336
Thanks to Barbara A. Mann for pointing out these additional sources on the topic: John
Heckewelder, John. 1820/1876. History, Manners, and Customs of the Indian Nations Who
Once Inhabited Pennsylvania and the Neighboring States, The First American Frontier Series,
New York: Arno Press, p.108; Hewitt, J. N. B. 1965. “Wampum,”pp. 904-909 in Frederick
Webb Hodge (ed.), Handbook of American Indians North of Mexico. New York: Rowman and
Littlefield; Arnold, Denise Y. with Juan de Dios Yapita. 2006. The Metamorphosis of Heads:
Textual Struggles, Education, and Land in the Andes Pittsburgh: The University of Pittsburgh
Press, chapter 10; Sharer, Robert J. and Loa P. Traxler. 2006. The Ancient Maya, 6th ed.
Stanford: Stanford University Press, pp. 125-52.
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been noted by a number of scholars 337 as has the use of the psychological mechanisms of
projection and delusion involved in differentiating “us” from “them” (see: Diamond, 1974: 1, 26;
Gay, 1993: 69; Elias, 1998: 49; Keal, 2003: 60-61, 71-72; Stannard, 1992: 14-15; Fanon, 1959;
Jennings, 1976: 10; Martinot, 2003a & 2003b; Szasz, 1970: 278; Loy, 2002: 254). 338
Indeed, an element present in most of these uses of the term –along with Western separation,
intolerance, narcissism, projection and other forms of delusion—is the implication not just of
superiority, but of domination and conquest. In other words, as noted by Jennings (1976: 10, 8,
12) and Keal (2003: 67), by defining civilization by what it is not, we include or exclude others
based upon our desire to dominate and/or conquer them. 339 Jennings provides an example of the
term’s unempirical flexibility in this regard, noting that when England wanted to conquer the
Irish, they sought out the one small difference between the English and the Irish –hierarchical
government structures—and made this the criteria for civilization. Yet:
At other times and on other occasions powers bent on conquest have been able to
point to more substantial differences between their own cultures, always deemed
as civilization, and the uncivilized societies of their opponents. More frequently,
337

Fanon’s (1959) ‘Mr. Debre’s Desperate Endeavors’ is quoted in Stannard (1992: 14-15): “The
colonialist … reaches the point of no longer being able to imagine a time occurring without him.
His irruption into history of the colonized people is deified, transformed into absolute
necessity.”Similarly, Elias (1998) noted: “Unlike the situation when the concept was formed,
from now on nations consider the process of civilization as completed within their own societies;
they see themselves as bearers of an existing or finished civilization to others, as standardbearers of expanding civilization. … Indeed, an essential phase of the civilizing process was
concluded at exactly the time when the consciousness of civilization, the consciousness of the
superiority of their own behavior and its embodiments in science, technology, or art began to
spread over whole nations of the West.”(P. 49).
338
Jennings (1976: 10) notes that the civilization-savagery dichotomy “so greatly distorted
Americans’ perceptions of reality that they met constant frustration in dealing with the issues
raised by the presence of Indians.”
339
Keal (2003: 67) notes: “If we do not know what we think “civilization” is, we can always find
an example of what it is not”(quoting White). Similarly, Jennings (1976: 10) discusses the
“myth of social structure in which civilization and savagery stood as reciprocals, each defined as
what the other was not, and both independent of any necessary correlation with empirical
reality.”
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perhaps, the difference has been one of religion. At other times it might have
been nomadic instead of sedentary habitation or one mode of subsistence versus
another: communities without agriculture—or those possessing horticulture but
lacking animal husbandry—were barbarous or savage. Some social scientists
have tried to bring validity and precision to these conceptions by making literacy
the criterion of civilization. All of these floundering attempts at explanation only
serve to obscure the essential fact that the civilized-uncivilized distinction is a
moral sanction rather than any given combination of social traits susceptible to
objective definition. It is a weapon of attack rather than a standard of measure.
There are other ways of using these terms, to be sure, although the taint of
historical usage makes difficult any attempt to purify them. (P. 8, emphasis
added)
Jennings continues a few pages later:
The very words used to express thought give it shape and direction as well as
symbolic substance, and the words evolved from centuries of conquest have been
created for the purpose of conquest rather than the purposes of knowledge. (P. 12)
Thus, what appears to be implied by the term civilization, but what often goes unsaid, is the
justification for Western conquest and domination of other peoples. In its most common and
widespread use, the term “civilization” not only demarcates the boundary line between
Westerners and the various, non-Western “others” that the former has targeted for domination.
The term also characterizes the former as superior and the latter as inferior, as people in need of
Western domination in order to aid their (forced) conversion to Western monoculture. 340 Hence,
through this term, the domination, exploitation, dispossession, conquest, and numerous other
horrors perpetrated upon non-Western peoples by Western society (ruling elites) are presented
not as organized, armed aggression for the purpose of plunder, (Mohawk, 1997 & 2000) but as
Western benevolence. 341 Indeed, we can find ample evidence for the argument that this term is
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“Another timeworthy legacy was the urgent sense of a mission to civilize—that is to say,
Christianize—unenlightened heathen tribes overseas or the unwashed heathen poor at home”
(Gay, 1993: 69).
341
“[T]he purpose of organized, armed aggression is to plunder” (Mohawk, 1997).
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primarily a justification for such actions in the writings of the scholars quoted in the above text
and notes. 342
However, the term is not only a justification for conquest of other, non-Western peoples. It is
also --and was first and primarily-- a justification for the pacification and domination of Western
populations by Western monied elites (Elias, 1998: 43, 56, 55). Through the “centralization and
monopolization of the use of physical violence and its instruments” (Elias, 1998: 43), the
militarization of commerce (Mohawk, 2000:95), and the “taming of the warriors” (Elias, 1998:
56) so that they were “dangerous only to [the] enemies” of Western dominating elites (Elias,
1998:43), the latter accumulated militarized control over large areas. The concept of
“civilization,” and the act of pronouncing some segments of the Western masses as “more
civilized” (generally on the basis of money/property, or military skill) 343 thus served as a
hegemonic justification for the new social relations of domination. 344 Combined, this
monopolized forced and hegemony solidified hierarchies of domination within Western society,
which were used for the purpose of dominating, first, Western populations, and only later, nonWestern peoples. Through these processes, both Western populations and non-Western peoples
were turned into, and treated as, little more than “raw material to be used in [the] interests” of the
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See for example, Elias (1998: 49): “And the consciousness of their own superiority, the
consciousness of this ‘civilization’, from now on serves at least those nations which have
become colonial conquerors, and therefore a kind of upper class to large sections of the nonEuropean world, as a justification of their rule, to the same degree that earlier the ancestors of the
concept of civilization, politesse and civilité, had served the courtly-aristocratic upper class as a
justification of theirs.”
343
Elias (1998: 49) notes that the knights and nobility were the first to be trained in the ways of
politesse and civilité, the “ancestors of the concept of civilization.”
344
“And then it is not difficult to understand that with this monopolization of physical violence
as the point of intersection of a multitude of social interconnections, the whole apparatus which
shapes the individual, the mode of operation of the social demands and prohibitions which mould
his social makeup, and above all the kinds of fear that played a part in his life are decisively
changed” (Elias, 1998: 43).
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few (Diamond, 1974: 39), wealthy and powerful individuals who managed to maintain control
over the Western and non-Western masses (and “in whom superiority was vested”) (Anaya,
2004: 26. See also: Diamond, 1974: 8, 39; Engels, 2000; Mies, 1986: 90, 93, 76; Jennings, 1976:
9; Trudell, 2003; Black Elk, 1983: 144-45). 345
Though populations always initially resist this exploitation and dispossession, they are
generally forced to comply via physical force. 346 This forced compliance, overtime, leads the
masses to internalize the social hierarchies of domination and their position within these
hierarchies. The masses become internally pacified, so traumatized by the death and destruction
of the resistance all around them that they give up on resistance and begin to obey out of fear
and, eventually, habit. At this point, force is no longer required to maintain the obedience of the
masses (though, of course, the threat of force always lingers in the background) (Litowitz, 2000;
Diamond, 1974: 8, 11-12, 17; Forbes, 2008: 47; Trudell, 2001b & 2003; Elias, 1998: 43, 51;
Anaya, 2004: 26). 347 Several scholars have linked this process of creating habitual obedience, or
of taming and pacifying the masses, to the processes of state formation and civilization itself.
345

As Engels has noted: “civilization is founded on the exploitation of one class by another.” To
this extent, Jennings (1976: 9) argues that the criteria for civilization is “the exploitation of one
class by another.” Diamond (1974: 39) adds to this criteria the a existence of a “territorial state
with coercive power.” Diamond (1974) remarks further upon exploitation and hegemony on
pages 2, 11-12, and 17. Black Elk (1983: 144-45) further adds that the standard of “civilization”
appears to be “the ‘will’ and ability to accumulate material” and the compulsive “need to
constantly arrange and rearrange material” such as by tearing up mountains for gravel and
transforming non-Western peoples into the image of Westerners.
346
As Stanley Diamond (1974: 8) has noted, “[c]ivilization always has to be imposed.”
347
The latter source (Elias, 1998: 43) notes “how important this internal pacification was for the
civilizing process,” because, as Litowitz (2000: 524) also notes, “brute force still leaves the
individual free to harbor rebellious thoughts, but complete conrol is both external and internal.”
On resistance, Forbes (2008) notes: “What we have seen in the past 2,000 years is not the rise of
civilization, but the rise of brutality and barbarism with, of course, numerous resistance
movements led by such diverse people as Buddha, Yehoshu’a, Tecumseh, Handsome Lake,
Crazy Horse, Chitto Harjo, Sarah Winnemucca, Emiliano Zapata, Mahatma Ganhi, and
thousands of other forgotten, important and less important, non-wétiko, sane human beings” (p.
47).
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Elias (1998: 43, 48, 55) has linked these two processes as part and parcel of the same thing, and
Litowitz (2000: 524) has remarked similarly that “domination is increasingly a matter of
colonizing the internal world of the dominated classes” (see also: Anaya, 2004: 26; Keal, 2003:
74; Trudell, 2001b & 2003; Diamond, 1974: 8, 11-12, 17; Jennings, 1976: 9). 348 An example of
this sort of habitual obedience is provided in Elias (1998):
Despite the barbarity of some of the laws, despite the faults of the administrative
principles, the increase in duties, their burdensome form, the harshness of fiscal
laws, despite the pernicious maxims which direct the government’s legislation on
commerce and manufacture, and finally, despite the persecution of the
Protestants, one may observe that the peoples within the realm lived in peace
under the protection of law. (P. 48, quoting Voltaire)
Much of the rest of this chapter has been geared towards showing the ways in which
civilization was imposed: first at home, then abroad, always for the purpose of capital
accumulation by the wealthy and powerful few (though the exploitation and dispossession of the
masses). The Crusades, Inquisition, witch-hunt, Enclosures, and so forth all served to define
women and “Other” peoples into nature, and to conquer, dominate and subdue these various
categories of peoples along with the natural world (Mies, 1986: 75, 76; Merchant, 1989;
Cullinan, 2011; Serpell, 1999: 39, 48, 47; Keal, 2003: 67-68; Drinnon, 1990: xxvii; Mohawk,
2000: 30; see also: England, 2012 for a modern example of this thinking). 349 For example,
civilization was explicitly linked to women’s subordination during the European invasions of
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“The legal idea of the state necessarily implies that of habitual obedience of its members to
those persons in whom superiority is vested…” (Anaya, 2004: 26).
349
Cullinan (2011) notes that our “legal and political establishments perpetuate, protect and
legitimize the continued degredation of Earth by design, not by accident” and have “reduced
other aspects of Earth and the other creatures that live on it to the status of objects for the use of
humans” thus legitimating “the eternal extermination of species and the most profound disrespect
and abuse of the Earth that sustains us. … [F]rom the perspective of our legal systems, the
billions of other species on the planet are outlaws, and are treated as such. They are not part of
the community or society that the legal systems concern themselves with, and have no inherent
right to existence or to have a habitat in which to live.”
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other lands. British colonialists viewed the equality of men and women as a sign of societal
backwardness, and included within their “civilizing mission” the act of subordinating and
destroying the independence of colonized women, and teaching “the colonized men the ‘virtues’
of sexism and militarism” (Mies, 1986: 93. See also: McAdams, (2012a, and/or 2011; Gay,
1993: 38) 350 The concept of civilization was also clearly linked to the oppression of working
class and poor masses, who were referred to as “savages, beasts and incorrigibles in need of
harsh discipline”(Lanier & Henry, 2004: 70-71; Canny, 1979: 34, 19; Drinnon, 1990: 69; Serpell,
1999: 39). 351 Such punishments might include being whipped and branded like livestock, or
being imprisoned, and there were reportedly hundreds of possible offenses that were punishable
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Mies (1986: 93) notes the account of a colonial officer in Burma in the late 1800s, who
complains of “the independence of Burmese women, of the equality between the sexes, and of
the peace loving nature of the Burmese people” and concludes that the failure of Burmese
society to subordinate its women “is the mark of a young race.” The colonial official further
concludes that women should “surrender their liberty in the interests of man” and that “Burmese
men should learn to kill, make war, and oppress their women,” and women should be “’brought
down’ to the status of the civilized, dependent housewife.” McAdams further notes that colonial
officials in North America had a similar, explicitly negative view on the equality of the sexes and
the need to subordinate Cree women in the process of “civilizing” the Cree people. On the
existence of similar views today, one need only refer to Representative Terry England’s (2012)
comparison of women to cows, pigs and chickens. In many ways the present war on women’s
rights to contraception and abortion (and healthcare) parallels the attempts by medieval Catholic
Church to control women, sexuality and birthrates (see Federici, 2004). While rape of working
and lower-class women has not been explicitly legalized today, violence against women is
endemic in this society, and both violent crimes and sexual assaults against certain categories of
women (in particular women of color and Native women) go largely unpunished when reported.
351
Canny (1979: 34, 19) notes that English colonial organizers referred to the English lower
classes as “wyld men of myne own nacione” and believed that martial law was necessary to
govern over them in the colonies because “most of those who ventured overseas came from the
poorest elements of society, and were considered by their superiors to be incapable of selfdiscipline, to be barely civilized, and certainly not suitable instruments for transmitting
civiliztion to others.” Drinnon (1990: 69) found the same attitudes among the founding fathers
of the United States, who “saw linkages between savages lurking on the frontiers and the
rebellious commons at home.” Serpell (1999: 39) makes similar observations: “Also ripe for
moral uplift were the working classes who were widely regarded as dangerous and disorderly
rabble, governed by “brute” passions and addicted to vicious “blood sports” such as bull-baiting
and cock-fighting.”
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by execution (Lanier & Henry, 2004: 70-71). Children were also seen as existing at the margins
of civilization, and as beings that were “innately cruel and heartless and needed to be carefully
socialized and ‘improved’ through exposure to morally uplifting activities and pastimes”(Serpell,
1999: 39) or through efforts at breaking their will and keeping them in subjugation at school and
at home through corporal punishment and/or humiliation (Williams, 1982: 10; Drinnon, 1990:
xxv; Elias, 1998: 53, 41). 352 Even a person’s inner nature was perceived as consisting of savage,
beastlike and “brutish animality”that had to be risen above, brought under control and mastered
in each person (Serpell, 1999: 39, 47; Drinnon, 1990: xxii-xxiii, xxv, 30; Keal, 2003: 67; Gay,
1993: 69; Canny, 1979: 18, 37) . 353
Thus, again, as is clear from the ways the term was used and applied to various categories of
people and/or nature within Europe, what was really meant by the process of “civilization” was
the taming, the pacification, and/or the process of achieving the obedience of the masses through
the forcible imposition of hierarchies of separation, domination and intolerance, which were
eventually internalized by the masses, making their obedience habitual. In other words, being
“civilized,” then, is not just the state of being conquered, but the state of being physically,
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The European child’s primary obligation was to obey his or her parents (Williams, 1982:10),
and “[t]he way the European governments treated their subjects mirrored the way European
parents dealt with their children” (p. 12).
353
“For Darwin and his contemporaries, “civilization” was a process clearly analogous to animal
taming or domestication. It could only be achieved through the active suppression of mankind’s
original, savage or beastlike character, and the simultaneous cultivation of domesticity, gentility,
and self-control” and poets such as Tennyson “exhorted his readers to ‘move upwards, working
out the beast’” (Serpell, 1999: 39). Further, “middle-class Victorians and their succesors had
risen above, and brought under control, a world of nature that included their own potentially
“brutish” animality” (p. 47). Drinnon (1990: xxii-xxiii) likewise noted that: “Long before their
first landfall, European immigrants were alienated from the “howling Wilderness” that had to be
mastered in themselves and in their new surroundings,” something which at least partially
explained their fascination for total control over the self and others. Finally, Keal (2003: 67)
notes the Western idea that: “The wild man was found ‘lurking within every man—clamouring
for release’.”
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mentally and spiritually colonized; of knowing one’s place in the hierarchy of domination and
subordination, and of acting out one’s proscribed roles in this hierarchy without complaint or
resistance. This assertion is supported by the historical evidence, and even by some modern
dictionary definitions of the term. 354
Though these hierarchies, statuses and roles were forcibly imposed at first, populations facing
constant repression, injury and death, first at the hands of the Church, later at the hands of other
forces of the consolidating state-commerce alliance, did eventually internalize them –realizing
through generations of trauma, terror and loss, as John Trudell (2001b & 2003) notes, that if they
wanted to survive at all the needed to go along (at least in their visible actions) with the newlyimposed systems of domination. By fitting themselves into the exploitative system that
dispossessed them and turned them into raw materials to be used in the accumulatory interests of
the wealthy and powerful, the masses, gradually and over generations, internalized the
hierarchical system and their “inferior” positions, roles and statuses within it until all of these
came to be seen as the normal, natural, given way that the universe works. 355 As such, they lost
their sense of what it was to be human beings, being socialized into a system made up not of
354

For example, one of the five dictionaries consulted above deviated slightly from the accepted
norm of defining “civilization” and “civilized” in terms of advancement and superiority. The
fourth entry for the term “civilized” (adjective) by Dictionary.com lists the term as meaning:
“easy to manage or control; well organized or ordered.” (Emphasis added).
355
Marx (1972a) notes that in every epoch people imagine the social relations of production (or,
here, the social relations of domination) to be normal and natural, to have always existed, and
thus to be beyond their abilities and imaginations to change. These relations of
production/domination are also, for Marx, equal tot he ideas of the ruling class:
The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas: i.e., the class which is
the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. …
The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material
relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the
relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its
dominance. (Marx/Engels Reader. 1972, pp. 136-37).
See also: Gramsci (1971), Litowitz (2000) and Foucault (1995) on hegemony and the active
participation of people in reproducing these ideas.
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fellow human beings, but of only oppressed and oppressors, those who are treated as property,
and those who treat others as property (Jennings, 1976: 3; Trudell, 2001b). 356
As mentioned above, the forcible-imposition of the conditions that brought about this view of
the world, and the adjustments involved in internalizing such a view, were highly traumatic for
those who survived these processes. These processes were made more so by the process of
individualization, which rerouted the resistance against these changes, transforming it from
collective actions of the masses against the ruling elite to 1) individual acts of resistance that
were criminalized and prosecuted, or 2) individual complicity in the civilizing processes. Seeing
themselves as unable to effect the entire system of hierarchical domination, they gave up on this
goal, and instead satisfied themselves with “self-improvement” –i.e, trying to effect a slightly
better position within the hierarchies of domination. They could most easily do so not only by
demonstrating themselves to be relatively more civilized (i.e., a “good worker,” “good Christian”
or “good” whatever), 357 but also by engaging in the projection, scapegoating, and other
psychopathological coping mechanisms encouraged and promoted by the present social relations
of domination. All of these actions require identifying with the perpetrator, as has been noted by
scholars as diverse as Paolo Friere (1971):
The very structure of their [the oppresse’s] thought has been conditioned by the
contradictions of the concrete, existential situation by which they were shaped.
Their ideal is to be men; but for them, to be men is to be oppressors. This is their
model of humanity. Thus, the behavior of the oppressed is a prescribed behavior,
356

“So by the time Columbus got here, see, they didn’t know what it meant to be a human being
anymore. It was just not a part of their spiritual perception or relationship to reality. They were
possessed, they were owned, they were property” (Trudell, 2001b)
357
“That’s the pollution and the toxic left over from the mining of the being part of human.
That’s the pollution that’s left over, see, and in that kind of a haze, … we don’t see ourselves
clearly. We do not see and recognize clearly who we are. And we’re never encouraged to.
We’re encouraged to be “good citizens,” or “good” this religion, or “good” that religion, or
good… workers, good [whatever]. But we’re never encouraged to be real about human beings.
In a way, we’re never really encouraged to be good to ourselves” (Trudell, 2001a & 2003).
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following as it does the guidelines of the oppressor. (P. 30-31, quoted in Forbes,
2008: 55)
And McFarlane & van der Kolk (2006):
Clinical work has taught us that the ability to tolerate the plight of victims is, at
least in part, a function of how well people have dealt with their own misfortunes.
When they have confronted the reality of their own hurt and suffering, and
accepted their own pain, this generally is translated into tolerance and sometimes
even compassion for others. Conversely, as long as people deny the impact of
their own personal trauma and pretend that it did not matter, that is was not so
bad, or that excuses can be made for their abuses, they are likely to identify with
the aggressors and treat others with the same harshness with which they treat the
wounded parts of themselves. Identification with the aggressor makes it possible
to bypass empathy for themselves and secondarily for others. (P. 36) 358
For Elias (1998), these choices and actions, which I have referred to as the result of trauma
and (psychopathological) coping mechanisms, are a natural part of the socialization process (in
Western society), which is passed down through the generations and equated with the civilizing
process:
[T]he specific process of psychological ‘growing up’ in Western societies, which
frequently occupies the minds of psychologists and pedagogues today, is nothing
other than the individual civilizing process to which each young person, as a
result of the social civilizing process over many centuries, is automatically
subjected to from earliest childhood, to a greater or lesser degree and with greater
or lesser success. The psychogenesis of the adult makeup in civilized society
cannot, therefore, be understood if considered independently of the sociogenesis
of our ‘civilization’. By a kind of basic ‘sociogenetic law’ the individual, in his
short history, passes once more through some of the processes that his society has
traversed in its long history. (Pp. 41-42)
Elias further emphasizes the role of emotions and feelings in the socializing/civilizing process,
such as the emotions of “shame, embarrassment … displeasure, distaste, disgust, fear” (p. 53)
358

See also: Herman (1992: 7-8) “when traumatic events are of human design, those who bear
witness are caught in the conflict between victim and perpetrator. It is morally impossible to
remain neutral in this conflict. The bystander is forced to take sides. … It is very tempting to
take the side of the perpetrator. All the perpetrator asks is that the bystander do nothing. He
appeals to the universal desire to see, hear, and speak no evil. The victim, on the contrary, asks
the bystander to share the burden of pain. The victim demands action, engagement, and
remembering.”
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that become associated with our engagement in certain behaviors and eventually --through our
desire to avoid the known repercussions of engaging in them— with these behaviors themselves
(pp. 53-54). In this way, though children rarely have innate feelings of disgust and shame, the
parental disapproval and external pressure and coercion they face upon engaging in certain
behaviors moulds them “into conformity with a certain standard,”(p. 54, see also 39-54) and
teaches them not only to associate these unpleasant feelings with these acts, but with all who
engage in these acts (pp. 52-53). Since “the pressure or coercion of individual adults is allied to
the pressure and example of the whole surrounding world”(p. 54), the codes of “civilized”
behavior are passed on and reproduced throughout the generations, altering only when there is an
alteration in the social relations of domination (“the structure of human relations”), at which time
these standards are also gradually changed (“slowly raised”) to reflect these new standards (p.
53). According to Elias, this “change is in the direction of a gradual ‘civilization’, but only
historical experience makes clearer what this word actually means” (p. 41).
Thus, Elias recognizes the socially-constructed nature of concept “civilization,” and the fact
that historical processes in society are “enacted in abbreviated form” in the socialization and “the
life of the individual human being”(p. 54), as I have also argued above. Yet, though Elias
recognizes the socially constructed nature of the concept of “civilization,” he also seems to treat
it as an objective category, describing the civilizing process as being “slowly raised … in the
direction of a gradual ‘civilization’” (both quoted and cited above), and thus implying that
civilization is some objective, external standard to be reached by the entire society, rather than a
reflection of social relations of domination and a rationalization for exploitation and
dispossession of the masses at the hands of the few. Further, though Elias demonstrates
considerable insight into the ways that these standards of civilization change over time (p. 41) as
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well as how the European ideology of superiority was/is unconsciously reproduced over the
generations (p. 49), 359 he does not explain the depravity and the inhumanity inherent in the
civilizing mentality. The psychopathological perpetration that has characterized Western society
in the various (and ongoing, literal and symbolic) wars that it has waged against women, nature,
non-Christians, eastern or independent-thinking Christians, the poor and working classes, or
other, non-European peoples goes almost entirely unacknowledged. But since, as Elias correctly
asserts, the socialization/civilizing process in Western society is the “sociohistorical processes of
centuries… slowly enacted in abbreviated form in the life of the individual human being” (p. 54),
and since he also correctly asserts that the “psychogenesis of the adult makeup in civilized
society cannot, therefore, be understood if considered independently of the sociogenesis of our
‘civilization’”(p. 42), then this (depravity, inhumanity, domination, exploitation and
dispossession in thought and action) is exactly what needs to be explained. As I have argued,
this can only be explained through the concept of unresolved, transgenerational trauma that is
never confronted or resolved, but is coped with, perpetuated and reproduced primarily through
the psychopatholocial mechanisms discussed in this chapter. 360
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“Of the whole preceding process of civilization nothing remains in their consciousness except
a vague residue. Its outcome is taken simply as an expression of their own higher gifts; the fact
that, and the question of how, in the course of many centuries, civilized behavior has been
attained is of no interest. And the consciousness of their own superiority, the consciousness of
this ‘civilization’, from now on serves at least those nations which have become colonial
conquerors, and therefore a kind of upper class to large sections of the non-European world, as a
justification of their rule, to the same degree that earlier the ancestors of the concept of
civilization, politesse and civilite, had served the courtly-aristocratic upper class as justification
of theirs.” (Elias, p. 49).
360
Due to time constraints, I will have to leave out of this chapter a fuller illustration of how
these concepts of civilization and progress, as well as the other psychopathological coping
mechanisms discussed in this chapter, played out in European-Native relations in the Americas,
as well as elsewhere around the world, during the beginning of the age of imperialism and
“exploration.” It is my hope that I have provided sufficient explanation already to render such an
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CONCLUSION
Thus, as this chapter has shown, Western society and the Western cultural worldview have been
shaped by various long-term, widespread campaigns of terror, torture, mass-murder, pillage,
rape, plunder, and other dehumanizing and traumatic events –most of which have been
orchestrated by people in positions of (Church and/or secular) power and authority for the
purposes of enriching themselves, their organizations, and their relatively few allies at the
expense of the majority of people, as well as the earth and all living things. These devastatingly
traumatic experiences have been so pervasive in the formation of, and the perpetuation of,
Western society and the Western cultural worldview that the impact of these unresolved events
and their rippling impacts have continued not only to live on but, in some ways, to increase
exponentially, as members of Western society at the individual, group, national, and societal
levels have continued to (largely unconsciously) reenact and reproduce these traumas upon
themselves, upon other members of Western society and, most damagingly, upon virtually every
non-Western society existing today (as well as upon the earth and every non-human form of life
in existence). That these pervasive rippling effects of this ongoing, perpetually reproduced
trauma are a –if not THE—central aspect to the Western society and the Western cultural
worldview can be seen perhaps most clearly through an historical examination of the intended
(but always implied, not stated) meaning of the term “civilization” –which, as a term of conquest
rather than a term of knowledge (Jennings, 1976: 12), has actually been developed specifically to
implicate this traumatizing process, in which those being “civilized,” as Norbert Elias (1998: 54)

illustration unnecessary, and that readers can build their own connections between these concepts
historically and these concepts as they are further discussed in chapters 5 and 6.
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remarked, experience or have enacted upon them “in abbreviated form” “the sociohistorical
process of centuries” of Western “civilization.”361
Thus, the civilizing process of Western society is the traumatizing process, 362 which is
synonymous with the process of dominating and internally colonizing the masses. Only this
understanding of the term, and of Western society in general, can explain the brutality, depravity,
inhumanity and compulsion with which these processes were undertaken against/ imposed upon/
and perpetrated against the non-Western peoples of the Americas, the Caribbean, and the African
coast during the Age of “Discovery” and Exploration (which might rightly be renamed as the
Age of Invasion and Traumatization). Further, this Age is still ongoing, as neither the invasions
nor the traumatization inflicted upon non-Western and other Western peoples have ceased.
Instead, they have been compulsively perpetuated, and from the looks of things presently, this
perpetuation may well continue until everything that humanity depends upon for life is destroyed
(along with humanity, quite possibly).
Though some will point to the insatiable, and near-compulsive greed displayed by the
European invaders of the Americas, the Caribbean, the coasts of Africa, and other lands and
peoples as the overall problem historically and in the present, this greed cannot, alone, explain
the barbarity, cruelty and inhumanity of the European invaders. At the same time, this greed can
be explained by the civilizing/traumatizing process through which compulsive, insatiable greed
is but one form of expressing the desperate, compulsive need to gain control over the intolerable
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“By a kind of basic ‘sociogenetic law’ the individual, in his short history, passes once more
through some of the processes that his society has traversed in its long history” (Elias, 1998: 54).
“[O]nce such feelings are aroused and firmly established in society by means of certain rituals
like that involving the fork, they are constantly reproduced so long as the structure of human
relations is not fundamentally altered” (Elias, 1998: 53).
362
Which is also, actually, synonymous with the process of internally colonizing the minds and
souls, as well as the physical beings, of the masses of people.
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(transgenerational trauma-induced) feelings of anxiety, fear, terror, insecurity, disgust, despair,
and so forth that plague victims of unresolved traumas. Similarly, though many, like Niall
Ferguson (2011) or Jarred Diamond (1997) point to technological developments, or combination
of technology and disease, as the cause of this massive, ongoing Western-led destruction (which,
nonetheless, neither seem to recognize as destruction), these factors are similarly unable to
explain the psychopathological mentality behind the development of this technology, the
direction in which this technology was developed, and/or the brutal and inhumane uses to which
this technology was put. As John Mohawk (1997) noted: “[w]hat we have is a pattern of
behavior of utterly unbelievable cruelty in a society that claims to be civilized.” This pattern only
begins to make sense, and only begins to be explained, when looked at through the lens of the
massive and widespread transgenerational trauma that is the very foundation of Western society.
The next chapter (chapter 3) will examine –in a general way—some of the characteristics of
societies that are not traumatized by centuries of conquest and “civilizing”/colonization. That is,
it will provide a general and brief glimpse into the majority of Native societies that existed
throughout the Americas prior to the start of the European invasion. Some of these
characteristics include the idea, common among numerous Native societies throughout the
Americas, that healthy human beings desire peace, and that they feel (and should feel) pain and
sorrow when killing another living being. If “one does not feel that pain, one has become
brutalized and ‘sick’” (Forbes, 2008: 12-14, 6-7; Akwesasne Notes, 2005: 31-40). The contrast
between, on the one hand, the traumatized (and psychopathological) nature of the Western
worldview, as displayed in patterns of thought and behavior and, on the other hand, the majority
of Native societies in the Americas prior to the European invasion will provide some further
insight into the full extent to which Western society is suffering form past, unresolved,
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transgenerational trauma, by demonstrating the very different patterns of thought and behavior
displayed in healthy societies. This exploration will also provide a necessary framework for
understanding the competing worldviews of Haudenosaunee people and Canadian non-Natives
during the 2006 Haudenosaunee protest in Caledonia, Ontario, Canada. Though the
Haudenosaunee Six Nations, like other Native nations throughout the Americas, have been under
attack by the forcibly-imposed traumatizing, colonizing, “civilizing” process of Western society,
they have continued to hold strong to many of their traditional cultural beliefs, and their past
treaty agreements with non-Native society. 363
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These beliefs and agreements include the Haudenosaunee Great Law of Peace (of
Kaianerekowa, in Kanien’keha, or the Mohawk language), the Covenant Chain, and the Two
Row Wampum treaty of non-interference –all of which continue to guide traditional and semitraditional Haudenosaunee people in fulfilling their cultural responsibilities to protect and
preserve the water, land, and other life forms for the past, present and future generations –a key
motivation behind the 2006 protest.
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Chapter 3:
Pre-invasion Native Nations as Non-Pathological, Healthy Societies
Any rational person would have to ask what’s so “primitive” about a people
which managed to maintain a perpetually democratic way of life, which shared
all social power equitably between both sexes and various age groups, which
considered war essentially a sport rather than an excuse to indulge in the wanton
slaughter of masses of people, which killed game only for food rather than as a
“sport,” which managed to occupy its environment for thousands of years without
substantially altering it (that is to say, destroying it). That same rational person
would have to ask why any sane individual would not choose to live that way if
the chance was available, or aspire towards such an existence if the chance
wasn’t immediate.
That same rational person would have to ask what’s so “advanced” about a
culture which generates authoritarianism and dictatorship as a social norm,
which deprives its women, its ethnic minorities, its elders and its youth of any true
social power, which engages in the most lethal warfare on a regular basis and
has left perhaps a half billion mangled bodies in its wake during this century
alone, which is eliminating entire species of plant and animal life forever and
without real concern, and which has utterly devastated the environment of this
continent in approximately two centuries. Finally, that same rational person
would have to ask what sort of lunatic would choose to switch from the first way
of life to the second.
~ Black Elk 1983, 141-42
But the time Columbus got here in 1492 –see, people have many opinions about
him: who he was or what he was but, whatever. See, he was really like the virus.
And the spirit was being eaten by disease. And it affected the perceptional reality
of the human. See, so when Columbus and them got here and we told him who we
were, they didn’t know. We said, “We’re the people. We’re the human beings.”
But they didn’t know, because it wasn’t a part of their perceptional reality –the
concept was no longer a part of their perceptional reality. See, this is what
happened to the tribes of Europe and the descendants of the tribes of Europe.
And so I know that by the time Columbus got here –and I’ve got a pretty good
idea of way before that. But, but by the time Columbus got here, the idea of a
human being and people in that kind of a way was no longer a part of their
perceptional reality.
~Trudell 2001b
By the time Europeans set sail in the voyages that would begin their invasion of the Americas,
they had been through over a millennium and a half of continuous, ongoing conquest, warfare,
mass murder, rape, plunder and pillage. They had lived under constant social relations of
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domination, oppression, exploitation, terror, dispossession, and various other forms of largescale, natural and man-made devastation and destruction that had traumatized virtually all
survivors. And these survivors, whether they survived as victims, perpetrators, bystanders or all
three, passed these unresolved –and in many cases, repressed and unspeakable-- traumas down
through the generations to their children, their children’s children, and so forth. These repressed,
unresolved, and unspeakable traumas, along with their symptoms, have formed much of the
fabric of Western society today, as they already had by the time Europeans set out to invade a
new world.
It is little wonder, then, as John Trudell notes, that by the time Europeans reached the shores
of the Caribbean Islands or the American continents, they found it difficult to comprehend the
openness, generosity, autonomy, abundance, and so forth of Native peoples and societies they
encountered. The conquerors could not relate to the Native peoples they encountered as fellow
human beings to befriend, celebrate, learn from, or share with, because European society had, for
so long, treated its people as property to be controlled and dominated. It had also long forced its
members to separate themselves from the earth, nature, animals, and other peoples (the wealthy
from the masses, men from women, Christians from non-Christians, Orthodox Christians from
all other Christians, and so forth), and had held a deep intolerance for anything that did not
resemble the Western ideal. Thus, ideas of befriending, learning from, sharing with and
celebrating with other peoples who were not like themselves (or their ideal image of themselves)
were no longer a part of their perception of reality (Trudell, 2001b & 2003; Todorov, 1982: 42;
Keal, 2003: 58, 59; Drinnon, 1990: xxv, xxvii, 12, 30, 56, 57, 69). 364 Instead, in their deep-
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“What is denied is the existence of a human substance truly other, something capable of being
not merely an imperfect state of oneself” (Todorov, 1982: 42). Drinnon (1990: xxv, xxvii, 12, 30,
56, 57, 69) has noted the extreme revulsion of the Puritans towards celebration, dancing, physical
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seeded insecurities about the place of Europeans in the world and their own positions within their
societal hierarchy upon their return (Canny, 1973: 597; Forbes, 2008: 77-78, 81; Martinot,
2003a: 409), 365 European invaders approached everyone and everything they encountered in
their voyages as “raw materials to be used in their own interests”(Diamond, 1974: 39; Keal,

passion, nature and their own bodies, viewing these as threats to their self-preservation and
engaging in elaborate and Draconian efforts towards repression of all spontaneous enjoyment
and the transformation of “bodies from instruments of rhythmic pleasure into instruments of
domination and aggression” (p. xxv). Drinnon further notes that: “The people of the European
race in coming into the New World have not really sought to make friends of the native
population or to make adequate use of the plants, or the animals indigenous to this continent, but
rather to exterminate everything they found here and supplant it with plants and animals to which
they were accustomed at home” (P. xxiii)
365
“The sixteenth century colonizer was a proud, disdainful person, but he was also insecure and
needed to remind himself constantly of his own superiority by looking to the imputed inferiority
of others” (Canny, 1973: 597). Similarly, on Western society’s millennia-long history of
atrocities, Forbes (2008: 77-78) notes that: “if we pause and assimilate the fact that, indeed, each
brutal killing or burning at the stake or rape did occur, then we must understand perhaps the
morbid, fearful strain in European culture. The fear of evil, in other words, should be understood
as being based upon no mythical character (Satan), but rather upon the European’s justified fear
of his own kind.” (Emphasis in original)
Forbes concludes (p. 81) that: “The quest of many Europeans penetrate, subdue, and change the
natural world must be viewed in part as a psychological phenomenon—that is, as a need
fulfillment or compulsion which is non-rational or irrational in character.”Similarly, Martinot
(Martinot, Steve. 2003. Patriotism and its double. Peace review. 15:4, 405-410) also notes the
role of this anxiety, or racial paranoia, in the late 17th and early 18th century when wealthy elite
plantation owners seeking to turn poor European and African masses against each other (rather
than allow them to continue to unite against their common oppressors) by enlisting poor English
farmers or laborers in slave patrols. According to Martinot (p. 409):
The patrols rapidly developed into a system of gratuitous violence. Its members vented
on the slaves their frustrations with the elite and gained social approbation for
suppressing supposed rebellion. Thus, the patrols perpetrated a culture of terror,
producing a sense of social threat to be located in the slave labor force. … The violence
of the patrols made their fear real, while generating a sense of well-being and selfjustification toward slavery within their own social solidarity [among wealthy and poor
English]. Thus, a paranoia (as a self-induced fear generated by their own injustice)
produced a demand for solidarity; social solidarity generated gratuitous violence; and
the violence rationalized the solidarity by giving the paranoia concreteness.
On the political and economic insecurity or anxiety of dominating groups who have removed
themselves from direct production, and thus depend upon the labor of others, in general, also see
Diamond, p. 8; Deloria, 1969, pp. 175-76; Keal, p. 64 (the discovery of America “unsettled
[European] conceptions of ‘knowledge’”).
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2003: 59, 60; Drinnon, 1990: xxiii). These interests were, of course, the conquer, plunder, and
pillage of the natural resources of these communities, as well as the torture, rape, and murder of
all who got in the way of this and (in South America and the Caribbean, at least) the enslavement
of anyone who survived –all in order to feed a compulsive greed and insatiable appetite for
status, wealth and power (Drinnon, 1990: xxv, 25-26, 56-57; Forbes, 2008: 81; Stannard,
1992). 366
In many ways, Native societies in the Americas resembled the polar opposite of European
society. Though there were a few empires in the south, the vast majority of Native societies in
the Americas were egalitarian societies run as participatory democracies in which leaders were
truly chosen and expected to serve the people, and the people “made sure that their leaders
remained essentially powerless” (Stannard, 1992: 48, 110; Williams, 1982: 13 33; Akwesasne
Notes, 2005: 34; Diamond, 1974: 9, 12). 367 For example, Jean De Lery, Calvinist missionary, in
the Amazon basin in 1550, remarked on the various egalitarian societies: “They have neither
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“The quest of many Europeans to penetrate, subdue, and change the natural world must be
viewed in part as a psychological phenomenon—that is, as a need fulfillment or compulsion
which is non-national or irrational in character” (Forbes, 2008: 81). Drinnon (1990: xxv, 25-26;
56; ) suggests that the European invader’s own sadistic compulsions (resulting from the extreme
repression of their own desires and traumas) were also at play in these compulsive,
psychopathological actions. Remarking on a massacre of hundreds of Pequots by English
colonists, for example, he finds that their “suppressed sexuality at last broke out and found vent
in an orgy of violence. Like men in a dream, they burned and shot the flesh they so feared and
hated in themselves: the breaking of the dam filled them with delight, their mouths with laughter,
their tongues with singing” and were likely to “become addicts, vengeance junkies” of such
slaughters.
367
In the cited passage, Stannard is writing primarily about Native societies in South America,
particularly the large societies of the Amazon Basin, while Williams (1983: 13) wrote more
specifically about the “intensely democratic” nature of “societies of the Indian nations of
Northeastern North America.” Akwesasne Notes focuses primarily on the participatory
democracy of the Haudenosaunee, while Diamond wrote more generally that numerous scholars
have observed that indigenous (“primitive”) societies are highly democratic. See also, Canada
Senate (2010) and the section on self-determination at the end of chapter 1 for more sources
relating to the highly democratic nature of indigenous societies in past and present-day Canada.
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kings nor princes and consequently each is more or less as much a great lord as the other”
(quoted in Stannard, 1992: 47) and Paul Williams (1982) has made similar observations on the
governance structures of Native societies in northeastern North America:
The “royaner” of the Iroquois Confederacy and the “ogimah” of the Ojibways
were servants of their people, leaders by example, whose positions brought them
duties rather than powers. They were not “princes” or “chiefs” in the European
sense, and had as little power over their people, and as little ability to enforce
obedience, as parents in their nations had over their children. (P. 12, see also
33) 368
In fact, becoming a chief, or a servant of the people, in many Native societies was often seen as a
hardship, with chiefs giving away personal property, and saying that they had been made poor by
accepting their title. Williams (1982) again remarks on this characteristic among the Ojibway
chiefs, which could be equally applied to chiefs of many other Native nations throughout the
Americas:
It was because he had placed himself in a position where personal gain was
irrelevant to him that he was trusted with the allocation of lands (among
Ojibways), the adjudication and settlement of disputes, and the guidance of the
community. (P. 22) 369
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More on parent-children relationships in these respective societies can be found below.
Similarly, in Haudenosaunee society, women elders nominated chiefs (which were approved
by their clans) from among the men they had observed for years, as children and adults, and
nominated those who demonstrated characteristics of placing the interests of society above his
own, of striving for peace, and so forth (Akwesasne Notes, 2005: 38, 32-35; Stannard, 1992: 29;
Williams, 1982: 27). The latter source further provides a quote, from a compilation of European
observations on Native societies:
The Chief of a nation is neither a supreme ruler, monarch or potentate. He can neither
make war or peace, leagues or treaties. He cannot impress soldiers, or dispose of
magazines. He cannot adjourn, prorogue or dissolve a general assembly, nor can he
refuse his assent to their conclusions, or in any manner controul them. … The chief of a
nation, even with the consent of his assembly, cannot raise one shilling of tax of the
citizens, but only receive what they please to give as free and voluntary donations. The
chief of a nation has to hunt for his living, like any other citizen. (Williams, 1982: 12,
quoting from: Loudon, Archibald, (ed). 1808. A Selection of Some of the Most
Interesting Outrages Committed by the Indians in the Wars with the White People. New
York: Arno Press & N.Y. Times, 1971, p. 239).

369
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Perhaps the vast majority of Native societies in the Americas were governed on the basis of
consent, not coercion or even the principle of majority rule (Stannard, 1992: 47, 48; Williams,
1982: 33, 12-15, 55, 58; Lyons, 1992: 39, 32; Canada Seneate, 2010: 32). The councils of the
Ojibway and Haudenosaunee peoples sought consensus and unity of mind through the
participation of all people --men and women, young and old alike—and unity of mind, both of
which required considerable amounts of time and diplomacy (Williams, 1982: 14 and note 10,
and 33; Lyons, 1992: 39, 34; Akwesasne Notes, 2005: 34). 370 As such, the governing councils
of both nations proceeded with the attitude that “there is always time in this world to do things in
the proper way” and with “enough deliberate thought” In other words, decisions did not have to
be arrived at immediately, and there was always time to accommodate the needs of the minority
in order to achieve unity of mind and singularity of purpose (Williams, 1982: 15, 55-56).
Because chiefs (and, in Haudenosaunee society, clan mothers) did not have coercive powers and
did not seek to command people to do anything, and because society sought to simultaneously
cultivate in every person individual autonomy and communal generosity, decisions of the council
were put off in cases where consensus could not be reached, and even when consensus was
reached, council decisions could not be completely binding on individuals or dissenting groups
without their consent (Williams, 1982: 12-14, 33,; Lyons, 1992: 32, 39; Stannard, 1992: 29, 10910; Diamond, 1974: 47). Each person had a choice as to whether or not to conduct him/herself in
accordance with the decision, and though each might also face some degree of pressure from
family and community members to abide by consensus-based decisions, the “council’s decision,
as a rule, avoided any form of interference in the personal affairs of individual citizens, just as
370

The former source notes that in Anishinabek society, “[a]ll men and women past puberty were
included in the open discussions of the … council” (p. 14, note 10), while Akwesasne Notes
(2005: 34) notes that in Haudenosaunee society: “Everyone in the Six Nations, wherever the law
prevails, has direct participation in the workings of the government.”
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parents avoided uninvited interference in the activities of their children” (Williams, 1984: 14;
Porter, 2008: 47). 371 This observation is further emphasized in one colonial official’s remarks on
Haudenosaunee (Iroquois) society:
The Iroquois laugh when you talk to them of obedience to kings: for they cannot
reconcile the idea of submission with the dignity of man. Each individual is
sovereign in his own mind; and as he conceives he derives his freedom from the
Great Spirit alone, he cannot be induced to acknowledge any other power.
(Williams, 1982: 14).
As such, many of the diverse, egalitarian, democratic and even consensus-based societies in
the Americas had no police force, jails or other organs of government coercion (Williams,
1982:12-15, 33; Lyons, 1992: 32, 39; Forbes, 2008: 46) and some, like the Haudenosaunee, had
reportedly eliminated all forms of capital punishment (Stannard, 1992: 28-29). 372 Many Native
societies also had no word for “freedom” since, as Diamond (1974) noted, “freedom as a concept
does not exist in [indigenous/land-based] society because society is not perceived as oppressive”
(p. 17). Many also had no words for rape or sexual assault, since such actions “were so unheard
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The Haudenosaunee principle of personal autonomy and non-interference can be further
illustrated in a modern day example of abortion. As Porter (2008: 47) has noted, for the
Haudenosaunee, all life is sacred, and the taking of life –especially life of the young—goes
against the Great Law of Peace. But so does the act of preventing another person from making
his/her own choices in life:
So you know right there that all Iroquois are against abortions. It’s not permitted. But
on the other hand, there are medicines that grow that can cause abortions. Well, we still
know about these medicines. So it’s up to you and me as individuals what our choice
is, whether we want to be a killer or not. So as an Iroquois, I’m on the for-life side, and
I’m also on the other one that’s for abortions—although I will never do an abortion—
because that person has to have the freedom to make that choice. So I’m on both sides,
100 percent. Iroquois cannot be otherwise, ‘cause you can’t take away someone’s
freedom or their decision to choose whatever route they want to take.
372
“Indians maintained a fairly stable and violence-free society even though they had no police
or state organs of coercion. In fact, freedom from coercion was one of the characteristics of
Iroquois society that most impressed the European mind. It affirmed a growing belief among
Americans that coercion was not, as it had been presented to them, a necessary service
performed by the state to protect the people, but instead was a tool used by the state to control
people” (Lyons, 1992: 32).
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of” (McAdams, 2012a & 2012b). In fact, in many of these egalitarian societies, women had
strong roles and voices in government --acting as the law keepers in Cree society, similar to the
European judiciary (McAdams, Sylvia, 2011), and as leaders and titleholders of the land in
matrifocal, matrilineal and matriarchal Haudenosaunee society (Woo, 2003; Stannard, 1992: 28,
29; Williams, 1982: 16, 27, 25, 23; Akwesasne Notes, 2005; Lyons, 1992; Taylor, 2006;
Johnson, 1964; Bonaparte, 2008). 373
Thus, while perhaps the vast majority of these societies had no coercive forces, and had
governments that actively strove to “interfere as little as possible in the lives of their
citizens”(Williams, 1982: 33), these societies experienced very little crime, and maintained
themselves as “fairly stable and violence-free” societies (Lyons, 1992: 32; McAdams, 2012b).
In large part, this is because these coercion-free societies were highly structured through
elaborate systems of law founded not upon statutes written by the wealthy and/or powerful, but
upon principles of peace and moral justice (McAdams, 2012a & 2012b; Lyons, 1992: 33-34).
Under the laws of most Native societies throughout the Americas, one of the most basic and
fundamental aspects of any system of law was the recognition that ‘all are related’ --i.e, that
people are all related to each other and to all other forms of life (MCAdams, 2012a; Akwesasne
Notes, 2005: 33, 85-91; Black Elk, 1983: 148, 153; Forbes, 2008: 22, 15; Means, 1983: 21-22;
373

Stannard (1992: 28-29) further elaborates, noting that Haudenosaunee society is matrilineal;
that women are progenitors of the nation; that men and women follow the status of the mother;
that women owned [are titleholders to] the land and soil; that women head agricultural
production and distribution, as well as life in the longhouse; that women appoint chiefs who were
responsible for hunting, fighting and intertribal/international affairs; that women could veto the
decisions of the chiefs or remove chiefs from their positions, and so forth. While many European
observers were unable to comprehend the power of women in Haudenosaunee society, some
remarked upon it, such as Father Joseph Francis Lafitau, who noted that the chiefs seemed to
“serve only to represent and aid the women in matters in which decorum does not permit the
latter to appear or act” (quoted in Bonaparte, 2008). Thanks to Barbara Mann for also pointing
out this source: Mann, Barbara Alice. 2000. Iroquoian Women: The Gontowisas. New York;
Lang Publishing, 115-82.
247

Porter, 2008: 339, 102; LaDuke, 1999). 374 As such, all people and all living things have a right to
the things they need for survival. Nothing belongs to human beings, and human beings have to
measure their actions by the impact they will have not only on other people in the present, but
also upon the past and future generations of all living things (Akwesasne Notes, 2005: 33;
McAdams, 2012a; Williams, 1982: 14-15, 55). 375
The Haudenosaunee, in particular, lived (and traditional Haudenosaunee continue to live)
under a system of governance founded specifically on the idea that the Maker of Life (or
Creator) could not have intended for human beings to destroy life by killing each other
unnecessarily, and that healthy minds always desire peace (Lyons, 1992: 33-39; Akwesasne
Notes, 2005: 32-39; Forbes, 2008: 22). 376 The purpose of government is to cultivate “a
spiritually healthy society” and to establish peace by preventing the abuse of human beings and
safeguarding the rights of everyone (and of other living things) (Akwesasne Notes, 2005: 33). To
this end, the government and the society actively worked to eliminate “the causes of conflict
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For example, Black Elk (1983) notes that: “Alienation is an impossibility within traditional
Lakota culture; we are prevented, by the way we view reality, from taking those steps which
would, sooner or later, produce the condition of alienation. Thus we are prevented, directly and
concretely, from undertaking alienating and self-destructive steps such as industrialization” (p.
153). Porter (2008) similarly notes that for the Haudenosaunee, despiritualizing politics, or
anything else, is a crime: “The minute you take spirit out of anything, you have already defeated
yourself”(p. 339).
375
“[T]he creation is intended for the benefit of all equally –even the birds, animals, trees, and
insects, as well as the humans. The world does not belong to the humans –it is the rightful
property of the Great Creator. The gifts and benefits of the world, therefore, belong to all
equally. The things that humans need for survival—food, clothing, shelter, protection—are
things to which all are entitled because they are gifts of the Great Creator. … Therefore all
people have a right to the things they need for survival… and no person or people has a right to
deprive others of the fruits of those gifts” (Akwesasne Notes, 2005: 33).
376
Forbes (2008: 22) writes of the similar observation from other Native societies that “[s]anity
or healthy normality among humans and other living creatures involves a respect for other forms
of life and other individuals.”
248

between individuals and between peoples” (Akwesasne Notes, 2005: 34). 377 Under this cultural
worldview, not only are all living things entitled to what they needed to survive, but everything
is a gift from the creator, nothing belongs to human beings, no one has the right to deprive others
of what they need to survive, “no one has a right to a greater share of wealth of society than
anyone else,” and all members of society have an active responsibility to defend others against
abuses of their rights (Akwesasne Notes, 2005: 32-38; Lyons, 1992: 32-39). Because of this
outlook, and its emphasis on peace, the Haudenosaunee also have numerous rules regarding war
and peace: including that force should be used only as a last resort, to repel an attack, and wars
should be carried on until the opponent agrees to peace –which it has an absolute right to do at
any time by calling truce (Akwesasne Notes, 2005: 37; Lyons, 1992: 37). At the end of
hostilities, the Haudenosaunee’s Great Law of Peace (or Kaia’nereko:wa in the Mohawk/
Kanien’keha language) also stipulated that the Haudenosaunee would not impose their way of
life upon any peoples defeated in war, would not seize their territory, and would not “collect
tribute from them nor subject them to any form of injustice” (Akwesasne Notes, 2005: 37;
Lyons, 1992: 37). Instead, the Haudenosaunee would merely demand that all weapons of war be
put away and that the two parties enter into negotiations for the purpose of finding agreeable
terms to lasting peace.
The diplomacy and values of the Haudenosaunee, certainly sophisticated beyond much of
what is visible in the world today, were not unusual to Native societies in the Americas at the
time of the European invasion. For perhaps most of the thousands of vastly diverse Native
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The Haudenosaunee Great Law of Peace “was conceived prior to the appearance of classes,
and it sought to anticipate and eliminate anything that took the appearance of group or class
interests, even in the form of clan or tribal interests, especially in the area of
property”(Akwesasne Notes, 2005: 34).
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societies throughout the Americas 378 (including the large, hierarchical empires), warfare was
highly ritualized: missions of peace were not attacked, it was considered cowardly to fight a
weakened enemy, and intentions for war were announced in advance, along with the reasons for
war, so that the offending party could usually avoid war by making satisfaction for the injury
done (Stannard, 1992: 110, 78, 51-52; Mohawk, 2000: 121; Forbes, 2008: 77-78; Todorov, 1982;
Keal, 2003: 60-61). 379 Wars were often fought in response to a personal insult or to inter-tribal
violence and were expected to last only a few days and to conclude in defeat, but not annihilation
of the opponent (Stannard, 1992: 53, 78, 109-110; Mohawk, 2000: 121, 130). Throughout much
of the American continents, it was generally expected that opponents adhered to the same rules
of war (Mohawk, 2000:121). When wars were not avoided, the ultimate goal of warfare was to
demonstrate bravery, skill and honor beyond what one’s opponent could demonstrate, leading to
symbolic ascendancy for the group. The highest form of this bravery was not to kill an
opponent, but to touch him without hurting him (Stannard, 1992: 109-110, 53; Diamond, 1974:
111; McAdams, 2012a). 380 Large-scale battles, protracted warfare, wars for conquest, the
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Stannard (1992: 31) notes that in the early 1990s there were known to be at least 800 separate
nations in North America alone. Certainly there were many, many more than this before the start
of the last 500 years of genocide and colonialism.
379
The exception to this was war by large empires like the Mexica for obtaining captives for
human sacrifice. These wars were also highly ritualized, and could only be undertaken at certain
times of the year and under certain circumstances (Mohawk, 2000: 121). As horrifying as
warfare for human sacrifice is to modern day westerners, the slaughter of entire villages
including men, women, children and elders, and the horrifying atrocities committed during these
murderous rampages (such as feeding children alive to dogs, disemboweling living people in
contests to see whose sword was the sharpest, raping women and cutting off their breasts or
severing legs, hands, feet, noses, ears and other body parts from living human beings, and
enslaving all survivors under conditions so harsh that few were able to survive them for more
than a few years were all, perhaps, incalculably more terrifying to Native peoples who
encountered these activities, and destroyed far more people in a far shorter period of time.
380
Touching the enemy “with something held in the hand or with a part of the person was the
bravest act that could be performed … [This was known as] to count coup on—to touch or
strike—a living unhurt man and to leave him alive, and this was frequently done…. It was
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annihilation of one’s enemy or the harming of noncomattants were all unheard of and unknown
objectives among Native societies prior to the arrival of Europeans (Stannard, 1992: 29, 78, 10910). 381
The peaceable and non-coercive values of perhaps the vast majority of Native societies
throughout the Americas were reflected in virtually all other aspects of life, as well. Just as
governments in northeastern North America (and beyond) avoided uninvited interference in the
affairs of its individual citizens, so, too did parents avoid uninvited interference in the affairs of
their children (Williams, 1982: 12, 14). Even when their children misbehaved, hitting or kicking
their them, parents might, at most, as one missionary commented, “toss a little water in the
child’s face, a gesture obviously intended more to embarrass than to harm” the child (Stannard,
1992: 30). 382 Another observer similarly noted parent’s concerns with promoting independence,
not conformity, and thus the lack of beating or scolding of children in Haudenosaunee and
Ojibway societies
“lest the martial disposition which is to adorn their future life and character,
should be weakened; on all occasions they avoid anything compulsive, that the
freedom with which they wish them to think and act should not be controuled.”
(Williams, 1982: 11, 53)383
While these societies sought to inculcate an unshakable independence in thought and action
among their children, they also taught communal generosity, pride, honour and avoidance of
regarded as an evidence of bravery for a man to go into battle carrying no weapon that would do
any harm at a distance … and the bravest thing of all was to go into a fight with nothing more
than a whip, or a long twig—sometimes called a coup stick” (George Bird Grinnell, quoted in
Stannard, 1992: 109-10).
381
However, Lyons (1992: 33) notes that, after the start of the European invasion, there were
times that the Haudenosaunee did engage in some wars of conquest, and in other ways follow
their ideals of peace imperfectly.
382
Stannard is quoting Jesuit Pierre de Charlevoix in his writings on his travels through New
York, Michigan and eastern Canada. Charlevoix further noted that only the Christianized
Indians, or Indians in settled colonies were known to chastise their children.
383
Williams, is quoting James Long, and also citing Father Louis Hennepin.
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shame through these non-coercive techniques with considerable success (Stananrd, 1992: 2930). 384
These values of communal generosity, individual independence, and moral justice were also
reflected in societal life, where people had few material wants and daily enacted their values that
all of creation was to be respected and shared among each other (and other life forms), and none
were to be deprived of what they needed to live Stananrd, 1992: 48, 110; Means, 1983: 22;
Akwesasne Notes, 2005: 34). The result of these values was a generosity among these Native
societies that was remarked upon repeatedly by the shocked and astounded Europeans who
arrived at the beginning of the invasion of the continents. As Columbus noted of the people
upon his arrival in Cuba:
[T]hey are so artless and free with all they possess, that no one would believe it
without having seen it. Of anything they have, if you ask them for it, they never
say no; rather they invite the person to share it, and show as much love as if they
were giving their hearts; and whether the thing be of value or of small price, at
once they are content with whatever little things of whatever kind may be given to
them. (Stananard, 1992: 63, see also: 52; Forbes, 2008: 21-22)
Similarly, Vespucci in South America noted in 1502 that the people living along the coast
“swarmed out to receive us … with as much confidence as if we had been friends for years,” and
Cartier in northern North America was likewise greeted upon his arrival in 1535 by people who
“freely and familiarly came to our boats without any fear, as if we had ever been brought up
together” (Stannard, 1992: 52). Others remarked upon the “fairness and dignity and self-control”
of the Native peoples in the Americas, and Jesuit Joseph Francois Lafitau noted with some
astonishment that:
If a cabin of hungry people meets another whose provisions are not entirely
exhausted, the latter share with the newcomers the little which remains to them
384

Stannard further notes the amazement of the Jesuits in how successful Native societies were
in raising model individuals through these techniques.
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without waiting to be asked, although they expose themselves thereby to the same
danger of perishing as those whom they help at their own expense so humanely
and with such greatness of soul. In Europe we should find few [people] disposed,
in like cases, to a liberality so noble and magnificent. (quoted in Stannard, 1992:
31)
Because sharing with all even in times of need was a part of the fabric of the majority –if not
all-- of Native societies in the Americas, the first Europeans found societies of abundance, not
need. As Stannard (1992: 11, 67, 52-54) notes, despite the European’s self-image of being
technologically and societally superiority, the food production, health, and life expectancy of
Native peoples in the Americas at the start of the European invasion all far surpassed anything
known to Europeans. So, too, did the apparent (and inordinate, from the European perspective)
contentment and happiness of Native peoples, who lived in abundance, ordered by laws or moral
justice and principles of individual liberty, so much so that difference was not feared but
expected, encouraged and accepted (Stananrd, 1992: 47; Forbes, 2008: 56). In other words, there
was a “kind of thinking, respect for another’s life [that] is based ultimately upon humility and the
sense of relatedness and equality of all creatures (but not equality equals sameness). Democracy
can only exist with such a philosophy” (Forbes, 2008: 56)

HEATLHY SOCIETIES WITHOUT PSYCHOPATHOLOGY
Referring back to the above discussion on Native societies in the Americas, and the discussion in
the previous chapter on problematic patterns in the western cultural worldview, it is abundantly
clear that Native societies in the Americas stood in stark contrast to the societies of Western
Europe in virtually ever way. Most importantly, for the purposes of this discussion, Native
societies in the Americas displayed virtually none of the problematic patterns of behavior that
compose the western cultural worldview. The following discussion will seek to address each of
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these problematic patterns of thought and behavior discussed in chapter 2, by contrasting the
very different patterns of thought and behavior in Native societies. 385
The vast majority of Native societies were non-hierarchical societies based not on the forcible
imposition of obedience and law, but on the consent of the governed. Thus, most of these
societies were built not upon social relations of domination like those experienced in European
society, but upon principles of equality (but not, as Jack Forbes notes, “equality equals
sameness”), participatory governance and consent of the governed. As noted above, some of
these societies, such as the Haudenosaunee, actively worked to prevent the formation of any sort
of divisions or points of conflict in their societies, including that of class or group interests, and
“especially in the area of property”(Akwesasne Notes, 2005: 34). By eliminating the causes of
conflict between individuals and peoples, they also eliminated the possibility of the development
of groups of people who could or would oppress others. In this way, many Native societies
could arguably be said to have prohibited all forms of domination (which many traditional
Native communities continue to strive to prohibit today). Societies such as the Haudenosaunee
were built in clear opposition to such domination, and around the moral principle that peace was
only achieved by the constant, active striving to end all forms of oppression and to achieve
absolute justice for everyone (Akwesasne Notes, 2005: 31-40; Lyons, 1992: 32, 34, 39; Stannard,
1992: 47, 48, 110; Williams, 1982: 12-14, 25, 33, 53-58; McAdams, 2012a, 2012b & 2011. See
also: Taylor, 2006; Johnston, 1964; Bonaparte, 2008; Porter, 2008).
Because, the vast majority of Native societies in the Americas lacked hierarchies of special
class or group interests, and governed on the basis of consent rather than coercion, these societies
385

Admittedly, this means that the below section will be somewhat repetitious of the above
section. The material in this chapter was initially intended to be included in a fuller discussion –
and a more detailed comparison and contrast, in chapter 2. But for now, it will have to be left
here, in this form.
254

never developed the dualistic mentality of separation and isolation that had become so deeply
entrenched in the Western worldview once social relations of domination had become a mainstay
of Western culture. In fact, an integral part of the cultural worldview of virtually all of the
Native societies in the Americas –and a worldview common to traditional indigenous societies
worldwide— is the understanding that everyone and everything is related (as the Lakota say,
Mitakuye Oyasin: we are all related). This way of viewing the world precluded (and precludes)
the formation of a mentality of separation from others –and thus precluded (and precludes) the
formation of a mentality of exploitation of other people or life forms, or a mentality of
accumulating for oneself at the expense of other people and/or other living things (Forbes, 2008:
80-81; Black Elk, 1983: 153; Deloria, 1969: 185). 386 Instead, as noted in the above section, this
egalitarian, pro-life mentality held that all people and all living things have a right to that which
they need to live, that no one has a right to deprive another person, and that none should ever
take more than is needed. 387
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“[T]he Lakota could despise no creature, for all were of one blood. He knew that man’s heart,
away from nature, becomes hard; he knew that lack of respect for growing living things soon led
to lack of respect for humans, too.” (Forbes, 2008: 80-81). See also p. 12:
The animal had rights—the right of man’s protection, the right to live, the right to
multiply, the right to freedom, and the right to man’s indebtedness … the Lakota never
enslaved the animal, and spared all life that was not needed for food and clothing.
(quoting Luther Standing Bear)
387
Westerners, particularly environmental or animal rights groups, often confuse this respect for
all life with a requirement that all adhere to a strict vegetarian diet, but this view fails to
comprehend the full interrelatedness of all life, and the weakness and dependence of humans
upon animals in numerous ways, including for food. Rather than refrain from eating animals,
traditional indigenous societies worldwide abide by traditional laws regarding when and under
what circumstances and animal can be killed for food, prohibitions regarding the wasting of any
edible part of an animal that is killed, and rules requiring ritualized respect be paid, and prayers
of thanks be given to all animals for the sacrifice of those who are killed, etc. See, for example,
Forbes (2008: 11):
Native Americans and many other “folk” peoples have struggled long and hard with the
contradiction inherent in eating other living creatures. Very simply, Native philosophy,
based upon the recognition that all living creatures are brothers and sisters, came to the
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In addition, for Native societies in the Americas, as well as traditional indigenous societies
worldwide, spirituality is not something that can be separated from other aspects of life; to do so
--as Western culture has done in virtually every aspect of life-- would be a crime, since all parts
of creation contain spiritual force and must be treated with respect and as part of the circle of
everything that is related (Porter, 2008: 339, 102; Means, 1983: 19-33; McAdams, 2012a;
Akwesasne Notes, 2005: 85-91; Smithsonian, Protocols of Peace, 2012). 388 In this way,
spirituality was (and is) a deeply embedded part of daily life in Native societies, and is
inseparable from the complex systems of law and principles of moral justice that structure
thought and behavior in these societies (Forbes, 2008: 15). Spirituality, then, is not about a
separate set of beliefs that are picked up once a week for a few hours, but about a way of
thinking and being in the world; it is about what one does in one’s life. 389 And what people are

conclusion that killing and eating, while unavoidable, can be done in such a way as to
make it less ugly and less brutalizing. As Juan Matus says, “we must be on good terms
with all the living things of the world. This is the reason why we must talk to plants we
are about to kill and apologize for hurting them; the same thing must be done with the
animals we are going to hurt.”
388
“Spiritual, social, economic, and political life are interwoven; one without the other is not
considered whole or complete. (The spiritual and political are inseparable)”(Porter, 2008: 102).
Further, the Haudenosaunee, among other traditional Native societies throughout the Americas,
believe that “every living thing and every part of creation contains a spiritual force” --suggesting
that people must be mindful of their actions in relation to everything around them, not just
people, and not just “living things,” but everything, because everything has a spiritual force.
(Smithsonian, Protocols of Peace, 2012). This belief, known to the Haudenosaunee as orenda,
has also been recognized by some western scholars, such as Sheldrake et. al., (2001: 102, 101)
who refer to it as the Hermetic tradition, which recognizes that “everything has a soul and souls
are permanent. Their occupation as animals or rocks or trees is temporary.”
389
Forbes (2008) notes:
Religion is, in reality, living. Our religion is not what we profess, or what we say, or
what we proclaim; our religion is what we do, what we desire, what we seek, what we
dream about, what we fantasize, what we think---all of these things—twenty-four hours
a day. One’s religion, then, is ones life, not merely the ideal life but the life as it is
actually lived.
Religion is not prayer, it is not a church, it is not theistic, it is not atheistic, it has little
to do with what white people call “religion.” It is our every act. If we tromp on a bug,
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socialized to do in these traditional Native/indigenous societies is to walk the “pollen path,” or
the “good, red road,” or to maintain the “good mind,” as the Navajo, Lakota and Haudenosaunee,
respectively, refer to “living life in a sacred manner with continual awareness of the interrelationship of all forms of life” and all of creation (Forbes, 2008:22). Some have suggested that
this inseparability of spirituality from everything else might explain why most Native societies in
the Americas have no word for “religion.” As Jack Forbes (2008: 15) notes, “it may be that a
word for religion is never needed until a people no longer have it.”
All of this does not mean that Native societies in the Americas never differentiated between
members of their own societies, or between their own societies and other Native societies. Just
as in any society, there were (are) different roles that must be filled and that require the
acceptance of different levels of responsibility. Though Native societies were run on the basis of
consent of the governed, many (if not all) of them had some form of government. But service in
government was an extra responsibility, and did not relieve a person from his responsibilities of
hunting for a living to feed his family (Akwesasne Notes, 2005: 38; Stannard, 1992: 48;
Williams, 1982: 12). 390 In fact, as noted, such service was often considered a hardship, though
an honorable one, since chiefs often gave away their personal possessions and were expected to
place themselves in a position where material gain was irrelevant to them. Their service often
impoverished them in the interest of their people, rather than enriched them at the expense of
their people.

that is our religion; if we experiment on living animals, that is our religion; if we cheat
at cards, that is our religion; if we dream of being famous, that is our religion; if we
gossip maliciously, that is our religion; if we are rude and aggressive, that is our
religion. All that we do, and are, is our religion. (P. 15)
390
“The chief of a nation has to hunt for his living, like any other citizen” and cannot raise taxes
or make decisions on his own, since he is a servant of the people, or a conduit for their voice
(Williams, 1982: 12).
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There were also distinctions between young and old, women and men; and many of these
distinctions came with separate sets of responsibilities. For example, even in societies where
women and men shared equally in governance, decision-making and/or running the activities of
daily life, there were still, necessarily, recognized differences between men and women, and
even different responsibilities attributed to each group. In matrilineal, matrilocal, and matriarchal
Haudenosaunee society, 391 men were responsible for hunting, fighting in wars, and conducting
deliberations between nations as chiefs, while women were in charge of agriculture and the
distribution of food, the continuation of the culture, the running of local life in the
village/longhouse, the selection of the chiefs and making all decisions relating to land. Because
Haudenosaunee society was (is) matrilocal, matrilineal, and matriarchal, women actually had
more power than men in many respects, overseeing the deliberations of chiefs; vetoing decisions
made by chiefs, if necessary; determining the location of villages; deciding when to go to war
and when to have peace; and even removing chiefs from office (referred to as dehorning the
chiefs) if they failed to act in accordance with the will of the people. But though Haudenosaunee
women had more responsibilities and influence in their society, they used their power not to
dominate men, but to ensure the equal exercise and sharing of power between men and women
(Williams, 1982: 14, 16, 25-27, 33; Woo, 2003; Stannard, 1992: 28, 29; Akwesasne Notes, 2005:
38; Proter, 2008: 115. See also: Lyons, 1992; Taylor, 2006; Johnston, 1964; Bonaparte, 2008).
Thus, despite these distinctions and differences in roles and responsibilities among different (but
equal) groups of people in Native societies, the cultural worldview that all things are interrelated,
and that spirituality is inseparable from their daily lives, prevented the formation of anything
391

Some, such as Barbara Mann, prefer the term matriarchal. Here I am also using the two terms
that were used by speakers in the Smithsonian’s Protocols of Peace (2012) event. Barbara Mann
has suggested that interested readers consult her own book on Iroquoian Women, cited in an
above note.
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approximating the extreme, artificial, conceptual separations observed in Western culture
between man and women, human and animal or nature, Christian and non-Christian (or eastern
Christians), and man and his Church, religion, God, and parts of himself. In fact, as already
noted, the Native cultural worldview absolutely prohibited the forms of separation that have
allowed Western men to mentally and spiritually justify their oppression and exploitation of
other people and living things. The Native worldview also prohibited the formation of any
concept of isolation and alienation of oneself from other human beings, from other living things,
from the Creator, or from him/herself (Black Elk, 1983; Means, 1983; Porter, 2008: 176; Forbes,
2008). 392
Because they lacked this alienation and dualist separation, traditional Native societies in the
Americas also lacked Western society’s concepts of universalistic domination, intolerance, and
rejection. Quite the contrary, individual difference was (and is) not only accepted, but expected
and encouraged. As Jack Forbes (2008) notes, the Creator has made all people, animals, and
things of a kind different for a purpose:
Animals and plants are taught by Wakan tanka what they are to do. Wakan tanka
teaches the birds to make nests, yet the nests of all birds are not alike. Wakan
tanka gives them merely the outline… All birds, even those of the same species,
are not alike, and it is the same with animals and human beings. The reason
Wakan tanka does not make two birds, or animals or human beings exactly alike
is because each is placed here by Wakan tanka to be an independent individuality
and to rely on itself. (Pp. 55-56, quoting a Teton Sioux elder)
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Porter (2008: 176) notes that in both Native and Western worldviews there is a force that
makes things good for human beings and a force that makes things difficult. But in the Western
worldview the latter is considered “evil” and an enemy to be hated. Meanwhile in the
Haudenosaunee worldview, each force controls half of the world, and each force is within each
of us, so making enemies with the more difficult half of the world’s power would be absurd and
rather unintelligent. Instead, this latter force is considered mischievous, something to be
watched and balanced: “So, it’s not evil, its just mischievous. You’ve just gotta be careful. It’s
like when your kids are teenagers: you have to be extra alert at that time. And it’s not that
they’re bad. It’s just the fact that if you aren’t alert, the consequences are big.”
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The same difference and diversity that was expected and encouraged among individuals was also
expected and accepted between societies. Thus, as noted above, societies such as the
Haudenosaunee had strict laws prohibiting the imposition of Haudenosaunee beliefs upon other
peoples, even when these peoples were aggressors who had been conquered in war. These same
ideas of independence, autonomy and accepted difference were present among Native societies
throughout much of the Americas (Stannard, 1992: 30, 47, 52, 63; Williams, 1982: 15, 33, 53-58;
Akwesasne Notes, 2005: 32-38; Lyons, 1992: 34; Diamond, 1974: 24-25), and were reflected in
–among other things—the polite acceptance of European missionary prostelytizing along with
the simultaneous rejection of conformity to Christianity. As such, the western belief that Native
societies should submit to European kings and convert and conform to European religion might
have been almost as incomprehensible to Native societies as their refusal was to European
conquerors –a refusal that was fairly consistent among those Native societies with which
European conquerors came into contact (Stannard, 1992; Mohawk, 2000). 393 Examples of this
refusal abound. When told by European missionaries that they had never worshiped the Great
Spirit correctly, Haudenosaunee Chiefs responded that their Creator “has made so great a
difference between us in other things; why may we not conclude that He has given us a different
religion according to our understanding?” (Williams, 1982: 57). 394 Similarly, John Mohawk
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Though, to be accurate, very little effort was made among early Spanish and English
explorers to actually convert Native peoples, while much more effort was made to dominate,
massacre, enslave and/or dispossess them by whatever means were possible –religion becoming
merely a symbolic justification (Canny, 1979 & 1973; Mohawk, 2000; stannard, 1992). This
point will be returned to in chapter 5.
394
The same source notes that the chiefs further added, perhaps sarcastically: “We are told that
you have been preaching to the white people in this place. These people are our neighbours. We
are acquainted with them. We will wait a little while, and see what effect your preaching has
upon them…”.
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(2000) remarks on Cortez’ attempts to impose Christianity upon the Mexica (Aztec) Emperor
and people:
When Cortes had urged Moctezuma to embrace Christianity and abandon
indigenous practices, the emperor replied that the religion of the Spaniards would
not be appropriate to his people. It would not have occurred to the Christian West
to discuss such an idea, since the Christian utopian enterprise was founded on the
belief that there could be only on Truth, one right way. (P. 137)
These concepts of monotheistic intolerance and domination simply did not have a place in the
Native worldview, making the Christian religion, at least in the form it was practiced among
Europeans in the late Middle Ages, 395 incompatible with these Native societies. Christianity, like
Western thought and behavior more generally, had long rested upon a foundation of domination,
separation, alienation, and extreme intolerance of all difference or deviation. Likewise,
Christianity’s hierarchical positioning of Church officials as the absolute authority and the sole
mediators in any given churchgoer’s relationship with God would have been incompatible with
the acceptance and encouragement of difference in Native societies, under which each individual
“is sovereign in his own mind,” has his/her own, individual and unmediated relationship with the
Creator and all of creation, and “derives his freedom from the [Creator] alone” (Williams, 1982:
14). Further, without these hierarchies of separation, difference, intolerance and
authoritarianism, Native societies would not easily have yielded to the constant contradicting and
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However, the Christian religion as it was originally founded, according to records of the
words and behavior of Christ, may well have been compatible with the cultural worldview of
many Native societies in the Americas. Some have even mistaken similarities between the two
religio-cultural worldviews as demonstrative not of universal principles of moral justice common
to all of humanity, but instead, of Christian origins of some Native spiritual worldviews (Wise,
1971: 52-69, x). However, the Haudenosaunee Confederacy, under the Great Law of Peace was
established long before the start of the European invasion of the Ameircas (Vachon, 1993;
Porter, 2006; Mann & Fields, 1997). Some versions of Haudenosaunee oral history present the
Haudenosaunee Peacemaker as bringing the message of peace to the Haudenosaunee first, and
then traveling across the ocean in an attempt to bring the same message there (see: Porter, 2008,
who mentions these versions).
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rewriting of the word of God, or misleading claims to be speaking for God, as were frequently
made by Western Church officials who had long strayed from the original teachings of their
religion. In fact, even if someone were to make such claims, they would not have mattered much
to many in Native society. Because each individual was unique, had his or her own relationship
with creation and the Creator, and had his or her own purpose or path to walk in life, it truly was
up to each individual to determine what this path and purpose was, and to walk it, or not,
according to his or her own choice (Porter, 2008; Stannard, 1992: 110). 396
At the same time that high levels of individual autonomy led each person on his or her own
path in life, the communities were held together by strong, unifying moral principles and cultural
worldviews. Lengthy and detailed oral histories were (and are) recorded and passed on from
generation to generation, and communities sometimes spent days or even weeks reciting
particular events in their history. Because the whole community was exposed to these histories
repeatedly, and because those who recited these histories had to do so accurately, without
making inadvertent changes, and in front of many elders who would know if such a change had
occurred, the cultural amnesia and manipulative rewriting of history so common in Western
society was likely unknown to Native societies throughout the Americas, whose oral histories
have been found to be incredibly accurate (See McNeil, 2001-2002 on recognition of this by
modern courts).
In addition, societies such as that of the Haudenosaunee, were founded on longstanding
traditions of reason, which encouraged individuals to think for themselves, to participate and
voice their ideas and concerns in deliberations, and to collectively deliberate and debate on
396

The latter source further notes the importance of this individualistic ethic in warfare, where
autonomous individual warriors “might chose not to join in battle for this or that cause, and it
was even common for an Indian war party on the march to ‘melt away as individual warriors had
second thoughts and returned home’” (p. 110).
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various issues so that the best possible answers to questions or solutions to problems could be
found (Akwesasne Notes, 2005: 31-39; Lyons, 1992: 32-39). This capacity of individuals to
reason and of communities to benefit from the collective reasoning of all of their members was
combined with centuries of accumulated knowledge and wisdom. Thus, these traditional
societies had the capacity to withstand and survive through devastating, and even nearapocalyptic events, to rebuild from the damage, and to continue on as healthy societies
maintained their cultural values and beliefs despite various odds –something that is evidenced
not only from the oral histories of various Native nations such as the Navajo, but also through the
continuing existence of hundreds of distinct Native societies despite five centuries of colonialism
and Western society’s concerted efforts to destroy Native peoples as individuals and as distinct
peoples.
The strength of these communities in their ability to withstand adverse events was based
largely on the collective contributions of their various, unique, individual members, these
societies recognized that attacks on individuality would hurt the long-term survivability of the
community. Because individuality was so encouraged and valued in community life, which
lacked the forms of dominations, separation and intolerances seen in Western society, individuals
within these societies had absolutely no need to engage in the various psychopathological
defense mechanisms of rejection and projection, avoidance of critical self-reflection, or various
other narcissistic defense mechanisms based on the individual or societal denial of various
aspects of reality, which include magical thinking, self-aggrandizement, or imperialistic needs to
forcibly recreate others in one’s own image. In fact, the spiritual worldview which holds that
everything is interconnected and each individual is responsible for identifying and fulfilling (or
choosing not to fulfill) his or her own life purpose –a worldview common to perhaps the majority
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of Native societies in the Americas— would have absolutely discouraged any of these defense
mechanisms as self and collectively defeating. This is at least in part because any individual
engaging in them would fail to engage in the sort of clear thinking and reasoning necessary both
for contributing to communal life and for making rational choices pertaining to responsibility in
one’s individual life. Further, since individual and societal differences were accepted rather than
rejected, there would be no reason to deny and project parts of oneself onto others, as there was
no part of oneself that one needed to fear, reject and deny, and society did not depend upon
creating ‘others’ onto which it could cast away these negative and intolerable aspects of itself, or
against which its members could bond in hatred. Indeed, such psychopathological patterns of
thinking or behaving would have been unthinkable to Native societies in the Americas, as was at
least partially evidenced by the generosity and friendliness shown to European conquerors
simply because they were fellow human beings (Stannard, 1992: 30, 47, 52, 63; Todorov, 1982;
Mann, 2005).
As such, and because Native peoples throughout the Americas were indifferent to material
accumulation (Stannard, 1992: 110, 30, 52, 63) –or even saw it as a sign of false status (Means,
1983: 22) -- the concept of accumulating material goods by dispossessing others of what is
theirs, or of exploiting other people, other living things, or the earth, was non-existent in Native
societies. Indeed, it would have likely been considered a crime by many Native societies, since
engaging in such behaviors would have required reducing these other people, living things and
parts of nature to mere resources to be exploited, and thus would have required the
despiritualization (and dehumanization) of these other people, living things and parts of nature.
This, in turn, it would have required that Native societies had experienced the same traumas, and
had been utilizing the same psychopathological coping mechanisms for denying these traumas
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that members of Western society had long experienced and utilized. Instead, as noted above, all
along the coast of the Americas, European explorers, upon their first arrival, consistently found
Native societies that were welcoming and generous with all that they had, and who treated
material items as things to be shared with others (Akwesasne Notes, 2005: 32-38; Stannard,
1992: 29, 30, 47, 48, 52, 109-10; Means, 1983: 22; Lyons, 1992:34; Williams, 1982: 5).
Likewise, the idea of progress, as it was conceived by Western Europeans, would have had no
meaning or place in Native society –or any traditional indigenous society (on the latter point, see:
Diamond, 1974). Native societies in the Americas conceived of time as cyclical, conceived of all
things as being related and having their own roles to play in the Creation, and even, in some
cases, actively strove to eliminate all special interests or divisions that might result in conflict
and the conceptualization of superiority/inferiority (Akwesasne Notes, 2005: 33, 34). Thus, the
concept of progress in non-Western, non-industrial, indigenous societies –if it can be applied at
all—would have pertained to the personal growth and learning that occurs as an individual
progresses through society and through the life cycle, during which the “inevitable conflicts of
growth” are shared, understood, socially structured, and resolved (Diamond, 1974: 41-43).
The communal involvement in the personal growth of individuals, and in helping them
through the life cycle and their varying roles in society, served to keep autonomous individuals
integrated into society, and thus kept societal members insulated from some of the more harmful
aspects of potential life traumas. It thereby precluded the development of anti-social or
psychopathological coping mechanisms. If any of these anti-social, psychopathological
mechanisms did arise, such as through trauma, these societies, like other societies with intact
cultures, had mechanisms in place to help individuals deal with and heal from psychological
trauma and get back on their spiritual life paths. The sweat lodge and the vision quest are
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examples of cultural rituals intended to help individuals move through and learn from the life
cycles and various challenges in society and the world, and the Haudenosaunee condolence
ceremony was created specifically to help individuals suffering from unresolved grief or trauma.
The latter is an integral part of the Haudenosaunee Great Law of Peace (Kaia’nereko:wa), which
united the original five Haudenosaunee nations (from east to west: the Mohawk, Oneida,
Onondaga, Cayuga and Seneca) under the principles that roughly translate into power,
righteousness, and reason (Akwesasne Notes, 2005: 31-39) 397 ended a long period of war and
inter – and intra-familial violence (Lyons, 1992, 31-39) and is one of the oldest and longest
standing democratic traditions in the world, as well as the only governing tradition founded upon
the principles of peace, and the active striving for peace (Lyons, 1992: 33; Akwesasne Notes,
2005: 33, 92; Johansen, 1998; Woo, 2003; Vachon, 1993). 398 According to these concepts and
this Great Law of Peace, “human beings whose minds are healthy always desire peace”
(Akwesasne Notes, 2005: 32, 33). While rage and grief are natural emotions for all humans, they
“confuse people’s abilities to think clearly” (Lyons, 1992: 38). Thus, in order to ensure that
decisions are made with clear minds, prior to treaty negotiations or other deliberations, it was not
uncommon for the Haudenosaunee to first perform a condolence ceremony to clear eyes, ears
and throat/mouth from dust, tears and strong emotions, or from anything else that might get in
the way of the parties seeing and hearing each other clearly, and of speaking and communicating
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Barbara Mann translates these as 1) health or well being, 2) honor or righteousness, and 3) the
sacred will of the people.
398
“Other political philosophers and organizers have come to the conclusion that government
can be formed for the purpose of establishing tranquility, but the Peacemaker went considerably
further than that. He argued not for the establishment of law and order, but for the full
establishment of peace. Peace was to be defined not as the simple absence of war or strife, but as
the active striving of humans for the purpose of establishing universal justice. Peace was defined
as the product of a society that strives to establish concepts that correlate to the English words
power, reason and righteousness.” (Akwesasne Notes, 2005: 33).
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clearly. The condolence ceremony was (and is) also performed, along with other ceremonies, for
relatives of members of the community who pass away, and in other circumstances in which
conflict and/or strong emotions of rage or grief need to be resolved so that clear thinking could
(can) proceed.
These cultural mechanisms for dealing with conflict, grief and trauma were further
strengthened and reinforced by the worldview that all people and living things are related, and by
the consensus processes that strove for societal unity on important issues. Western literature on
clinical work with trauma survivors has only in recent decades begun to catch up with the
insights and cultural wisdom of the Haudenosaunee and other Native peoples of the Americas in
relation to the processes of healing from trauma and grief. For example, in their work with
trauma survivors, McFarlane and van der Kolk (2006), Herman (1992) and Kelman (1973) have
all found that what we do to --or tolerate being done to—others is, perhaps primarily, damaging
to ourselves and our own humanity. 399 Such insights have been inherent in the traditional
cultural knowledge of the Haudenosaunee and other Native societies for centuries, though
expressed in slightly different words (Porter, 2008: 173; Forbes, 2008: 12-14). 400 Arguably,

399

To this extent, Kelman (1973: 50-52) noted that the process of dehumanizing the victim
requires the simultaneous (or, perhaps, preceding) dehumanization of the victimizer him/herself,
as the former weakens moral restraints and causes the victimizer to “lose the capacity to act as a
moral being” –thus also losing his/her sense of personal identity and community. Likewise
McFarlane and van der Kolk (2006: 36) have noted the deep-seeded connections between
tolerating the victimization of others (and thus, of identifying with the perpetrator, since
identifying with the victim requires a refusal to tolerate such victimization) and engaging in
victimization of one’s self, noting that “[i]dentifying with the aggressor makes it possible to
bypass empathy for themselves and secondarily for others.” Similarly, Herman (1992: 9) has
noted the societal connections between denying the pain and suffering caused to some with
societal inabilities to acknowledge or deal with trauma, pain and suffering of any of its members.
400
“Greed and gluttony, along with the cruel using of others’ lives without remorse, is seen as
destructive of one’s own spiritual potential as well as a form of sickness” (Forbes, 2008: 12-14).
Porter’s insight, in a way about all of us being connected, and in a way about the harm to
ourselves and our relationship with the Creator and the rest of the universe when we are
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Western society has not yet caught up with the Haudenosaunee and other Native peoples of the
Americas in relation to the processes of participatory democracy and the active striving for peace
that is desired by all healthy minds. 401
Hence, of all of the problematic patterns of thought and behavior in the Western cultural
worldview, there were only two that were present in a mere handful of the thousands of diverse
Native societies throughout the Americas: the practices of ritual human sacrifice and/or the
potential practice of cannibalism. While these practices were understandably alarming and
frightening to Europeans arriving on the shores of a strange land, both of these practices were
also present in areas of Europe at various points in time. For example, Stannard (1992: 51-52)
and Mohaw (2000: 125-26) contrast the ritualistic human sacrifice of a few large empires in the
Americas with the Inquisition and witch hunt that was ongoing throughout Europe and which
also constituted a form of ritualized human sacrifice. For example:
The Spanish were more self-righteous than usual about the superiority of
Christianity because they were repulsed by the idea of human sacrifice and
disgusted by the evidence of cannibalism that sometimes accompanied the
sacrifices. They could disembowel a person without flinching, slaughter a village,
or burn a person to death slowly over fires for days but could not stomach
cannibalism in any form. (The acts of cannibalism by crusaders at Maarat anNuman and Niceae during the First Crusade were unlikely to have been preserved
in popular memory.) (Mohawk, 2000: 125-26) 402
destructive towards others, can also be found in western religions, such as the teachings of
Christianity. The difference, of course, is that the Christian Church became so separated from
these teachings that they are often –thought not always-- only verbally expressed in Christianity
during Sunday sermons. But as Forbes (p. 15) remarks: “All that we do, and are, is our religion.”
401
On healthy minds desiring peace and treating other people and life forms with respect, see
Lyons (1992: 33-39), Akwesasne Notes (2005: 32-39), Forbes (2008: 22).
402
“[T]he very plain fact is that the many tens of millions of people who lived in the Americas
prior to 1492 were human—neither subhuman, nor superhuman—just human. Some of the
social practices of selected groups of them we would find abhorrent to our cultural tastes and
attitudes at present, in the same way that we find loathsome certain social practices of earlier
European and Asian cultures. Thus, for example, few of us today would countenance the practice
of human sacrifice as a way of propitiating an angry god, as was done by a few of the highest
urban cultures in Mesoamerica during the fifteenth- and early sixteenth century. However,
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Likewise, Stannard (1992) notes that ritual cannibalism was certainly not unheard of in 15th
century European society, though it was “not officially condoned, at least, not usually”:
Violence, of course, was everywhere, as alluded to above; but occasionally it took
on an especially perverse character. In addition to the hunting down and burning
of witches, which was an everyday affair in most locales, in Milan in 1476 a man
was torn to pieces by an enraged mob and his disemboweled limbs were then
eaten by his tormenters. In Paris and Lyon, Hugenots were killed and butchered,
and their various body parts were sold openly in the streets. Other eruptions of
bizarre torture, murder, and ritual cannibalism were not uncommon. (P. 61)
Thus, while Native societies throughout the Americas were imperfect, and at times deviated
from their ideals and convictions (Lyons, 1992: 33), the vast majority of these societies were
healthy societies with imperfect humans. In many ways, “from methods of child rearing and
codes of friendship and loyalty, to worshiping and caring for their natural environment,” to
communal generosity and individual autonomy and liberty, they “appear far more enlightened”
than Western society and its cultural worldview does today (Stannard, 1992: 52). In other words,
Native societies in the Americas were healthy societies, not just in relation to the disastrous
conditions that existed across the oceans and the destructive, devastating, and
psychopathological patterns of thought and behavior that composed the Western cultural
worldview, but also in absolute terms: their members were happy, healthy, socially integrated
and supported in all aspects of their life cycles, and living lives “of apparent total liberty”
(Stannard, 1992: 47). Meanwhile, when viewed in relation to Native societies in the Americas,
Western society and the Western cultural worldview, was, and continues to be, incredibly
unhealthy physically, socially, mentally, emotionally, and spiritually.

neither would many of us support the grisly torture and killing of thousands of heretics or the
burning of tens of thousands of men and women as witches, in a similar effort to mollify a
jealous deity, as was being done in Europe, with theocratic approval, at precisely the same time
that the Aztecs were sacrificing enemy warriors.” (Stannard, 1992: 51-52)
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This difference certainly did not go unnoticed by European colonists. Whether they were part
of colonial ventures to subjugate the Gaelic Irish or to establish colonies in North America,
English soldiers and colonists deserted to the Natives in a “regular hemorrhage” from the late
1500s to well into the eighteenth century. They did so despite the harsh penalties for desertion
and the likely execution that awaited those deserters who were hunted down and dragged back to
the colony in Jamestown (Canny, 1979: 23-24, 30-35; Mohawk, 2000; Stannard, 1992: 103-05;
Martinot, 2003b: 38). 403 In fact, though English desertion from Jamestown stopped completely
for a while after the Pequot attack on the colony in 1622 (Canny, 1979), it continued to be an
ongoing issue for the colonies well into the 18th century, as New York writer Hector St. John de
Crèvecœur noted in 1782: “thousands of colonists had left the colonies voluntarily to live with
various indigenous societies, while not a single indigenous person was known to have left his or
her society voluntarily to live with the Europeans.” Crèvecœur further stipulated that “there must
be something more congenial [in the indigenous societies] to our native dispositions than the
fictitious society in which we live” (quoted in Martinot, 2003: 38). Rousseau made similar
observations about European colonial ventures more generally. 404

403

“They found Indian life to possess a strong sense of community, abundant love, and
uncommon integrity—values that the European colonists also honored, if less successfully. But
Indian life was attractive for other values—for social equality, mobility, adventure, and, as two
adult converts acknowledged, ‘the most perfect freedom, the ease of living, [and] the absence of
those cares and corroding solicitudes which so often prevail with us.’ (Stannard, 1992: 104,
quoting Axtell, James. 1985. The Invasion Within: The Contest of Cultures in Colonial North
America. New York: Oxford University Press, p. 303). For these reasons and more, deserters
often refused to return to the European colony even when they were promised a pardon for their
“crimes,” sometimes going to great lengths to blend into Indian society and hide from colonists.
In addition, deserters came from all ranks of colonial society (Canny (1979: 32, 33).
404
“It is an extremely remarkable thing for all the years that Europeans have been tormenting
themselves to bring the savages of the various countries in the world to their way of life that they
have not yet been able to win over a single one, not even with the aid of Christianity; our
missionaries sometimes make Christians of them, but never civilized men. Nothing can
overcome the invincible repugnance they have of adopting our morals and living in our way. If
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This difference also did not go unnoticed by Native societies at the time. 405 And though
modern westerners, blinded by their own, unresolved, transgenerational trauma and
psychopathological coping mechanisms, have been unwilling or unable to recognize the
extremely unhealthy nature of Western society and the Western cultural worldview, modern
Native peoples who continue to resist assimilation into (or further colonization by) this cultural
worldview have not been so oblivious to this fact. In his book, Columbus and other Cannibals,
Jack Forbes (2008: xv) has analogized the destructive strands leading Western culture with “a
plague, a disease worse than leprosy, a sickness worse than malaria, a malady much more terrible
than smallpox,” and has likened it to cannibalism, or wétiko (cannibal) psychosis (where wétiko,
a Cree term, is defined as “an evil person or spirit who terrorizes other creatures by means of
terrible acts, including cannibalism”) (p. 24). Forbes’ observations are certainly apt, both in the
context of the atrocities committed by the Spanish in the south and the English in the North of
the New World 406 as well as in the modern day destruction promoted by military and corporate

these savages are as unhappy as it is claimed, they are, by what inconceivable depravity of
judgment do they constantly refuse to civilize themselves by imitating us or to learn to live
happily among us—whereas one finds in a thousand places that … Europeans have
voluntarily taken refuge among these natives, spent their entire lives there, no longer able to
leave such a strange way of life ….”(Rousseau, quoted in Diamond, 1974: 24-25, emphasis
added). A similar account (by the same person) is quoted in Stannard (1992: 104): “Thousands
of Europeans are Indians, and we have no examples of even one of these Aborigines having from
choice become European!”
405
For example, when a Native leader in Hispanola named Hatuey was captured after fleeing
Spanish massacres and atrocities with many of his followers, “a Franciscan friar urged him to
take Jesus to his heart so that his soul might go to heaven, rather then descend into hell. Hatuey
replied that if heaven was where the Christians went, he would rather go to hell” (Stannard,
1992: 69-70).
406
These histories include example after example, almost ad infinitum, of this sort of account:
Wherever the marauding, diseased, and heavily armed Spanish forces went out on
patrol, accompanied by ferocious armored dogs that had been trained to kill and
disembowel, they preyed on the local communities—already plague-enfeebled—forcing
them to supply food and women and slaves, and whatever else the soldiers might desire.
At virtually every previous landing on this trip, Columbus’s troops had gone ashore and
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profiteering ventures at home and abroad. Further, though the technological means of
domination, colonization and destruction have changed over the centuries, the destructive,
exploitative, and dominating mentality has not, something we’ve seen in the current wars on
“terror” and non-Western peoples.
Similar to Forbes, John Trudell (2001b & 2003) has referred to the destructive mentality and
actions of western society, first brought over the oceans by Columbus, as “the virus,” 407 while
Vine Deloria, Jr. (1969: 188) has referred to Western culture as something that is “not a culture

killed indiscriminately, as though for sport, whatever animals and birds and natives they
encountered, “looting and destroying all they found,” as the Admiral’s son Fernando
blithely put it. Once on Hispaniola, however, Columbus fell ill… and what little
restraint he had maintained over his men disappeared as he went through a lengthy
period of recuperation. The troops went wild, stealing, killing, raping, and torturing
natives, trying to force them to divulge the whereabouts of the imagined treasure-houses
of gold. (Stannard, 1992: 69)
Similarly, among the English colonists:
[In Roanoke] when an Indian was accused by an Englishman of stealing a cup and
failing to return it, the English response was to attack the natives in force, burning the
entire community and the fields of corn surrounding it. … Such disproportionate
responses to supposed affronts was to mark English dealings with the Indians
throughout the seventeenth century. … [In Jamestown] Indians who came to English
settlements with food for the British (who seemed never able to feed themselves) were
captured, accused of being spies, and executed. On other occasions, Indians were
enticed into visiting the settlements on the pretence of peace and the sharing of
entertainment, where upon they were attacked by the English and killed. Peace treaties
were signed with every intention to violate them … [And] [h]undreds of Indians were
killed in skirmish after skirmish. Other hundreds were killed in successful plots of mass
poisoning. They were hunted down by dogs… Their canoes and fishing weirs were
smashed, their villages and agricultural fields burned to the ground. Indian peace offers
were accepted by the British only until their prisoners were returned; then, having lulled
the natives into false security, the colonists returned to attack. It was the colonists’
expressed desire that the Indians be exterminated…. (Stannard, 1992: 105-06).
407
“But the time Columbus got here in 1492 –see, people have many opinions about him: who he
was or what he was but, whatever. See, he was really like the virus. And the spirit was being
eaten by disease. And it affected the perceptional reality of the human. See, so when Columbus
and them got here and we told him who we were, they didn’t know. We said, “We’re the people.
We’re the human beings.” But they didn’t know, because it wasn’t a part of their perceptional
reality –the concept was no longer a part of their perceptional reality. See, this is what happened
to the tribes of Europe and the descendants of the tribes of Europe.” (Trudell, op. cit.)
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but a cancer.” 408 The contagious nature of the destructive patterns of thought and behavior in the
Western worldview have further not gone unnoticed by these latter scholars 409 (though,
unfortunately, it seems likely that many Native peoples at the time of the initial invasion might
have been unfamiliar with this concept of contagion 410). These observations are entirely inline
with Western revelations on the contagious nature of traumatic symptomology (Figley, 1997a &
1997b; Gilbert, 1997; Williams, 1997; Remer & Ferguson, 1997; Catherall, 1997; Danieli, 1998;
Hardtmann, 1998; Bar-On et al., 1998; Felsen, 1998; Warner & Weist, 1996).
CHAPTER CONCLUSION
My hope is that this brief chapter has demonstrated the stark contrast between Western patterns
of thought and behavior –patterns which result from and reflect the western “civilizing”/
colonizing/ traumatizing process—and the patterns of thought, behavior and being that were
widespread among perhaps the majority of vastly diverse Native societies living throughout the
Americas at the start of the invasion. I also hope that this chapter, together with chapter 2, has
given the reader a better sense of what I mean by healthy societies and pathological societies. As
will be seen more clearly later, this chapter has laid some of the groundwork necessary for the
discussion in chapters 5 and 6, on Native-non-Native relations and the development of

408

“White culture destroys other culture because of its abstractness. As a destroyer of culture it
is not a culture but a cancer.” (Deloria, 1969: 188).
409
To this extent, Deloria advocated separatism from white culture “as the only means by which”
different groups, or individuals, can “gain time for reflection, meditation, and eventual
understanding of themselves as a people” (Deloria, 1969: 188). See also, Stannard (1992): “just
as their isolation from Old World diseases made the Indians an exceptionally healthy people as
long as they were not contacted by disease-bearing outsiders, once Europeans invaded their lands
with nothing but disdain for the native regime of mutual respect and reciprocity, the end result
was doomed to spell disaster” (p. 109).
410
As one Cree survivor noted of the small pox: “we had no belief that one man could give it to
another, any more than a wounded man could give his wound to another”(Quoted in Stannard,
1992: 53).
273

international law, and on non-Native reactions to the 2006 Haudenosaunee Six Nations protest in
Caledonia, Ontario, respectively.
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Chapter 4
The Canadian and Ontario Governments’ War on Haudenosaunee Human Rights: An
Atrocity Producing Situation
In order to escape accountability for his crimes, the perpetrator does everything
in his power to promote forgetting. Secrecy and silence are the perpetrator’s first
line of defense. If secrecy fails, the perpetrator attacks the credibility of the
victim. If he cannot silence her absolutely, he tries to make sure that no one
listens. To this end, he marshals an impressive array of arguments, from the most
blatant denial to the most sophisticated and elegant rationalization. After every
atrocity once can expect to hear the same predictable apologies: it never
happened; the victim lies; the victim exaggerates; the victim brought it upon
herself; and in any case it is time to forget the past and move on. The more
powerful the perpetrator, the greater his prerogative to name and define reality,
and the more completely his arguments prevail.
~ Herman 1992, 8
To perceive others as fully human means to be saddened by the death of every single
person, regardless of the population group or the part of the world from which he comes,
and regardless of our own personal acquaintance with him. If we accord him identity,
then we must individualize his death, …. If we accord him community, then we must
experience his death as a personal loss, a sentiment expressed with beautiful simplicity
by John Donne’s Any man’s death diminishes me, because I am involved in mankind.
~ Kelman 1973, 49
The question of how and why some groups of people commit atrocities against other groups of
people has preoccupied academics since at least World War II, and a number of different
potential explanations have surfaced over the last several decades. The explanations have ranged
from those that focus on political, ‘tribal’ identities (Mamdami, 2002), to those that focus on
individual and collective forms of denial (Cohen, 2005; Herman, 1992; Bauman, 2000), to those
that focus on the ‘chain of command,’ or on situations of power and/or obedience (Bauman,
2000; Haney & Zimbardo, 1973a & 1973b; Milgram, 1974). While all of these potential
explanations make important contributions to our understanding of the dynamics of atrocities,
one of the most interesting ideas that has arisen out of this vast literature is the idea that human
beings generally have in instinctive aversion to killing and/or committing violent atrocities -275

even in situations where violence and killing are required (Grossman, 1999; Watson, 1978;
Eisenhart, 1975; Litz et al., 2009; Kelman, 1973). Thus, it is the erosion of this aversion to
victimizing and killing others that, some say, most needs to be explained.
In his examination of the atrocities committed by US soldiers during the Vietnam War,
Herbert Kelman (1973) sets out to do just this, and argues that the root cause of these atrocities
was the purposeful and calculated loosening of the normal moral restraints by government
policies and practices. For example, Kelman (1973: 29, 30, 31) identified three processes that
could result in the loss of normal moral restraint in what he called “sanctioned massacres,” and
he argued that these processes are always primarily the result of government policies and
practices that are either purposefully aimed at destroying particular groups of people, or are
geared towards the pursuit other policy objectives, which allows, encourages, promotes, or
tacitly ignores attacks on the targeted group(s) of people. For example, the purposeful
destruction of entire groups of people was, in many ways, the explicit goal of government policy
in Nazi Germany, while the pursuit of other policy objectives allowed, encouraged and promoted
the decimation of entire villages of innocent civilians in Vietnam in the 1970s (as well as in Iraq
and Afghanistan, today). 411
Though Kelman uses the term “sanctioned massacres” to describe the atrocities committed
against innocent men, women, children, and elderly adults in Vietnam, he acknowledges that the
phenomenon he is describing is not limited to massacres, but may also include other forms of
death, injury, uprooting, and/or displacement of the targeted group(s) of people; as well as the
destruction of their lands, the source of their livelihoods, their social structures, and/or their ways
411

“Massacres of the kind that occurred in My Lai were not deliberately planned, but they took
place in an atmosphere that made it quite clear that the civilian population was expendable and
that actions resulting in the indiscriminate killing of civilians were central to the strategy of the
war” (Kelman, 1973: 32).
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of life (Kelman, 1973: 32, 25). For this reason, rather than use Kelman’s term, Lifton’s (1975,
2004) concepts of atrocities and atrocity producing situations in my examination of Canadian
federal and provincial government policies and practices that precipitated both the 2006
Haudenosaunee protest in Caledonia and corresponding behaviors of non-Native residents both
preceding the protest and in response to it. These latter behaviors will be discussed more
thoroughly in chapter 6, while this chapter is primarily concerned with examining the behaviors,
policies and practices of government officials and others in positions of relative authority (such
local businessmen and news reporters and editors). Further, the main purpose of this chapter is
to examine the ways in which government officials have engaged in the problematic patterns of
thought and behavior, discussed in chapter 2, in ways and to an extent that has normalized the
conditions of atrocity producing situations in relation to the Haudenosaunee and other Native
peoples throughout Canada. I argue that atrocities are being perpetrated against Native peoples
in Canada in the form of dispossessions, displacements, and uprooting of Native peoples, as well
as the destruction of Native lands, livelihoods, culture and ways of life. All of this is being done
in pursuit of policy objectives intended to further the accumulation of capital in the hands of a
few at the expense of the vast majority of both Native and non-Native peoples throughout
Canada.
There are three sections in this chapter. The first provides a brief overview of Herbert
Kelman’s (1973) theory regarding the pre-conditions for the production of atrocities. This muchabbreviated discussion is intended to provide some context for the second and third sections in
the chapter, as well as for the discussion in chapter 6. The second section applies aspects of
Kelman’s theory to federal, provincial and county-level governments’ pursuit of policy
objectives, as well as the explicit support for these objectives that has been demonstrated on the
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part of businessmen and media representatives (i.e., other people in position of relative
authority). Through this examination, I will argue that these authorities created (and/or
maintained 412) the necessary conditions for the production of atrocities against the
Haudenosaunee people in relation to their 2006 land rights protest. The third and last section in
the chapter will examine some of the Canadian Supreme Court rulings and legally-binding
international human rights laws that are routinely being violated by the Canadian and Ontario (as
well as county-level) governments in pursuit of the policy objectives of capital accumulation
through settlement, development and resource extraction on First Nations lands throughout
Canada –i.e., the process of accumulation by dispossession (Harvey, 2003). I will argue that the
creation/maintenance of the conditions of atrocity in response to the 2006 Haudenosaunee protest
must be contextualized within the broader, long-standing context of ongoing violations of the
rights of indigenous peoples in Canada. Further, all of these must be contextualized within the
psychopathological patterns of thought and behavior that were discussed in chapter 2.
In the chapter’s conclusion –as well as parts of the third section of the chapter-- some of the
repercussions of these ongoing legal violations, and ongoing psychopathology, will be
considered. Such repercussions may include the loss of legal and political legitimacy at home
and abroad, as well as the inevitable escalation of atrocities and atrocity-producing situations
within Canada. Such an escalation of atrocities in Canada can be expected if Canadian and
provincial governments continue to violate their own domestic laws and their legally-binding
international human rights commitments in pursuit of capital accumulation and the “superpower”
status that is expected to accompany the intensification of resource extraction projects in Canada.
If these process of accumulation by dispossession continue in Canada, Native peoples across the
412

Since, arguably, these conditions have existed almost as long as Europeans have lived on the
continent.
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country will be forced to either resign themselves to destruction as distinct peoples or adopt
alternate, and increasingly confrontational means to protect their lands, resources, Aboriginal,
treaty, and human rights. Many Native peoples will quite understandably choose the latter.
This, in turn, may incite many Canadian non-Natives, who are largely ill-informed about the
domestic and international human rights of indigenous peoples, to mobilize in anger against what
they perceive to be “special privileges” of Native peoples. Following the lead of their
government officials, these non-Natives may thus increasingly respond to Native rights
assertions with escalating anger and violence, as was the case in Caledonia on 2006 (see chapter
6 for a discussion of non-Native responses in Caledonia).
THE CONDITIONS OF ATROCITY-PRODUCING SITUATIONS
As mentioned above, Herbert Kelman (1973) argued that in atrocity-producing situations the
normal human aversion to killing or committing atrocities against other peoples is overcome
through official policies and practices that are either purposefully aimed at eliminating entire
groups of people, or are geared towards the pursuit of other policy objectives that explicitly
encourage, allow, promote or tacitly ignore attacks on one or more targeted group(s) of people.
Kelman further identified three types of policy processes that serve to loosen these normal moral
restraints, thus allowing and potentially leading to the production of atrocities. He termed these
processes authorization, routinization, and dehumanization (Kelman, 1973: 8). Each of these
will be briefly explained.
For Kelman (1973: 39), the process of authorization is the process through which authorities
perceived of as legitimate make it known that attacks on a targeted group of people are
encouraged and promoted and/or will be allowed and tacitly ignored. Through this explicit or
implicit permission, Kelman argues, there is a lessening of the moral restraints that normally
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prevent individuals and groups from engaging in violent actions that are otherwise perceived to
be immoral, illegitimate or illegal. At the same time, there is a heightened willingness among
individuals or groups who identify with these perceived legitimate authorities to engage in such
activities (p. 39). Both this lessening and this heightening are further enhanced when members
of the perpetrating group live within a hierarchically structured society in which obedience to
authority is expected and required. To this extent, Kelman (1973: 41-44) and numerous others
(Haney & Zimbardo, 1973a & 1973b; Milgram, 1974) have found that unquestioned obedience
to authority is an extremely widespread characteristic of US society 413 (and Western society in
general 414), and many members of US society feel that they have an “overriding obligation” do
follow the orders of a superior, regardless of the immoral or illegal characteristics of such an
order. Certainly Canadian society is no less geared towards unquestioning obedience to
authority, and there are convincing arguments that it is geared towards this much more so than is
the United States (Chamberlin, 2002: 14-15).

413

“In a national survey of public reactions to the Calley [the Lt. in charge at the My Lai
massacre] trial, conducted a few weeks after the conviction of Lt. Calley had been announced,
we asked respondents what they thought they would do if they were soldiers in Vietnam and
were ordered by their superior officers to shoot all inhabitants of a village suspected of aiding the
enemy, including old men, women, and children. Fifty-one percent of our sample said that they
would follow orders and shoot; 33% said that they would refuse to shoot. We cannot infer, of
course, from their responses to a hypothetical question what these individuals would actually do
if they found themselves in the situation described. Our data do suggest, however, that they are
prepared, in principle, to engage in mass violence if faced with authoritative orders to do so.
They are certainly prepared to condone such actions; they regard obedience to orders under these
circumstances—even if that means shooting unarmed civilians—as the normatively expected, the
required, indeed the right and moral thing for the good citizen to do. In short, the cognitive and
ideological grounding for mass violence in an authority situation seems to be present in large
segments of the US population” (Kelman, 1973: 41)
414
See for example: Mann, L. 1973. Attitudes toward My Lai and obedience to orders: An
Australian survey. Australian Journal of Psychology. 25 (1), pp. 11-12, (cited in Kelman, 1973:
41)which finds similar obedience-to-authority attitudes in Australia.
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The willingness among individuals or groups to engage in attacks and atrocities against other,
targeted people is further heightened when the groups explicitly or implicitly targeted already
have a long history of being targeted by psychopathological projections as scapegoats, or when
the group doing the targeting already has a long history of engaging in these psychopathological
projections and scapegoating (Kelman, 1973: 32, 35, 37, 50). Thus, though US soldiers in
Vietnam may have never previously encountered Vietnamese people or culture, they had been
exposed to a long history of targeting other groups of people –such as African Americans, Native
North Americans, Mexicans, and Chinese immigrants—through psychopathological projection
and scapegoating. According to Kelman, this long history of targeting various groups of people,
and setting them apart from the rest of society as “fair game” for attack, was easily transferred to
Vietnam by US soldiers already long familiar with, and possibly participants in, this type of
dynamic.
Kelman further stresses that, while targeted groups may have long-histories as victims of
discrimination and attack, they are not, in the case of sanctioned massacre or atrocity-producing
situations, being attacked for what they have done. Rather, they are being attacked because of
what they are, and/or because of what their relationship is to particular policy objectives (i.e.,
they are “in the way” of such objectives) (Kelman, 1973: 32, 37, 30, 49). John Mohawk (2000:
5) has noted similar dynamics throughout the history of Western, utopian thinking, through
which certain groups of people are seen as being both “in the way” of “progress,” and
expendable in Western society’s pursuit of a distant (and impossible) Utopia. Some of these
ideas were discussed more thoroughly in chapter 2, particularly in the sections on projection,
scapegoating and human sacrifice. In all of these examples, distant policy objectives (whether
Utopian or not), together with established patterns of victimization and perpetration, serve as a
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form of justification to the perpetrators that what they are doing is not only okay, but perhaps
even necessary, moral, benevolent, or valorous. Such patterns of thought constitute what
Kelman (1973:44) calls a “transcendent mission,” the likes of which is easily illustrated in
Himmler’s motivational speeches to Nazis in charge of exterminating various groups of
people. 415 Part of these transcendent missions, such as in the current war on terrorism, may
consist of claims to self-defense against perceived potential attacks –claims that are invoked in
an attempt to make the attacks and atrocities more morally acceptable. Of course, all of the
above-discussed forms of justification are, when not entirely fabricated, always far out of
proportion with any objective observation of the behavior of the targeted group (Kelman, 1973:
32), as well as any objective observation on the proportional force required for the alleged selfdefensive of the perpetrating group. Despite the obvious lack of validity and proportion involved
in such transcendent missions, authorities may, themselves, get caught up in these alleged
missions (as opposed to simply using them strategically to manipulate the masses into supporting
their stated or unstated policy objectives), and may come to view their efforts at mobilizing the
population around these missions as part of a “popular mandate”(which, itself, reinforced the
alleged legitimacy of these missions, at least in the eyes of deluded authorities) (Kelman, 1973:
45). In order to keep the masses mobilized in this fashion, all of the above-discussed processes
of authorization generally must be repeated and reinforced perpetually, and in various forms.

415

Kelman (1973: 45, quoting from Arendt) noted that Himmler motivated Nazis in charge of
exterminating various ‘undesirable’ groups of people by praising the officers “for their courage
and devotion to duty in carrying out repugnant acts” and for their involvement “’in something
historic, grandiose, unique (‘a great task that occurs once in two thousand years’)’.”
Transcendental missions are often just as vague as those invoked by Himmler, and have included
(and continue to include) notions of “progress,” “civilization,” “national security,” the “war on
terrorism,” and --before that-- the wars on communism, drugs, and narcoterrorism, as well as the
wars against infidels, witches, heretics, non-Christians, and so forth (see chapter 2 for more on
these latter wars and the policy objectives behind them).
282

While the processes of authorization provide some forms of pseudo-justifications for the
lessening the moral restraints against the commission of atrocities, the processes of routinization
serve to encourage wide-spread dissociation pertaining to these atrocities and lessened moral
restraints (Kelman, 1973: 47). Stanely Cohen (2005), Judith Herman (1992) and Zygmunt
Bauman (2000) have all also written extensively on this concept and process, though they refer
to it using slightly different terminology. Max Weber (1995), also discussed this concept and
process in his discussion of Western bureaucracy and the ‘iron cage’. The process of
routinization achieves this dissociation by transforming the various contributions that individuals
and groups make to widespread atrocities “into routine, mechanical, highly-programmed
operations” (Kelman, 1973: 46). In order to do so, the contributions that individuals make to the
entire atrocity-producing process are “broken down into discrete steps carried out in automatic,
regularized fashion” (p. 47). Individuals performing these steps are required to focus on the
details of these steps and/or on notions of “efficiency” or “productivity,” rather than on the
overall big picture. In this way, the need for individuals to make decisions, and/or the ability of
individuals to influence the larger picture, are virtually eliminated, as are concerns about
individual responsibility or morals (p. 47).
Often the processes of routinization are helped along through language of illusion and
dissociation. For example, during the Vietnam war, government and military officials used
terms such as “protective reaction,” “pacification,” and “forced-draft urbanization and
modernization,” to refer in a dissociated way to the decimation of entire villages and the mass
murder, rape and/or forced relocation of surviving villagers (Kelman, 1973: 48). Similar code
words were used in Nazi Germany, where the terms “final solution,” “evacuation,” and “special
treatment,” served as euphemisms for the ongoing extermination of entire groups of people
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(Kelman, 1973: 48). In the present “war on terror” mass killings of innocent civilians is referred
to as “collateral damage,” and a number of other euphemistic, illusionary words could also be
quite easily identified. All of these various code words, part of the language of illusion and
dissociation, were intended to allow participants to differentiate their own actions from “ordinary
killing and destruction,” which they continue to recognize as clearly illegitimate, illegal and
immoral, illegal.
The language of illusion or dissociation also contributes to the third process involved in the
loosening of moral restraints: dehumanization. For example, Goodwin (1989) wrote about the
emotional deadness that was instilled in U.S. soldiers during bootcamp, demonstrating the
linkages between this process of routinization and the process of dehumanization:
This dehumanization gradually generalized to the whole Vietnam experience.
The American combatants themselves became “grunts,” the Viet Cong became
“Victor Charlie,” and both groups were either “KIA” (killed in action) or “WIA”
(wounded in action). Often many “slopes” would get “Zapped” (killed) by a
“Cobra” (gunship), the “grunts” would retreat by “shithook” (evacuation by
Chinook helicopter), and the jungle would be sown by “Puff the Magic Dragon”
(C-47 gunship with rapid-firing mini-gatling guns). The nicknames served to
blunt the anguish and horror of the reality of combat. (P. 10)
The use of degrading words to stereotype groups of people based on racial, ethnic, gendered,
national, religious, cultural or other categorizations, deprives the members of targeted groups of
their identity by denying them the ability to define who they are individually and/or communally.
Targeted groups and group members are also excluded from the community(ies) of those who
degrade and stereotype them. Both this deprivation and exclusion dehumanizes targeted group
members, while also setting them apart from the rest of society as “fair game” for attack –again,
based not on what they have done, but upon what they are (Kelman, 1973: 50). And what they
are, in the case of dehumanization, is always allegedly something “subhuman, despicable, and
certainly incapable of evoking empathy” (Kelman, 1973: 50).
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Target groups are also further dehumanized in other ways through the routinization and
authorization processes. In addition to the routinization process’s language of illusion, the
dissociation that this process produces desensitizes members of the perpetrating group to the pain
and suffering of the targeted group. Likewise, the authorization of atrocities against the targeted
group, as well as any corresponding pseudo-justifications and transcendental missions, which
view the targeted group as standing “in the way” of “progress,” dehumanizes members of the
targeted group. In addition to the contributions of these first two processes to the process of
dehumanization, participation in the process of dehumanization itself further contributes to this
process, since:
[t]he only way [perpetrators or dissociated bystanders] can justify what is being
done to these people, both by others and by themselves, and the only way they
can extract some degree of meaning out of the absurd events in which they find
themselves participating is by coming to believe that the victims are subhuman
and deserve to be rooted out. (Kelman, 1973: 47)
To decide otherwise, and to side with the victims, would require action. It would require
confronting –perhaps in an ongoing fashion—the perpetrators, and such actions may result in the
confronter becoming the target of attacks him or herself (Lifton, 2004). However, a worse,
though perhaps less obvious, fate awaits those who refuse to side with the victim and chose to
side, instead, with the perpetrator. As Herman (1992: 7-8) remarks, in conditions of atrocity and
victimization, there is no middle ground. In refusing to side with the victim, one is choosing
(explicitly or implicitly) to side with the perpetrator. 416 And in doing the latter, one internalizes
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“When events are natural disasters or ‘acts of God,’ those who bear witness sympathize
readily with the victim. But when traumatic events are of human design, those who bear witness
are caught in the conflict between victim and perpetrator. It is morally impossible to remain
neutral in this conflict. The bystander is forced to take sides.
It is very tempting to take the side of the perpetrator. All the perpetrator asks is that the
bystander do nothing. He appeals to the universal desire to see, hear, and speak no evil. The
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the dehumanization of the victim, therefore aiding one’s own dehumanization by constricting
one’s community and involvement with humanity, as well as by losing a part of one’s moral
restraint, one’s capacity to feel, and thus a part of one’s identity (Kelman, 1973: 50-52). Jack
Forbes (2008) made a similar observation, involving not just one’s capacity to feel for other
human beings, but for all things:
[O]ne should feel the pain and sorrow of killing a brother or sister, whether it is a
weed, a tree or a deer. If one does not feel that pain, one has become brutalized
and “sick.” One is, in short, out of harmony with the Universe. (P. 14)
All three of the processes that Kelman (1973) identified as being necessary for the weakening
of human being’s innate moral aversion to violence and killing are endemic in Western society,
and have been normalized “in the structure of our political and social systems and reinforced in
daily life” (p. 52), as much of chapter 2 has demonstrated. In Canada, these processes have long
been employed to target Native peoples whose lands, resources and trust funds have been
coveted by non-Native settlers. To these ends, Native peoples were historically categorized as
“fair game” for non-Native perpetrations, including the settlement and development on Native
lands. Campaigns were waged that had the explicit goals of exterminating Native peoples
(Upton, 1977; Reid, 1993a & 1993b) and, more often, the pursuit of policy objectives (such as
taking Native lands, resources and trust funds) did and has often lead to the ordered, encouraged,
approved and permitted the commission of violence and atrocities against Native peoples. Aside
from instances of outright genocide (Upton, 1977; Reid, 1993a & 1993b), Native peoples
throughout Canada have also been subjected to the atrocities of injury, uprooting, and/or
displacement, as well as the destruction of their lands, the source of their livelihoods, their social
structures, and their ways of life. As a group with a long history of being victimized by non-

victim, on the contrary, asks the bystander to share the burden of pain. The victim demands
action, engagement, and remembering.”(Herman, 1992: 7-8)
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Natives, Native people make an easy, obvious target in Canadian society, and are the group most
often targeted for non-Native projections and scapegoating. Further, as a group with a long
history of victimizing other peoples, non-Natives in Canada, and throughout Western society,
frequently engage in projections, scapegoating, degrading and dehumanizing Native peoples as
almost second nature, and without even being consciously aware of the fact that they are doing
so. In other words, the dehumanization of Native peoples in Canada has not only long been
authorized, it has also long been routinized, becoming part and parcel of the fabric of Canadian
society (as it is among other settler state populations, as well).
The next section will examine some of the ways in which these processes were reasserted by
government officials and others in positions of authority during the 2006 Haudenosaunee protest.
THE LANGUAGE OF DEHUMANIATION AND DISPOSSESSION
The Confederacy Council is not a splinter group or a special interest group. We
are the government of Six Nations: We hold these treaties and lands in our
jurisdiction. Canada has the ability to end this now --they've had the ability for
300 years. We the Chiefs are sending this message back with Mr. Coyle, that the
development of our land in Caledonia must stop and that talks between the
federal government and the Confederacy Chiefs [must start] not only over this
dispute, but over what has happened to our lands and trust fund. Canada must
come to the table with people mandated to make decisions, not fact finding. Our
people have been waiting for 300 years. Our neighbors are waiting and need
their government to act.
~ Mohawk Chief Allan MacNaughton, quoted in Smith 2006a, 1
Incidents led by splinter groups are arguably harder to manage as they exist
outside negotiation processes to resolve recognized grievances with duly elected
leaders. We seek to avoid giving standing to such splinter groups so as not to
debase the legally recognized government. Incidents are also complicated by
external groups such as Warrior Societies or non-Aboriginal counter-protest
groups.
~ Indian and Northern Affairs Canada presentation to the Royal Canadian
Mounted Police, quoted in Diablo & Pasternak 2011
All three of the processes that Kelman (1973) identified in the loosening of moral restraint -authorization, routinization and dehumanization—were prevalent in the reactions of non-Native
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authorities to the 2006 Haudenosaunee protest. A thorough examination of the ways in which
federal, provincial and local authorities engaged in these processes would require considerable
space, and thus goes beyond the scope of this dissertation. Therefore, the below section will
primarily consider some of the ways in which one particular type of behavior, engaged in by
federal, provincial and local authorities, contributed to the processes of authorization,
routinization and dehumanization. This particular type of behavior is the manipulation of facts
through the use of language of illusion. Examples of how various authorities engaged in this
type of behavior, as well as some of the consequences of this behavior, are provided below
merely to illustrate the concept, and to demonstrate the applicability of Kelman’s (1973) theory.
The below discussion does not provide a comprehensive list of all possible examples of the this
behavior, nor does it provide a full account of the other ways in which federal, provincial and
local authorities engaged in the authorization, routinization and dehumanization processes.
The federal government employed the language of illusion to manipulate facts pertaining to
the 2006 Haudenosaunee protest in a number of ways, all of which served to deny federal
responsibility in resolving the protest, as well as discredit the claims of Haudenosaunee
protesters and the Haudenosaunee Confederacy Council. For example, almost from the very
start of the protest, the Minister of Indian Affairs, Jim Prentice, insisted that he had no
responsibility to get involved in the dispute because it was not related to a land claim. Instead,
Prentice’s office characterized the dispute as a local dispute between the developer and the
protesters or, alternatively, as a local dispute that “has nothing to do with the federal
government” and should be resolved by the Ontario Provincial Police (Fragomeni, 2006; Legall,
2006e; Muse, 2006h; Canadian Press, 2006i). Though elsewhere federal officials acknowledged
that the protest was related to a land claim (Best, 2006c & 2006e; Jackson, 2006h; Muse, 2006d
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& 2007h), these officials generally kept to the line that the dispute should be resolved by
Provincial Police rather than federal officials.
Though these incredibly inaccurate assertions may have been made with the sole intentions of
protecting federal officials from public backlash by denying any federal responsibility in the
situation, what they really accomplished was the creation of public backlash against the
Haudenosaunee. Members of the public who heard their government deny that the dispute was
related to a land claim, were thus lead to believe that the protesters were lying about their
grievances and disrupting the development and livelihood of the Henning brothers (the owners of
the development company) without any justification whatsoever. Failing to see any obvious
motive for the Haudenosaunee protest, local non-Native residents began to fill in the blanks
themselves, deciding that the Haudenosaunee were unjustifiably protesting and disrupting the
lives of local developers purely out of a selfish need for attention or a criminal, thug-like desire
to extort innocent non-Native residents. Thus, the federal government’s denial of it’s own
responsibility in the dispute, no matter what the original intent of this denial was, served to
drastically escalate non-Native misunderstandings of the Haudenosaunee protest, as well as nonNative anger towards (and non-Native willingness to commit violence against) the
Haudenosaunee protesters/ Native people.
These federal denials also hurt relations between non-Native residents and the Ontario
Provincial Police. As non-Native residents repeatedly heard their federal officials insist that the
matter was not related to land claims, and should be resolved by Provincial Police, local nonNative residents became increasingly irate by the inaction of provincial police, even to the point
of imagining themselves to be victimized by police inaction. Some non-Native residents, in their
anxiety-filled need to understand why the provincial police would not act when their federal
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government had made clear it was their job to do so, attempted to construct stories that might
explain this inaction. One of the most common of these such stories was that either the
Haudenosaunee (and Native people in general) were so incredibly thuggish that even the
provincial police were “afraid” to act against them, or that the provincial police were so corrupt
that they were working with the Haudenosaunee protesters, who were seen as organized crime
(see Blatchford, 2010, for numerous examples of this sort of misguided thinking among nonNatives who simply did not realize that their federal government was lying to them. See also the
third section of this chapter, for a fuller explanation on Canadian law in relation to Native land
claims [and why it was absolutely, and solely, the federal government’s responsibility to resolve
this dispute]).
Another tactic used by the federal government in denying its responsibility for getting
involved in the dispute was to perpetuate misinformation and outright inaccuracies relating to the
land under protest in 2006, and the corresponding land claims filed on that land. These land
claims and much of this misinformation was already discussed more thoroughly in chapter 1. To
summarize that discussion, the federal government –generally through anonymous federal
officials—repeatedly told the media that the land under protest had been surrendered in 1841
through an agreement with the full council of Haudenosaunee chiefs. These assertions are, of
course, entirely false (see chapter 1). While it is possible that federal officials making these
assertions were seeking only to protect themselves and their own jobs when they made these
statements, the statements –like those discussed above-- served to enrage non-Native residents
and pit them against the Haudenosaunee protesters.
Both types of denial discussed so far served to authorize non-Native attacks on
Haudenosaunee protesters, as well as Native people in general. Their federal government had
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portrayed protester grievances as lies, and protesters as criminals (suggesting the protest was a
matter for the police), and this signaled to non-Natives that the just and right thing was an end to
the protest. When police did not step in to do this “just and right” thing, many non-Native
residents sought to take it upon themselves to do this, feeling that this course of action had been
authorized by federal statements (which, in many ways, it had). Both types of behavior also
served to reinforce the routinization of dispossessing Native peoples from their lands, resources
and human rights. As discussed in chapter 1, and examined more thoroughly in chapter 6,
several non-Natives in town had built their livelihoods off of these dispossession processes,
working in the development, construction, real estate or finance industries for decades, as others
had done before them. Non-Native development on Native land was a common, taken-for
granted, normal activity that occurred daily. Many non-Natives involved in these processes were
largely unaware of the illegality of their actions, or of any pain and suffering they caused to
Native people. When the protest challenged this lack of awareness, the federal acts of
authorization allowed non-Natives to remain dissociated from the consequences of their actions,
and even to respond to potential reminders with anger (as if the reminders victimized nonNatives, see chapter 6). Finally, all of this inaccuracies served to dehumanize the
Haudenosaunee protesters, and Native people in general, by portraying them, first, as people who
dehumanize others (disrupting the lives of the owners of the development company for attention
or for selfish personal gain through unjustified extortion), and second, as people who have no
more rhyme or reason to their actions that these latter, selfish motives.
Haudenosaunee protesters were further dehumanized, and attacks against them were further
authorized, by repeated federal and provincial characterizations of them and their traditional
government as a “faction,” a small impatient group, or simply “the radicals” (Jackson, 2006k;
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Dunfield & Howlett, 2006; Ontario, Legislative Assembly, 2006a). This language portrayed the
protesters and their traditional government as one-dimensional, selfish, dishonest, and
manipulative (i.e., “subhuman”) individuals who were thus allegedly far different from nonNative residents and their government. This language also served as a signal to non-Natives that
the Haudenosaunee protesters and their traditional government were illegitimate, were part of a
tiny group that did not represent the Haudenosaunee people as a whole, and were thus “fair
game” for public derision, dehumanization and attack. Yet, as discussed in chapter 1, such
characterizations were entirely inaccurate. There was widespread support both for the protest
and for the Haudenosaunee traditional government on the Six Nations reserve, the former of
which is evidenced by the hundreds of people who flooded onto the protest site the morning of
the police raid, in order to prevent the site from being taken out of protesters’ hands. While,
after 80 years of federal recognition and funding for the Six Nations Band Council, there was
also some support for this federally-imposed government, this support is rather minor, by all
appearances, and is certainly not more than the support for the Haudenosaunee Confederacy
Council (on minor support for the Band Council, see: Burman, 2006a; Best, 2006b; Smith,
2006a; Ahooja, 2008a; and the subsection on self-determination in the below section of this
chapter).
Further evidence of the authorization and routinization of ongoing perpetrations against
Native peoples within the geographical borders of Canada can be found in Paul Joffe’s (2010)
article examining the Canadian government’s behavior during the negotiations around the
adoption of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP).
Domestically, Canada’s Harper government consistently made untrue or misleading claims to
Parliament and provided information that was erroneous, contradictory, unjustly interpreted or
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misinterpreted in ways which served to “generate public fear, opposition and discrimination,”
against the UNDRIP and to pit non-Natives against Native peoples at home (Joffe, 2010: 166-68,
170). For example, “Indian Affairs Minister Chuck Strahl publicly stated that the ‘rights of nonnative Canadians would have been threatened had the government not opposed’ the Declaration”
and also claimed that the Declaration was incompatible with Western democracy (Joffe, 2010:
167). The Harper government also repeatedly refused to consult with indigenous peoples when
preparing comments, reports, or proposals in relation to the UNDRIP or to Canada’s Universal
Periodic Review by the UN Human Rights Council. These refusals amounted to “repeated
violations of the rule of law in Canada” in “both procedural and substantive terms” (Joffe, 2010:
165), since the human right of indigenous peoples to consultation and accommodation, and to
Free, Prior and Informed Consent were violated (see below section on these rights).
Internationally, the Harper government engaged in similar behavior, omitting or providing
erroneous and misleading information to other states regarding Canada’s support for the
UNDRIP,

417

while secretly lobbying states with records of human rights abuses to vote against

the UNDRIP. In these and other ways, the Harper government “repeatedly violated the rule of
law internationally,” by failing to “respect the purposes and principles of the UN Charter,”
failing in its obligations to “uphold the highest standards in the promotion and protection of
human rights,” and pursuing “the lowest standards of any Council member within the Western
European group of States” (Joffe, 2010: 170). 418 All of these behaviors demonstrate a clear
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For example, Canada told other states that it “supported the renewal of the mandate of the
Special Rapportueur on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of Indigenous
peoples,” but neglected to mention that Canada’s support was conditioned on the proposal that
the UNDRIP not be implemented within Canada. (Ibid, 167-68).
418
“During its three-year term [on the Human Rights Council], Canada pursued the lowest
standards of any Council member within the Western European group of States.” (Grand Council
of the Crees (Eeyou Istchee) et. al., quoted in Joffe, 2010: 170). Though Joffe largely attributes
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pattern of manipulation, misinformation and dishonesty used to target Native peoples who ‘stood
in the way’ of Canadian “progress” (i.e., accumulation by dispossession). These patterns clearly
existed long before the 2006 Haudenosuanee protest, and was applied to the Haudenosaunee
protesters and their traditional government just as they were applied to the Harper government’s
attempts to undermine the UNDRIP.
Despite the inaccurate nature of the federal government’s characterizations of the
Haudenosaunee protesters and traditional government during the 2006 protest, local authorities
were quick to utilize them. To this extent, after six weeks of requesting the federal government
to step in and resolve the dispute, Haldimand County Mayor Marie Trainer finally announced her
agreement with Indian Affairs Minister Jim Prentice’s decision not to negotiate with “the
radicals (in the subdivision) out there” because doing so would “just be giving… more power” to
“the Mohawks or the ones causing this problem from all across Canada” (Best, 2006g; Jackson,
2006k). The Mayor further asserted the futility of attempting to negotiate with the protesters or
their government when she characterized not just these groups, but the Six Nations community,
in general, as factionalized, noting that there were “four different factions of Natives that have to
be consulted” (Pearce, 2006a). Likewise, the owners of the local development company, John
and Don Henning, referred to the protesters and their traditional government as “a splinter
group” that blocked their development and held them hostage (Henning, 2006a; 2006b; 2006c;

the above-summarized behaviors to a decline in Canada’s commitment to the human rights of
Native peoples caused by Harper’s Conservative government, the majority of these tactics also
appear in Canada and Ontario’s Statement of Defense against the HSN 1995 lawsuit (which
simply asked for an accounting of HSN lands, resources, rents and trust funds). See: Attorney
General of Canada. 1996. Statement of Defence of the Attorney General of Canada. From: Six
Nations of the Grand River Band of Indians v. Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada and
Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario. Ontario Superior Court of Justice, Brantford Ontario,
Civil Division. Filed January 15. Reference File No. 406/95. (as well as Ontario’s statement of
defense)
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Henco Industries Limited, 2006). These latter assertions characterized the Haudenosaunee
protesters not only as a group of one-dimensional (sub)people who were fair game for derision
and attack, but also as victimizers who held others hostage. Portraying the protesters an their
government in this light served to further authorize (and even mandate) attacks upon them by
non-Natives who valued ‘justice’ and felt it was their duty to fight for it.
Also like the federal and provincial governments, both Haldimand County officials and the
Henning brothers adopted the narrative that the claims of Haudenosaunee protesters and their
traditional government were fabrications. For example, at one of the first non-Native rallies
against the Haudenosaunee protesters Haldimand County Mayor Marie Trainer, along with local
real estate lawyer Ed McCarthy, told the assembled residents and the media representatives that
“There’s no doubt [the 1841 General Surrender] was done legally” (Pearce, 2006a). Trainer
further portrayed the protesters and their government –rather than Canadian, Ontario and
Haldimand County officials-- as the ones who were unreasonably refusing to confront (or admit)
the reality of the situation. Though Trainer had been informed numerous times of the relevant
Supreme Court of Canada rulings that were being violated by the development (Muse, 2006f &
2006d; Windle, 2006a; Hamilton Spectator, 2006c; Best 2006e; and see more on this in the next
section), she chose to ignore these rulings entirely, even feigning ignorance at times, and making
inaccurate claims. These inaccurate claims included the assertion that officials were only
required to notify –rather than consult with and accommodate-- the Haudenosaunee prior to the
start of the development (Windle, 2006h). They also included the assertion that a former Band
Council Chief had previously supported and approved the development that was under protest
(Legall, 20061; Muse, 2006j), obscuring the fact that the Band Council had never been given a
voice in whether or not the development would proceed (and that the former Band Council Chief

295

vehemently denied such accusations). Both of these statements were entirely false, yet the
Mayor ignored her own fabrication of facts, and projected it onto the Haudenosaunee protesters,
arguing that: “I guess the Natives are not believing anyone or anything”(Pearce, 2006a).
The Hennings similarly presented the protesters as unreasonable bullies, and presented
themselves as innocent victims. Part of this latter presentation involved regular (implicit and
explicit) assertions by the Hennings that they had never been notified by the Haudenosaunee that
there was a claim on the land until after their development was already well underway (Hamilton
Spectator, 2006c; Best, 2006c). This assertion was entirely false (Muse, 2006d; Windle, 2006a;
Hamilton Spectator, 2006c; Ahooja, 2006b), as was the former assertion by the Hennings that
they were innocent victims. In fact, according to Cayuga Sub-Chief Leroy Hill, Haudenosaunee
women approached the Hennings when they first arrived to begin construction on the land.
Rather than engage in a conversation about Haudenosaunee land rights, the Hennings reportedly
kicked dirt on the women and told them to “bring it on”(Ahooja, 2006b).
To non-Native residents unaware of these manipulations and fabrications, the Haudenosaunee
protesters and their traditional government were further portrayed as one dimensional, selfish,
criminals who had no justifications for their behavior and who couldn’t care less about “the
truth” or about anyone else. Such portrayals served to further dehumanize the Haudenosaunee
protesters and heir traditional government, and to authorize attacks against them and the alleged
injustices that they were perpetrating. As members of a group with a long history of
victimization and dehumanization at the hands of non-Native settlers, these dehumanization and
authorization processes, in many ways, had already long been routinized in Canadian society.
Because of this, many angry non-Natives could fall back on these behaviors without question,
and without concerns for empathizing or sympathizing with Native peoples –much less Native
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peoples who were (allegedly) degenerate, criminal, thuggish, and so forth. Thus, the conditions
of atrocity, which had long existed in Canadian society, were quickly escalated by non-Native
officials less than two months into the Haudenosaunee protest, and the stage was set for the
angry and violent behavior that came to characterize non-Native opposition to the
Haudenosaunee protest in the weeks and months ahead. 419
The news media also aided in the escalation of these processes of authorization, routinization
and dehumanization. Often treated as sources of objective, fact-finding, reporters and editors for
local and regional media sources unquestioningly repeated federal and provincial versions of the
alleged 1841 General Surrender. Adding supposed support for these assertions, Band Council
Spokesperson Dan David was misquoted by at least one news article as having stated that the
land under protest was not part of one of the 28 claims filed by the Haudenosaunee Six Nations
(Legall, 2006g). Though the Band Council sent letters requesting that the paper retract and
correct this statement, no retraction was made, and at least one other newspaper picked up the
assertion and re-reported it as news (Jackson, 2006h). These instances of misreporting furthered
the perception of non-Native residents that the Haudenosaunee protesters and their traditional
government were a small minority of radicals who did not represent the rest of the Six Nations
reserve –and who were thus, also, fair game for public derision and verbal (or even physical)
attack. Reporters gave additional credence to these beliefs by referring to the protesters and their
government in exactly this manner (Jackson, 2005, 2006h, 2006g; Legall, 2006q, 2006l, 2006g;
Gamble, 2006g; Brantford Expositor, 2006e), as well as by making false claims that Band
Council Chief David General did not support the protest (Brantford Expositor, 2006e; Gamble,
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Some of the most inflammatory statements made by Haldimand County residents, as well as
by the Hennings, were not touched upon here due to time and space constraints. Some of these
statements will be recounted in chapter 6.
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2006g, 2006f; Legall, 2006l). Yet, publicly, the Chief voiced neither support nor opposition to
the protest, while several members of the Band Council did voice public support for it (Legall,
2006g, 2006o; Hamilton Spectator, 2006c; Morse, 2006a; Gamble, 2006f; Canadian Press,
2006h; Best, 2006c).
Other examples of media neglect, omission, false reporting, and so forth abounded during the
2006 protest. Though providing a full discussion of these goes beyond the scope of this
dissertation, two more examples are worth giving. One of these is the example of the news
media’s reporting on the Supreme Court of Canada rulings. A federal or provincial government
refusing to follow its own federal Supreme Court rulings would seem like a major news story,
and there was certainly no loss of mention of the violations of these rulings by Haudenosaunee
protesters (or by the local Native press). Yet, only a single non-Native news article so much as
mentioned that there were Supreme Court of Canada rulings relevant to the protest, and this
mention was made only as a passing reference –failing to give the name of the specific rulings at
stake and lacking any description or explanation of what the rulings stated or how the protesters
felt they applied (Best, 2006e). The widespread omission of all mention of these rulings,
including that these ruling even existed, reflected both the deeply-entrenched routinization of the
processes through which non-Natives regularly discounted anything that Native protesters said,
and the complicity of non-Native reporters in the pursuit of federal and provincial policy
objectives, and in identifying as “fair game” Native peoples who asserted their land and treaty
rights. Further, by denying information on Canada’s legal system to interested non-Natives who
expected to be informed by media sources, the local and regional media not only aided in the
authorization of attacks on Haudenosaunee protesters, but it actually steered non-Native anger in
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the sole direction of denying Haudenosaunee claims and believing –unquestioningly—federal
and provincial politicians.
The second and last example is that of the media’s portrayal of Native protesters as angry and
potentially violent. This example is discussed more thoroughly in chapter 6, so while it is
important to mention here, it will not be discussed further in this chapter.
All of the above-discussed manipulation of facts through the language of illusion served to
dismiss and dehumanize Haudenosaunee protesters and their traditional government (and Native
people in general) during the 2006 Haudenosaunee protest, as well as to authorize and further
routinize attacks against them. None of these would have been possible or permissible to the
extent that they occurred if Native people had not already been historically set apart from
everyone else in Canada and made “fair game” for attack –i.e., if attack against them had not
already been a routinized part of non-Native life in Canadian society. Put simply, Native people
had long been “in the way” of various policy objectives pursued by the British-Canadian, and
now the Canadian and provincial governments. The primary policy objective pursued by these
governments historically and today has been the accumulation of capital –i.e., land, resources,
trust funds, and even cheap labor-- through the dispossession of Native peoples from all of these
forms of capital. The next section, which is the third and last section in this chapter, will provide
an overview of the Canadian and provincial government’s efforts towards these ends in the past
several decades, using the dispossession of the Haudenosaunee Six Nations as illustration.
ACCUMULATION BY DISPOSSESSION AND ONGOING HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS IN CANADA
The above examples of some of the ways in which government, media, and other authorities
misrepresented (and fabricated) facts surrounding the 2006 Haudenosaunee protest must be
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contextualized within a broader, more long-standing tendency within Canada to dehumanize
Native peoples while authorizing and routinizing violations of their human rights. Without this
broad, recent and more distant historical context, it seems unlikely that non-Natives locally and
nationally would have so quickly and unquestioningly discarded everything the Haudenosaunee
protesters stated, while embracing as true everything government officials, media representatives
and local authorities said. In fact, throughout Canada’s history local, regional and national
colonial authorities have repeatedly constructed narratives intended to discredit Native peoples
and to justify and promote the interests of non-Natives. These latter interests have generally
been focused on making personal, corporate or government gains through the dispossession of
Native peoples from their lands and resources. While the motives for such acts of dispossession
have largely remained the same over time, the internationally recognized human rights of
indigenous peoples have undergone dramatic changes, even in just the last decade. Further,
though the Canadian government has consistently opposed the international recognition of the
human rights of indigenous peoples (Joffe, 2010), it is nonetheless legally bound to follow these
human rights requirements for a number of reasons, including: it became a party to treaties and
conventions that have since been recognized to also apply to the human rights of indigenous
peoples; it both sought out and held a position on the Human Rights Committee, which requires
strict adherence to particular human rights standards; it is a party to the Organization of
American States Charter, which requires adherence to regional human rights standards; and
international customary law has recognized certain human rights standards as customary norms
or even peremptory norms (jus cogens), which are binding upon all states. Most of these reasons
will be discussed in the following sections. The next section will also examine the various
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reasons why the Canadian government might not be adhering to its international obligations
regarding the human rights of indigenous peoples.
Possible Reasons for the Canadian Government’s Failure to Adhere to International Standards
for the Human Rights of Indigenous Peoples
Despite the fact that the Canadian government is legally bound to uphold a number of
standards regarding the human rights of indigenous peoples, the vast majority of these standards
have not been implemented domestically, as the Canadian Senate itself noted in 2001:
Canada is not entirely fulfilling its international commitments…. Canadians and
international human rights bodies have begun to notice this gap. … [T]he
continued failure of governments in Canada to systematically address the
domestic legal implications of international human rights treaties it has
voluntarily ratified could leave this country open to charges of hypocrisy and has
the potential to diminish Canada’s moral authority as a leading voice for human
rights in the international arena. (Canada Senate, 2001; see also Canada Senate,
2007; Poverty and Human Rights Centre, 2007)
While there are a number of reasons why these human rights standards have not been
implemented the best overall explanation for this failure is the ongoing drive by government
officials and their corporate partners to accumulate capital through the dispossession of Native
peoples from their lands, resources and human rights. To demonstrate this, the various factors
influencing the Canadian government’s non-compliance with these human rights standards will
be briefly discussed below before the section proceeds with a discussion of some of the various
means through which the Canadian government is continuing to dispossess Native peoples from
their lands, resources and human rights.
The Canadian government’s failure to implement its international human rights obligations
has sometimes been attributed to Canada’s extreme dualist approach to international law (de
Mestral and Fox Descent, 2008). Under Canada’s dualistic approach to international law, the
executive branch can sign and ratify international treaties and conventions, but it is it is generally
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believed that specific legislation must be passed before these can have an effect in domestic law.
Though this approach represents perhaps the most extreme form of dualism of any developed
nation (de Mestral and Fox Descent, 2008: 582), Canadian governing bodies have argued that
this approach “safeguard[s] the democratic legislative process by ensuring that the laws and
rights of the people are not altered without the consent of their elected and appointed
representatives” (Canada Senate, 2001; de Mestral and Fox Descent, 2008: 581). Some have also
argued that this approach has promoted a lack of knowledge of Canada’s international human
rights obligations among legislators, in particular during the years from 1968 to 2008 when
treaties and conventions ratified by the Executive branch were not even tabled for review or
debate in the House of Commons (de Mestral and Fox Descent, 2008: 608-614).
As problematic as Canada’s extreme dualistic approach to international law may be, it cannot
fully explain the Canadian government’s failure to implement human rights treaties and
conventions because there are already a number of other legal mechanisms through which
international law can be, and is, integrated into Canada’s domestic law. Some of these
mechanisms include adoption, 420 the presumption of conformity, 421 inferred interpretation, 422
and consultation before ratification 423 (Joffe, 2010). But even more importantly, international
customary law 424 is a part of Canadian law, 425 and it has long been a rule of customary
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Through adoption customary or sometimes conventional international law is adopted into
domestic law.
421
Through the presumption of conformity, domestic law is presumed to have been made in
accordance with Canada’s customary and conventional international legal obligations.
422
Through inferred interpretation, interpretation of Canada’s constitution and/or domestic law is
to be informed by customary and conventional international human rights law.
423
Through consultation prior to ratification, the federal government does not ratify or bind
Canada to international treaties without first assuring that these treaties are consistent with
existing or developing domestic legislation.
424
Customary international law is concerned with patterns of behavior that are so frequently
followed by states as to be considered the norm. Once this norm is solidified, it becomes
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international law that treaty obligations must be honored (Vienna Convention, 1969, Article 26)
and that a state cannot use its internal law as an excuse for failing to implement the provisions of
a treaty by which it has bound itself (Ibid, Article 27). In other words, Canada’s international
human rights obligations are no less binding upon Canada simply because Canada has failed to
implement them. 426 And while some of the gap between the ratification and implementation of
Canada’s human rights obligations might be explained by a widespread lack of knowledge (de
Mestral & Fox-Descent, 2008: 611-12, 582; Canadian Senate, 2001) among legislators, judges
and lawyers, these are the very people who are supposed to be the most knowledgeable on all
recent developments in law. In other words, the same factors that lie behind the government
failure to implement Canada’s international human rights obligations also appear to lie behind
this lack of knowledge. This is clearly a problem of political will.
The lack of political will among members of the Canadian judiciary to promote and protect
(rather than persistently violate) the international human rights of indigenous peoples might be
partly explained through critical legal and historical-legal studies. For example, following in the
tradition of Gramsci (1971), Litiowitz (2000: 549) has explored the role of the legal system in

customary law. On the other hand, Conventional international law is that law which is regulated
by treaty agreements or conventions, each of which must be signed and ratified by individual
states. Those states that chose to sign and ratify these treaties and conventions are (depending on
the terms of the treaties and conventions) then legally bound to adhere to --and to implement-the terms of the treaty or convention domestically.
425
Customary international law is a direct source of domestic legal rules unless the legislature
takes explicit measures to ensure that a particular customary rule does not have the force of
domestic law. de Mestral & Fox-Decent, 2008, pp. 576-77 (citing R. v. Hape [2007] SCC 26,
[2007] 2 S.C.R. 292, 280 D.L.R. (4th) 385).
426
The Canadian Senate (2001) has acknowledged this:
International human rights obligations are no less binding upon us than our
domestic guarantees. … Signature and ratification of international human rights
treaties carries with it an obligation to submit to international scrutiny. But, in
addition, we have an obligation to effectively implement the rights within Canada
See also: Vienna Convention (1969, Article 26); Shelton (2008, pp. 59-60).
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legitimizing the actions of the state, supporting the interests of the powerful, and hiding its own
partial and unjust rulings through a “worldview dominant code in which [some] claims are not
afforded the status of rights.” Similarly, Williams (1982: 6) has remarked that the judiciary acts
as a mere reflection of extension of the “political will and attitude” of the state; Kennedy
(1979/1982: 34-35) has noted that the “legal system maintains the social structure of the
capitalist state;” and Lâm (2000: 16) has asserted that the Supreme Court is more than willing “to
supply whatever justification is needed for the actions of Congress.” All of these views fall in
line with Becker’s (1963) assertions that deviance is created/labeled by those with social power.
Other critical legal scholars concerned with the phenomenology of judging have noted that,
contrary to popular (hegemonic) perceptions that judges “find” the law, laws are not found but
made (Cohen, Haines, and Cardozo, in Shuchman, 1979). Further, they are made by individuals
who are drawn from the wealthiest and most privileged sectors of society (Devlin, 1995) and
who, drawing their legitimacy from the societal status quo, may have a strong tendency to avoid
decisions that challenge the legitimacy of this status quo (Williams, 2008). Because of this,
Haines (in Shuchman, 1979: 256) has noted that: “[a]s a rule, judge-made law represents the
conviction of an earlier age and is characterized by conservatism.” Judges have also been noted
to have strong predispositions towards the communities and institutions with which they most
identify (Shuchman, 1979: 235-262; Kennedy, 1987), and to have various personal biases that
impact the direction of their judicial rulings (Shuchman, 1979: 235-262; Kennedy, 1987).
Williams (2008) have even suggested that, in relation to the rights of indigenous peoples, many
judges may have “deep psychological needs” to see a particular outcome to a given case.
Because it is virtually always possible for a judge to decide “almost any question any way, and
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still be supported by an array of cases” (Cohen in Shuchman, 1979: 244) these desired outcomes
can frequently be easily justified by judges without any clear appearance of bias.
Yet, while this literature explains how and why judges acting in their own interests are also
acting in the interests of the powerful (with whom they likely identify) and the status quo (that
gives them legitimacy), it doesn’t explain why the Canadian status quo is stacked so steeply
against recognizing the human rights of indigenous peoples. This only becomes somewhat
clearer when one examines the tremendous profits that are being made from the dispossession of
indigenous peoples from their lands, resources, and human rights. A single example should
suffice to illustrate this point. The trust fund accounts missing from one First Nations community
in Canada, the Haudenosaunee, when calculated using the same compound interest methods that
governments and corporations use to calculate interest, exceed $400 billion (Six Nations Lands
and Resources, 2010). Historical documentation shows that this money was taken by BritishCanadian government officials, without the knowledge or consent of the Haudenosaunee, to pay
various government debts and to fund various public and private construction projects, and has
never been repaid. But this is only the money taken from the Haudenosaunee trust fund accounts.
When one adds in monies lost from resources taken from community lands without payment,
from outstanding unpaid rents and from lands wrongfully taken, the amount owed to this
Haudenosaunee community –when calculated at 6% compound interest-- is well into the trillions
of dollars and would bankrupt Canada if the government was ever required to repay it (Ibid).
Yet, the Canadian government continues to take from this community, approving, and even
mandating, settlement and development projects on lands under registered claim by the
Haudensaunee. Further, this community is only one of five Haudenosaunee communities in
Canada; and the Haudenosaunee are only one Confederacy of Native Nations out of hundreds of
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First Nations within Canadian borders –the vast majority of which also have extensive stories of
historical and ongoing dispossession. Clearly the capital that is being accumulated through the
dispossession of Native peoples from their lands, resources and human rights throughout Canada
is enormous.
The theoretical framework that best seems to explain what is happening here is David
Harvey’s theory of Accumulation by Dispossession (Harvey, 2003). According to Harvey,
capital’s insatiable appetite for new profit-making ventures constantly requires the exploitation
of something outside of itself in order to continue its process of accumulation (Harvey, 2003:
141). This ‘something outside’ can either be actively manufactured from within (such as through
budget cuts, austerity measures and/or massive lay-offs, which create downward pressure on
wages, and thus new profit-making ventures), or they can be pre-existing, non-capitalist
formations on the outside (such as new “empty lands,” new sources of raw materials, and/or noncapitalist social forms that can be co-opted and privatized, for example, education). In either
case, “[t]he state, with its monopoly of violence and definitions of legality, plays a crucial role in
both backing and promoting these processes” (Harvey, 2003: 145). To put it another way, the
Canadian government is aiding and abetting the dispossession of indigenous peoples from their
lands, resources and human rights because the state “couldn’t grow if it had to pay, because it
couldn’t afford to pay, so the simplest thing was just to take the land without paying.” 427
Dispossession by Legislation and Judicial Silence
One example of how the Canadian government is dispossessing indigenous peoples of their
lands, resources, and human rights is through the ongoing use of colonial era legislation that
allows the government to infringe upon the human right of self-determination. Protection of the
427

Williams (2008: 246) is talking about the dispossession of indigenous peoples within the
United States, but the same holds true for Canada.
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right of peoples to self-determination is one of the founding purposes of the United Nations, as
acknowledged in the United Nations Charter (1945). 428 This right has also been enshrined in a
number of international treaties and conventions to which Canada is a party (and by which
Canada is legally bound). For example, articles 1 of the International Convention on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) (1967) and the International Convention on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) (1967) both state that:
All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and
cultural development.
Though settler state governments such as the Canadian, United States, Australian and New
Zealand governments have argued that these rights apply only to states, the UN Human Rights
Committee has stated quite clearly that these rights apply to indigenous peoples and have
“bearing upon the obligations of states” towards them (Anaya, 2000:87). In fact, it would be
discriminatory to construct a lesser right of self-determination for indigenous peoples than for
everyone else (Lâm, 2006: 154; Joffe, 2010, 179-80, notes 321 and 322), and the Canadian
government is bound by both conventional and customary international law to refrain from
violating the norms against racial discrimination. 429 Further, the inherent right to selfdetermination is part of international customary law (Anaya, 2004: 97; Joffe, 2010: 133;
D’Amato, 1997: 136-38) 430 and is considered by some to be such a foundational human right as
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See also: Harvard Law School (2010: 33, note 93).
See for example: the International Covenant for the Elimination of all forms of Racial
Discrimination (ICERD) (1966); UN Charter (1945, article, 1 [on “respect for the principles of
equal rights and self-determination of peoples”]); also see ICCPR (1967, article 2(1)) and
ICESCR (1967) article 2(2)); Joffe (2010: 132 & 183, notes 65, 66, 344).
430
The Canadian judiciary acknowledged the right to self-determination as customary
international law in: Reference Re Session of Quebec ([1998]: para. 114)
429
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to be a prerequisite to the exercise of all other human rights, as well as a peremptory norm 431 and
a part of jus cogens 432 (Anaya, 2004: 97; Joffe, 2010: 133, Lâm, 2006: 155). As such, some have
even argued that, in cases where human rights comprising jus cogens are violated, concerns over
state sovereignty and territorial integrity “may be offset to the extent required by an appropriate
remedy,” 433 and international human rights law can take precedence over domestic laws that
violate these. 434
Under its international legal obligations, Canada is not only required to refrain from violating
Native peoples’ inherent right of self-determination, but it is also required to respect, protect and
promote this right 435 and to provide judicial remedies for domestic violations of this and other
human rights (ICCPR, 1967, article 2(3)). But though the Canadian government has
internationally recognized the inherent right to self-determination of indigenous peoples, 436
domestically it has only recognized the lesser right to indigenous peoples’ self-government of
indigenous peoples. 437 And though it has recognized this right as an inherent human right that is
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A norm from which no derogation is permitted.
The “compelling law” that all countries must follow.
433
“[S]ince the atrocities and suffering of the two world wars, international law does not much
uphold sovereignty principles when they would serve as an accomplice to the subjugation of
human rights or act as a shield against international concern that coalesces to promote human
rights. … [W]here there is a violation of self-determination and human rights, presumptions in
favor of territorial integrity or political unity of existing states may be offset to the extent
required by an appropriate remedy. Furthermore, heightened international scrutiny and even
intervention is justified in the degree to which violations of human rights are prone to lingering
unchecked by decisions makers within the domestic realm.” (Anaya, 2004: 109-10). See also:
Joffe (2010: 183-84).
434
“The right of self-determination is generally to be considered jus cogens…. Territorial
integrity, on the other hand, while a fundamental principle… does not enjoy this status” (Lâm,
2006, p. 155). See also: Anaya (2004: 109-10); Joffe (2010: 179-80, notes 321 and 322).
435
UN Charter (1945, article 56), ICCPR (1967, articles 1(3) and 2), ICESCR (1967, articles
1(3) and 2), Harvard Report (2010: 32, Note 87).
436
Canadian Statement to the UN Commission on Human Rights Working Group on the Draft
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Oct. 31, 1996 (quoted in Anaya, 2004: 111).
437
Canada. Minister of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development (MAAND) (1995/2005).
432
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protected under s. 35(1) of the Canadian Constitution Act, 1982, 438 it has continued to drastically
limit this right for First Nations throughout Canada 439 under colonial era legislation known as the
Indian Act (1985 s. 74) 440
The case of the Haudenosaunee can offer an illustration of how the Canadian government
attempts to limit the inherent right to self-determination. In 1924, after numerous attempts by the
Haudenosaunee to get an accounting from the Canadian government for what it did with
Haudenosaunee trust funds, lands, and resources, the Haudenosaunee sent a representative to
Britain and then to the League of Nations to seek international support. Though the
Haudenosaunee found some sympathy for their struggles abroad, their representative was not
allowed to present Haudenosaunee grievances to the League of Nations. Further, the Canadian
government retaliated against the Haudenosaunee for this international embarrassment,
outlawing the Haudenosaunee government (the Haudenosaunee Confederacy Council) and
orchestrating a raid upon the homes and Council House of the Haudenosaunee Chiefs by the
Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). The RCMP arrested Chiefs, broke open the
Haudenosaunee government safe, stole several Wampum belts, 441 built an army barracks, and
announced the imposition of a new system of government upon the Haudenosaunee people
(Woo, 2003). According to Cayuga sub-Chief Leroy Hill, in the supposedly “free elections” that
created the federally-funded, created and controlled Six Nations Band Council, only 13 or 14
people voted, and several people voted twice, creating a total of 27 votes in a community of
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MAAND (1995/2005), Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP) (2010: 38).
MAAND (1995/2005), Joffe (2010: 180-81).
440
For a fuller description of the various provisions of Canada’s Indian Act legislation see:
Mathias & Yabsley (1991).
441
Wampum belts are records of treaty agreements.
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thousands (Hill, quoted in Ahooja, 2008). With this move, the Canadian government claimed to
have brought “democracy” to the Haudenosaunee people. 442
Despite these claims, what the Canadian government really did was make it much easier to
dispossess the Haudenosaunee people without accountability. The Canadian Senate (2010) has
acknowledged as much, admitting that Band Council systems of government are far less
democratic than traditional Native systems of government, and far less accountable to their
constituents than they are to the Canadian government. For example, Menno Boldt remarked in
a Canadian Senate hearing:
[A]lthough band/tribal chiefs and councillors must seek the vote of their people,
their mandate to govern comes from DIAND [the Department of Indian Affairs
and Northern Development]. This puts elected Indian officials (chiefs and
councillors) and the appointed bureaucrats in an inevitable position of political
subordination to DIAND officials, rather than to the people who elect and appoint
them. (2010: 69)
Regardless of these observations, the Canadian government refused to acknowledge the still
existing and operating Haudenosaunee Confederacy Council for over 80 years, preferring instead
to work with the federally created, funded, and controlled Six Nations Band Council. By doing
so, the Canadian government was able to bypass the Haudenosaunee’s traditional system of
government which makes decisions based on consensus and which prohibits the sale or
alienation of land. As a representative system of government, rather than a participatory
democracy like the Haudenosaunee Confederacy Council, the Band Council can and does
frequently strike deals with federal or provincial governments or with corporations without the
approval of the Haudenosaunee community. In addition, as a federally funded, created, and
442

In addition to the less than democratic voter turnout, the irony here also lies in the fact that
most Native nations throughout the Americas were participatory democracies, and were far mare
democratic and inclusive than any western elected system that has been imposed upon them.
See, for example: Stannard (1992: 47-48, 110), Williams (1982: 12-13, 33), Akwesasne Notes
(2005: 34), Canada Senate (2010).
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controlled body of government, the Band Council is generally prohibited from seeking the
“return” of lands claimed by the Haudenosaunee, because doing so goes against Canadian
policy. 443
Dispossession Contrary to Supreme Court Rulings
The Canadian judiciary has largely remained silent on indigenous peoples’ human right to
self-determination, and on the lesser right, recognized (but drastically limited) by the Canadian
government to self-government. But in other instances, members of the judiciary have been quite
vocal in recognizing and protecting the some limited forms of the human rights of indigenous
peoples. While doing so may seem to break with the status quo in Canada, recognizing only a
limited version of the human rights of indigenous peoples actually reflects a strong reformist
strand within Canada’s societal status quo. This reformist strand does not appear to be intent on
disrupting or halting the ongoing dispossession of indigenous peoples in Canada, as Canadian
courts do not allow Native nations to veto infringements to their land rights (Haida, 2004 at 48)
and do not require that Native peoples consent to these infringements (Haida, 2004 at 48-49;
Delgamuukw, 1997 at 168). Instead, the reformist strand seeks to end the use of force employed
in the dispossession of Native peoples from their lands, resources and human rights, as well as to
more actively involve indigenous peoples in the projects that dispossess them through
compromises that possibly address some of the grievances of indigenous peoples in relation to
these projects (Haida, 2004 at 43-50). In other words, they seek to provide this process with
some legitimacy by requiring that the Canadian or provincial governments compromise in some
cases, depending upon “a preliminary assessment of the strength of the case supporting the
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This policy will be discussed further in the section on “Dispossession through judicial
assistance.”
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existence of the right or title, and to the seriousness of the potentially adverse effect upon the
right or title claimed”(Haida, 2004 at 39, 43-45).
However, these Supreme Court of Canada rulings do require that federal and provincial
governments engage in consultation with indigenous peoples at the earliest possible stages of
projects that might adversely impact outstanding Native rights and interests (Haida, 2004; Taku
River, 2004; Mikisew, 2005). Taking into account the extremely drawn out nature of Canadian
court or land claims processes, 444 and the Canadian government’s tendency to dismiss Native
claims outright 445 these court rulings have held that this consultation is mandatory regardless of
whether Native rights or interests have yet been proven in court. And though there is no right to
veto decisions and in some cases only a very minimal standard of consultation is required
(Haida, 2004 at 39), even in these cases the Court has held that consultation must be meaningful
(Mikisew, 2005 at 54); must be undertaken “in good faith, and with the intention of substantially
addressing the concerns of the aboriginal peoples whose lands are at issue;”(Haida, 2004 at 42)
and “cannot exclude from the outset any form of accommodation” (Mikisew, 2005 at 54). 446
These Canadian Supreme Court rulings meet a considerable portion of Canada’s legally
binding international human rights obligations to consult indigenous peoples with the objective
of obtaining their consent prior to making any decisions that might affect them (Human Rights
Council, 2009 at 43-44, 46; International Labor Organization (ILO) C 169, 1989, articles 15 &
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There are over 800 outstanding land claims registered in Canada, and new claims continue to
be registered every year. Through the Canadian land claims process it takes an average of 13
years to resolve a land claim, but claims can easily take two and even three decades before they
are resolved (Canada Senate, 2006).
445
See the next section on Dispossession through judicial assistance, which discusses Canada’s
policy of extinguishment.
446
“Consultation that excludes from the outset any form of accommodation would be
meaningless. The contemplated process is not simply one of giving the Mikisew an opportunity
to blow off steam before the Minister proceeds to do what she intended to do all along.”
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6(2)). This duty to consult is “firmly rooted in international human rights law”(Human Rights
Council, 2009 at 38), including several core international human rights treaties by which Canada
is bound, 447 as well as “the overarching right of indigenous peoples to self-determination”
(Human Rights Council, 2009 at 41). This duty is further grounded in the right of indigenous
peoples’ to sovereignty over natural resources (Harvard, 2010: 34 note 2) as well as the right to
cultural integrity, 448 (which is inextricably linked to rights to use their traditional lands and to
participate in decisions relating to that land 449) and the right to property and non-discrimination
(Human Rights Council, 2009 at 41). But under international law, states have more than just the
duty to consult Indigenous peoples, they have a duty to uphold a higher standard of Free, Prior
and Informed Consent (FPIC), 450 meaning that “even after the rights of others are fully and fairly
considered, the FPIC of Indigenous peoples must prevail”(Joffe, 2010: 191; Haida, 2004 at 24).
Both committees overseeing state adherence to the ICESCR and the ICERD have upheld the
FPIC standard in all matters directly relating to the specific rights of indigenous peoples. 451 In
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Article 1(2) of the ICCPR and the ICESCR, supra note 1 reads: “All peoples may, for their
own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any
obligations arising out of international economic co-operation, based upon the principle of
mutual benefit, and international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of
subsistence.” See also article 47 of the ICCPR and article 12 of the ICESCR, supra note 1 stating
that: “Nothing in the present Covenant shall be interpreted as impairing the inherent right of all
peoples to enjoy and utilize fully and freely their natural wealth and resources.”
448
ICCPR (1967, article 27); Human Rights Committee (1994, para. 7); CERD (1997 at paras. 4
(a) & (e)); CESCR (2009 at 7, paras. 36 & 37); Human Rights Council (2009 para. 41).
449
Harvard (2010: 36).
450
A few of the international human rights bodies and reports that have recognized FPIC as an
international human right include: CESCR, General Comment No. 21 (2009 at 37); ILO c. 169
(1989 article 4); UN Commission on Human Rights (2006 at 4, para. 11); United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) (2008 articles: 10, 11(2), 19, 28(1),
29(2), 32(2)); among other sources; CERD General Recommendation 23 (1997 at para 5).
451
CERD has called upon states to “[e]nsure that members of indigenous peoples have equal
rights in respect of effective participation in public life and that no decisions directly relating to
their rights and interests are taken without their informed consent” (CERD General
Recommendations 23, 1997); and the CESCR has stated that “[s]tate parties should respect the
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fact, the committee overseeing state adherence to the latter also recommended that states take
steps to return lands and territories taken from Indigenous peoples without free prior and
informed consent. 452
Regardless of these binding international human rights laws, and regardless of Canadian
Supreme Court rulings, the Canadian government has repeatedly refused to consult with Native
nations, 453 instead pushing ahead with resource extraction, development and settlement projects
on lands claimed by Native nations. These repeated refusals represent the other strand in the
Canadian status quo: those who remain grounded in an archaic, state-centered, Euro-centric,
positivist legal paradigm that justifies colonization and empire building through the use of
physical force. Adherents to this paradigm not only refuse to recognize the full expression of the
human rights of indigenous peoples (like most reformers), but also refuse to recognize that
indigenous peoples have human rights at all other than what individual states decide to grant
them. 454 Though many Native nations will not accept anything less than a full recognition of
their internationally recognized human rights, and thus criticize reformist efforts as being too
little too late, the failure of the Canadian and provincial governments to adhere to these reformist
efforts when expressed in Canada’s own Supreme Court rulings predetermines the further
principle of free, prior and informed consent of indigenous peoples in all matters covered by
their specific rights” (CESCR General Comment No. 21, 2009 at 7, para. 37).
452
CERD General Recommendations 23 (1997) (emphasis added). See also: Maya Indigenous
Communities of the Toledo District v. Belize (2004 paras. 115 & 117).
453
As has been repeatedly noted by both international human rights monitoring bodies and
international law scholars, some of the most recent of which include: Joffe (2010), CERD,
Concluding Observations (2012 at para. 20).
454
Both the Inter-American Commission and Court on Human Rights have held that the
Indigenous peoples’ rights to their lands originate from the laws and customs of Indigenous
peoples, and exist independently of a state’s conception or legal recognition of them. (Maya
Indigenous Communities of the Toledo District v. Belize (2004) at 117; Gunn, 2007, at 81). They
have both also held that states must take measures “aimed at restoring, protecting and
preserving the rights of indigenous peoples to their ancestral territories” (Maya Indigenous
Communities of the Toledo District v. Belize, 2004 at 115).
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alienation of indigenous peoples in Canada. In the face of these anti-reform efforts, Native
peoples in Canada are more likely to refuse to assimilate into Canadian hegemony and polity
because both are clearly demonstrated to be illegitimate. 455 And since national court systems,
like national political systems, are demonstrated to be incapable of delivering even a limited
form of human rights to Native peoples within Canada, acts of protest and occupation become
the only hope for many Native nations wishing to stop the illegitimate destruction of their lands
and the plundering of their resources and trust funds (Barvara, 2010; Enemark, 2010; Nishnawbe
Aski Nation, 2012; Diabo & Pasternak, 2011; Walker, 2011).
A prime example of this dynamic can again be found in the case of the Haudenosaunee.
Though the first two of these Supreme Court of Canada rulings were passed in 2004 (Haida,
2004; Taku River, 2004), in 2005 the Ontario government passed legislation mandating
settlement and development quotas on lands on which the Haudenosaunee still claim ownership
and outstanding rights. Though the Haudenosaunee repeatedly requested that the Canadian and
Ontario governments fulfill their consultation duties, both governments persistently refused to
engage in even the most minimal form of consultation, treating the lands in question as if they
were provincial lands. Similarly, after an additional Supreme Court of Canada ruling mandating
consultation was passed in 2005 (Mikisew, 2005), various construction and development projects
were approved and/or started on lands under Haudenosaunee claim. The Haudenosaunee again
made repeated demands that both the Canadian and Ontario governments consult with them
before allowing these projects to move ahead, but both the Canadian and Ontario governments
repeatedly refused to even acknowledge their duty to do so. In many ways, these persistent
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Nothing in this statement should be interpreted to suggest the author is advocating
assimilation. On the contrary, the author is advocating nothing less than full recognition,
protection and promotion by the Canadian government of the entire range of indigenous peoples
internationally-recognized human rights.
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refusals by the Canadian and Ontario governments forced the Haudenosaunee to choose between
giving up their lands forever or occupying construction sites in protest. The Haudenosaunee
chose the latter route, and began a peaceful yet determined protest on a tract of land in
Caledonia, Ontario in February 2006, stating that federal consultation with their traditional
government was one of the requirements for the end of the protest. Federal officials refused to
oblige the Haudenosuanee, and instead launched a pre-dawn police raid on the protesters some
two months into the protest. The federal government’s ongoing refusals to acknowledge the
Haudenosaunee’s legitimate grievances gave non-Native residents the impression that there were
no legitimate grievances, and sparked a series of anti-protest (and in some cases, anti-Native)
counter rallies and “near riots” (Harries & Rusk, 2006) in the community which is still struggling
to heal from this turmoil six years later.
The whole situation, which virtually destroyed otherwise amicable relations between Native
and non-Native locals and cost the province millions of dollars, could have been easily avoided
had the Canadian and Ontario governments simply consulted with the Haudenosaunee. But
government officials reportedly did not want to send the “wrong message” to indigenous peoples
across Canada who may also have been contemplating protests over their own human rights
grievances.
Dispossession Through Judicial Assistance
Other members of the Canadian judiciary are not always as reform minded as Canada’s
Supreme Court justices, and many lower court judges frequent demonstrate the same antireformists tendencies as the Canadian and provincial governments. To provide an example of
this I will turn again to the case of the Haudenosaunee. As mentioned above, when
Haudenosaunee people felt symbolically forced into a corner in 2006, with both provincial and
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federal refusals to recognize their Supreme Court mandated rights to consultation and
accommodation (much less their human rights to FPIC), they occupied a tract of land under
Haudenosaunee claim, halted development on the land, and demanded that the federal
government enter into talks with their traditional government in order to resolve outstanding
Haudenosaunee claims on the land. Under the Canadian Constitution, only the federal
government can resolve Native land claims, and only the federal government has jurisdiction
over “Indians and Lands reserved for Indians” (Constitution Act, 1867, s. 91(24); Wilkins,
2003). However, the Canadian government persistently refused to acknowledge its sole
jurisdiction in the matter, and repeatedly insisted that the protest was a local matter that needed
to be resolved by the Ontario Provincial Police.
In the jurisdictional vacuum that resulted, a provincial court judge asserted his jurisdiction
over the dispute. Entirely ignoring his constitutional lack of jurisdiction in the matter, as well as
the above-discussed Supreme Court of Canada rulings, the judge issued a series of injunctions
criminalizing the Haudenosaunee protesters and ordering police to remove them, using physical
force if necessary. The provincial court judge –who also owned land under Haudenosaunee
claim 456-- justified his assertion of jurisdiction over the protest by claiming that the issues in his
court were not about land at all, but were about the protesters’ contempt of court for refusing to
heed previous provincial court injunctions demanding they move off of the land (Legall, March
17; Gamble, March 18). Despite these assertions, the judge also admitted that the case was, in
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The judge was asked by the Haudenosaunee to remove himself from the case on the basis that
his ownership of several parcels of land under Haudenosaunee claim constituted a conflict of
interest, but after a brief self-review process the judge said he found no evidence of a conflict of
interest --noting that virtually all judges owned land under claim by the Haudenosaunee and that:
“[t]he land I own was acquired through the legal system… it’s the only legal system we have
here.” ( Legall, 2006, March 17; Gamble, 2006, March 18). The former assertion appears to have
been true, as even the courthouse where the hearing was held was built on lands under
Haudenosaunee claim.
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fact, about land when he justified his injunctions against the protesters on the grounds that, under
Canada’s policy and practice of extinguishment, the Haudenosaunee would never regain
recognition of title to their lands anyway. Therefore, the best course of action for the judge was
to weigh the “balance of convenience” in the case, which required avoiding the ‘undue
inconvenience’ that the Haudenosaunee protest was creating for the development company
(Legall, March 18; Best, March 22). This was exactly the type of scenario that the Supreme
Court of Canada had sought to avoid in its rulings mandating government consultation, as noted
by the court in Haida (2004 at 14):
[T]he balance of convenience test tips the scales in favour of protecting jobs and
government revenues, with the result that Aboriginal interests tend to “lose”
outright pending a final determination of the issue, instead of being balanced
appropriately against conflicting concerns (Haida, 2004 at 14)
Aside from his explicit disobedience to Supreme Court of Canada rulings (and the Canadian
Constitution), in citing the Canadian government’s policy of extinguishment as part of the basis
for his ruling, the judge also directly violated another of Canada’s international, legally-binding
human rights obligations: Canada’s obligation to end its practice of extinguishment. Under
Canada’s policy and practice of extinguishment, the Canadian government refuses to “return”
lands wrongly taken from Native nations, and demands that Native nations sign away all title,
rights, and interests on their lands before the Canadian government will enter into negotiations
aimed at resolving their outstanding land claims (Orkin, 2003: 446, 448, 453; Epstein, 2002: 512). By persistently reasserting this policy, federal and provincial governments and legal systems
routinely operate as if they can entirely disregard Native title and/or rights on their traditional
lands --because government policy basically requires that these be extinguished (Ibid). This
government policy and practice, however, has also been repeatedly cited and condemned by
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international human rights monitoring bodies including the CESCR (1998 at 18), 457 the UN
Human Rights Committee (1999), and the CERD (2002 at 17). In response to these international
criticisms, the Canadian government renamed the practice (Orkin, 2003 at 453; Grand Council of
the Crees, 2001; Kairos, 2006) and continue it per usual while claiming that “extinguishment”
was no longer the practice in Canada. This response provoked additional criticism from both the
CESCR (2006 at 16) and the Human Rights Committee (2005), 458 as well as from the UN High
Commissioner of Human Rights (2004 at paras. 99, 19-32) who noted that “from a human rights
perspective,” the “text and spirit” of any agreement between Canada and Native nations should
clearly establish:
[T]hat no matter what is negotiated, the inherent and constitutional rights of
Aboriginal peoples are inalienable and cannot be relinquished, ceded or released,
and that Aboriginal peoples should not be requested to agree to such measures in
whatever form or wording. 459
In fact, international human rights law is increasingly recognizing a right to restitution for
violations of these human rights and/or for property wrongly taken. For example, CERD has
called upon states to:
[T]o recognize and protect the rights of indigenous peoples to own, develop,
control and use their communal lands, territories and resources and, where they
have been deprived of their lands and territories traditionally owned or otherwise
inhabited or used without their free and informed consent, to take steps to return
those lands and territories. 460
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“The Committee… endorses the recommendations of RCAP that policies which violate
Aboriginal treaty obligations and the extinguishment, conversion or giving up of Aboriginal
rights and title should on no account be pursued by the State Party.”
458
“The State party should re-examine its policy and practices to ensure they do not result in
extinguishment of inherent aboriginal rights….”
459
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. Mission to Canada, Addendum: Report of the
Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous
Peoples, Rodolfo Stavenhagen, UN ESCOR, 61st Session, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2005/88/Add.3 (2
December 2004) at para. 99, also see paras. 19-32.
460
CERD General Recommendation 23, (1997 para. 5) (emphasis added). See also: Shelton
(2008: 59-60); Maya Indigenous Communities of the Toledo District v. Belize (2004 at 115).
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Section Conclusion
The above is just a partial exploration into some of the ongoing violations of the human rights of
indigenous peoples in Canada, and some of the legislative and judicial mechanisms involved in
dispossessing indigenous peoples from their land, resource, treaty and human rights. While
Canada’s extreme dualistic perspective to international law might explain a small portion of
these ongoing human rights violations, the numerous other mechanisms available for
domestically implementing Canada’s international, and legally binding, human rights obligations
demonstrate that the problem is not merely about Canada’s internal political processes. Further,
though the above-examined evidence clearly supports the historical-legal and critical legal
studies literature that describe legal systems as tools of state hegemony and enforcers of the
status quo, or that describes judges as upper class individuals with various institutional and
personal stakes in seeing cases decided in a particular way, this literature does not explain why
the Canadian status quo is what it is. The theory that best describes the political and legal
motives for continuing to dispossess Canada’s indigenous peoples of their land, resource, treaty
and human rights is David Harvey’s (2003) theory of Accumulation by Dispossession.
Yet, while Canada’s ongoing dispossession of indigenous peoples is, like outright theft,
highly conducive to capital accumulation, the Canadian government has come under increasing
criticism in recent decades for its plummeting human rights record pertaining to the human rights
of indigenous peoples (Joffe, 2010). Despite this escalating criticism, in the past decade the
Canadian government has done virtually nothing of substance to curb these abuses and the
resulting criticisms. Instead, it has escalated them both in opposing developments in the human
rights of indigenous peoples abroad (Joffe, 2010) and in ignoring Supreme Court rulings and
fast-tracking environmental oversight for settlement and development projects (McCarthy &
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Ibbitson, 2012), many of which will take place on lands claimed by indigenous peoples. In
doing so, the Canadian government is setting the stage for increased conflict with and protests by
First Nations peoples whose domestic and international human rights are being entirely
disregarded. The Canadian government is also violating additional, legally binding international
human rights obligations. As international legal scholar Paul Joffe (2010: 140-41) has noted:
“[n]o other people in Canada are automatically subjected to such consistently adverse and
discriminatory treatment.” Whether looking at indigenous peoples’ inherent right to selfdetermination, their rights to Free, Prior, and Informed Consent, or their rights to enjoy their
lands, resources and rights without the constant threat and requirement of extinguishment, the
Canadian is persistently engaging in human rights violations that are “racially motivated” and
“applied exclusively and prejudicially to indigenous peoples” who do not enjoy the same legal
protections for their properties and human rights as all other people within Canada (Epstein,
2002. 50, 53-54). Though indigenous peoples have collective human rights that are in some ways
different from the individual human rights of the majority of the people living within Canada, the
Canadian government should afford these rights the same level of protection as is afforded to the
human rights of all other people within its borders. To fail to do so is adversarial and
discriminatory, as has been repeatedly noted by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination (CERD, 2007 at 21 & 22; CERD, 2002 at 17; CERD 2008).
For all of these reasons, there is a mounting crisis of political and legal legitimacy in Canada
and it does not appear that steps will be taken to mitigate or reverse this growing crisis any time
soon. It does, however, appear that there is a growing awareness and concern regarding Canada’s
ongoing human rights violations internationally, as well as domestically (Canada Senate, 2001;
Joffe, 2010), as well as a growing recognition that restitution and/or payment of reparations for
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breach of international obligations is supported in international law (CERD, 1997 at 5; Maya
Indigenous Communities of the Toledo District v. Belize, 2004 at 115; Shelton, 2008: 59-60), and
that the failure to provide restitution “engages the international responsibility of the states”
(Maya Indigenous Communities of the Toledo District v. Belize, 2004 at 115, 117; Gunn, 2007 at
81; Lâm, 2006: 152) and may offset state rights to sovereign, territorial integrity to the extent
required by international intervention towards finding an appropriate remedy (Anaya, 2004: 109;
Joffe, 2010: 179-80, 183-84; Lâm, 2006: 55). This means that the Canadian government has
maneuvered itself into a difficult position, and unless it takes immediate steps to remedy the
ongoing wrongs committed against indigenous peoples within its borders and to restore to them
lands that have been wrongfully taken and rights that have been wrongfully disregarded, it may
soon find itself in a lose-lose situation where its ability to govern is threatened by internationally
and domestically plummeting legitimacy, and its ability to enhance this legitimacy is threatened
by its inability to afford the restitution owed to indigenous peoples without bankrupting the
country. Only time can tell if the Canadian government will wise up and acknowledge its
responsibilities to indigenous peoples before it finds itself in this lose-lose situation. Judging
from past and current government actions, however, the prognosis is quite bleak.
CHAPTER CONCLUSION
As has been demonstrated, the historical patterns through which non-Natives have accumulated
gains through the dispossession indigenous peoples from their lands and resources are not only
ongoing in Canada, but constitute a social norm that is deeply engrained in the Canadian psyche.
Government policies and practices have perpetually reinforced this norm through the processes
of authorizing and routinizing the dispossession and dehumanization of Native peoples, all for
the pursuit of policy objectives (primarily, non-Native capital accumulation). The effects of
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these policies and practices upon non-Native attitudes towards Native peoples, in particular how
these played out in the 2006 Haudenosaunee protest, will be examined in chapter 6. But first,
chapter 5 will examine the underlying foundations of the above-discussed forms of
dispossession: the Canadian government’s assertion of sovereignty over Native peoples.
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Chapter 5
Sovereignty 461
We have every right to stand here and call ourselves a nation. We need that spirit
to enter this.
~ Haudenosaunee Confederacy Sub-Chief Leroy Hill, March 27, 2006, quoted in
Best 2006b
It is scarcely necessary to point out that as international law is a product of the
special civilization of modern Europe, and forms a highly artificial system of
which the principles cannot be supposed to be understood or recognised by
countries differently civilized, such states only can be presumed to be subject to it
as are inheritors of that civilization.
~ Hall 1924
The European description [of European-Native relations] has often been based
on political expediency rather than historical fact, and governments have not
hesitated to rewrite history where convenient. … [Laws are] merely a reflection
of the political will of a government or a sovereign, which the court has limited
powers to interpret… It is rare that courts have acted as anything but an
extension of the state’s political will and attitudes. When they have, the laws have
been changed to set the courts back on course.
~ Williams 1982
The conflicting ideas represented in the fist two introductory quotes reflect the diametrically
opposed worldviews that are at the heart of all of Canada’s ongoing violations of the rights of
indigenous peoples (discussed in chapter 4). The Haudenosaunee, like many Native nations
throughout North America, insist that they never surrendered the sovereignty that they have
exercised over their lands and resources since time immemorial. Meanwhile, the Canadian
government, like other settler state governments, has asserted that it holds sole sovereignty over
all First Nations people and lands that are located within Canadian borders. Also like other
settler state governments, the Canadian government has largely justified this assertion through
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Note to the reader: this chapter is really just a partial draft of a longer paper that still needs
plenty of work. As a result, much of the information that I would like to include to make my
argument is, unfortunately, not included here, and much of what is included here is not nearly as
complete or well-written as I would prefer. My arguments here are therefore partial, and readers
should look to future work rather than rely alone upon this chapter.
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reference to an 1823 U.S. Supreme Court ruling that relied on interpretations of medieval
Christian legal concepts such as discovery, conquest, and terra nullius (Johnson v. M’Intosh,
1823). However, this paper argues that, at the time Europeans invaded North American shores,
these concepts did not have legal force that was attributed to them by U.S. Supreme Court Chief
Justice John Marshall or successive legal scholars. Though these concepts were ever-present
fixtures in settler rhetoric and anti-Native sentiment from the start of the European invasion of
North America, these concepts did not form the basis of international law during the period in
question, and thus do not provide a justification for European assertions of sovereignty over
Native peoples and their territories. Rather, European assertions of sovereignty over territories
that had not been acquired by Native nations constitute actions that ran contrary both to
international law and, often, to the laws of the respective European sovereigns. Consequently,
there was (and is) no legal justification for these assertions of sovereignty, and settler state
governments will eventually have to reconcile with this fact and begin the long and painful
process of reexamining these assertions in light of this reality.
CURRENT SOCIOLEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
There is a growing body of literature that examines the doctrines of discovery, conquest, and
terra nullius as they were used by U.S. Supreme Court Justice John Marshall’s 1823 decision in
Johnson v. M’Intosh to justify the past and ongoing dispossession of Native peoples within the
borders then claimed by the United States. Arguing that the concepts which formed the basis for
Johnson’s 1823 ruling constituted a legal, but immoral, basis for European assertions of
sovereignty over Native peoples, many of the preeminent scholars on this issue have been a part
of the international campaign to raise awareness and to pressure the Catholic Church to renounce
its historic and present day support for the doctrines. Such scholars include –but are not limited
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to-- Miller (2006), Miller & D’Angelis (2012), Newcomb (2008 & 2010), Frichner (2010), and
Keal (2003). While the Pope has consistently refused to meet with Indigenous activists on this
issue, and the Catholic Church has not yet issued any formal statement either way on the
continuing (and original) validity of these medieval concepts, the campaign has met with
considerable success in other areas – such as through renunciation of the concepts by individual
churches and denominations (see for example: Native News Network, 2012; Sison, 2010;
Toensing, 2009), and condemnation of these concepts by international human rights monitoring
bodies (which will be discussed more later).
While there is a generally agreement among scholars as to the problematic, racist, Christianand Western-centric nature of these concepts, other scholars have expressed some disagreement
on the extent to which particular concepts were relied on by Western Europeans who asserted
sovereignty over Native lands and peoples during the half-millennium of European imperial
colonization. For example, examining the British quest for property in nineteenth century South
Africa, Bennett & Powell (1999: 458, 455-56) trace the evolution of the concept of terra nullius
over time and argue that, according to both state practice and the original meaning of the term, it
could never have justified taking the property of a people who had some form of social
organization (including nomads), no matter when this concept was applied. McNeil (2000: 11)
likewise argues that though discovery and effective possession allowed Europeans to acquire
sovereignty over terra nullius lands, if these lands truly belonged to no other sovereign, Native
nations in the Americas fit the criteria for sovereign nationhood just as much as fledging
European nation-states did at the time (see also: Miller, 2009: 3; Lenzerini, 2006: 163). Thus, the
doctrine of terra nullius could not have provided legal justification for European assertions of
sovereignty over Native peoples on these continents. Of course, despite this, some Europeans
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sought ways to define lands inhabited by Native nations as terra nullius, but according to McNeil
(1999: 12) European discovery claims to lands that were not truly terra nullius were rarely taken
seriously by other European nations unless these claims were also accompanied by effective
possession and control over the territory.
Others, such as Lenzerini (2006: 164), argue that, with one exception, European nations
routinely used the concept of terra nullius to justify taking lands from non-Western peoples and
asserting sovereignty over them. 462 Damrosch et al. (2009: 377) make a similar argument but, in
doing so, apply a conservative, nineteenth-century definition of the term to 1648 international
law. As such, they assert that terra nullius allowed European nations to take any lands that they
discovered, so long as these lands were not already claimed by other European nations. Such an
assertion directly contradicts the above-noted arguments of McNeil (2000) (who does not limit
other nations to other European nations) and Bennet & Powell (1999) (who note that the concept
of terra nullius in 1648 held a completely different meaning than the nineteenth-century concept
associated with the same term). While these discrepancies have the potential to produce
considerable confusion, most of these scholars note that, since the 1975 Western Sahara
Advisory Opinion, terra nullius claims –regardless of when they were made—are inapplicable to
lands that were already inhabited by peoples with any form of social organization (Damrosch et
al., 2009: 378; Lenzerini, 2006: 164; Bennett & Powell, 1999: 455, 459; see also: Lâm, 2006:
152). The Australian High Court in Mabo v. Queensland (1975, paras. 40-42) reinforced this
finding that terra nullius does not and never did serve as a legal justification for taking Native
lands (see also Lenzerini, 2006: 167, 169; Lâm, 2006: 152; Borrows, 1999: 548). In other words,
regardless of how European sovereigns intended to justify their assertions of sovereignty over
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According to Lenzerini (2006: 164), the “only significant exception” to this was the February
6, 1840 Treaty of Waitangi between the Maori of New Zealand and the British Crown.
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Native lands and peoples during their invasion of the Americas, the concept of terra nullius
cannot serve as a justification for these assertions, and any assertions based upon this concept
must be retroactively re-examined in this light.
While that seems simple enough, these is somewhat less agreement on the historical use of
the other terms: discovery and conquest. Kades (2008: 9, 23), Williams (2008: 243), 463 Berman
(1992: 132), McNeil (1999: 14), O’Malley (2000: 10), and Wolfe (2006: 390) all agree that
European claims to discovery were only ever intended to regulate intra-European relations, and
that Europeans making such claims held no pretensions that the claims had an impact on
European-Native relations. As such, it is difficult to see how anyone could reason that such
claims did impact European-Native relations by superseding Native sovereignty with European
sovereignty. Further, many writers have agreed with McNeil’s (1999) assertions that European
claims to have exclusive rights (among Europeans) to particular portions of the Americas were
widely considered as invalid by competing European sovereigns when these claims were based
on discovery alone. For example, Berman (1992: 133 note 28, quoting Geobel) argues that
claims based on discovery were seen by competing European sovereigns as little more than
“fugitive political argument[s] advanced by a chancellery that was unable to find adequate
support in accepted international customs.”
As a result, many European Nations sought to supplement their discovery-based claims to
exclusivity with other sources of authority, such as papal bulls or Crown charters (Lenzerini,
2006: 164; McNeil, 1999: 11, 12). But even when claims of discovery were combined with
these other forms of “authority,” they were still frequently disregarded by other European nations
[and eventually discredited by both the British Privy Council and the US Supreme Court
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Williams (2008) is primarily talking about the meaning of the term in Marshalls 1823
Johnson v. M’Intosh ruling.
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(McNeil, 1999: 13, note 20)]. As illustration of this point, the 1493 papal bull Intercartera was
ignored by virtually all competing European states, including Britain (Berman, 1992: 132, 133
note 27; Frichner, 2010: 9; MacMillan, 2006). In fact, it was only when discovery claims to
exclusivity were accompanied by actual, effective possession of the territory that other European
sovereigns would take these claims more seriously (MacMillan, 2006; Jennings, 1988: 110), and
even then there could be considerable disagreement resulting in warfare among European
sovereigns, as was the case in the ongoing wars between the British and French (as well as the
Spanish to the south, and the Dutch and Swedes in earlier periods of European invasion of the
continent) (see for example: Berman, 1992; Taylor, 2006; Arneil, 1996). To this extent,
Williams (2008: 243-44) argues that Native lands weren’t taken through claims of discovery;
they were taken through an immoral conquest that Americans haven’t yet been able to come to
terms with because it contradicts their self-image of legitimacy and morally purity.
In fact, a number of other scholars have come to similar conclusions as Williams (2008),
arguing that the only legitimate way for Europeans to have asserted their sovereignty over Native
lands and/or peoples was to have first acquired these lands through conquest in a just war or
through consensual agreement with Native peoples --i.e., treaty agreements of surrender. Kades
(2008: 108) and McNeil (2000: 15) suggest that this was the black letter of Marshall’s 1823
ruling in Johnson v. M’Intosh (as well as his 1832 Worcester v. Georgia ruling), and a growing
number of scholars have also held that the only two legitimate legal means for acquiring
sovereignty and/or territory in North America (Bennett & Powell, 1999: 456; Berman, 1992; see
also, to an extent, Jennings, 1988: 107, 111-12). To this extent, Jennings (1976 & 1988) argues
that the dispossession of Native nations in what is now the United States was accomplished not
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through the normal course of conquest, but through a more ominous form of “double
conquest”(p. 122).
However, according to many, during the time that Europeans were invading North America,
there were numerous criteria that had to be met in order for territory to be taken through
conquest. For example, a war of conquest had considered “just,” and the behavior of conquering
nations post-conquest was further limited by a wide number of restrictions, such as leaving
conquered populations in possession of their property and, often, living under the control of their
own laws, among other constraints (see: Berman, 1992: 133, note 29; Kades, 2008: 15, 108;
Bennett & Powell, 1999: 456-57; Banner, 2005: 17-18). 464 Because of this, a number of scholars
have argued that the conditions surrounding the dispossession of Native peoples in North
America do not reflect conquest (Kades, 2008; Berman, 1992; Bennett & Powell, 1999; Banner,
2005). The United States Congress, and various Canadian Supreme Court rulings have
concurredat least with regards to the vast majority of lands (see, for example: Kades, 2008: 17;
R. v. Van der Peet, 1996; see also Banner, 2005: 26).
To this extent, even Supreme Court Justice John Marshall acknowledged that the
circumstances surrounding the dispossession of Native peoples throughout the Americas did not
represent actual conquest. Most historians concur, describing long-standing historical relations
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“Military conquest alone, however, did not give the conquering state sovereign rights.
Sovereignty was the product of three factors in addition to military success: the conquest must
have been firmly established –so long as warfare continued, no annexation could be effective in
international law; subjugation must have been complete –the enemy must have ceased to exist as
a political entity in the territory at issue and the fate of that territory left to the unilateral
disposition of the conqueror; a formal annexation must have been effected, amounting to the
assimilation of the territory to the dominions of the conquering state. Even a total victory would
not produce a transfer of sovereignty if the victorious powers disclaimed any intention to annex
the occupied territory” (Berman, 1992: 133, note 29). Banner (2005: 17-18) and Bennett &
Powell (1999: 456) likewise remark upon the conditions required for a war of conquest to be
just, though contrast this with Tuck (1999) and Keal (2003).
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and conditions that do not fully reflect any of the requirements of conquest as it was understood
by international law at the time. Thus, Jennings (1988: 122) refers to this dispossession as a
“double conquest,” acknowledging that what was done to Native peoples in North America was
quite different from the rules governing just causes of conquest and just behavior of conquerors
at the time. In fact, Jenning’s discussion of the long and painful process of dispossession are
more reflective of fraud, coercion and vigilante violence, none of which reflect actual conquest
through a just war, but reflect illegitimate actions and behaviors that would have been illegal
under international laws as well as the laws of respective European sovereigns.
Taylor (2006), Harring (1998a & 1998b), and Stannard (1992: 104-15) likewise discuss the
process of dispossession of Native peoples in the eastern United States and Canada. Few of
these processes reflect conquest through a just war, though European settlers of New England
(see Stannard, 1992: 105-07) apparently made some attempt to forge the appearance of just war
conquest –demonstrating that they understood there were laws governing just war conquest (see
also: Banner, 2005; McNeil, 2000; Venn, 2002; Linden in Ipperwash Inquiry, 2005). While
some of these attempts resemble the behavior and justifications made by Europeans in South
America over a century earlier (some of which were considered conquest) (Mohawk, 2000;
Stannard, 1992; Miller & D’Angelis, 2012; Todorov, 1982), by the time the English were
asserting their claims in New England the acceptable behavior of Europeans and the accepted
causes of “just war” had changed considerably (see Jahn, 2000, also see below discussion on
developments in international law). Thus, according to this line of argument, with the exception
of an extremely miniscule portion of North America, European sovereign powers did not achieve
territorial sovereignty, nor acquire property, over Native lands and peoples through conquest
(Berman, 1992: 133, note 29; Kades, 2008: 15, 108; Bennett & Powell, 1999: 456-57; Banner,
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2005: 17-18; O’Malley, 2000; see also: Jennings, 1988). As Banner (2005: 6) notes: “What kind
of conqueror takes such care to draft contracts to keep up the appearance that no conquest is
taking place?” Banner’s answer to this question is simply: “A conqueror that genuinely does not
think of itself as one.” This paper suggests the answer to this question is: a conqueror that has no
legal right to conquer, that is aware of this fact, and that desperately seeks to justify its actions by
making the circumstances around them appear to be different than they were. 465 As has been
said of exclusivity claims based on discovery, assertions of sovereignty based on conquest
appear to be little more than a “fugitive political argument advanced by a chancellery that was
unable to find adequate support in accepted international customs” (Berman, 1992: 133 note 28,
quoting Geobel on European claims of discovery).
However, there is no consensus on this point in the literature, and scholars such as Keal
(2003), Williams (2008), Miller (2006), Miller & D’Angelis (2012), Newcomb (2008 & 2010),
Frichner, 2010), Lenzerini (2006: 164 & 2008: 11) and Wolfe (2006: 391) still rely heavily upon
the concept of conquest –or upon some combination of conquest, discovery, terra nullius and
possession/occupation—to explain the dispossession of Native peoples from their inherent
sovereignty over themselves and their territories. Further, even among those who argue that
conquest was not a significant factor in the dispossession of Native peoples throughout North
America, there is still not agreement upon what were significant factors. For example, while
Banner (2005), who invests considerable effort in convincing the reader that the territories of
Native peoples were not acquired through conquest, discovery, or terra nullius, he nonetheless
insists that, though Native lands were not taken through these means, Native sovereignty was.
This is because, according to Banner, Europeans never recognized Native sovereignty and
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In this way, we can say that very little has changed from the invasion of the Americas five
centuries ago to the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan a mere decade ago.
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consistently held it as a given that European discoverers could and did impose their sovereignty
upon Native peoples without their consent (p. 7). Others, including Wolfe (2006: 391) and many
other writers who rely on the concepts of conquest, discovery, terra nullius and
occupation/possession similarly make this assumption, but all of these accounts lack further
explanation, particularly in the face of the contradictory facts that abound.
The rest of this paper will consider these facts, as well as the differing conceptions of
sovereignty between Native and non-Native peoples, and the changes in international law as it
developed over time. The paper will argue that none of these legal concepts –conquest,
discovery, terra nullius (or “vacant lands”)—were applicable to the European assertions of
sovereignty over lands and peoples in North America. Instead, these legal concepts, even at the
time of the European invasion of North America, had little-to-no bearing (outside of promoting
European attitudes of superiority) on actual European-Native relations. Further, there were no
legal concepts that clearly justified the European assertion of sovereignty over Native lands and
peoples, and this assertion was thus neither consistently nor unanimously made at any point
before the Revolutionary War or the two decades which followed the war and preceded
Marshall’s 1823 Supreme Court ruling in Johnson v. M’Intosh. Thus, in this ruling, Supreme
Court Chief Justice John Marshall re- (mis-) interpreted these medieval concepts, and re-wrote
them altogether, in ways that would justify the outcome that he sought.
THE PAPAL BULLS AND BACKGROUND TO THE INTERNATIONAL DEBATE
Under the mentality of the Crusades, the Inquisition and the witch-hunt, massacring, enslaving
and/or taking the lands of non-Western/non-Christian peoples needed increasingly little –if any-specific justification. The blanket justifications long provided by the Church for such activities
left those engaged in them virtually immune to criticisms from anyone who did not wish to
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become a target (Mohawk, 2000; Jennings, 1976: 3-5). Thus, when the Portuguese killed,
captured, enslaved, and seized the lands of the Gaunches of the Canary Islands, they did so
without making even the slightest effort to justify their actions (Mohawk, 2000: 101-02). A few
decades into their rampage (which lasted from 1402 to the 1490s), the Pope gave his blessing
nonetheless, through a series of papal bulls authorizing first Portugal to invade the lands of
Muslims, pagans, “and other non-believers and enemies of Christ wherever they may be,” and to
reduce them to “perpetual slavery,” to take their possessions, and to assert European/Catholic
dominion over their lands (quoted from: Pope Nicholas V, 1452 and Wikipedia, 2012b. See
also: Pope Nicholas V., 1455 & 1456; Mohawk, 2000: 100-04; Miller & D’Angelis, 2012;
Jennings, 1976: 4-5). 466 These declarations created a rift between Portugal and Spain, the latter
of which wanted a piece of the action and took up the invasion of the Canary Islands in the 1490s
(Mohawk, 2000: 100).
As mentioned in chapter 2, the Church was very much a --when not the-- dominant power
over the lives of people in Western European throughout the middle ages, and in many ways the
Crusades had been started in an attempt to maintain this power –by uniting western Europe under
Catholic authority, turning the fighting and pillaging on external enemies, and thus (with the aid
of consolidating sovereigns) securing trade routes for merchants whose wealth helped fund the
Crusades and the lavish lifestyles of Church officials, as well as the development of guns and
weapons that further aided both in the crusades and the consolidation of secular sovereign power
(Mohawk 2000: 95, 100-01, 133; Tigar & Levy, 2000). Thus, in order to quell the growing
dispute between Portugal and Spain, additional papal bulls were issued in the 1490s that

466

The latter source argues that this papal bull had been intended to apply to the Ottoman Empire
(which fell in 1453), but that the Portuguese used the terminology “whatsoever” and
“wheresoever” to justify their conquests on the western African coast.
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supposedly divided the newly “discovered” Americas and other lands between Portugal and
Spain and called for the subjugation of indigenous peoples in the New World and the
propagation of Church doctrines there (Pope Alexander VI, 1493d, 1493c, 1493b, 1493a). 467
The papal license to murder, enslave, pillage and commit atrocities against the indigenous
peoples in the Americas, combined with the Crusader mentality which needed little-to-no
justification for such acts in the first place, led to treatment and conditions of life so atrocious in
Spanish-invaded South America that Spain achieved international notoriety once these
conditions were exposed internationally in the writings of Dominican Friar Bartolomé de las
Casas and others in the school of Salmanca (Mohawk, 2000: 106-07, 136-37; Anaya, 2004: 1516; Keal, 2011: 69-70; Hanke, 1959). As early as 1513, Las Casas was arguing that the Spanish
had no rights to kill, enslave or take the property of indigenous peoples in the Americas, because
they were rational human beings capable of receiving the teachings of Christ and becoming good
subjects of the Crown (Mohawk, 2000: 136; Anaya, 2004: 17, 16; Keal, 2011: 71, 92; Miller &
D’Angelis, 2012, note 99). As such, he argued, those Spanish colonists who were engaged in
such illegal and immoral acts should be denied the holy communion (Mohawk, 2000: 136). In
response, Pope Paul III issued another papal bull in 1537, which forbade the enslavement of
indigenous peoples in the Americas (Pope Paul III, 1537), 468 and King Charles V of Spain –
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The agreement to split the world between Spain and Portugal was solidified in the Treaty of
Tordesillas, June 7, 1494 (this treaty is also available in Davenport, 1917). The dispute between
the two states festered on for years, but further discussion of this goes beyond the scope of this
paper. For more on these papal bulls, see also: Mohawk (2000: 100-04), Jennings, (1976: 5),
Mahmud (2010: 8), Miller & D’Angelis (2012).
468
“…notwithstanding whatever may have been or may be said to the contrary, the said Indians
and all other people who may later be discovered by Christians, are by no means to be deprived
of their liberty or the possession of their property, even though they be outside the faith of Jesus
Christ; and that they may and should, freely and legitimately, enjoy their liberty and the
possession of their property; nor should they be in any way enslaved; should the contrary
happen, it shall be null and have no effect ...” (Pope Paul III, 1537; also quoted in Newcomb,
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interested in avoiding international embarrassment and the consolidation of private interests into
independent political power in the New World—issued the New Laws (Mohawk, 2000: 137;
Anaya, 2004: 19 note 40). 469 The latter outlawed the enslavement of indigenous peoples under
punishment of death, and was so unpopular among Spanish colonists that widespread protest lead
to the local suspension of many of the laws provisions, and the execution of a viceroy sent to
Peru to enforce the laws. The mass rebellion eventually caused Charles V to revoke substantial
portions of these laws altogether (Anaya, 2004: 19, note 40; Mohawk, 2000: 137).
Despite his retreat, Charles V temporarily suspended all conquest in the New World until an
inquiry into/ debate on the justness of the Spanish conquest and dispossession of indigenous
peoples could be held to determine how best to proceed with further conquest (Hanke, 1959: 3641). 470 The debate was held in 1550-51, and in it Las Casas continued his argument that
indigenous peoples in South America were rational human beings who had the same rights to
possessions as Spaniards and who could be made good converts to Christianity and subjects of
the King (Hanke, 1959: 35). He therefore argued that conversion should proceed by sending
2010; and Wikipedia.com, 2012d). Unfortunately it is incredibly difficult to find the full text of
this document online. The document has been referred to differently on occasion, being given
the names Sublimus Deus, Sublimis Deus, and Sublimis Dei. There seems to be some
disagreement as to whether or not this papal bull was rescinded in response to the outrage
expressed by Spanish colonizers in South America. Others referring to this papal bull include:
Drinnon (1990: 48), Mahmud (2011: 9, note 39),
469
Spain also responded to early criticisms by Las Casas by requiring Spanish conquistadores to
read El Requerimiento before invading the villages of indigenous peoples and slaughtering,
enslaving and dispossessing the residents therein (Hanke, 1959: 41; Mohawk, 2000). Further
discussion on this document and the horrors that followed it is beyond the scope of this paper,
though it will be noted that indigenous peoples in the Americas did not know or understand
Spanish, and conquistadores frequently read it quietly outside villages at night (if at all) so that
villagers neither heard nor were aware of its reading. For more on this document, see the latter
source (Mohawk, 2000: 107-111), who quotes the entire text of the English translation of the
document.
470
“Probably never before or since has a mighty emperor –and in 1550 Charles V, Holy Roman
Emperor, was the strongest ruler in Europe with a great overseas empire besides—ordered his
conquests to cease until it was decided if they were just” (Hanke, 1959: 37).
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priests and friars only, and in cases where the indiegenous populations resisted conversion, by
building fortresses on their borders and gradually winning them over through peace, love and
good example (Hanke, 1959: 42) but not by forced evangelization (Keal, 2011: 71). Opposing
Las Casas, and strongly supported by the Spanish conquistadores and encomienderos, Juan Gines
de Sepulveda [sometimes referred to as the father of modern racism (Mohawk, 1997)] sought to
justify the dispossession, enslavement and genocide of indigenous peoples on the basis that they
were barbarians and idolaters who had sinned against natural and divine law and whose natural
rudeness made them natural slaves to more refined peoples (Hanke, 1959: 40-41; Keal, 2011:
91). As such, forcible conquest was necessary in order to spread the Christian faith and,
allegedly, ‘save’ the “weak among the natives themselves” (Hanke, 1959: 40-41; Keal, 2011:
91). 471
The terms of the debate were limited from the start, with Charles V posing the question to
debaters: “is it lawful for the king of Spain to wage war on the Indians before preaching the faith
to them in order to subject them to his rule, so that afterwards they may be more easily instructed
in the faith?” (Hanke, 1959: 38). Apparently, within the Western cultural worldview, it was not
possible for Charles V or the debaters to even conceive of the idea that perhaps the Native
inhabitants of the New World did not need to be converted to Christianity at all. After all, “the
Christian utopian enterprise was founded on the belief that there could be only one Truth, one
right way,” (Mohawk, 2000: 137) and had by this point dedicated several centuries to the
eradication of all who were perceived to have strayed form, or resisted, this one true way.

471

Though, like the English in Ireland and later in the Americas, the Spanish conquistadores –
minus the priest and friars-- made virtually no effort to convert the Natives they killed, enslaved
and dispossessed. See: Canny (1973:588), Mohawk (2000: 107-111), Jennings (1976: 5). On
some (generally murderous) attempts at conversion, see Stannard (1992: 65, 69-70), and Gay
(1993: 69, 87).
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Further, at this time there was no clear established international legal doctrine at the disposal of
the debaters. So both Las Casas and Sepulveda framed their debate around ancient theories on
the justness of enslavement verses a more compassionate form of conversion –which was largely
focused on the supposed cultural characteristics of the indigenous peoples, as well as indigenous
peoples’ rights and obligations under (European conceptions of) Natural and divine (see: Keal,
2011: 89, 88, 69-70; Hanke, 1959; Mohawk, 2000).
The debate at Vallodid did not actually resolve the issue in any clear direction. Both Las
Casas and Sepulveda claimed to have emerged victorious, but the panel of judges who heard the
debate avoided giving any opinion on the matter (Hanke, 1959: 74), thus leaving indigenous
peoples in South America to fend for themselves in a struggle that is still ongoing centuries later
(Mohawk, 2000:137; Adams, 2007). Indeed, through Sepulveda’s arguments in the wellpublicized debate, a theory of cultural classification and Spanish/European superiority began to
emerge (Mohawk, 1997; Canny, 1973: 593) which had an impact on later developments around
the world. Further, the debate at Valloidid set the terms of future debates, outside of which none
would argue. Thus, neither Las Casas nor other theorists of that or later eras argued against the
idea that the Spanish Crown held sovereignty over the New World. But this does not mean that
Europeans did not also recognize the sovereignty of non-Western peoples. In fact, many legal
theorists argued that the sovereignty of the King of Spain did not subsume indigenous ownership
of land or indigenous governance over their own affairs (Keal 2011: 92, 88-97).
In the end, virtually all legal theorists renounced the idea that the pope had authority to grant
to sovereigns lands that lay on the other side of the world (Anaya, 2004: 17; Keal, 2011: 92). 472
DISCOVERY, CONQUEST, “JUST WAR,” AND TERRA NULLIUS
472

“Neither emperor nor pope… possessed lordship over the whole world” (Anaya, 2004: 18,
paraphrasing Vitoria).
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The Protestant Reformation was well underway by the time Charles V held the debate at
Vallodid (Berman, 1983: 19), and emerging legal theorists such as those at the Spanish school of
Salmanca were seeking to formulate and justify a system of law that would benefit the rising,
wealthy merchant class (Tigar, 2000: 57). The arguments made in the debate at Vallodid
continued to resonate with these legal theorists, who redeveloped some of these arguments in
their own writings. Theorists also continued to revive and build upon ancient concepts in Roman
law (gens gentium or jus gentium), which had governed relations among individuals through
perceived standards of good that existed above and beyond any man-made law and that all
rational human beings could agree to and were bound by –including feudal lords, emerging
sovereign powers, the Church, and even God ‘him’self (Keal, 2011: 88; Anaya, 2004: 16-17, 18;
Tigar, 2000: 56-57, 28). 473 At the same time, sovereign powers were consolidating a positivist
form of law was being developed which attempted to separate law from the Church and
centralize it under secular sovereign powers that would prioritized the individual property and
contract rights of the rising merchant class (and, if necessary, use militarized force to protect
these rights externally and command obedience internally) (Mohawk, 2000: 133, 101; Tigar,
2000: 52, 54-56; Berman, 1983: 29-30; Anaya, 2004: 26; see also Elias, 1998: 43, 51, 55). This
latter form of law began to predominate during the 18th century (Tigar, 2000:56), and has been
associated with the rise of the sovereign state [which was not completed until “well into the 19th
century” (McNeil, 2001-2002: 11)], as well as the rise of scientific racism and ‘stages of
development’ theories (Keal, 2011: 72-75). Elements of both forms of law were present in the
writings of early legal theorists, and it is possible to make the generalization that, over time, as
the interests of the rising merchant class and consolidating sovereigns –as well as available
473

Grotius (1535-1645) apparently argued that even God was subject to, and unable to change,
the law of nature (Anaya, 2004: 17, note 12).
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technology-- advanced in the direction of accumulating capital through the dispossession of other
peoples and life forms, international legal theorists sought to develop various ‘legal’
justifications for the actions that supported these goals (Anaya, 2004: 16, 34; Keal, 2011: 86, 84).
In many ways, both forms of law also carried on the debate between Las Casas and Sepulveda at
Vallodid, and moved increasingly towards favoring forms of the latter’s arguments as positive
law and the sovereign-state came to predominate.
These ideas were fresh in the minds of the English when they arrived on the shores of North
America. Just as the Spanish had approximated a theory of cultural classification (in which the
Spanish belonged to the superior culture) so, too did English colonizers in Ireland who followed
the Spanish example and felt entirely justified in their efforts to massacre and make virtual slaves
of the Irish –allegedly for the purpose of converting them to Christianity and subjugating them to
the English Crown (Canny, 1973: 593-597; Drinnon, 1990: 48-49; Stannard, 1992: 98, 106). The
English colonists who arrived in the New World also followed the example of Spanish
conquistadores (but not the Spanish Crown) in embracing aspects of Sepulveda’s arguments at
Vallodid, and ignoring Pope Paul III’s Sublimis Dues (which proclaimed that Native peoples in
the Americas were “truly men” and should be treated with the rights of men) (Drinnon, 1990: 4849). Thus, though many of the early English colonists in the New World owed their lives to
Native peoples who took pity upon them and helped them survive the winters (Stannard, 2000:
53), colonial leaders who coveted land 474 used virtually any excuse to wage war on and massacre
the Natives around them, and broke their promises with Native peoples as soon as it was
474

And/or who wanted to stop the constant desertion of colonists –from all walks of life-- who
fled the colonies to join and live with Native communities (Canny, 1975: 28-35). Canny (30, 34)
notes that instilling in colonists a fear of Native peoples –such as was instilled after the 1622
retaliatory massacre of colonists-- was the only way that desertion was finally stopped. Drinnon
(1990: 51-52) similarly notes the various attempts of colonial leaders to instill such fear in the
minds of colonists.
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beneficial to them to do so (Stannard, 1990: 116, 112-115, 104-05; Jennings, 1976: 6; Drinnon,
1990: 51-52; Nammack, 1969; Taylor, 2006; Kades, 2008 paras. 12-15). But unlike the early
Spanish conquistadores, even at the earliest stages of English colonization it is clear that colonial
leaders believed they needed some form of justification for their actions, and they attempted to
find these justifications in the various legal theories of their time. Thus, it seems worthwhile to
review some of the legal concepts and theories that were developing in international law before
moving on to the historical analysis (which demonstrates that these concepts rarely applied to
Euro-Native relations in the New World)
The Doctrine of Discovery
While early legal theorists, including Vitoria (1492-1546), Las Casas (1484-1566) and Grotius
(1538-1645), argued that indigenous peoples held sovereignty over their lands, they also agreed
with Charles V’s assertions of Spanish sovereignty in South America. Yet, they were all in
agreement that papal bulls could not be the source of this sovereignty –nor could the doctrine of
discovery that was based on these papal bulls (Anaya, 2004: 18, 19; Grotius, 2001: 228, IX).
Later theorists did not appear to have even concerned themselves much with discovery, and
focused instead on conquest and the laws of just war, which will be dealt with momentarily.
Competing European powers still asserted discovery over lands to which they sought exclusivity
relative to other European powers, but these claims, even when combined with symbolic
possession, had virtually no weight on intra-European relations, and were instead viewed as
fugitive political arguments made by those with no legitimate basis for exclusivity assertions
(Berman, 1992: 131-33 and 133 note 28; Kades, 2008: 9; McNeil, 2000: 12-13).

475
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In fact, these

Though see MacMillan (2006), who argues that in the 1500s these doctrines still played a role
in the British Crown’s attempts to develop of legal justifications for ignoring the papal bulls and
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claims were often largely exaggerated and transparent, often overlapped with the discovery
claims of other European powers, and were entirely unenforceable. Thus, as the weakest of all
exclusivity claims, claims based on discovery were often entirely ignored by competing western
powers. Further, European powers asserting exclusivity based on discovery (or discovery
combined with symbolic possession) had no pretensions that these claims impacted EuropeanNative relations (Berman, 1992: 132); they related soley to intra-European relations (and rarely
had an impact on even these) (Berman, 1992: 132-33 and 133 note 28; Kades, 2008: 9) –a fact
US Supreme Court Justice John Marshall noted in his 1823 opinion (discussed further below).
Conquest & “Just War”
As neither papal grants, discovery, or discovery combined with symbolic possession could
protect intra-European exclusivity claims to New World territories, and as none of these could
provide European powers with sovereign rights over these territories, the rising merchant class
and consolidating sovereign powers sought justification for their claims in other arguments.
Legal theorists were quick to oblige, and it seems that, for the most part, after Vallodid, the later
a theorist wrote, the more likely he was, and the more ways he tended to find, to justify the
dispossession of indigenous peoples in the Americas. Though Vitoria, Las Casas and Grotius
argued that the indigenous peoples in the Americas held title to their lands 476 and dominion over
their own affairs, they began to part ways after this. Las Casas argued that the indigenous

sending Cabot to the northern coast of North America. See also, on the papal bulls: Frichner
(2010).
476
“Neither moral nor religious virtue, nor any intellectual excellence is requisite to form a good
title to property. Only where a race of men is so destitute of reason as to be incapable of
exercising any act of ownership, they can hold no property, nor will the law of charity require
that they should have more than the necessaries of life.
“For the rules of the law of nations can only be applied to those, who are capable of political
or commercial intercourse: but not to a people entirely destitute of reason, though it is a matter of
just doubt, whether any such is to be found” (Grotius, 2001: 228, X).
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peoples in the Americas were civil human beings (Keal, 2011: 72), and though Vitoria mostly
agreed with this (Keal, 2011: 92), he also suggested that they may exhibit “elements of
barbarianism” (Keal, 2011:70-71). Though on the one hand Vitoria had recognized that the
indigenous peoples in the Americas had methods in their affairs, orderly and arranged polities,
legal systems and magistrates, definite forms of marriage, and systems of trade which were all
based on reason (Anaya, 2004: 17-18), 477 on the other hand he argued that they might be
incapable of forming a state and governing their own interests according to the European model
(Keal, 2011: 71, 92, 93; Anaya, 2004: 18). 478 When and where this was the case (according to
European judgments), Vitoria argued, the Spanish Crown could assert its sovereignty over
Native peoples to civilize them, so long as this was done for the benefit of the latter and not the
personal profit of subjects of the former (Keal, 2011, 92; Anaya, 2004: 18). 479
Unlike later theorists, neither Vitoria nor Grotius made the existence of a European-model
state the basis for the rights of indigenous peoples –their land ownership and self-government
still existed and were still recognized by these theorists (Anaya, 2004: 22). Grotius and Hobbes
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According to Vitoria, the Indians: “are not of unsound mind, but have, according to their kind,
the use of reason. This is clear, because there is a certain method in their affairs, for they have
polities which are orderly arranged and they have definite marriage and magistrates, overlords,
laws, and workshops and a system of exchange, all of which call for the use of reason; they also
have a kind of religion” (Anaya, 2004: 17, quoting Vitoria).
478
According to Vitoria, the Indians “are unfit to found or administer a lawful State up to the
standard required by human and civil claims. Accordingly, they have no proper laws nor
magistrates, and are not even capable of controlling their family affairs” and have no literature,
arts, conveniences of life, “careful agriculture”, etc. (Anaya, 2004: 18).
479
According to Anaya (2004: 18), Vitoria neither supported nor rejected this view outright. Of
course, as noted in chapter 2, the “civilizing process” was always undertaken for the benefit of
the wealthy and powerful, but these latter also often used Orwellian double-speak to justify their
own perpetrations against others. In addition, as noted in chapter 3, all indigenous peoples
throughout the Americas did have their own system of law, government, art, entertainment, and
so forth. Thus, it was only by holding up the European model of government as the pinnacle
aspiration of all human beings that Vitoria, and later theorists, could make such an argument –
one that was so clearly self-serving while presented as not being so.
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(1588-1679) further argued that in addition to their rights to property and self-government, the
indigenous peoples in the Americas had the same natural law rights as all states, including the
rights to enter into treaty relationships, to defend themselves against other peoples (Anaya, 2004:
19; Keal, 2011: 78-79). But Hobbes provided a justification for ignoring these rights. Building
upon Vitoria’s differentiation between indigenous and European forms of government, Hobbes
treated indigenous peoples in the Americas as if they had no form of government (a completely
incorrect and self-serving assumption, see chapter 3) (Anaya, 2004: 22). And he argued that it
was the duty of persons living in a “state of nature” to select one man or an assembly of men to
represent them and make decisions on their behalf (Anaya, 2004: 20; Keal, 2011: 79). Without
doing this, Hobbes argued that European sovereigns were justified in assertion their sovereignty
over Native peoples Keal, 2011: 80). Locke (1632-1704) agreed (Keal, 2011: 82, 79), and both
Pufendorft (1632-1694) and Vattell (1714-1769), writing after the Treaty of Westphalia,
suggested that the law of nations focused on, or only applied to states/ nation-states (Anaya,
2004: 20) and for the most part indigenous peoples could not qualify as such (Anaya, 2004: 2122). 480 Thus, by the mid-seventeenth century, indigenous peoples were treated as mere
individuals, without collective autonomous rights under the law of nations; and they did so
despite the fact that even Europeans had not consolidated their own states under centralized
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Though some, such as the Inca and Aztec, already attacked and subjugated in Peru and
Mexico, did qualify. According to Anaya (2004: 22-23), Vattel:
defined states broadly to include “all political bodies, societies of men who have united
together and combined their forces, in order to procure their mutual welfare and
security.” Vattel clearly believed at least some non-European aboriginal peoples
qualified as states or nations with rights as such. Bringing into question European
expansionism in the Americas, Vattell remarked: “Those ambitious Europeans States
which attacked the American Nations and subjected them to their avaricious rule, in
order, as they say, to civilize them, and have them instructed in the true religion—those
usurpers, I say, justified themselves by a pretext equally unjust and ridiculous.
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sovereign power, and many would not do so until “well into the 19th century” (McNeil, 2000: 11;
Miller, JR, 2009: 3-4).
European interpretations of indigenous peoples political systems were not the only factor
allegedly justifying their dispossession, and even Grotius, who saw no difference between the
rights of states and the rights of individuals under natural law, argued that failure to cultivate the
soil could be justification for indigenous peoples’ dispossession (Keal, 2011: 77). Vitoria and
Las Casas before him made no such assertions, but theorists writing after him agreed with
Grotius’ assertion that lands that remained uncultivated could not be considered property, and
were thus open to the taking. And though Grotius’ writing in this regard was not particularly
interested in applying his arguments to indigenous peoples (Anaya, 2004: 19), Locke specifically
made these arguments to justify the dispossession of indigenous peoples in the New World
(Keal, 2011: 76-78, 80; Anaya, 2004: 23). For Locke, a failure to cultivate the soil in European
(English) fashion was equated with a lack of civil society, and one supposedly could not have the
latter until one acquired property rights through the former (Keal, 2011: 78, 79, 82). Without the
former, no property existed and lands were open for the taking, and Europeans were justified in
doing the taking, as well as in asserting their sovereignty over such lands and peoples (Ibid,
Anaya, 2004: 23). 481 Like Locke, Vattel also linked the cultivation of the soil to civil society, and
argued that doing so was a requirement under natural law. And though Vattel left some room for
the inclusion of indigenous peoples (for Vattel, the cultivation of the soil was not a specific
481

“Locke’s theory of property … attached ownership to a ‘higher’ stage of development than
that attained by Amerindians. And since they were at a ‘lower’ stage, it was believed that
European settlers were justified in ignoring both indigenous patterns of land use and the native
rights attached to these patterns, and in dispossessing the original occupants” (Keal, 2011: 75).
However, others have argued that Locke’s knowingly selected facts that supported his theories
and rejected facts that did not lend support (Arneil, 1996), and further, that Locke’s theories
actually had little-to-no impact on the practice of settlers and colonial governments in the
Americas (other sources to be added).
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requirement for statehood), he did argue that the cultivation of the soil was a nation’s duty under
natural law, and that those who cultivated the soil had greater rights to lands than those who did
not (Anaya, 2004:23 and note 70). The latter, thus, “may not complain if other more industrious
Nations, too confined at home, should come and occupy part of their lands” (Vattel, quoted in
Anaya, 2004: 23 note 70). Though Locke and Vattel each demonstrated some degree of
ambiguity when it came to determining which Native peoples “qualified” for state-status and
natural law rights and which did not, later theorists entirely ignored any aspect of these
arguments that might have recognized the rights of at least some indigenous or non-western
peoples. Instead, like the theorists before them, they picked out what was useful in justifying the
dispossession and colonization actions of wealthy merchant-government interests at the time, and
discarded everything that might call these actions into question.
One final aspect of early legal arguments that will be examined here is that of the “just war.”
In the early-to-mid-1500s, Las Casas, Vitoria and others had argued against the idea of natural
slavery, insisting that all people were human beings, not barbarians, and that the Spanish had a
duty to love all people as their neighbors (Keal, 2011: 70- 72, 92). However, Vitoria argued that
the rights of non-Christian peoples were limited relative to the rights of Christians, and that such
peoples also had duties under natural law. One of these duties required that they to allow the
Spanish free travel, trade, and evangelization among them (Keal, 2011: 71; Anaya, 2004:18). If
they did not do so, according to Vitoria, they were failing to uphold their duties under natural
law, and since their rights were limited relative to the rights of Christians, such interference or
refusal may constitute just cause for war –a point on which Las Casas vehemently disagreed
(Keal, 2011: 71, Anaya, 2004: 18). However, for Vitoria, actions contrary to natural law were
not necessarily enough to justify war (Keal, 2011: 92). Thus, he warned against “imaginary
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causes of war” (Anaya, 2004: 18), and held out as one of the only just causes of war that which is
waged to protect innocent victims –even if these victims did not seek or want protection (Keal,
2011: 92). Presumably this “protection” includes asserting Crown sovereignty over those
peoples with “elements of barbarianism” who were presumed incapable of forming a state and
governing themselves by European standards (see discussion at the top of this section).
Writing a few decades later, and seeking to justify actions of the wealthy merchants and
sovereigns during his own time, Grotius disagreed on many points made by Vitoria and Las
Casas. He argued that some peoples were natural slaves (Keal, 2011: 94, 71), and he also argued
that violations of natural law could be punished and were sufficient to constitute just cause for
war (Keal, 2011: 92, 93). However, Grotius sought to secularize legal theories, and so he was
rather adamant that interference in evangelization, or refusal to accept the Christian religion, did
not constitute just cause for war (Anaya, 2004: 19). For Grotius, just war could also be waged
for defense and the recovery of property (Anaya, 2004: 19) –and this theorization might explain
the alleged justification in the minds of English colonists when they waged war against Native
peoples for matters so simple as one Native person in a community being accused of stealing a
cup. For example, Stannard (1990) notes that in Roanoke:
When an Indian was accused by an Englishman of stealing a cup and failing to
return it, the English response was to attack the natives in force, burning the entire
community and the fields of corn surrounding it. (P. 105)
But theories of “just war” involved more than just an identification of provocations, there were
also a number of other criteria that must be met in order for a war to be considered “just,” 482
including moral concerns over how war was waged, the proportion of violence used relative to

482

I’d like to do more research in this area in the future (as with the other issues in early
international law), but for now the discussion will be confined to only more recent, secondary
sources, and will not provide an overview of how these theories changed over the centuries.
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the threat, the refrain from harming innocent non-combatants, whether war was declared in
advance and waged by proper authority, and whether all avenues for a peaceful resolution were
attempted before the war and arriving at a peaceful resolution –rather than profit or gain-- was a
central motivation of the war 483 (Vitoria had emphasized this latter criteria in his speculations on
just war, see above). Certainly examples like the above fail to meet most of the criteria for a just
war.
What’s more, Berman (1992: 133 note 29) and Epstein (2002) question the applicability to the
term “conquest” to the activities in the New World, and in other European encounters with nonWestern peoples. Both note that conquest was a term that was intended to refer to “armies of
contending states at war,” or to conquest and subjugation in a “just war” (quoted, respectively,
from: Epstein, 2002: 48; and Berman, 1992: 133, note 29). And Berman further notes that in
order to conquest to have any effect under law it needed to entail three factors : 1) a decisive and
firmly established victory in warfare; 2) a complete subjugation of the conquered party such that
the party “ceased to exist as a political entity in the territory at issue and the fate of that territory
left to the unilateral disposition of the conqueror;” and 3) the conquering state had to formally
annex the conquered territory and assimilate it into the dominion of the conquering state. Failure
to achieve any one of these criteria would equal a failure to achieve exclusivity –or sovereignty
(Berman, 1992: 133, note 129). 484 In virtually all cases in the Americas, these criteria were not
met –and in no case were they met “justly.”
But aside from the criteria of just war and conquest, these medieval concepts were largely
inapplicable to European-Native relations in North America for other reasons: Within a few
483

Wikipedia (2012c). See also sources cited below.
Or failure to “produce a transfer of sovereignty,” (Berman, 1992: 133, Note 29 citing L.
Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise, vol. 1 (London: Longmans, Green, and Company,
1905), 287-92).

484

348

decades of English colonization in North America both the Crown and colonial officials created
prohibitions against conquest-based dispossessions of Native peoples (Kades, 2008 para. 15). 485
Instead, lands were to be secured solely through treaty agreements with Native nations, and only
Crown or colonial officials were authorized to make such agreements (Kades, 2008: 24). 486
According to Kades, the former prohibitions (requiring payment for Native lands) were adhered
to as soon as they were declared, even by colonists who argued against the prohibitions (Kades,
2008: para. 15). Encroachment on Native lands by wealthy land speculators and poor settlers
continued to be a problem for colonial officials (when it was not directly encouraged by
them 487), but prohibitions against such actions were regularly reiterated by both the Crown and
colonial governments –most famously in the Royal Proclamation of 1763. 488 Thus, non-Natives
who encroached on Native lands without permissions had an increasingly difficult time
convincing anyone that they held title to these lands. This was the case both before and after the
Revolutionary War, even though settler resentment of these prohibitions was one of the
contributing factors to the Revolution (Taylor, 2006: 8, 38-45, 79-81), as the new US
government quickly recognized the same dangers that the Crown had almost two centuries
earlier. As soon as it consolidated enough power to do so (about 1789) Congress renewed the all
of these prohibitions and consistently refused to recognize land deeds that had been obtained by
485

Kades notes that Massachusetts Bay Colony passed such prohibitions as early as 1629, and
the Crown reasserted these in 1660 and again, repeatedly, every few decades.
486
This was done at least as early as 1634, according to Kades. Part of the intention behind these
prohibitions was to prevent a costly and unsustainable state of constant warfare in the colonies,
as well as to prevent the emergence of wealthy, private monopolies on lands and thus colonial
politics –both of which could arise from the unregulated taking of Native lands.
487
Colonial authorities saw non-Native encroachment in Native territories as an effective means
of clearing land, running off wildlife, depleting Native populations (via small pox and other
contagious diseases) and forcing the surviving Natives to relocate to new lands –freeing up
coveted lands for colonial possession. Taylor (2006, particularly 118, 142-166), Kades (2008:
125), Nammack (1969), Harring (1998a, 1998b).
488
Which, Borrows (1997) argues convincingly, was actually a treaty agreement.
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non-Natives outside of the official processes (Taylor, 2006: 238-242; Kades, 2008: 25-29). 489 Of
course, Congress also wanted to expand US territory, protect the interests of wealthy landspeculators, 490 and maintain political legitimacy among settlers on the frontiers. 491 To these ends,
it did not entirely seek to halt non-Native encroachment on Native lands, only to regulate it. 492
And allowing non-Natives to settler right up close to Native territories meant that forests would
be cut down, game would be driven away, and Native peoples near non-Native settlements
would be hungry and vulnerable to non-Native offers to buy or coercion to relocate –a fact which
Supreme Court Justice John Marshall recognized well.
However, even when non-Native encroachment on Native lands was allowed, or encouraged
by colonial officials and/or the newly independent US government, Euro-Native relations in
North America were, from the start, governed by treaties between Native nations and European
powers –not by papal bulls, discovery, or alleged ‘just war’ conquests. Early on, and for at least
two centuries, the economic, political and social success and survival of European powers on the
continent were entirely dependent upon Native peoples and the permissions and cooperation they
489

The types of profits reaped from gaining a monopsony on land can be demonstrated in the
following example: in 1785 the New York State coerced the sale of land from members of the
Oneida nation, who were already weakened and starving, by threatening that NY would not
protect any of their lands from encroaching settlers if the Oneidas did not agree to sell a
substantial portion of what they had. According to Taylor (2006: 165) New York paid the
Oneidas $11,500 for 460,000 acres land, and then sold 343,594 acres for $125,955 (Taylor,
2006: 165).
490
Unregulated, it was argued that poor settlers would take the best lands for themselves, and
leave only piecemeal sections of land for the wealthy speculators. Wars also “undercut the value
of large, speculative land holdings elsewhere on the frontier” (Taylor, 2008: at 240, 239-41. See
also: Kades, 2008: paras. 123-24; RJ Miller, 2006).
491
Taylor (2006: 107), notes that, after the Revolutionary War, many settlers viewed their
victory as evidence of their racial and cultural superiority, which allegedly gave them the right to
further dispossess Native peoples.
492
For example, Congressman James Duane expressed his understanding of the Revolutionary
War in the same terms, noting that if supremacy was not imposed over the Indians then “this
Revolution, in my eyes, will have lost more than half its value.” See also Taylor (143; see also:
40-45, 142-154), Kades (2008 paras 31-34), Nammack (1969), Harring (1998a, 1998b).
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granted Europeans through treaty agreements (Miller, 2009: 4-5, 11-12; Berman, 1992: 133-34;
Johnston, 1986: 10). 493 In addition, for at least 200+ years, these treaty agreements were made
according to the protocol of Native nations --and Europeans had to learn and abide by this
protocol if they wished to engage in treaty negotiations at all (Williams, 1982: 3, 5, 36, 58;
Johnston, 1986: 10; Berman, 1992: 150; Miller, 2009: 5, 11-12). These treaty negotiations, with
a limited number of exceptions, 494 were based on nation-to-nation agreements along the same
lines as those made between European powers at the time (Berman, 1992: 146; Coté, 2001: 1516; O’Reilly, 2009: 387) 495 –i.e, they were premised on the understanding that all parties had the
capacity to act internationally (Berman, 1992: 133, 129; Gunn, 2007: 66), and they recognized
493

“Each successive European state seeking to establish commercial or settler colonies
necessarily as a matter of course entered into treaty relations with indigenous nations concerning
territorial cessations, peace and non-aggression, military alliance, and the course of trade,” and
“…these agreements and the continuing relationships they created were frequently decisive to
the survival as well as the success of the European project,” (Berman, 1992: 128). Private
corporate interests understood this quite clearly as well, as Miller (2009: 12) notes: “Even though
the Hudson’s Bay Company Charter awarded the Company rights to land and governance as well
as trade, the directors had quickly learned that First Nations were the actual proprietors of
territory. It was necessary, they recognized, for their agents to obtain by means of a ‘compact’
Indian leaders’ permission to use the navigation routes and trading sites that were critical to the
trade.”
494
Berman (1992) notes that the northeastern Algonquin entered into a protectorate with Britain.
Such relationships did not necessarily entail a loss of sovereignty, as Martens (1788, quoted in
Berman, 1992: 130 note 14) and Vattel (quoted in Anaya, 2004: 23) both acknowledged.
However, according to the many theorists, including the latter, even under conditions of a
protectorate, sovereignty and independence are not necessarily lost. If the protected state
maintains its own self-government, it also maintains its independence and sovereignty. It is only
when a state agrees to come under the laws of the protecting state, and thus to give up its selfgovernance, that it loses its sovereignty and its international personality. For variations on this
assertion, see also, Bennett & Powell (1999), and others cited above on the rules of just war and
conquest.
495
“Indian nations in North America were unquestionably regarded as having requisite
international personality to cede rights to other sovereign entities that then formed the root of
European titles in international law. The treaty process that produced a cession merely
memorialized the sovereign status of all involved parties,” (Berman, 1992 at 133, 129). In
addition, see O’Reilly (cited in text): “By entering into treaties with native nations the Crown
recognized the nationhood of its treaty partners”); and Coté (cited in text): “Early British colonial
powers recognized the sovereignty of Indian nations by entering into treaties with them”).
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Native nations as “fully independent and self-determined societies”(Berman, 1992: 126; Coté,
2001: 15-16; O’Reilly, 2009: 376-78, 387) that “possessed inherent, preexisting sovereign rights
and conducted political relations in their own interests in the international plane”(Berman, 1992:
131, 129; Epstein, 2002: 52; Hall, 2010; O’Reilly, 2009: 376-78, 387). Several of the earliest
treaties, such as the Two Row Wampum treaty made between the Haudenosaunee and various
European powers, were premised on the concepts of peace, friendship and respect, as well as and
non-interference in each other’s affairs (Johnston, 1986: Williams, 1982; Berman, 1992: 149,
146). 496 These treaties still stand today, are still honored by British Royalty whenever they visit
Canada (see for example, Miller, 2010), and have never been replaced nor abridged by either the
Canadian or US governments.
Treaties with Native nations were not only essential to the survival and/or success of
European colonies or corporate ventures on the continent, but they were also far more legitimate
means for intra-European claims to exclusivity than were such claims when based on the far
more transparent assertions of conquest, discovery or papal grant (Berman, 1992: 131). 497 It
should thus come as little surprise that, just as they did with these much less legitimate forms of
exclusivity claims, European powers often greatly exaggerated the terms of their treaties with

496

“More substantively, the principles symbolized in the Two-Row Wampum demonstrate a
well-developed indigenous philosophy of respect for what we now call the right of selfdetermination of peoples as the basis for coexistence already in place at the inception of the
Indian-European relationship in this region” (Berman, 1992: 149)
497
“By the mid-seventeenth century, treaties with indigenous nations had a dual purpose for
European states. In North America, they provided the formal intersocietal mechanisms for
establishing and regulating evolving relationships consistent with the specific realities of
international life on the continent. Additionally, in the European context Indian treaties were
increasingly employed by states to legitimize territorial claims in the western hemisphere against
each other” (Berman, 1992: 131). European powers –whether funded privately or through a
Crown grant-- understood that they could only possess derivative rights in the New World, and
could only acquire these through international treaty relationships with the original inhabitants
(Berman, 1991; Chamberlin, 1997; Miller, 2009; Borrows, 1999).
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Native nations to other European powers. Examples of this sort of posturing abound, and
European powers frequently made claims to have subjugated Native peoples in the written
records of their treaties –texts that did not reflect the oral treaty agreements often written in a
language Native peoples did not read. 498 Regardless, it is important to keep in mind that
European texts were merely records of treaty agreements, they were not the treaty agreements
themselves; these were made orally according to Native protocol. Thus when Native nations
signed these treaties, whether they were aware of the elaborate pretensions made within them or
not, these pretensions had little impact upon the actual reality of Euro-Native relations (Taylor,
2006; Berman, 1992). Canadian courts have repeatedly recognized this fact when asserting that
the written text / record of treaty agreements must be interpreted according to the intentions and
understandings that Native nations would have had at the time treaty agreements were made, and
that any “ambiguities or doubtful expressions… must be resolved in favour of the Indians” (R. v.
Badger [1996] at 41; Hutchins, 2009: 444; Williams, 1982: 58; O’Reilly, 2009: 387-88). As the
latter source further notes:
Reference to Indian “subjects” and promises to obey the “law” in written texts of
the numbered treaties cannot trump the nation-to-nation relationship or the Indian
perspective of the treaties as forming an alliance or partnership. Even leaving
aside representations of Her Majesty’s commissioners during treaty negotiations,
the entire context and tenor of most treaties clearly indicate that the Indian nations
party to the treaty were to continue to govern their own internal affairs. It follows
that continued Aboriginal governance was, at a minimum, an implied term of the
treaties which subsist to this day and is now a constitutionally protected treaty
right. (P. 388)
An illustration of these sorts of transparent pretensions exists in the European relationships
with the Haudenosaunee. Perhaps no Native peoples were more important to European success

498

See chapter 4 for a longer discussion on the recognition by Canadian courts that written treaty
documents frequently differed from the actual treaty agreements and thus cannot be used alone to
represent these agreements.
353

or failure in northeastern North America than were the Haudenosaunee, whose far-reaching
hegemonic influence, fierce military prowess and extensive control over trade routes and hunting
rights throughout their vast territories (Berman, 1992: 148-49, 134) made them at the same time
a coveted and powerful ally and a dangerous and formidable foe to European powers attempting
to trade or settle in the region. 499 In fact, the Haudenosaunee were so influential and important
to European survival on the continent that both British and French interests 500 quickly became
fixated on attempting to gain an agreement of exclusivity with them. Had one or the other
European state been able to secure a cession/surrender of the entire Haudenosaunee territory, or a
submission of Haudenosaunee sovereignty, such as through an agreement of protection or
vassalage, this would have been enough for either state to claim exclusivity (since such an
agreement would give only that European state the ability to negotiate international agreements
on behalf of the Haudenosaunee). This did not happen, however, as the ongoing rival between
the two nations, and the ongoing assertions and actions of self-determination by the
Haudenosaunee evidence. But since they were both unable to secure an agreement of
exclusivity, the British and French each attempted repeatedly to at least forge the appearance that
they had done so, using grandiose language to claim they had made the Haudenosuanee subjects
of their respective nations, or that they had gained agreements of protection or vassalage over
them (See for example, Williams, 1982: 62). These claims were immediately transparent to all
parties, as well as to other European states, even when the Haudenosaunee signed documents
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The Haudenosuanee’s hegemonic influence over Euro-Native and intra-Native relations
within their traditional territories --from the Hudson River in the east to the Mississippi River in
the west, and stretching many miles north of the St. Lawrence seaway and four of the great lakes
and as far south as North Carolina-- lasted into the 1790s. (Berman, 1992: 148).
500
Sweden had ended its claims in North America around 1650, and Holland did so around 1675,
leaving only the British and French to fight for the exclusive right to trade and make agreements
with the Native peoples in the region.
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containing such pretenses, or allowed such rhetoric into European speeches to them 501 –both of
which, in some cases, were examples of the Haudenosaunee strategically playing British and
French pretensions against each other (Miller, 2009: 51, and 51 note 31; Williams, 19182: 62, 4;
Berman, 1992: 159; 151).
In fact, regardless of any written documents or records of speeches with pretensions of
making the Haudenosaunee subjects of one Crown or another, neither the British nor the French
ever had the ability to limit or prevent the Haudenosaunee from forming military alliances or
making commercial or other treaty agreements with other European powers; much less did either
have the ability to enforce unilaterally Haudenosaunee compliance with their own respective
interests and agreements (in fact, both Britain and France also routinely broke their own
grandiosely-worded agreements with the HSN, demonstrating the agreements’ fictitious nature)
(Taylor, 2006; Berman, 1992). Instead, both Britain and France continued to rely heavily on
Haudenosaunee consent for their various activities (such as the fur trade or settlement); both
continued to court the Haudenosaunee in hopes of obtaining an alliance with them against the
other; and both clearly understood that Haudenosaunee assent to any sphere of influence claims
by either power was purely strategic, was based on consent (and the ability to withdraw consent
the agreement), and did not give either power, authority, or ability to control any aspect of
Haudenosaunee affairs. (Taylor, 2006; Berman (1992). 502

501

In fact, allowing such pretensions in European speeches to them –such as allowing colonial
officials to refer to them as “children” as occasionally happened-- fits with Williams’ (1982)
description of Haudenosaunee protocol. According to Williams, Haudenosaunee chiefs rarely
contracted each other or their visitors directly, but instead tried more to build upon agreements
among all parties.
502
As Sir William Johnson, British superintendent of Indian Affairs remarked:
[T]he Six Nations, however their sentiments may have been misrepresented, all along
considered the Northern parts of North America, as their sole property from the
beginning; and all although the conveniences of Trade (with fair speaches [sic] and
355

These recognitions of Haudenosaunee sovereignty, as well as the sovereignty of most other
Native nations in North America, continued for at least two hundred years, and in many cases for
longer than this (Harring, 1998: 10; Johnston, 1986: 12; Coté, 2001: 15-16; O’Reilly, 2009: 378;
Berman, 1992: 128), including after the Revolutionary War in both the United States and Canada
(Taylor, 2006: 239, 115; Coté, 2001: 20; Borrows, 1999; Kades, 2008, note 75; Johnston, 1986:
14). 503 Early treaties such as the Two Row Wampum treaty of peace, friendship, respect and
non-interference, still continue to stand, and have never been repealed or replaced in any other
treaties. Thus, it is clear that lands and/or sovereign powers were not obtained by European
sovereigns through conquest, and both the United States and Canadian governments have
recognized this one some level (Kades, 2008; Haida Nation v. British Columbia [2004] at 25)504.

promises) induced them to afford both, us and the French settlements in their Country,
yet they have never understood such settlement as a Dominion, especially as neither we
nor the French have ever made a conquest of them: they have even repeatedly said at
several conferences in my presence, that “they were amused by both parties with stories
of their upright intentions”… to see who would become masters of what was the
property of neither one nor the other… (Quoted from Berman, 1992:186).
The tendency of some historians to read these written agreements literally is thus highly
problematic and contrary to actual practices in the region at the time (Berman, 1992: 150, 151,
159).
503
For example, in 1792 Upper Canadian official John Graves Simcoe assured the
Haudenosaunee that the documents and treaties of the English all confirmed their status as an
independent nation that had never yielded its sovereignty:
This clearly chose, Brothers, that what we told you, is proved to be just and true: --- the
Documents, Records and Treaties between the British Governors in former times, and
your wise forefathers, of which in consequence of your request, authentic copies were
transmitted to you, all established the Freedom of your Nations.
Brothers:
These authentic papers prove that no King of Great Britain ever claimed absolute power
or sovereignty over any of your Lands or Territories that were not fairly purchased or
bestowed by your Ancestors at Public treaties, they likewise prove that your natural
Independency has been preserved… (Simcoe, quoted in: Williams, 1982: 159).
504
“Put simply, Canada’s Aboriginal peoples were here when Europeans came, and were never
conquered. Many bands reconciled their claims with the sovereignty of the Crown through
negotiated treaties. Others, notably in British Columbia, have yet to do so. The potential rights
embedded in these claims are protected by s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. The honour of the
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Further, in instances where hostilities did break out between European powers and Native
nations, they were resolved through treaty agreements, not conquest. And these treaty
agreements further solidified European recognition of Native sovereignty in North America.
CONCLUSION
Further detailed discussion of the factors contributing to the changes in thinking among US
and Canadian officials were planned but now lie beyond the scope of this chapter. Thus it will
have to suffice to say that these changes rested on the rise of social Darwinist theories of racial
superiority and “stages of development” that had solidified in Western minds by the 1780s (Keal,
2011: 72-74; Joffe, 2010: 145-46) and crept into western jurisprudence by 1766 (Keal, 2011: 75,
citing Blackstone). These theories certainly had their sources in the arguments of earlier legal
theorists, as well as in centuries of domination, exploitation, mass murder and dispossession that
came before and after the beginning of the European invasion of the Americas. But despite legal
theorists’ best efforts to justify the actions of their respective sovereigns and/or class interests,
there continues to be no legal basis for settler state assertions of sovereignty over Native nations.
Against this backdrop, Supreme Court Justice John Marshall recognized as much in his trilogy of
rulings that began with his 1823 ruling in Johnson v. M’Intosh. In this ruling, Marshall referred
to medieval legal concepts such as discovery, conquest, vacant lands and Christian missions,
manipulating the actual meanings of each of these, but also acknowledging in his own way that
none of these concepts were sufficient --alone or in combination with the other concepts-- to
justify the assertion of sovereignty over Native lands and peoples. Finding that the situation in
the United States did not fully meet any of the criteria for these concepts, Marshall proceeded to

Crown requires that these rights be determined, recognized and respected. This, in turn, requires
the Crown, acting honourably, to participate in processes of negotiation. While this process
continues, the honour of the Crown may require it to consult and, where indicated, accommodate
Aboriginal interests” (Haida Nation v. British Columbia [2004] at 25).
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make up new concepts, with the reasoning that because the ongoing dispossession of Native
peoples was supported by no laws, but was practice of his country, new laws were required to
explain it. He then proceeded to make up new legal interpretations, arguing basically that
whether or not these were moral, it was not for him to question the practices of his government.
Marhsall’s rulings have been adopted by settler state courts worldwide, including the
Canadian government, 505 to serve as legal justification --where absolutely none other exists—for
their ongoing dispossession of Native peoples. 506 And just as Marshall re- (mis-) interpreted
medieval legal concepts to suit his needs (and just as medieval legal theorists did the same with
the arguments of those before them), so, too, did later judges selectively re- (mis-) interpret
Supreme Court Justice John Marshall’s rulings --in order to justify increasingly more intense
forms of dispossession and denial of basic rights to Native peoples (McNeil, 2000: 10). 507
However, legal scholars and international human rights law is increasingly recognizing that these
505

St. Catherine's Milling and Lumber Co. v. The Queen (1888); Calder v. British Columbia
(Attorney General) [1973]; Guerin v. The Queen [1984] at 378; R. v. Sparrow, [1990] at 1103;
R. v. Van der Peet [1996] at 31, 43, 117; Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] at 41; and
Mitchell [2001] at 9 & 80. However, according to some, such as O’Reilly (2009: 380-82), Popic
(2005: 151-2), Hutchins (2009: 451), this latter case left open the possibility that some limited
forms of Native sovereignty could have survived (at 10). See also: Haida Nation v. British
Columbia [2004] at 17.
506
The argument is somewhat reminiscent of the more recent, often sarcastic question relating to
the Iraq and Afghanistan wars: “How did our oil get under their sand?” I also have several
paragraphs written on how the Johnson v. M’Intosh ruling made its way into Canadian law and
was warped and twisted over time to fit Canada’s own form of dispossession, but I will also
leave this out, since the writing needs more work and I am out of time.
507
For example, manipulated and misinterpreted conceptions of “conquest” stretched beyond all
recognition were retroactively applied to historic Native-US relations in the US Supreme Court
Case Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States (1954) [in which the court insisted that “the very
presence of whites in North America had effected a conquest over all the continent’s indigenous
peoples”]. The term was similarly misinterpreted and stretched when the Supreme Court of
Canada in Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] upheld the reasoning of the lower British
Columbia Supreme Court Judge McEachern, who stated that Native peoples “became a
conquered people, not by force of arms, for that was unnecessary, but by an invading culture and
a relentless energy with which they would not, or could not, compete” (Delgamuukw v. British
Columbia (1991) at 342, also quoted in Borrows, 1999: 545).
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settler state court rulings are little more than legal fictions that defy legal logic and are based on
nothing more than raw assertion (Kades, 2008: 1; Borrows, 1999: 127, 562, 569, note 107;
Berman, 1992: 127, 132; Joffe, 2010: 155, 145-46 notes 136, 137; O’Reilly, 2009: 373-74;
Gunn, 2007: 4; Orkin, 2003; Green, 1995; Epstein, 2002; Frichner, 2010; McNeil, 1989: 107). It
has also recognized, as Joffe (2010: 145-46) notes, the presumptions of racial superiority
inherent in assertions of western/ settler-state sovereignty over Native lands and peoples:
It is well-established that countries around the world have sought to exploit,
dominate and dispossess Indigenous peoples on the basis of presumed racial and
cultural inferiority. Under English and Canadian law, theories of dispossession
evolved based on doctrines of European superiority. Indigenous peoples were
considered either too primitive or else heathens and infidels, and therefore
disqualified from owning or controlling lands, territories and resources. Such
racistrationales as the “doctrine of discovery” –which is still a part of the case law
in Canada and numerous other countries—purportedly provided European powers
with a rationale to claim jurisdiction and sovereignty over Indigenous peoples’
traditional territories.
Given these recognitions, international human rights monitoring bodies have also condemned the
legal doctrines upon which such claims to European/settler-state sovereignty rest:
The concepts of ‘terra nullius’, ‘conquest’ and ‘discovery’ as modes of territorial
acquisition are repugnant, have no legal standing, and are entirely without merit
or justification to substantiate any claim to jurisdiction or ownership of
indigenous lands and ancestral domains, and the legacies of these concepts should
be eradicated from modern legal systems. (United Nations Economic and Social
Council, 1989, para 40(b) at 10).
Despite these condemnations, settler state governments and their judiciary continue to refuse
to re-examine their court cases based upon these faulty concepts, and their assertions of
sovereignty over Native lands and peoples. Such refusals are calling non-Native land tenures into
question (Borrows, 1999: 544; Epstein, 2002: 46: Wilkins, 2003: 103-111, and note 223) and are
creating a growing –internal and external-- crisis of political and legal legitimacy for the
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Canadian government. 508 But much worse than this, settler state government and judicial
refusals to re-examine their legally baseless assertions of sovereignty over Native lands and
peoples are allowing these nations to perpetuate their mentalities of excepting themselves from
common collective morality, and are allowing legacies of genocide to continue, unabated –for, as
Lâm (2006: 149) and numerous others have noted: “The message indigenous peoples deliver is
quite simple: their ability to survive as distinct peoples is inextricably tied to their right to occupy
their traditional territories and control their resources.”
Though many academics who study the Nazi Holocaust fail to see the links between that
event and the Holocaust in the Americas, 509 certainly many similarities and differences between
these two horrific periods in human/western history (see, for example, Kakel, 2011). Perhaps the
most important differences, in the context of this paper, are in the fact that the Nazi Holocaust is
over, ended by international intervention, and those responsible, when found, were brought to
trial, while the perpetrating state was forced to make reparations to the survivors of those groups
508

This legitimacy crisis is occurring both internally [as unjust Canadian courts and claims
processes lead to an increase in Native protests over land and treaty rights, and non-Native
businesses and residents increasingly demand that the Canadian colonial state repress Native
protests and protect non-Native colonial interests] and externally [as the international community
becomes increasingly aware of Canada’s human rights violations at home and its anti-human
rights stance in international forums relating to the rights of Indigenous peoples (for example,
see: Joffe, 2010)]. See also Moses (2002: 60), Epstein (2002: 45) and Borrows (1999: 581 Note
320) on potential international consequences for Canadian sovereignty that is built upon an
extralegal foundation of mere raw assertion. Such a legitimacy crisis could –if left unaddressed
or improperly addressed long enough by the government and the judiciary—even lead to
financial consequences for Canada [as potential investors become increasingly concerned with
the growing potential for legal disorder and political instability in the country].
509
“All German historians… seem to look in the same direction. None looks to the west. But
Hitler did. What Hitler wished to create when he sought Lebensraum in the east was a
continental equivalent of the British Empire. It was in the British and other western European
peoples that he found the models, of which extermination of the Jews is, in Nolte’s words, “a
distorted copy” (Linqvist, 1996: 10). See also: Mohawk, 2000, p. 75
(“Of all the horrific genocides that have occurred in the twentieth century against the Armenians,
Jews, Gypsies, Ibos, Bengalis, Timorese, Kampucheans, Ugandans, and more, none has come
close to destroying this many—or this great a proportion—of wholly innocent people”).
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they had victimized. On the other hand, the atrocities committed against indigenous peoples in
the Americas for centuries remain largely unacknowledged. No international intervention put an
end to the Holocaust in the Americas, no perpetrators were found and brought to trial, and no
governments have made reparations for the survivors of genocide. Further, the atrocities against
indigenous peoples throughout the Americas (and around the world) continue, unabated, though
now in a different form –one that is more appropriate to the technology and western cultural
worldview of today.
Thus, while indigenous peoples are no longer subjected to mass murder, they are still faced with
mass dispossession, and with all of the trappings of ongoing cultural genocide –i.e., the
deliberate infliction “on the group of conditions of life calculated to bring out its … destruction.”
While there were no existing laws –domestic or international—that were violated by the horrific
atrocities in Nazi Germany, there is an ever-growing body of law relating to the international
human rights of indigenous peoples that are being violated in the ongoing dispossession of
Native peoples. And yet, the horror continues.
By failing to act to stop these atrocities, we remain sided with the perpetrators, immune to the
dehumanization and destruction of other human beings, and thus to our own dehumanization and
loss of capacity to act as moral beings (Kelman, 1973: 52). As such, we are doing a grave
disservice not only to indigenous peoples around the world, but also to ourselves, our children
and our future generations who will be left to struggle with the increasingly psychopathological
mechanisms associated with our unresolved and ongoing trauma as both the oppressors and
targets/victims of our own internal mentalities of oppression. 510 Further, given the increasing
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As McFarlane and van der Kolk (2006), Kelman (1973) and others have noted, what we do to
others we also, and primarily, do to ourselves. By treating others with intolerance we lose our
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crises in the world around us, and the increasing possibility that we may have done so much
damage to our environment as to have caused permanent, lasting, and increasingly violent and
unpredictable shifts in climate, weather, and ocean levels, as well as long-lasting destruction to
the quality and ingestability of increasing portions of our food and water sources, it is really not
in our best interest to 1) continue on the destructive perpetrator path we are on or 2) destroy
alternative models for structuring democratic societies and living sustainably in the world around
us. If we continue to refuse to recognize, honor, support and promote the rights of indigenous
peoples, and continue to be unwilling or unable to see non-western peoples (as well as all other
life forms) as equal partners and co-owners 511 of this planet then we are, quite literally, choosing
the path of perpetration, destruction and extinction.

ability to care for and tolerate difficult parts of ourselves. By acting as perpetrators against
others, we similarly internalize and engage in perpetrations against ourselves and our loved ones.
511
The Western concept of “ownership” is used here because of the weight of the rights that
ownership implies, which have long had a much higher priority and much heavier weight in
western society than the rights of human beings (or other life forms, which have no rights in
western society). Thus, the term is used with the intent of raising to the highest possible western
standard, the right of all living things to have to an equal share of all that is, and to what they
need to survive. At the same time, I am not using the term with any intent whatsoever of
suggesting that the earth or even parts of it can actually be owned in the western sense of
property.
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Chapter 6
Non-Native reactions to the 2006 Haudenosaunee protest
They're scared. You know, those people are scared, because basically they've
been lied to their whole life. And now we're standing there telling them a truth
that they've never heard, and it scares them to think about their future and their
past. What is the true history of their past? And so out of this fear and this hurt
of being lied to, it makes them angry.
~ Wendy Hill, Haudenosaunee, on the intense responses of non-Native residents
to the 2006 Haudenosaunee protest, quoted in Haudenosaunee Confederacy,
2007
In order to escape accountability for his crimes, the perpetrator does everything
in his power to promote forgetting. Secrecy and silence are the perpetrator’s first
line of defense. If secrecy fails, the perpetrator attacks the credibility of the
victim. If he cannot silence her absolutely, he tries to make sure that no one
listens. To this end, he marshals an impressive array of arguments, from the most
blatant denial to the most sophisticated and elegant rationalization. After every
atrocity once can expect to hear the same predictable apologies: it never
happened; the victim lies; the victim exaggerates; the victim brought it upon
herself; and in any case it is time to forget the past and move on. The more
powerful the perpetrator, the greater his prerogative to name and define reality,
and the more completely his arguments prevail.
~ Herman 1992, 8
The two introductory quotes above represent two different facets of the non-Native opposition to
the 2006 Haudenosaunee protest. The first represents the fears, doubts and insecurities that the
Haudenosaunee protest triggered in local non-Native residents. In response to these
uncomfortable or even intolerable emotions, some non-Native residents struggled both to deny
their guilt, complicity, and responsibility for the historic and present-day harms caused to Native
peoples and to maintain their privileges as dominant group members. Thus, the second
represents some of the processes through which those non-Native residents who move
vehemently opposed to the protest sought to hide their own guilt and/or complicity in ongoing
perpetrations against the Haudenosaunee people. These processes primarily involved attempts to
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discredit the Haudenosaunee protesters, as well as the Haudenosaunee people and Native people
in general, so that their grievances could be dismissed without examination. These processes
were largely inline with the similar processes of authorization, routinization and dehumanization
perpetrated against Native peoples by government officials and other types of authority
throughout Canada, which were discussed in more detail in chapter 4. As discussed in that
chapter, the rhetoric and actions of the representatives of authority in Canada (government
officials, the media, corporations, and even smaller local businesses), have created an
environment in which Native peoples in Canada have long been identified as “fair game” for
attack, primarily through projections, scapegoating, and Western societal forms of human
sacrifice (see chapter 2). To this extent, the second introductory quote above can be used equally
to describe 1) the processes of authorization, routinization and dehumanization that are promoted
by government officials and other authorities within Canadian society, 2) the ways in which nonNative residents responded to and went along with these government processes, as well as
collectively created and enacted their own processes of authorization, routinization and
dehumanization. Some of these processes will be discussed in more detail in the text that
follows.
Of course, not all non-Native people followed the lead of their government in this regard, and
not all participated in the collective creation of processes authorizing and routinizing the
dehumanization of Haudenosaunee protesters and Native people in general. There were many
non-Native residents who openly, and even loudly, supported the Haudenosaunee protest. And
there were many more residents who remained at least publicly silent on the issue, choosing to
avoid taking a clear side in the debate. In the web of non-Native responses to the Haudenosaunee
protest, both of these categories are complex and equally worthy of examination. For example,
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non-Native residents who supported the protest, and who were a clear minority in the town of
10,000, demonstrated a wide range of reasons and motivations in their support, as well as
fluctuations in the level of support their felt or demonstrated over time. Similarly, those
choosing to remain publicly silent on the issue, who comprised a clear majority in the town, also
likely had a wide range of reasons for their decisions from being too busy and focused on other
aspects of their lives to get distracted by it to possibly taking the easy road, as many people often
do, when faced with atrocities and perpetration. 512 What proportion of the silent majority were
motivated by which reasons is still largely hidden in their silence. 513
Originally, I had planned to write an entire dissertation examining the different non-Native
views of the Haudenosaunee Six Nations protest, and relating these differing views of the protest
to different ways of thinking and perceiving the world. To this extent, I found a number of
factors corresponding with and/or influencing non-Native perceptions of and attitudes towards
the Haudenosaunee protest, including: pre-existing worldview expectations and biases;
government policies and practices towards, and treatment of, Native peoples; government
statements; media reports and media responsiveness to correcting inaccuracies; and the actions of
some of the Haudenosaunee protesters and non-Native interpretations of these actions. While
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Herman (1992) and others (McFarlane & van der Kolk, 2006) have suggested that choosing to
remain neutral in the face of perpetration and atrocities is equivalent to siding with the
perpetrator: “[W]hen traumatic events are of human design, those who bear witness are caught in
the conflict between victim and perpetrator. It is morally impossible to remain neutral in this
conflict. The bystander is forced to take sides. … It is very tempting to take the side of the
perpetrator. All the perpetrator asks is that the bystander do nothing. He appeals to the universal
desire to see, hear, and speak no evil. The victim, on the contrary, asks the bystander to share the
burden of pain. The victim demands action, engagement, and remembering.” (Herman, 1992: 78)
513
Those who agreed to be interviewed on the topic in 2009 were largely those who had voiced
opinions in one direction or another, with the exception of the local clergy. Many in this latter
group attempted to maintain some degree of neutrality in the dispute, and had been actively
involved in working to heal relations and/or bring people together from all sides of the conflict.
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each of these factors corresponded with certain views on the Haudenosaunee protest, I quickly
realized that each of these factors is much more complex and needs to be investigated on its own
merit. For example, those most opposed to the Haudenosaunee protest appeared on first glance to
unquestioningly believe everything the Canadian, provincial, or county governments said
relating to the history of the land and the legitimacy of the Haudenosaunee protesters’
grievances. They used these government statements to frame their anti-protest rhetoric and their
extreme displays of anger. Yet, this alone did not fully explain the extent of non-Native anger
displayed by many anti-protest individuals, nor did it explain the anti-Native sentiment that often
accompanied this anti-protest anger. What’s more, further investigation revealed that these nonNatives were not so unquestioning in their adoptions of whatever government officials said.
They were actually quite strategic and sophisticated in their outright rejection and condemnation
of anything that conflicted with their anti-protest views, as well as in their outright embrace of
anything that supported these anti-protest views and their selective use of portions of information
provided by elected officials, media reports, local businessmen and other non-Native residents.
By selectively adopting and/or rejecting bits of information from other sources (and taking the
cue from government authorization, routinization and dehumanization processes), the non-Native
residents who most strongly opposed the protest were able to construct piecemeal narratives that
lent credibility to their own anti-protest stances while also undermining every other stance. Thus,
they believed that they were able to justify their own displays of anger and intolerance toward all
other stances or views on the protest.
These findings became somewhat more disturbing after I began my investigation into the
legal and historical facts surrounding the Haudenosaunee protest. As noted into the introduction,
I expected to find that neither the Haudenosaunee protesters nor the anti-protest non-Natives
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were entirely correct in their positions. I also expected that --given the predominance in media
reports of facts and narratives that tended to diminish the Haudenosaunee protesters’ credibility,
while supporting the Canadian governments’ version of events-- perhaps the latter had a stronger
case, though the former likely did have some grievances. However, what I began to find (and
continued to find) was quite the opposite. In fact, the Haudenosaunee version of history and law
is far more credible than that put forth by the Canadian government, the provincial government,
the county government, the media and/or the development company. The media simply did not
report on --and government officials at the federal, provincial and county levels simply did not
acknowledge-- Supreme Court of Canada rulings mandating consultation with Native nations
prior to approving or undertaking development projects on lands under claim. As discussed in
chapter 4, these rulings apply to all Native lands under claim, regardless of whether or not those
claims have yet been proven in court. In addition, as discussed in chapter 1, the “General
Surrender” of 1841 is not a legitimate document of surrender --as admitted by the Upper
Canadian government, itself, a number of times during the 1840s and 50s (see other examples of
problems with the Canadian government’s official versions of law and history in chapter 4).
What this information demonstrated to me was that non-Native Canadians who were most
opposed to the Haudenosaunee protest were not only selectively adopting and rejecting
narratives that fit a particular view that they wanted to have of the Haudenosaunee protest, but
that the selective narratives they were creating were based primarily on inaccurate information.
Certainly, part of the reason why non-Natives were basing anti-protest (or anti-Native)
arguments on faulty information was because they had been mislead by their government
officials and by the media (which may also have been mislead by government officials) (see
chapter 4). In this sense, non-Natives were reacting to the protest within the context of
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government policies and practices that authorized and routinized various processes of
dehumanizing and proclaiming open season on Native peoples and their lands, resources, treaty
and human rights. However, all non-Native residents were equally subjected to this
misinformation by government officials, the media, the developer and local businesspeople, but
many nonetheless remained open to hearing other points of view and to adopting perspectives
towards the protest that differed from the official, often-repeated versions of “facts.” Thus, there
are many other factors involved in the rigidity with which some non-Natives (in fact, a
substantial portion of them 514) selectively used facts to construct a particular anti-protest
narrative. These non-Natives further demonstrated both an angry intolerance of other points of
view and an inflexible need to be “right” in the inaccurate narratives they had constructed.
All of these dynamics should be of the utmost interested to any who are concerned about the
present trajectory of Western society, with its countless symbolic wars at home and literal wars
abroad, and with the rate at which it is rapidly destroying the planet and all life upon it. As
discussed in chapter 2, these patterns of thinking and behavior are rooted far back in the history
of Western society, and form a large portion of the foundation upon which this society has been
built. Thus, while future attention also needs to be given to an examination of the motivations
behind and dynamics involved in the varying levels of non-Native support for protest, as well as
non-Native silence in the matter, this chapter will primarily focus its examination on the
dynamics of non-Native opposition, all of which are contextualized within the problematic
patterns of thinking and behavior that are common and even foundational to Western society.

514

As noted in chapter 1, in a town of 10,000 people, 2,000-3,000 people participated in the
largest anti-protest rally (during which some speakers expressed considerable anti-Native
hostility). See below note.
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To this extent, this chapter constitutes an examination into the various factors involved in the
rigidity of anti-protest (and anti-Native) responses to the 2006 Haudenosaunee protest. More
specifically, this chapter seeks to explain why it is that a significant portion –20-30% 515 -- of
non-Native residents wanted, needed, and sought-out means (regardless of the correctness of
information upon which these means were based) for delegitimizing and dismissing all
Haudenosaunee grievances, while also justifying their own, sometimes extreme, displays of
anger 516 over the continuation of the Haudenosaunee protest and the refusal (or failure) of the
Canadian or Ontario governments to employ physical force to end the protest. Thus, the rest of

515

Non-Native anger culminated in a series of ever-intensifying anti-protest rallies, some of
which drew 2,000-3,000 people. (On there being 3,000 people at the April 24th rally, see:
Bonnell, Gregory; Canadian Press. 2006. Ontario land-claim protest turns ugly. Breaking News
from globeandmail.com. April 25, 12:05AM EST. Section A, B, National, Front). Meanwhile,
from 500-1000 residents participated in one or more of the “near-riots” (described as such in:
Harries, Kate and James Rusk. 2006. “Mayor loses speaking role on Caledonia; remarks about
Six Nations protesters sideline Trainer, prompt council apology.” The Globe and Mail
(Canada). April 26; Adams, Jim. 2006. Six Nations Reserve repels Ontario police. Indian
Country Today, April 21). On the numbers, see: Harries (2006b & 2006a); Harries and Rusk
(2006); CBC News (2006a)
516
In some instances, hundreds of non-Native residents (see note above), shouting racial slurs at
protesters and insults at police, attempted to force their way through police lines in order to
physically confront and remove Native protesters. These events were described by some as
“near-riots” and by others as simply “intense, intense, irrational anger” (Harries, Kate and James
Rusk. 2006. “Mayor loses speaking role on Caledonia; remarks about Six Nations protesters
sideline Trainer, prompt council apology.” The Globe and Mail (Canada). April 26; Harries,
Kate and James Rusk. 2006. “Mayor loses speaking role on Caledonia; remarks about Six
Nations protesters sideline Trainer, prompt council apology.” The Globe and Mail (Canada).
April 26). In addition, non-Native businesses reportedly refused to serve Native customers, and
non-Native kids’ sports teams refused to play neighboring teams from the Haudenosaunee Six
Nations reserve (Muse, Sandra. 2006. Six Nations councils meeting on occupation.
Tekawennake, April 12, page 4; Interviews with Caledonia residents, February-June, 2009). At
least some non-Native business owners, such as contractors, continued to refuse to do business
with Haudenosuanee Six Nations people more than three years later (Interviews with Caledonia
residents, February-June, 2009). Further, some non-Native residents stated that they had
stockpiled Molotov cocktails in their backyards or planned to ship guns into the town in the
event that “shit hit the fan” and a “civil race war” broke out in Canada (something that people
were still talking about three years later) (interviews with Caledonia residents, February –June,
2009).
369

this chapter will examine some of the various reasons why non-Native residents opposed to the
2006 Haudenosaunee protest, as well as some of the various reasons why and how these
opposing non-Natives expressed such intense angry opposition to the protest. It should be
emphasized here, as it has been elsewhere in the dissertation, that though this chapter examines
responses of a group of non-Native residents who vehemently opposed to the 2006
Haudenosaunee protest, and though many examples of behavior by individuals within this group
are provided to illustrate these dynamics, the label of “psychopathological” is not intended to
apply to the people in this discussion. Rather, it is the society, along with the patterns of thought
and behavior that it produces and encourages in individuals, groups and an entire society, that is
psychopathological, and that needs to be examined, understood and changed if humanity or any
other life form is to have a chance of surviving into the next century.
FINANCIAL GAINS
If the small colonizer defends the colonial system so vigorously, it is because he
benefits from it to some extent. His gullibility lies in the fact that to protect his
very limited interests, he protects other infinitely more important ones, of which
he is, incidentally, the victim. But, though dupe and victim, he also gets his share.
~ Memmi 1965, 11
One of the most obvious reasons why non-Native residents opposed the protest and rallied to
prevent the government from meeting any of the Haudenosaunee demands was the financial
benefits non-Native residents experienced, or the financial gains they were expecting to
experience through the ongoing dispossession of First Nations peoples from their lands,
resources, treaties and human rights. The town of Caledonia was one of the fastest growing
communities in southern Ontario. It had been experiencing rapid growth in the two decades
previous to the Haudenosaunee protest, and was expected to more than double in size over the
next two decades (see chapter 1, or see: Muse, 2005c; Hemsworth, 2006b; Harries, 2006b). With
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residential development as the single largest industry in the area (Best, 2006a), many residents
were expecting their housing values to dramatically increase, and had begun to build future life
plans around this expected financial windfall: buying a newer, bigger house; paying for their
children’s college education, starting a new business, or simply planning their retirement
(Interviews with Caledonia Residents, 2009). Many residents had also expected the rapid growth
to bring in new tax revenues for schools, children’s sports teams, and improvements to roads,
sidewalks, water and other systems in the community. 517 At best, the protest appeared to be
putting a temporary damper on these plans for several dozen families who were employed on or
had invested in the occupied/reclaimed construction site, and possibly for a few business owners
who claimed that business was much slower than usual. 518 But as the protest dragged on, those
developers who had invested in the site began to worry about bankruptcy, or about dwindling
interest in their development among prospective homebuyers (Windle, 2006h; Best, 2006c;
Legall, 2006d). Meanwhile, other developers and realtors began to worry about an adverse
financial impact on the building and trades industry as a whole (Legall, 2006l), and some
residents began to worry about the protest hurting their town’s image or their abilities to sell their
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The majority of people who chose to be interviewed in 2009 who brought up the issue of the
expected growth had wanted the growth. However, there were also people who were not
interested in (and were even opposed to) the new growth, which was expected to bring new
problems as well. Some did not want to deal with the politics of all kinds of new people moving
in and changing the workings of the town (some had already experienced some tension between
the wants of the new residents and the status quo comfort of the old residents). Some wanted the
town to stay small and rural for ecological and recreational purposes. Some were frustrated that
the influx of people would push farmers out and eat up surrounding farmland… (Interviews with
Caledonia residents, 2009).
518
Court documents filed by Henco Industries Limited, Inc., stated that there were as many as 75
construction workers who were employed on the site (Legall, 2006d), though later news reports
asserted that there were as many as 200 tradespeople (“such as carpenters, plumbers, roofers and
bricklayers”) who lost pay checks (Howard, 2006). On claims of slowed business, see: Canadian
Press (2006u).
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homes at a hefty profit, as previously planned (Brantford Expositor, 2006a; see also: Legall,
2006l; Jackson, 2006a).
Once residents learned of the protesters’ demands for a moratorium on development on the
site under protest, as well as on all Haudenosaunee lands under claim, these anxieties began to
escalate (Jackson, 2006j), and residents mobilized to oppose this moratorium and to protect “the
single largest industry (residential development) in our area”(Best, 2006a). Though the demand
for a development moratorium on all lands under Haudenosaunee claim was never even
considered by federal and provincial officials (see Appendix 1), provincial officials did appear to
leave themselves open to at least the possibility of moratorium on development on the small tract
of land under protest. The province made it clear that, in the event of such a moratorium, the it
(together with the federal government) would fully compensate the developer, but this was
entirely unacceptable to non-Native residents who feared that such a move would “set a
precedent,” jeopardizing development on all lands under Haudenosaunee claim. For example,
local businessman Ken Hewitt argued that if a moratorium on development was allowed even on
that small tract of land under protest, “then all other communities along the Grand River as well
as across Canada will be equally compromised,” and Haldimand County Councilmember Craig
Aschbaugh made similar emphatic insistences that “a moratorium on development cannot be
allowed” (Smith, 2006c; Best, 2006a). 519
Intent on organizing support for these views, local developers, realtors, mortgage and
financial brokers organized a counter-protest rally, appealing to residents’ fears with a flyer
announcing that “[i]f this situation is not resolve quickly we could all be looking at significant
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Real estate business owner and CCA organizer Bruce MacDonald similarly noted that the
protesters’ demands “would indicate that all lands [in the Haldimand tract] are subject to their
interference” (quoted in: Best, 2006a).
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decreases in our property values” (Best, 2006a; Pearce, 2006a; Brantford Expositor, 2006a;
Autonomy & Solidarity, 2006d). 520 The flyer and speakers at the rally also encouraged residents
to join with them in demanding that all builders, trades men, business owners, and home owners
in the town –and not just the impacted development company-- should be paid a monthly stipend
until the protest was resolved, to compensate them for the “inconvenience” the protest was
causing them (Best, 2006a; Pearce, 2006a). 521 One reporter even used his weekly column to
argue that, whether tax payers liked it or not, there was no question that builders, developers,
workers and home buyers should be compensated for their losses “and put back on even ground.
End of story”(Jackson, 2006d). 522 Yet, tellingly, not one speaker at the rally is reported to have
extended these concerns for “just” compensation to the Haudenosaunee people, much less for
seeing that land claims were resolved peacefully. Instead, only adamant opposition to the
protesters’ demands was voiced. To this latter extent, one resident even argued (incorrectly) in a
letter to the editor that the Haudenosaunee had already been paid in full, or even over-paid, for
the land under protest through tax credits; and further, that they never should have been paid in
the first place because “throughout history subject peoples (including Scottish!) have rarely if
ever been paid for their losses” (Flemming, 2006b). Another resident argued that the government
should pay “interim compensation for the developer and inconvenienced home-buyers,” and then
520

The flyer was created by the Caledonia Citizens’ Alliance, a loose, grassroots coalition of real
estate and construction businessmen in order to oppose recognition of Haudenosaunee Six
Nations demands.
521
What inconvenience homeowners actually experienced from the rally at this point –April 4—
is entirely unclear, since the protest was peaceful and contained to a tiny area of land on the far
edge of town.
522
“There's no point in getting into a big debate about whether or not builders and developers
should be compensated for losses. Of course they should, now. … None of our laws have
prevailed to resolve an ongoing land dispute and because of that, people who stand to lose the
most --the developers, workers and home consumers who followed the laws and regulations
before them-- should be granted compensation and put back on even ground. End of story. It
doesn't mean that as a taxpayer or even a local business owner you have to like it.”
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“simply [walk] away until cooler heads [prevail],” leaving the protesters with nothing and with
no bargaining leverage (Howard, 2006). 523 A third resident, and one of the leaders of the antiprotest counter-rally, likewise insisted that the government should not be negotiating with the
protesters at all:
We don't believe you can be in negotiations when one of the parties is performing
an illegal act by blocking one of the roads. Our town shouldn't be the victim or the
tool to control the government. (Ken Hewitt, quoted in Harries, 2006a)
Thus, many non-Native residents actively advocated the ongoing dispossession of
Haudenosuanee peoples and ongoing colonial nation-building in Canada, and they did so
because they were benefiting or were expecting to benefit financially from these ongoing
activities. To this extent, these same non-Native residents actively opposed the demands of the
Haudenosuanee protesters, who asked simply that development on lands under claim stop until
the land claims were settled. Further, some residents even appear to have actively opposed any
redress for past wrongs committed against the Haudenosaunee, by demanding that the
government not talk to protesters, or by inaccurately asserting that the Haudenosaunee had
already been paid for the land under protest and should not have been paid in the first place
(since “subject peoples” are rarely compensated for such dispossessions). Further, it appears that
many of these residents did not feel the need to justify their opposition to the protest or the
protesters’ demands at all. Their own perceptions that they might not gain financially in the ways
they had been expecting to gain seemed more than enough justification for these residents. Thus,
they demanded (and eventually received)—financial compensation for the inconvenience of

523

The resident made this argument on the grounds that the protest had “rapidly turned nasty,”
apparently referring to the protesters’ display of defiance when the local sheriff had read the
newest injunction to protesters about a week prior. This statement was made on April 1, at a time
when all the protest was peaceful by all accounts.
374

having been interrupted in their process of gaining financially from the dispossession of
Haudenosaunee people.
Thus, many non-Native residents All of these double-standards and displays of a complete
lack of empathy or sympathy for Native concerns clearly suggest a considerable degree of
psychopathology at play. As discussed in chapter 4, government policies and practices had long
authorized and routinized the ongoing dispossession of Native peoples throughout Canada so
much and for so long that many non-Native residents were actually outraged when these
processes were interrupted. Upon the slightest hint of this interruption, these non-Native
residents demonstrated an urgent, emphatic concern for themselves, as well as any other nonNative who claimed financial injury because of the peaceful Haudenosaunee protest. Yet, they
had no concern whatsoever for the Haudenosaunee people and the long-standing and ongoing
injuries that they suffered, and were so lacking in concern as to not even feel it necessary to give
symbolic lip service to the idea of justice for their Native neighbors. All of these factors, as
argued in chapter 4, have made Canada ripe for atrocity-producing situations on an escalating
basis, not only in the policy-driven forms discussed in chapter 4, but also in the form of local
interracial, intercultural settler-colonial conflict. Further, non-native residents’ unquestioned
complicity with, participation in, and active advocating for these ongoing perpetrations against
Native peoples demonstrates a psychopathological dehumanization of Native peoples, which can
best be explained through the prisms not merely of “siding with the perpetrator,” 524 but of
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“[W]hen traumatic events are of human design, those who bear witness are caught in the
conflict between victim and perpetrator. It is morally impossible to remain neutral in this
conflict. The bystander is forced to take sides.
It is very tempting to take the side of the perpetrator. All the perpetrator asks is that the
bystander do nothing. He appeals to the universal desire to see, hear, and speak no evil. The
victim, on the contrary, asks the bystander to share the burden of pain. The victim demands
action, engagement, and remembering.” (Herman, 1992, p. 8).
375

actively modeling one’s behavior after, and seeking to be the perpetrator, in whatever fashion
possible. Such extensive dehumanization of others (and of oneself) is a result of the
psychological processes of dissociation, splitting, and projection, taken to psychopathological
extents, and observable not only in the complete lack of empathy for Native peoples and their
concerns, but also in the various allegations levied against them: i.e., that they “turned nasty;”
that they were lawbreakers and should be ignored; and that they were greedy, manipulative
people seeking to get paid for things they were already paid for and should never have been paid
for. In fact, all of these accusations, when considered within the historical context of non-Native
displacement and dispossession of Native peoples (as well as in the present context of settlement
and development on Haudenosaunee lands in 2006), much more accurately reflect the behavior
and psychological patterns of those non-Native residents who were most opposed to the protest.

THREATS TO CULTURAL WORLDVIEW AND REASSERTIONS OF PRIVILEGE
Indeed, so strong was the drive to preserve slavery that, during the 1820s and
1830s, its defense became synonymous with nationalism, and hence patriotism. In
response to European criticism that the U.S. was hypocritical in its claims to
being democratic, many Americans argued that to be free, one must dominate
others. In dominating absolutely, the U.S. was the freest of nations. And others
added that, since property right was inseparable from freedom, the U.S. exalted
liberty in raising property right to its highest form (as property in persons).
~ Martinot 2003a, 408
The very structure of their [the oppresse’s] thought has been conditioned by the
contradictions of the concrete, existential situation by which they were shaped.
Their ideal is to be men; but for them, to be men is to be oppressors. This is their
model of humanity. Thus, the behavior of the oppressed is a prescribed behavior,
following as it does the guidelines of the oppressor.
~ Friere 1971, 30-31
His racism is as usual to his daily survival as is any other prerequisite for
existence. Compared to colonial racism, that of European doctrinaires seems
transparent, barren of ideas and, at first sight, almost without passion. A mixture
of behaviors and reflexes acquired and practiced since very early childhood,
established and measured by education, colonial racism is so spontaneously
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incorporated in even the most trivial acts and words, that it seems to constitute
one of the fundamental patterns of the colonialist personality. The frequency of
its occurrence, its intensity in colonial relationships, would be astounding if we
did not know to what extent it helps the colonist to live and permits his social
introduction. The colonialists are perpetually explaining, justifying and
maintaining (by words as well as by deed) the place and fate of their silent
partners in the colonial drama.
~ Memmi 1965, 70
The above section examined motivations behind the explosive and sometimes violent
expressions of non-native anger in Caledonia relating to real or imagined financial hardships said
to have been caused by the Haudenosaunee protest and to have unfairly harmed non-Natives.
However, though these types of claims continued to pepper anti-protest rhetoric throughout the
duration of the conflict (which continues today), the bulk of anti-protest rhetoric quickly veered
away from them and towards rhetoric that served to denigrate Native protesters (and Native
people in general) through assertions of race, class, gendered, legal and nation-based dominance.
In large part, these various assertions of privilege can be said to be reflective both of a cultural
worldview that is based upon the subjugation and oppression of other peoples and is incapable of
dealing with difference, and of a fundamental tendency within this western cultural worldview to
reenact past societal trauma –on one’s self and others-- through what Elias has termed the
“civilizing process” (see chapter 4). Both of these are integral parts of the other, and both will be
briefly explained before a review of some of the relevant actions and statements of non-Natives
in this regard.
Some of the Psychological Dynamics of Non-Native Assertions of Privilege
A large and ever-growing body of Social Psychological literature, often referred to as Terror
Management Theory (TMT) has examined the importance of cultural worldviews on self-esteem
and management of anxiety –particularly death-related anxiety (for an overview, see: Hayes, et
al., 2010). Consisting of hundreds of articles, this body of literature holds that cultural
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worldviews are essential to our abilities to manage anxiety and to feel good about ourselves and
our place in the world. When these cultural worldviews are threatened, people strongly
identified with them are likely to experience increased anxiety and to respond defensively in
order to protect themselves from the psychological threat that is posed to their sense of wellbeing. Such defenses may include clinging to one’s cultural worldview despite contradictory
evidence (Greenberg et al., 2003) and/or efforts to socially distance oneself from “undesirable”
others (Schimel et. al., 2000: 446). In both cases, people may engaged in various degrees of:
derogating others to minimize the threat posed by their views, convincing them to
abandon their beliefs in favor of one’s own (e.g., missionary activity), or
annihilating them entirely, thus proving the “truth” of one’s own beliefs (Solomon
et. al., 2000: 201).
These findings are in line with Devries’ (2006) argument that culture provides us with positive
social identity, shields us from stressful life events, and that threats to, or loss of, culture can lead
to paranoia, aggression, identity confusion, negative identities, and socially regressive and
exclusionary forms of bonding (see chapter 2 and/or appendix 2. See also: Hutchinson & Bleiker,
2008; Greenberg et al., 2003). 525
These findings are also in line with various Sociological studies. For example, TMT studies
have found strong elements of nationalism, racism and other expressions of dominant group
privilege are elicited when dominant group privileges are symbolically threatened. When
Schimel et al. (2007) exposed Canadians to materials that questioned or denigrated Canadian
achievements and culture, they found that those who most strongly identified with Canadian
nationalism experienced a significant increase in death-related thoughts (while those with other
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The latter source reports that: “[T]houghts of one’s own death [and presumably also the death
of one’s own cultural worldview] affect a wide range of human activities, including prosocial
behavior, aggression, nationalism, prejudice, self-esteem striving, sexual attitudes, risk taking,
and close relationships.”
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primary identifications did not). Meanwhile, Branscombe et al. (2007 & 1998) studied the
impact on dominant group members of reminders of the privileges (versus the “disadvantages”)
of dominant group status. The researchers found that being reminded of one’s group privilege
produced greater levels of racism among dominant group members who most strongly identify
with their dominant group category (while eliciting a social-distancing effect among other, less
identity-invested dominant group members. Elsewhere, Sociologists have also found that when
White Americans were encouraged to think of themselves as “American” they exhibited higher
levels of prejudice than they did when they were encouraged to think of themselves as “White
American” or “European American,” suggesting that “American” is a category that they feel
needs to be defended for and by white people (Dach-Gruschow, 2006: 126). Perhaps in partial
explanation of this phenomena, West-Newman (2004: 190) has argued that dominant group
members –particularly in settler societies—have long come to expect that social relations of
domination in which dominant group members hold privileged positions relative to others will be
reproduced and reinforced through government policies and practices. 526 Likewise, Cramer
(2006: 318, citing Gosset) has reported that dominant group members with the most to gain from
the dispossession of Native peoples often exhibit the most hatred and contempt for Native
peoples who assert their rights.
Thus, they psychological defense mechanisms associated with threats to one’s cultural
worldview, can be deeply intertwined with various race-, class-, gender-, nation-, culture-, and/or
religious-based assertions of privilege and participation in oppression. In part, this is due to the
anxiety that challenges to one’s cultural worldview can produce, as well as, perhaps, the paranoia
that accompanies the both the perpetration against others and the psychological defenses of
526

See also, Litowitz (2000), on arrests as symbolic reenactments of social relations of
domination.
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denial, projection and scapegoating (Martinot, 2003a &2003b; Bladwin, 1965; Wise, 2005;
Szasz, 1970; Sartre, 1977; Lifton, 1975). 527 These psychological defenses are likely to be
particularly acute among dominant group members who, unlike non-dominant group members,
may have experienced little prior exposure to alternative cultural worldviews (whereas nondominant group members generally have these forced upon them). Further, as noted in chapter 2,
Western society is built upon a foundation of psychopathological extremes of these various
coping mechanism, and it provides its members with few healthy collective methods for
resolving trauma or worldview-related anxiety. Instead, the defense mechanisms of choice, into
which we are all socialized, are more likely to based on the regressive social bonding talked
about by Devries (2006), Schimel et al, (2000) and others, noted above. Thus, in the face of
challenges to their cultural worldview, or to their privileged status, dominant group members in
Western society are already deep into the psychopathology of the Western worldview. In their
Western-characteristic confusion, anxiety, fear, and paranoia, they may well feel justified in
asserting their own claims of victimhood –as if those who challenge the Western cultural
worldview are victimizers for “provoking” these uncomfortable emotions (see, for example:
Lipsitz, 2008; Sommers & Norton, 2006). To this extent, Doane (2006: 269) has noted how,
“Politically, casting whites as victims provides a strong base for neutralizing minority claims for
racial justice and for activating white counter-mobilization for the defense of racial advantages.”
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For example, Lifton (1975) wrote about the societal-wide “fearful sense that various forces of
change threaten to destroy or kill something in the American cultural-ideological essence, a
perception that is itself called upon in order to ward off the unacceptable feeling that the process
of decay is internal (nationally and individually). Broadly speaking, one could say that Watergate
and My Lai represented desperate last-ditch efforts to maintain a faltering cosmology around the
American secular religion of nationalism, which was inwardly perceived to be collapsing”(p.
174).
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(Guilt also plays a central role in many of these dynamics, and will be examined on its own in
the next section).
In reasserting their dominant group privileges, or their alleged positions of domination over
other, non-dominant groups, residents are at one and the same time seeking to defend these
privileges and reenacting past societal traumas. The “civilizing process” in Western society,
reenacted in abbreviated form in the lifelong socialization of each of its members, had long ago
taught these residents about social hierarchies, social relations of domination, and how to act
respectfully and deferentially towards their hierarchical “superiors.” This is among the most
essential lessons taught to members of Western society –as the existence of hierarchies of
domination is largely the factor that set Western “civilized” peoples apart from those deemed
“uncivilized” (see chapters 2 and 5. See also: Jahn, 2000). Even today in Western society, those
who fail to learn their “place” in the hierarchies of social domination, and to act accordingly
(with the requisite respect for their alleged “superiors”) generally also fail to find “success” in
schooling, in the workplace, and in gaining employment in the first place –unless, of course, they
are independently wealthy, or wildly successful in their creativity. 528 After all, Western standards
of “success” require obedience to authority and hard work for others, and Western myths hold
that by following these rules and being “good citizens” one can gradually move up in the social
hierarchy, gaining dominance over others as a reward. [To this extent, Jahn (2000: 56) noted that
according to the social hierarchies of Western society upon their discovery of the New World, a
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Success in their creativity would require producing a product that was widely coveted by
those with money, such as art, or producing a product that earned one lots of money, such as a
dot.com or other such creation, and thus made him/her independently wealthy. Thus, in either
case, according to the Western social hierarchies of domination, these individuals would deserve
deference and respect rather than owe it to others –and thus did not actually fail to learn anything
in this regard.
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man’s position in these hierarchies was determined by how much authority (domination) he
commanded over animals, women, and other men (see also p. 59; and Todorov, 1999: 152-53)].
The 2006 Haudenosaunee protest challenged all of these assumptions around which many
non-Native residents had built their entire lives --constantly playing by the rules and, if they were
anything like perhaps the majority of people in Western society, repeatedly repressing their own
desires, and even dissociating from the essence of who they each were as people, all in an
attempt to move up the social hierarchy. To many of these by-the-rules non-Natives, the
Haudenosaunee protesters demonstrated a blatant disregard for the rules and the socially
accepted hierarchies of Western society. As such, they had not “earned” the right to demand
deference from others, as perhaps many non-Natives imagined themselves to have done through
their long lives of hard work, obedience and deference to “superiors.” Further, in refusing to
recognize, much less abide by, these hierarchical constructs, the Haudenosaunee protesters were
challenging these cultural assumptions, thus threatening not only the cultural worldview and the
privilege of non-Native residents, but the very meaning of their lives –lives that had been spent
following, adhering to, conforming to the (arbitrary) rules. As Native protesters who either did
not know or care about the place in Western society that had been assigned to them demanded to
talk to federal officials, non-Native residents who had been lifelong obedient conformists in the
social hierarchy of Western society were struggling to even be heard by their local mayor and
county councilors. For at least some of these non-Native residents, the protesters’ actions and
demands absolutely could not be seen for what they were –legitimate grievances regarding
ongoing and egregious violations of Haudenosaunee rights—because viewing them in this regard
would require that non-Natives discard all of the assumptions around which they had built their
obedient, rule-abiding, self-repressing lives. For some, the entire meaning of their lives, and to
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the society and culture around which they had built their identities as good, moral, upstanding
citizens, was under threat.
The protest thus also challenged the Western beliefs in moral purity (of Western society) and
in a just world (that bad things happen to bad people, and vice versa). If non-Native residents
opened themselves up to the possibility that the Haudenosaunee grievances were legitimate, both
of these aspects of the non-Native worldview immediately fell apart. The entire nation of
Canada –like western society itself-- has long been built upon the forcible dispossession of
people(s), other life forms, and parts of the earth; but these facts had been conveniently forgotten
long ago through the Western practices of rewriting history and the Western myths of progress
and civilization. The protesters’ grievances threatened to bring these intolerable, long repressed
and denied facts to the surface, and this would completely invert Western assumptions regarding
who was morally righteous and just and who was not. Haudenosuanee protesters were not only
presenting grievances, they were presenting a version of reality that had long been denied, but
that –even while actively repressed-- still held so much resonance of truth that it threatened the
entire fabric of the lives of those most strongly identified with Western and/or Canadian
mythology. Many of these non-Natives were thus among the most opposed any recognition of
Haudenosaunee grievances, and actively demanded a forcible, violent end to the protest. When
seeing that no end was in sight, these non-Native residents sought to take matters into their own
hands by physically confronting and removing the Native protesters in vigilante fashion. They
would have done anything to prevent the threads of their illusory lives from unraveling. As
Haudenosaunee community member Wendy Hill remarked in the first quote introducing this
chapter, non-Native people were terrified of what they might see, of themselves, of their society,
of everything they had known in their lives, if these threads unraveled:
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They're scared. You know, those people are scared, because basically they've
been lied to their whole life. And now we're standing there telling them a truth
that they've never heard, and it scares them to think about their future and their
past. What is the true history of their past? And so out of this fear and this hurt
of being lied to, it makes them angry. (Haudenosaunee Confederacy, 2007)
The rest of this section will explore some of the assertions of privilege, and some of the
claims to victimhood, made by non-Natives desperately seeking to hold onto either their
privilege, their worldview, identity, and the meaning of their lives, or all of these. Only a few
examples will be given for each point made, in the interest of time and space.
Examples of Non-Native Assertions of Privilege
Some of the ways that non-Native residents reasserted their privilege and defended against
threats to their cultural worldview was by bonding together around a common national identity
that implicitly (or explicitly) excluded Native peoples and that contextualized Haudenosaunee
grievances within the broader Canadian project of nation-building through the dispossession of
Native and non-Western peoples (see also: Dudas, 2005). For example, at one anti-protest rally,
organizer Ken Hewitt sought to energize the Canadian-flag-waving crowd by asking them to
think of the Olympics and to remember the troops in Afghanistan, adding:
Reach out to all your political people and let them know we are not willing to
stand still any longer. It’s time the Canadian ideology that exists within these
flags take precedent. (Ken Hewitt, quoted in Smith, 2006c)
Both the war in Afghanistan and the 2010 Olympics represent national imperialist and/or
colonial ventures. At the time this statement was made, the 2010 Olympics in Vancouver were
being built upon unceded First Nations lands, against the will of many First Nations people.
Meanwhile, the war in Afghanistan was being carried out to promote the hegemonic dominance
and strategic economic positioning of Western countries and their corporate elites. Thus, for Ken
Hewitt and other non-Native residents at this rally, these colonial and imperialist activities were
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to be celebrated, and their own “struggle” against Haudenosaunee protester demands was
contextualized within the ideologies of Canadian nation-building and Western (White)
supremacy. Other residents repeated this message, asserting to reporters, for example that: “I’m
proud of my Country, I’m proud of my race, I’m proud of my town” (unnamed non-Native
resident quoted in: Hayley & Harries, 2006; Horn, 2006).
At the same time that non-Native residents sought to exclude Native peoples from their
collective, socially-constructed, national identity, they also attempted to reassert the dominance
of this identity over Native peoples. They did so, in some instances, by repeatedly denouncing
protesters’ claims that the Haudenosaunee were (are) a sovereign people. 529 To this extent, one
resident remarked in a letter to the editor that “Contrary to some protesters' beliefs, they are
subject to the laws of Canada. Just ask any of the natives currently serving time in Canada's
prisons,”(Lupton, 2006). Another non-Native editorial columnist asserted, oddly: “I keep reading
media reports about the "peaceful" protesters in Caledonia and their claims to sovereignty. …
[T]he natives are no more sovereign than breasts on a woman” (Jackson, 2006c). 530
Further in line with the “Canadian ideology that exists within these flags,” many non-Native
residents who opposed the protest rhetorically advocated punishments for Native peoples
asserting their sovereign status. One non-Native resident suggested that: “if natives are not
Canadian, and do not deem themselves to be subject to the laws of Canada, then they should not
be receiving the billions of Canadian tax dollars that they do now” (Shaver, 2006). Though the
concept of providing funding to other nations only on the condition that these nations do what
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Protesters made statements about Haudenosaunee sovereignty to the press throughout the
protest. Some media mentions closest to this time are included in: Canadian Press, 2006a, 2006u
& 2006s).
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The implicit gender-based assertions of privilege here are also interesting, and there are a
number of other, similar examples of this type of assertion. These will be explored in a future
work.
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Canada wants was not lost on this resident, these comments display a willful ignorance of the
fact that historic treaty agreements with Native nations often explicitly stipulated that Europeans
pay annuities and share in promoting the well-being of particular Native nations in exchange for
permission to use portions of these nations’ lands. Another non-Native resident went even
further in her denunciations of Haudenosaunee claims to sovereignty, insisting that there could
be no grey area on the topic: “If these people are not Canadians then they're bloody terrorists”
(Lisa Parent, quoted in Bonnell & Canadian Press, 2006c), again towing the general assumption
in the Western cultural worldview today that those nations and peoples who act contrary to
Western interests are self-evidently terrorists.
Of course, non-Natives’ defense of the western cultural worldview and assertions of privilege
over Native peoples did not rest solely on constructions of (white) Canadian nationalism. They
also sought to denigrate Native protesters (and peoples in general) through the use of stereotypes
which perpetuated idea of Native peoples as low on the social hierarchy, and as less “civilized”
than non-Native Canadians. For example, at their weekly anti-protest (anti-Native) rallies, nonNative residents intent on confronting Native peoples and venting their anti-Native anger arrived
holding signs with slogans such as: “Get a job you filthy Indians” and “How ‘bout Some
Whiskey?” (Tekawennake, 2006b). Other signs proclaimed the protesters to be “cowards,
thugs… half-wits, and terrorists,” and proclaimed the protest site to be “Loserville” (signs shown
in: Haudenosuanee Confederacy, 2007). Letters to the editor and editorial columnists further
played on stereotypes of Native peoples as lowly and “uneducated” “loafers” or slum-dwellers
who have nothing better to do than to destroy the investments of more civilized businessmen. As
one resident remarked:
If the police had shown any foresight in this matter they would have acted when
there was only a handful of these clowns at Douglas Creek Estates. Now we have
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dozens of loafers living in a mini slum at the edge of town. Meanwhile, a local
businessman is watching his investment circle the drain. (Thompson, 2006a)
Further, an editorial column proclaimed:
Educated people who have bought homes are being held hostage as are the
builders and developers who need to work to earn a living. And non-natives are
getting increasingly frustrated with natives in general when they should be
concerning themselves with a group of people who don't know any better and
have nothing better to do. (Jackson, 2006c)
Other non-Native residents focused on stereotypes of Native people as welfare recipients,
dependent upon non-Native hand-outs and needing to “finally learn that life is somehow more
satisfying when you have to pay for your own lunch”(Flemming, 2006a); and even the local
mayor advanced such stereotypes, suggesting that, unlike non-Native residents, Native protesters
did not understand what it was like to have to work for a living: “[The non-Natives] don’t have,
uh, monies coming in automatically every month. They’ve got to work to survive. And, and the
Natives’ have got to realize that” (Mayor Marie Trainer, quoted in: CBC News, 2006a; Harries
& Rusk, 2006; Rook, 2006f).
Numerous other residents utilized racial slurs and race-based assertions of dominance,
directed at Native protesters as well as Native people in general who attempted to patronize local
businesses. For example, one non-Native resident yelled urgently to his fellow non-Natives:
“Don’t let Indians get through that door!”(Hayley & Harries, 2006; Horn, 2006). Some of these
race-based assertions of privilege and dominance will be further explored in the section on
dehumanization.
As part of their cultural worldview of non-Native privilege and dominance, non-Native
residents who vehemently opposed the Haudenosaunee protest had expected to see a show of
force against the Native protesters, and many of them lined the roads around the protest site on
the days of this expected show of force in order to get a good view of the symbolic reenactment
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of Canadian society’s social relations of domination. 531 When this show of force did not
materialize, non-Natives’ sense of entitlement and privilege within the social hierarchy of
Canadian society was threatened. Many non-Natives responded to this sense of threat by
reasserting their sense of entitlement, by simultaneously dismissing Native grievances outright,
and by making exaggerated claims to non-Native victimhood. Some of these exaggerated claims
will be explored in their own section, further below.
GUILT, SELF-ESTEEN, REFRAMING LAW, REWRITING HISTORY
The subject [that] would try to obtain liberation through oblivion from something
that actually happened, looses a part of its history, and therefore a part of its
identity. In this way, the subject walks around without a shadow and becomes
“face- and history-less” and is yet permanently in restlessness and fear of being
caught by its own shadow and its true face.
~Hardtman 1998, 92
People who imagine that history flatters them (as it does, indeed, since they wrote
it) are impaled on their history like a butterfly on a pin and become incapable of
seeing or changing themselves, or the world. … They are dimly, or vividly, aware
that the history they have fed themselves is mainly a lie, but they do not know how
to release themselves from it, and they suffer enormously from the resulting
personal incoherence.
~ Baldwin 1965
Guilt and the struggle for self-esteem are important aspects of the dynamics discussed in the
above section. Part of chapter 2 examined the loss of culture and the adverse impacts of that
upon the people who experience it. It was also asserted in that chapter that cultural identities that
were constructed from this loss were often built upon regressive forms of social bonding and
other exclusionary and psychopathological patterns of thought and behavior. These assertions
fall in line with the observations of others, such as Tim Wise (2005) and Vine Deloria, Jr.
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For more on this sort of phenomena, see Litowitz (2000) and West-Newman (2004). For
some media accounts of this behavior, see: Windle (2006f) and Greenberg (2006a).
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(1969), 532 who have both found that “white” Western culture is based more on exclusion and
destruction than on the self- and other-affirming aspects associated with culture in indigenous
and other non-Western societies. As such, Western culture in many ways fails to provide its
members with any but the most fragile foundations for social support, for successfully navigating
life’s many stages, for the development of a “positive evaluation of the self in the social
context,” and for keeping its members sane and human (Diamond, 1974: 254; Devries, 2006:
400). In fact, as argued in chapter 2, the main means that Western culture offers its members for
the construction of social identities are exclusion, domination and consumption (Horkheimer,
1996; Horkheimer & Adorno, 1997; Marcuse, 1964; Deloria, 1969; Wise, 2005). Wise (2005)
elaborates on the fragile foundations of identity-construction in Western society, as well as one
of the key problems of concern in this section:
To define yourself, ultimately, but what you’re not, is a pathetic and
heartbreaking thing. It is to stand denuded before a culture that has stolen your
birthright, or rather, convinced you to give it up. And the costs are formidable,
beginning with the emptiness whites so often feel when confronted by
multiculturalism and the connectedness of people of color to their various
heritages. That emptiness then gets filled up by privileges and ultimately forces
us to become dependent upon them. We are not ourselves anymore, but the
overpaid, overfed, overstuffed slaves to a self-imposed, self-chosen system of
cultural genocide.
I can’t help think that at the end of the day, we, too, got played. (Pp. 145-46)
Some of the Psychological Dynamics of Guilt
Because, as noted above, reminders of group-based privilege are often experienced as threats
both to privilege and self-esteem, privileged group members frequently respond in ways intended
to defend both of these, while also denying (repressing) associated feelings of guilt. Such efforts
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“As far as we could determine, white culture, if it existed, depended primarily upon the
exploitation of land, people and life itself. It relied upon novelties and fads to provide an
appearance of change but it was basically an economic Darwinism that destroyed rather than
created” (p. 179).
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may well include increased displays of racial or cultural prejudice among those most strongly
identified with one’s cultural worldview or in-group status and/or other forms of clinging to the
cultural worldview that affords them privilege (Branscombe et. al., 1998; Branscombe et. al.,
2007; Hayes et al., 2010). In part, some have argued, this is because feelings of guilt and
acknowledgement of one’s responsibility for past or ongoing atrocities can be “deeply painful”
(Williams, 2000). Those who are not strongly invested in the dominant group identity may seek
to socially distance themselves from the dominant group in order to relieve themselves of at least
some of these feelings (Arndt et. al., 2007; Williams, 2000; Branscome, 1998 and 2007). Others
who are more invested in these dominant group identities may attempt to repress feelings of
guilt. Some do so out of fear that the negative emotions they will experience will be so great that
they will never be able to recover from them, or out of fear that if they acknowledge these
atrocities to any extent, they will be required to give up their “cheerfulness and liveliness”
forever, and will be required to live their entire lives focused on past horrors that can never be
undone (Bar-on, Ostrovsky, and Fromer, 1998; Goodwin, 1989). Others do so out of a need to
maintain feelings of moral purity and superiority (Williams, 2008; Litz et al., 2009), or a need to
adhere to cultural worldview myths of Western benevolence in imposing destruction upon nonWestern peoples. Thus, by denying all guilt, these privileged group members are denying the
reality of past and present perpetration, and thus construct identities around and adopt the
mentality of justifying perpetration –referred to by Herman (1992) as “identifying with the
perpetrator.” 533
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“[W]hen traumatic events are of human design, those who bear witness are caught in the
conflict between victim and perpetrator. It is morally impossible to remain neutral in this
conflict. The bystander is forced to take sides.
It is very tempting to take the side of the perpetrator. All the perpetrator asks is that the
bystander do nothing. He appeals to the universal desire to see, hear, and speak no evil. The
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Unfortunately, the willful (or even unconscious) adoption of this mentality is conducive to
future acts of perpetration and atrocities, and the efforts required to repress and deny knowledge
of past perpetrations is likely to evoke feelings of resentment and anger (Williams, 2000;
Halloran, 2000; West-Newman, 2004; Lifton, 2002) which can “inevitably become sources of
identity” themselves (Hutchinson and Bleiker, 2008: 396, 391). These can in turn evoke
symptoms of paranoia, attack imagery, imagined persecution and/or imagined threats of
disintegration (Williams, 2000: 137-38; Litz et. al. 2009: 699; Martinot, 2003; Lifton, 1975 &
2002: 67; Doane, 2006: 269), requiring psychopathological processes of blaming, blame-shifting,
and scapegoating to maintain the illusion of cultural moral purity and righteous benevolence
(Williams, 2000; Litz et. al., 2009; Bar-On, Ostrovsky and Fromer, 1998). All of these
psychopathological mechanisms can serve to justify symbolic or actual physical assaults on
already victimized groups in attempts to ward off otherwise intolerable feelings of guilt that
one’s fragile identity and sense of self-esteem cannot otherwise survive intact (Kelman, 1973;
Martinot, 2003a; Williams, 2008; Hardtmann, 1998). 534
Non-Native residents in Caledonia who adamantly opposed the Haudenosaunee protest chose
the former option, constructing temples of illusion to protect their fragile identities, self-esteem,

victim, on the contrary, asks the bystander to share the burden of pain. The victim demands
action, engagement, and remembering.” (Pp. 7-8)
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“For the children, the second generation in Germany, this means that they grew up with
partially “face- and history-less parents.” Insofar as they have identified with them, as, for
instance, the right-wing radical youth, their own identity depends on an illusionary and brittle
foundation. It is difficult for them to develop a defined identity of their own, to live a different
history, and show a different face. To the extent that they develop this identity, they have to
question the parental models and thus the yearning and loving feelings attached to them. They
are orphans inside, reliant on surrogate mothers and fathers. The story of these surrogate mothers
and fathers has not yet been written. From the psychoanalyst’s perspective, it is not rare for the
psychoanalyst to take over that function” (Hardtmann, 1998: 92).
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and cultural worldview, and to reassert their privileged positions. The following discussion in
this section will examine some of the ways in which they did so.
Applying the Dynamics of Guilt Repression and Denial to Non-Native Opposition to the
Haudenosaunee Protest
Though the 2006 Haudenosaunee protest was a peaceful protest of perhaps a dozen or so
people confined to a small plot of land on the outskirts of town (at least prior to the failed police
raid), it confronted non-Native residents with a version of local and Canadian history that many
had long sought to deny. Because of this long-standing denial and repression, many non-Natives
were entirely unprepared for the feelings of guilt that arose within them when they were
confronted with reminders of their deep, collective and personal, complicity in these harms.
Perhaps without understanding the source of these feelings, but wanting to get rid of them
quickly, many non-Native residents immediately opposed the events that provoked these
feelings. The forced surfacing of these intolerable feelings of guilt with which they were wholly
unprepared to deal may even have been one of the motivating factors behind non-Native
opposition to the protest, particularly for non-Natives who were more dissociated from their
emotions and less willing to engage in critical self-reflection necessary for processing
unexpected emotions. Other residents, whose opposition may have been motivated by different
factors (financial gain, desires to protect privilege and/or assert domination), were similarly
forced to respond in some way to feelings of guilt associated with their opposition to justice for
Native peoples, and many of these latter likely also sought to deny and repress feelings of guilt
rather than confront and critically reflect upon them.
Thus, regardless of whether guilt was a motivating factor in opposing the protest or an
unpleasant emotion that needed to be neutralized, non-Natives seeking to avoid intolerable
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feelings of guilt utilized a number of psychological defense mechanisms for doing so. For
example, as briefly mentioned above, some non-Natives who intensely protested the interruption
in colonialism-as-usual denied that colonialism was present at all, or sought to shift blame away
from their own behavior towards that of Native protesters (who had turned “nasty” or were
“violating the law”). Other non-Native opposing the protest acknowledged that colonial
perpetrations against Native peoples had existed in the past, but denied that non-Natives had any
responsibilities to make up for them (since “subject peoples” allegedly do not have rights to
redress, or since they weren’t alive when these harms occurred) (Flemming, 2006b; Jackson,
2006b; Howatt, 2006b). Non-Native residents further denied the existence of ongoing colonial
perpetrations in the present and projected their own acts of, or complicity in, present day
perpetrations onto the peaceful Haudenosaunee protesters. According to these projections, the
Haudenosaunee protesters –and not non-Natives who promoted the settlement and development
on lands under Haudenosaunee claim-- were the ones who were attempting to acquire
illegitimate gains from other, such as by allegedly demanding to be paid yet again for land that
they (a resident inaccurately claimed) had already been paid in full, and even over-paid
(Flemming, 2006b). Thus, through the psychopathological mechanisms of Western thinking, the
peaceful protest was the victimizing action, and morally degenerate Haudenosaunee protesters
were victimizing morally pure non-Natives.
Thus, to aid in their denial of past and/or present wrongs that their society had inflicted upon
Native peoples, and to avoid intolerable feelings of collective and personal guilt with which they
were wholly unprepared to cope, non-Natives engaged in elaborate attempts to construct
alternate versions of reality in which non-Natives were morally pure and Native protesters
victimized non-Natives. Many of these alternative versions of reality hinged on partial-truths,
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such as was the case in locally constructed narratives of “law,” “law and order,” and history.
Both of these will be explored briefly below.
Local constructions of law
Following the lead of their government, non-Natives constructed local narratives of law or “law
and order” that entirely ignored relevant Supreme Court of Canada rulings, issues of Canadian
constitutional law and treaty law, and international laws pertaining to the human rights of
indigenous peoples that Canada is legally bound to uphold. Chapter 4 provides an overview of
these various types of law, as well as the various ways in which government officials and media
outlets ignored all of these. Since many non-Natives relied on the media and their government
officials for information, it is understandable that many were mislead in relation to the actual
laws that were applicable to the 2006 Haudenosaunee protest. Yet, non-Native residents were all
equally exposed to this misleading information, and many non-Natives supported the
Haudenosaunee assertions of rights or at least admitted that they did not know who was right or
wrong. Many non-Native residents also willingly acknowledged the problematic history in their
governments’ past dealings with Native peoples and the need to repair past wrongs. However,
those non-Native residents who were most opposed to the Haudenosaunee protest were not
willing to acknowledge either past wrongs or their own present uncertainty. Instead, those most
opposed to the Haudenosaunee protest framed issues of law and order with absolute certainty,
asserting that they (morally degenerate Native protesters) were wrong, and we (morally pure nonNatives) were right.
In order to create such a narrative, these non-Native residents needed to ignore entirely
everything that did not fit into the view of the world that they wished to construct. And so they
did: insisting that the protest was an “illegal occupation” and that Haudenosaunee protesters had
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“clearly broken the laws that we as Canadians abide by,” (unnamed residents quoted in Rook,
2006e) or the “law of the land,” as one non-Native resident remarked five weeks into the protest:
I understand they have a cause. As Canadian citizens, they also have to abide by
the law of the land. The only thing I don’t understand is why the army, the police
or somebody else in authority doesn’t go in and put a stop to it. (Unnamed
resident quoted in Legall, 2006f)
Interestingly, the phrase “law of the land” is generally associated with constitutional law [as in,
“The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada” (Constitution Act, 1982: s. 52(1))],
though this resident is ignoring the Canadian constitution, which assigns to the federal
government –and not provincial police or provincial courts-- sole jurisdiction over matters
relating to “Indians and lands Reserved for Indians” (s. 91(24)). Though this provision would
indicate that provincial laws against protesting or “trespassing” are not applicable to Native land
claims protests (see chapter 4 and also: Wilkins, 2003), the resident’s rhetoric served its purpose,
and numerous other non-Natives chimed in with similar statements or demands. For example,
one argued that: “Sure, there is the spirit of some native people, but there is also the spirit of the
law. Today’s law,”(Jackson, 2006b), while others demanded that police at immediately to “Get
those outlaws out of there”(non-Native resident quoted in Edwards, 2006a) and “Put an end to
this now!”(protest sign quoted in Nolan, 2006c; Bauslaugh, 2006a).
There were, of course, a number of non-Native residents who were not blindly opposed to the
protest, and who attempted to bring a more factual basis to locally constructed narratives of law.
For example, one local resident who argued that the protesters’ assertions that:
"Canadian law doesn't apply to natives" is a fairly accurate statement. Under
Canadian law, if you were to sell a parcel of land to someone, then they refused to
pay for it, the government would help you either get the money that is owed to
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you or remove the person who is illegally on your land. That same protection
however has not been afforded to Six Nations. (Davis, 2006) 535
Other non-Natives who supported the protest also noted the longstanding history in Canada of
criminalizing activists of all stripes whenever they attempt to assert their rights, thus confronting
the locally constructed narratives of law and order:
In our experience, where people stand up for their rights –including the labour
movement—it gets turned into a law and order issue and we get criminalized. We
stand with [the Six Nations]. It [the protest] should be resolved with discussion.
(quoted in Pearce, 2006c) 536
Yet, despite these attempts by some non-Natives to contradict the black-and-white narrative
of legal certainty that was being constructed by local non-Natives opposed to the protest, the
latter continued to intensify their opposition to the protest, and expanded their feelings of anger
to encompass not just to the allegedly “lawbreaking” protesters, but also police, elected officials,
and even media accounts that diverged from this law and order narrative. For example, one nonNative resident responded angrily to the suggestion of another non-Native resident that
politicians pay compensation to non-Natives and then “walk away,” insisting instead that police
violently force “law breaking” protesters off the site:
I can't believe The Spectator would advocate that the law not be enforced. The
developers have a legal court order for the removal of the protesters. They should
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It should be mentioned again here, however, that the Haudenosaunee never sold this land:
there is no evidence that they ever intended to /agreed to sell it, and there are no legitimate
documents of surrender/sale (see the summary in chapter 1). Thus, the question here is not
whether the Haudenosaunee were fairly compensated (they were not), but why the government
has wrongfully treated the lands as if they were sold. The writer’s confusion may have stemmed
from the fact that the Six Nations Band Council was only seeking financial compensation for
these lands at this time, which was against the wishes of vast numbers of traditional and nontraditional Haudenosaunee people in the Six Nations community (and was thus also one of the
motivating factors for the protest, as noted in chapters 1 and 4).
536
Pearce (2006c) is quoting Hamilton Steelworker and member of United Steelworkers Local
1005, Paul Lane. On the unions present, see also: Hamilton Spectator (2006e) and The MarxistLeninist (2006a & 2006b)
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not "walk away until cooler heads prevail." They should insist these lawbreakers
be removed now.
It's time for the OPP to do their job and enforce the court order. Contrary to
some protesters' beliefs, they are subject to the laws of Canada. Just ask any of
the natives currently serving time in Canada's prisons. (Lupton, 2006)
Another resident, holding fast to local claims that the protest constituted an “illegal occupation,”
lamented the failure of police and elected officials to “uphold the law and protect citizens” and
further demanded that while officials compensate non-Natives for the inconvenience, they
likewise ignore entirely Haudenosaunee grievances. The resident justified these demands on the
basis that law-breaking protesters were bullies who should not be catered to:
I agree that those financially disadvantaged by the illegal occupation require
government compensation to make up for the local, provincial and federal
governments’ failure to uphold the law and protect citizens.
However, to turn the land over to the protesters, or even to leave it vacant, is
not a viable solution. … If you give in to bullying and intimidation, it does not
stop. … The intimidation and bullying of law-abiding citizens and businesses is
not acceptable. 537
In this same vein, while some non-Natives characterized the lack of police action (at least
prior to the failed April 19 police raid on the protest site) as a “display of weakness” by law
enforcement and other local authorities, 538 many others turned it into an alleged wrong that was
being committed against them by police and local politicians. In constructing this narrative,
local non-Native residents argued that the lack of police action against Native protesters
demonstrated police favoritism towards Natives and discrimination against non-Natives.
Residents argued repeatedly that: “[i]f that was us sitting out there holding a protest, we could
have been taken out on the first day”(quoted in Nolan, 2006c) and “if it were any other group
except natives, they would have been removed on Day 1” (Lupton, 2006).
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Meyer, Ann. 2006. The bullying must stop. Hamilton Spectator, April 18, Final Edition,
Opnion.
538
Thompson, Bryan. 2006. Action should be taken now. Regional News. April 12. Page 6.
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A few non-Native residents who did not blindly oppose the protest again attempted to point
out that these assertions were actually not true. They gave examples of the Red Hill Valley
protest, a few years back, in which tree-sitting non-Natives blocked construction of a highway
for 105 days, (E. Marion, 2006). 539 But those non-Natives vehemently opposed to the protest
completely ignored such reminders and instead ratcheted up their rallying cries against the
Liberal government (Nolan, 2006c) and its alleged “state-sponsored racism” regardless of actual
objective evidence. Further, the construction of this narrative of “state-sponsored racism” was
begun a mere two weeks after the protest had started --long before the police actually had the
authority to remove protesters. 540 The resident who can be credited with this invention (at least
as the concept relates to this particular protest) wrote in a letter to a local paper that:
[T]he Federal government should enact legislation abolishing state-sponsored
racism. Giving special privileges to people because their great-grand parents
belonged to the "right" racial group is morally indefensible.
539

“The letter writer is wrong to say that only natives could persist in civil disobedience for any
length of time. None of the tree-sitters in the Red Hill Valley were native, and that lasted for 105
days, ending only when the last tree-sitter came down.”
540
As noted in Chapter 1, the March 3 order was merely a civil injunction pending trial of the
merits of the case, this trial being scheduled on March 9 (Coyle, 2006; Legall, 2006i). The
March 9 permanent, interlocutory injunction was apparently also a civil order (also pending trial
of the merits of the case) rather than a criminal order, and thus the provincial police said they had
no authority to enforce it (Canadian Press, 2006i; Legall, 2006j). The trial on the merits for the
March 9th order was held on March 16 and 17, and the order that came out of that hearing, citing
protesters for contempt of court, apparently contained an error that prevented police from
enforcing it. After the March 22 deadline passed, Crown Attorney John Pearson noted that the
March 17th order erroneously stated that protesters would be fingerprinted and photographed
under the Identification of Criminals Act, though this act could did not apply to contempt of
court cases. Pearson thus asked Marshall, after the March 22 deadline, to clarify the order by
including in it both the statement that the fingerprinting and photographing would be done under
a probation order, and the statement that protesters would be guilty of criminal as well as civil
contempt. The order was amended on March 28. On Pearson’s comments regarding the
Identification of Criminals Act and his request to the judge, see: Legall (2006b). On
irregularities in the March 17th order, the amending of the order, and the March 28th date of the
order being amended, see: Best (2006f). For additional sources on the judge clarifying the order
and/or ambiguities in the order, see also: Harries (2006c), Canadian Press (2006l), Bonnell &
Canadian Press (2006d), Legall (2006n), Burman (2006b).
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Everyone would benefit, especially the natives who would finally learn that
life is somehow more satisfying when you have to pay for your own lunch.
(Flemming, 2006a)
Another resident lent his own version of this commonly-expressed them, expanding the category
of alleged victimizers to include not only Native peoples and the police and government officials
who refused to “enforce the law” upon them immediately, but also all non-White peoples:

Any non-natives who decided to trespass on someone's property would be
arrested without a court order, but if you're a minority living in Canada you can
stay for eons. All police do is sit at the side of the road. (Jackson, 2006c)
After the Ontario Provincial Police failed in their attempted raid against the protesters, nonNative residents added to their long list of alleged victimizations against them the assertion that
the provincial police and politicians had abandoned them and their town. They persisted in these
claims despite the obvious fact that large numbers of police were actually everywhere in the
town from that day until the road blockades were removed a couple months later. Thus residents
asserted that police had abandoned their post and abandoned “our community, our safety, our
business, our property values and our rights as Canadian citizens” (Edwards & Gombu, 2006;
Edwards, 2006a). This alleged abandonment was further equated with forcing the rights of
Canadian citizens to “take a back seat” to Native rights, because presumably the two could not
be equally honored, but one (the former) had to predominate over the other. (Mayor Marie
Trainer, quoted in Bonnell & Canadian Press, 2006c. See also: Healey & Nolan, 2006).
By perpetuating claims that they had been victimized by Native protesters, as well as police
and elected officials, non-Native residents were able to avoid feelings of guilt and blame for their
own complicity in the ongoing perpetrations against Haudenosaunee people, largely by
projecting this guilt and perpetration onto Native peoples and anyone who did not engage in
behavior aimed at immediately and forcefully ending the Haudenosaunee protest and returning
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things in town to dispossession and colonialism-as-usual. Further, because these psychological
mechanisms are frequently taken to psychopathological extremes in Western society, many nonNative residents may have been entirely unaware of the existence of their denied guilt, and may
well have convinced themselves that they were the innocent, morally-pure victims suffering by
the wrongs done to them by everyone else around them who did not do what they
wanted/demanded. Indeed, these non-Native residents may well have felt like suffering victims,
as this is characteristic of the psychopathological mechanisms for denying, repressing and
projecting onto others intolerable feelings (Hardtmann, 1998; see also Appendix 2).
Further, the alleged failures of police and politicians to do what non-Native residents wanted
represented, for some of these residents, a violation of their cultural worldview expectations of
privilege that had long been reinforced by government policies and practices of dispossessing
Native peoples. The conditions for atrocity (discussed in chapter 4) had long been present and
normalized in the national consciousness of Canadian society’s dominant group (and in Western
society in general), and non-Native Canadians, long socialized into these conditions, had
expected police and government authorities to reenact these conditions locally through displays
of domination that would immediately end any interruption in Canada’s ongoing norm of
dispossession and colonialism-as-usual. When these reenactments did not occur, non-Natives
felt betrayed, not only because they were then confronted with long-repressed and denied
feelings of guilt and complicity in these perpetrations against Native peoples (as the only ones
demanding the forced end to the protest), but also because the expectations they had long been
socialized to expect were not being met. Because their locally constructive narratives of law and
order had left them completely blind to the actual domestic and international laws that were most
relevant to the conflict, these anti-protest non-Native residents were unable to understand why no
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one was acting as they demanded. Filled with intolerable emotions that were not being assuaged
but were only making them increasingly more uncomfortable and anxiety-filled, these nonNatives came to the only conclusions that their denial and intense emotions would allow:
everyone was victimizing them in horrible, morally and legally degenerate ways. That the extent
of this believed victimization, and the exaggerative lengths that non-Native peoples went to
express their actual feelings of victimization, far outweighed any possible empirical
interpretation of reality was of little concern to these residents, because they were struggling so
intensely with intolerable anxieties and fears as to be wholly incapable of seeing empirical reality
(something quite typical of people in such a situation, as noted in the discussion on trauma,
above). Some of the more extreme and exaggerated claims to victimhood made by non-Native
residents will be further explored more in another section below. But first, local versions of
historical facts, as they were constructed by non-Native residents who opposed the 2006 protest,
will be examined.
Local constructions of history
While claims regarding the legality of the Haudenosaunee protest took front and center in
non-Native rhetoric against it, in order to be fully convincing in these claims –as well as in their
claims to moral purity and victimization—non-Native residents who most vehemently opposed
the protest also had to neutralize and counter Haudenosaunee grievances pertaining to the status
of the lands under protest. As already noted above, some non-Natives were able to satisfy
themselves with (entirely false) claims regarding the alleged compensation (or “overcompensation”) received by the Haudenosaunee (Flemming, 2006b). But the majority of nonNatives opposing the protest and demanding a return to colonialism-as-usual, even these
admissions of past colonialism were risky. Thus, to ease their collective guilt in their own eyes
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and the eyes of others, they sought to discredit Haudenosaunee claims to injury entirely. To
these ends, just weeks after the start of the protest, non-Native residents opposing the protest
began constructing an elaborate local version of history as it pertained to the Haudenosaunee
land base. For example, in his March 22nd opinion column, reporter Bill Jackson confidently
(and incorrectly) asserted to his readers that “[m]ost of the land Six Nations held originally was
sold legitimately” (Jackson, 2006b). Jackson further bolstered this false assertion with further
false assertions, arguing that the Haudenosaunee had only filed land claims on a “relatively small
fraction” of their original 950,000 acres, and that any past wrongs the Haudenosaunee had
suffered were at least partially their own fault. After minimizing Haudenosaunee claims in this
way, Jackson then sought to dismiss them entirely, asking his readers if it was really “wise to let
misappropriation –both native and non-native—dating back centuries get in the way of good
judgment”(with “good judgment” apparently meaning non-Native accumulation through the
dispossession of Native peoples) (Jackson, 2006b). About a month later the editor of the paper
took Jackson’s statements even further, asserting a new, and entirely inaccurate, version of
history, which held that:
some 150 chiefs signed the document giving away title to the land, and the natives
should come to the realization that, just as for other Canadians, they cannot and
could not always trust their leaders. (Pickup, 2006)
Though many of Jackson’s assertions could have been easily debunked by any non-Native
residents who were interested in knowing what really happened, 541 other residents quickly
followed Jackson’s lead of attributing to the Haudenosaunee at least equal blame and
541

For example, all of the Haudenosaunee claims to land are posted on the Six Nations Lands
and Resources website, and even a quick glance at the site would have revealed that claims have
been filed on most of the original 950,000 acres. Further, almost all of the rest of the land that is
not under registered claim would be under registered claim, if the federal government had not
prevented the Haudenosaunee from filing additional claims in response to the Haudenosaunee’s
1995 lawsuit against Canada and Ontario.
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responsibility for their own past injury. For example, another resident argued in his letter to the
editor that the situation was really quite ambiguous, that there had been broken treaties “on both
sides,” and that non-Natives could not really be blamed for never being able to “grasp the fact
that striking a deal with one tribal chief didn't necessarily mean a deal had been reached with the
whole tribe” (Dreschel, 2006). 542 This version of history, though wildly inaccurate, clearly made
a better story for angry non-Natives than did the version generally accepted by historians and
Canadian courts alike, but it still acknowledged some guilt and responsibility on the part of nonNatives for the Haudenosaunee grievances. Thus, not surprisingly, other versions history were
constructed that were much less “ambiguous” on this point (and, of course, much less accurate).
Examples of this latter historical narrative was demonstrated at one of the first rallies organized
by local developers and realtors, when local real estate lawyer Ed McCarthy emphatically and
confidently (and also incorrectly) told a crowd of several hundred non-Native residents that the
Haudenosuanee had “absolutely” surrendered the lands under protest in 1841, and that both the
protest and the police failure to remove the protesters were flagrant violations of the law:
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In fact, considerable historical evidence demonstrates not only that non-Natives were fully
aware of the fact that striking a deal with one person did not equate striking a deal with an entire
Native nations, but that they routinely and purposefully sought to exploit this fact –preferring to
find individual non-Natives who had no authority over anything, to bribe them to sign documents
of surrender, and then to attempt to pass these documents off as legitimate surrenders. Far from
being a result of non-Native naïveté, the practice was often the preferred method for obtaining a
(fraudulent) surrender from Native peoples, since the laws of most Native nations prohibited the
alienation of land, and the consensus basis on which many of these communities were run was
not otherwise corruptible (McNeil, 2001-2002). Further, the desire to avoid dealing with entire
communities and their democratic or consensus-based decision-making processes was a primary
motivating factor behind the passage of the Indian Act, which authorized the Canadian
government to forcibly impose elected systems of government upon Native communities (as a
way to get around working with traditional systems of government) (Reid, 2004). See chapter 4
for more on Native laws prohibiting the alienation of land, and on recognition by Canadian
courts that these fraudulent practices were routine and purposeful –but that documents obtained
through such practices are not legitimate documents of surrender.
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The laws are being flagrantly violated…. There’s a need to bring this to an end
and to bring it to an end promptly…. The law of the land has to be enforced….
This land belongs to Henco Industries Ltd. Nobody has the right to interfere with
it. (Nolan, 2006c; Bauslaugh, 2006a) 543
Though the local real estate lawyer was not a historian, and apparently knew very little about
Canadian court rulings regarding the validity of purported surrenders (see chapter 4), the local
mayor and other residents quickly jumped on the bandwagon of claiming (without evidence) that
“there’s no doubt” the land was surrendered legally; that the Haudenosaunee protesters were
“from a legal standpoint … wrong;” and that, despite “the evidence,” “the Natives are not
believing anyone or anything” (Haldimand County Mayor Marie Trainer, quoted in Pearce,
2006a; and Caledonia resident Doug Flemming in Flemming, 2006c). Of course, all of these
assertions that allegedly described Haudenosaunee protester behavior far more accurately
portrayed the behavior of non-Native residents. In large part this is because the latter, in an
almost desperate need to believe their own fabrications, projected their revisionism upon the
Haudenosaunee protesters, claiming it was they –and not the non-Native residents-- who had
falsely constructed versions of history that had no relation to facts, and who refused to “believe
anyone or anything” With this reconstructed version of history in hand, non-Native residents
who opposed the protest were able to more confidently label Haudenosaunee protesters as
criminals and outlaws (Mark Roberge, quoted in Jackson, 2006i; unnamed non-Native resident,
quoted in Edwards, 2006a). They were also more able to justify their vehement (and nonobjective) anti-protest anger. Thus, after establishing their fabricated local versions of history,
non-Native residents proceeded to refer to the land under protest not as contested land, but as
“other peoples’ [i.e., not Native] land,” “crown land” and even “our land” (Mark Roberge,
543

Articles estimated that from 250-500 residents attended this first anti-protest rally. See:
Bauslaugh (2006a), Pearce (2006a), Windle (2006b), Smith (2006b), Fragomeni (2006),
Canadian Press (2006o), Graham & Canadian Press (2006), Graham (2006), Nolan (2006c).
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quoted in Jackson, 2006i; unnamed non-Native resident quoted in Rook, 2006e). 544 In doing so,
non-Native residents were able to insinuate that they were being directly victimized by the
ongoing protest, because it was the Haudenosaunee protesters who had no legitimate grievances,
who enjoyed privileges, who behaved as “unruly children,” and whose “Native tradition of
constantly identifying themselves as victims [was] getting old” (Thompson, 2006b). All of these
accusations were, again, more applicable to the behaviors of non-Natives who vehemently
opposed the protest, but these latter actors avoided any acknowledgement of this fact through
their psychopathological mechanisms of denial and projection. And so long as non-Native
residents were able to discredit the Haudenosaunee protesters through these projections, they
were able to avoid a conversation with these parts of themselves.
Some local non-Natives who did not oppose the protest attempted to call these false
constructions of history into question, asking for example why media assertions that the lands
under protest had been surrendered in 1841 only ever cited “anonymous” federal or provincial
authorities, and further questioning why “is the public not pushing for the government to look at
the claim objectively and why such disdain for Six Nations people?”(Hirota, 2006). This line of
questioning made it clear that no federal or provincial official was willing to go on record with
assertions that the land was sold in 1841. It also pointed out that local anti-protest hostilities and
locally-constructed versions of history were both disproportionate and out of touch with a reality
in which there was, at best, considerable confusion pertaining to the ownership of the lands
under protest.
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“‘My sign signifies the fact the government is doing nothing about a bunch of criminals
taking up crown land in the middle of Highway 6,’ Said Mark Roberge” (Jackson, 2006i). And
the unnamed resident: “We do not support the protesters' illegal occupation of our land and
illegal occupation of our public streets. They have clearly broken the laws that we as Canadians
abide by” (Rook, 2006e).
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Thus, historical rewrites pertaining specifically to the ownership of the land could not,
themselves, suffice, and other rewrites were necessary. Some of these attempted to paint nonNatives and their government as benevolent and morally pure. For example, one non-Native
resident argued in a letter to the editor that Canadians had “given” the Haudenosaunee their lands
in the first place and that the Haudenosaunee should be thankful rather than holding “for ransom
the country that gave them shelter and gifts.”(Howatt, 2006a). The letter writer then went even
further, asserting claims of trans-generational victimization of non-Natives by Natives:
Several generations of Natives and European/British decendents [sic] have been
and are being punished for errors that were made in the past. Whether a few
native leaders got together and sold land that had been given to their people or a
few 'Whitemen' took advantage and bought it at a disgusting price is really a non
issue [sic]. The land was originally given as a gift and unfortunately was
somehow bartered away. That land cannot be given back due to development.
Such claims to white benevolence and victimization at the hands of Native peoples fly in the
face of historical facts, but were psychologically useful for local non-Natives who, angrily and
with an increasing willingness to employ violence, were doing everything they could to maintain
narratives of non-Native innocence and suffering at the hands of guilty, criminal Native
protesters. Such claims also follow the lead of elected officials who entirely dismissed,
discredited and demeaned the traditional government of the Haudenosaunee people (see chapter
4). To this extent, the resident argues that, after all, it was likely “native leaders” themselves
who “got together and sold the land that had been given to their people” by benevolent whites –
i.e., Native people did it to themselves, and it is not the fault of non-Natives (this theme will be
taken up again later). Though such claims would not stand up to historical scrutiny, among nonNatives who were seeking out any means for denying guilt or responsibility, they found fertile
ground and were able to flourish and proliferate. So, too, were the assertions by this resident
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that, regardless of what happened, history cannot be undone, and the land cannot be given back,
“because of development” –assertions that will be reviewed in the next section.

THE TRANSCENDENTAL MISSION OF “PROGRESS” OR: “IT’S HISTORY, GET OVER
IT!”
[W]e cannot change history that happened in the past two hundred years. It is
physically and financially impossible to remove all non natives from the
Haldimand Tract because of what happened over the last 200 years. I feel badly
about how the land was transferred and the Natives lost. However, I feel we must
now put this behind us and learn from our mistakes and move on.
~ Local non-Native resident Gerald Stoneman 2006
For he cannot surrender the notion of progress without destroying the rationale
for his entire civilization. No matter how critical he may be of the realities of his
society, he clings to his progressivism as he would to his sanity. It is the notion of
progress that mediates his alienation, and makes it possible for him to construct a
reality which he does not actually experience.
~ Diamond 1974, 39
A few days after the Ontario Provincial Police failed in their attempt to remove Haudenosaunee
protesters from the land they had reclaimed, the Ottawa Sun polled reader opinions on the
conflict. Readers were given two choices: (a) the protesters have a “legitimate cause” and “land
deals made in the past should be examined,” or (b) the protesters were “breaking the law” and
the land claim issue was “ancient history” (Sun Media, 2006). The wording of the first part of
the question was based on the assumption that a deal had been made, and the only question was
whether past deals should be subject to reexamination. In fact, the Haudenosaunee protesters
had repeatedly stated that no deal had ever been made, and that the land under protest had simply
been taken against the will of the Haudenosaunee people. The wording of the second part of the
question suggests that land claims filed by First Nations could actually be considered “ancient
history.” This suggestion contradicts the entire concept of land claims in Canada. The very
existence of Canada’s land claims process is an acknowledgement that lands were wrongfully
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taken from First Nations and that the ongoing problems that First Nations face because of this
need to be resolved in the here and now. The misleading and one sided wording of this poll
suggests not only that a conservative element runs the Ottawa Sun, but that for all it’s
government’s rhetoric about reconciliation, the Canadian people are largely ignorant of issues
pertaining to First Nations land claims. This ignorance persists despite the fact that virtually
every First Nation in Canada has either filed claims or has the potential to do so, and that there
are well over 800 Specific claims already filed, several hundred Comprehensive claims filed, and
many hundreds more claims that in the process of being researched and filed across Canada (see
chapter 1, second footnote). Some argue that as much as 90% of Canada is unceded Native
territory to which the Canadian government has no legitimate legal claim according to its own
laws (Chrisjohn, N.d.) The general, nation-wide ignorance of the epidemic of past wrongful
dealing that the present Canadian and provincial governments are responsible for resolving
demonstrates the degree to which First Nations and First Nations’ concerns have been singled
out as both dismissible and fair game for attack in Canada (see chapter 4).
Given the misleading conceptualization and wording of the poll, as well as the longstanding
government authorization and routinization of verbal (and physical) attacks against Native
peoples, it is hardly surprising that 69% of poll respondents answered “b” while only 31%
answered “a.” In fact, further inspection of the wording of the poll demonstrates the role of
Western society’s transcendental mission in dispossessing Native peoples –i.e., the myths of
Western “progress” and mythical western conceptions of “civilization.” As discussed in chapter
2, through both of these myths, Western society is perpetually reenacting its centuries-long
history of trauma and perpetration upon other peoples and other life forms through the “civilizing
process” which it inflicts upon these non-Western others. And by “civilizing” these other peoples
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and life forms (i.e., forcing them to conform to Western patterns of use), it directly or indirectly
pursues the elimination of everything other than itself, either because these non-Western forms
are simply in the way of what Western society wants to do, or because the transformation of
these non-Western forms into potential or actual capital is what Western society wants to do (see
Harvey, 2003). John Mohawk (2000 & 1997) has discussed these processes in the context of
utopian thinking (also see chapter 2), through which it is reasoned that in order to arrive at the
future utopia, sacrifices of other peoples and life forms will have to be made for the greater good,
to which only Western society can lead the world. Kelman (1973) similarly discusses these
processes, using the term “transcendental mission” to describe the exact same process of killing
and “sacrificing” others in order to read some future, unobtainable goal (see chapter 4). As both
authors argue, in this type of thought process, characteristic of Western thinking, the vague and
never-achievable ends are used to justify whatever means are necessary to move “towards” this
vague and never-achievable ends. Thus, taking Native lands and squashing Native assertions of
land and treaty rights are all in a days work towards this transcendental mission of progress, or
capital accumulation in the name of progress (Harvey, 2003) and, according to this line of
thinking, Native peoples would be better off understanding this and accepting it.
While these problematic mythical forms of thinking present themselves everywhere
throughout this history of Native-non-Native interactions (see, for example, Toqueville, 2000), it
is sometimes less obvious to the casual observer that these old, colonial and genocidal mythical
justifications remain alive and well today. Yet, examples of these myths, and their reenactment
in various forms abound in the rhetoric of non-Native residents who opposed the 2006
Haudenosaunee protest. This section will provide an overview of a few of the ways in which
they were applied and reenacted in this conflict.

409

Though examples of this myth abound in the rhetoric of non-Native residents opposed to the
protest, some of the best examples of local expressions of this myth appeared in two March
editorial columns written by reporter Bill Jackson. In the first of these, which appeared about a
week after the Haudenosaunee protest had begun, Mr. Jackson began by asking his readers how
far back in history one can legitimately go to “form a basis for contemporary reality?” (Jackson,
2006a). Not very far, he concludes, after taking his reader through a series of exaggerated
examples and faulty reasoning. A portion of his column is quoted here:
[I]n today's fast paced world where forward thinking dominates our society, it's
interesting a land deed dating back to 1784 is getting so much attention, press and
respect. Just how far can we go back in history and legitimately form a basis for
contemporary reality, more specifically future land development? Well, judging
from the fact construction workers have stopped building on a Caledonia
subdivision because of a 'peaceful protest' by Six Nations Confederacy members,
at least 221 years. Here you thought we were moving forward when all along we
should be adhering to the rules and regulations of Upper Canada or maybe even
the New World. Or maybe even the Vikings.
…
It's just that if you're going to go back 221 years and start living with the rules of
that day, you should also live like people did back then. Don't be a mennonite
[sic] with a microwave. (Jackson, 2006a)
In the quoted portion, Jackson juxtaposes Western assumptions about progress and “moving
forward” with Native assertions of historical treaty rights, presenting the latter to be the opposite
of the former, and presenting the former as the obvious and only desirable thing to do. Jackson’s
assumptions about progress and “moving forward” will be further examined below. But first, it
seems worthwhile to examine Jackson’s juxtapositioning of the present and the future as states
that are completely separate from the past. Through this line of (faulty) reasoning, Jackson
argues that one can only live according to anything in the past if one lives according to
everything in the past. As such, Native assertions of historic treaty rights can be presented as
acts of victimization, perpetrated against non-Native peoples by hypocritical (morally
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degenerate) Native protesters who want to force the former to live back in time, but who do not
themselves live like their ancestors did 200 years ago. According to this reasoning, because
Native protesters go to Tim Horton’s for coffee, or sleep in campers or cars (on the protest site),
they are enjoying modern conveniences and are thus hypocritical for demanding that non-Natives
honor treaties made in the past. Further, by making this latter demand, Jackson claims, Native
protesters are trying to force progress-loving non-Natives to adhere to all rules and regulations
from the past –perhaps even going back as far as the Vikings. When will this unreasonableness
end? He seems to be asking.
Yet, despite applying this arbitrary rule to the protesters (if you are going to live according to
anything in the past, you have to live according to everything in the past), it is clear that neither
Jackson nor the non-Native residents who adopted his rhetoric ever intended to apply this
arbitrary rule to themselves. After all, most institutions in Canada are based on rules and
documents that date back in history, some hundreds of years. (And certainly the attitudes and
opinions expressed in Jackson’s comments date back at least that far!) Yet, Canadians still
celebrate historic events like Canada Day, or various historic war victories. Further, a portion of
the Canadian Constitution dates back to 1982, but the column’s author would not have argued
that judges, lawyers or citizens who apply the constitution must abide by all-things-80s: music,
clothes, hairstyles, and so forth. Instead, these arbitrary rules were created and selectively
applied to a particular group (the protesters, or all Native people who refer to historical
documents) in a particular situation (this protest, or any assertion of treaty rights) so that nonNative residents could label the former “hypocrites” and claim victimization at the hands of
hypocrites. The hypocritical nature of applying to other people arbitrary rules that one does not,
him or herself, plan to ever follow, escapes non-Native residents entirely –at least in so far as it
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might apply to themselves—because they have dissociated from their own actions and projected
them onto other people, in this case the Haudenosaunee protesters. Such hypocrisy further
allows non-Natives to dismiss outright Haudenosaunee grievances without ever having to
address historical facts that did not fit with the view of reality they sought to construct, thus
further victimizing the Haudenosaunee people. Thus, the behaviors Jackson describes: creating
arbitrary rules and applying them hypocritically to others in order to victimize these others, is far
more applicable to Jackson’s argument than it is to the Haudenosaunee protest –once again
demonstrating the use of denial, projection, blame-shifting, and the complete lack of critical selfreflection displayed by those non-Native residents who most vehemently opposed the protest.
Thus, despite the obvious faulty character of the reasoning employed in these arguments,
numerous non-Natives adopted them uncritically, and used them to stir up further non-Native
anger and resentment in an effort to bolster their anti-protest (and even anti-Native) stance
(Interviews, 2009). 545
Some local Native and non-Native residents who were not blindly opposed to the protest
attempted to point out the logical flaws in this line of reasoning. To this extent, George Beaver, a
freelance Haudenosaunee journalist contradicted the idea that looking back in history is
regressive and we should all only look forward:
Recently in Caledonia, some people have questioned why a document written in
1784 should still be relevant today. The Declaration of Independence was written
in 1776. Try to tell an American it's no longer relevant. How about the Bible? It's
a lot older. 546
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See, for example, See also any number of letters to the editor or editorial columns, including:
Blizzard (2006), whose asked her readers: “So who's running this place? A ragtag bunch of
activists who are acting like bullies? First they defy a superior court injunction. Now they want
to roll back history 150 years.”
546
Beaver, George. 2006. Six Nations land protest brings pride. Brantford Expositor. April 10.
Local News, Our Town, Page A4.
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Yet, despite these more clear-reasoned rebuttals, the local constructions of the narrative of
victimization and progress continued to be utilized, and often involved a number of intertwining
(and often contradictory themes). In this way, attacks on one or two strands within the narrative
could thus easily be ignored, and non-Native who needed to believe these narratives simply
shifted their attention to other strands within the narrative without admitting the incorrectness of
any part of the whole. These contradictory strands can be seen in the same column written by
Jackson and quoted above. Towards the end of this column, Jackson summarized and concluded
his argument:
Now I think it’s fair to say times have changed. Relations between natives and
the ‘white man’ are better today. None of us living had anything to do with what
happened centuries ago. What we do have is a county called Canada. And we
can all work together to make it a better place, or put up fences and prevent
progress. … The Land Claim group's message is borderline racist. … Trying to
prevent responsible development by affecting people who had nothing to do with
rules set out 200 years ago or today is only creating a divide that I thought we’d
all overcome for the most part. (Jackson, 2006a)
Here, the themes of progress are even more overt. Again, themes of non-Native suffering and
victimization at the hands of Natives are intertwined with these themes in the author’s claims
that, while non-Natives have worked to overcome divisions and racism, Haudenosaunee
protesters are regressively putting up fences to prevent progress and creating a “borderline
racist” divide. Though the writer doesn’t explain how the “Land Claims group is borderline
racist” (because he can’t. It isn’t 547), his assertion that it is is enough to encourage non-Natives
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The Haudenosaunee protesters’ message had nothing to do with non-Native people, with the
one exception being that local non-Natives were asked to pressure the government to resolve
land claims. The rest of their message was directed at the Canadian and Ontario governments,
demanding that lands that Canada could not prove it had acquired legitimately not be treated as if
they belonged to Canada (or Ontario) until a resolution to these past wrongs could be negotiated.
The Haudenosaunee protesters were quite clear about the fact that their grievances were with the
government, and repeatedly stated that their issues were not with non-Native residents. There
was absolutely nothing racist, or even conceivably “borderline racist” about it.
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to deny and project their own racism onto the Haudenosauene protesters, and thus to feel
justified in claiming moral purity and victimhood. This need among some non-Native residents
who vehemently opposed the protest to rid themselves of all moral impurity, and to rid the
Haudenosaunee protesters of all moral purity, suggests a struggle that these non-Native residents
were having within themselves. They appear to have desperately needed to repress, deny, and
otherwise avoid any acknowledgement of their own complicity in past and present wrongs, and
their own responsibility for ending and resolving these wrongs. This need was so great that all
logical reasoning was abandoned, and any fragment of an argument that could be used to protect
non-Natives from their repressed and unresolved feelings of guilt and complicity were used.
At the same time, the Western narrative of progress had long been used to justify the gains of
Westerners through the dispossession of everyone (and everything) else, and has long ago
become an important part of the Western cultural worldview. Westerners who have long
adhered to this cultural worldview and its unquestioned assumptions about “progress,” are likely
to experience negative emotions when these are questioned or challenged. Thus, though the
Haudenosaunee protesters were not making the ridiculous anti-progressive demands of which
they were accused, apparently the very accusation that they were (however faulty the reasoning)
was seen as a challenge to the ways of life of those non-Native residents who already opposed
the protest and were searching for a justification for their opposition.
Thus, the Haudenosaunee grievances elicited feelings of guilt and shame in non-Native
residents who had long repressed and denied them, and who were entirely unprepared and
unwilling to deal with them. Unable and unwilling to tolerate these feelings, and entirely
unaware of their internal source, local non-Native residents responded as if the Haudenosaunee
protesters had caused these feelings, and as if the protest was somehow a personal attack upon
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local non-Natives. The intensely unpleasant feelings that arose within some non-Native residents
when they were confronted with past –and ongoing—wrongs likely felt like an external attack,
particularly for those non-Natives who, clinging to denial, had long ago dissociated themselves
from portions of the reality around them. These latter then projected their own “borderline
racist” thoughts and behaviors onto Haudenosaunee protesters, who had no issues with nonNative residents, but had always made convenient scapegoats in Canadian society, and thus were
already an appropriately authorized and routinized target of attack.
Yet, though they were able to remain in complete denial regarding their complicity in ongoing
wrongs committed against the Haudenosaunee, they were unable to fully convince themselves of
the complete absence of past injustices –even despite the local historical rewrites and the locally
manipulated versions of law. Thus these past wrongs –and any link to non-Native guilt in the
past—were dismissed entirely as things that were in the past. Looking into the past at these
wrongs was likened to “putting up fences to prevent progress.” Both of these were likened to
refusing to work together to make Canada a better place, such as by overcoming “borderline
racist” divides that progress-loving non-Natives had long worked to overcome, and had thought
“we’d all overcome for the most part.”
Given the prominence in Westerns society of myths of “progress” and “civilization,” it is
hardly surprising that these myths arose in some form. Yet, the logic through which these myths
found expression in local narratives was so inconsistent and contradictory as to fall apart upon
examination by external others. For example, any sociological study of transgenerational wealth,
income and social capital could easily belie the notion that there is no connection between past
wrongs and the present privileges of non-Natives living today in settler colonial states. Further,
it is Western society, not Native society, that has the long history of quite literally “putting up
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fences” to keep other people out –from the enclosures of the Middle Ages to the privatization of
virtually everything everywhere that belongs to other people, including indigenous lands
worldwide. Locally, the development company was most certainly interested in putting up
fences and keep the Haudenosaunee out, but in all of these cases putting up fences was
interpreted by Western non-Natives as progress. It was only when the Haudenosaunee (or other
Native peoples throughout Canada, or other non-Western peoples elsewhere in the world) assert
their own claims to property, which exclude Western non-Natives, that such behavior is
interpreted by the latter as halting or standing in the way of progress. Thus, it becomes clear that
--as has always been the case with the Western myths of “progress” and “civilization”-- what
Western non-Natives really mean by impeding progress is getting in the way of what wealthy
Western non-Natives want to do. After all, as discussed in chapter 2, the term progress in
Western society has always referred to the accumulation of capital by wealthy Western elites
through the conquering, plunder and dispossession of other peoples, life forms and the earth.
This is still true today: progress means the growth of capital, and the growth of capital requires
the transformation of (other peoples’) lands, resources and/or labor power into products, as well
as the privatization and exploitation of non-capitalist social forms (Harvey, 2003).
Furthering their local narratives of progress in this way, Jackson and other local non-Native
residents suggested “better things” that Haudenosaunee protesters could –and supposedly
should—be doing with their time. For example, in this same column, Jackson suggested that:
Native protesters would be better using their time to address Six Nations' garbage
woes, or perhaps join the fight for safer drinking water. That would be a lot more
worthwhile. Six Nations is recycling only two per cent of its garbage. It's rather
strange that they choose to fight for land when they have so many problems
associated with their own land to begin with. (Jackson, 2006a)
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Other non-Native residents similarly points out the various social ills associated with Native
reserves in Canada (including: sexual abuse, unclean water, obesity, poverty, drugs, alcohol), and
one resident concluded that the reserve system itself is the problem –not ongoing colonialism or
the dispossession of Native peoples from their lands, resources, trust funds and human rights.
Claiming that the congregation of Native peoples on the few small parcels of land still reserved
for their exclusive use 548 --and not Canadian colonialism that seeks to dispossess Native peoples
of even these lands-- promotes segregation and should be abolished. Thus, rather than returning
wrongfully taken lands to Native peoples, the author advocates taking whatever has not yet been
taken, in the interest of ending segregation (and forcing assimilation) (Howatt, 2006b),
apparently because she believes that this course of action is benevolent and just. Though these
views are taken right out of the 1800s (see for example, Tocqueville (2000) for an almost wordfor word expression of the same ideas), they are considered “progressive” by the author and
other non-Native residents who are complicit in the ongoing dispossession of Native peoples.
The looting of every last bit of wealth that is collectively controlled by Native peoples, and
their complete destruction as distinct peoples, is thus seen as “desirable” and “progressive” by
this resident, because this type of dispossession and destruction is exactly what the Western myth
of progress has always served to rationalize and justify. Though occasionally the results of this
line of thinking are recognized as genocidal (Powell, 2011; Kakel, 2010; Sartre, 1967; UN
General Assembly, 1948), 549 Westerners have long denied the connection between the two,

548

As noted in chapters 1, 4 and 5, the Canadian government claims to own all the land within its
geographical borders (despite the fact that up to 90% of this land was never ceded (Chrisjohn,
N.d.), including those areas of land set aside as Native reserves.
549
“[T]here may not be so much difference between the anti semite and the democrat. The
former wishes to destroy him as a man and leave nothing but the Jew, the pariah, the
untouchable; the latter wishes to destroy him as a Jew and leave nothing but the man, the abstract
and universal subject of the rights of man and the rights of the citizen” (Sartre, 1977: 57). The
417

sometimes through the aid of an appropriated form of Multiculturalism, which seeks to mitigate
tension between, for example, settlers and Natives (see Veracini and Hage, both cited inMoses,
2011: 150). 550 Thus, the resident insists that, though they will be plundered and destroyed as
distinct peoples, they can still keep their “cultures, music and art alive through festivals,
concerts, restaurants and numerous other venues” (that non-Natives enjoy) (Howatt, 2006b).
Unwilling or unable to look outside of her Western myth of superiority and progress, the writer
missed (or ignored) entirely the fact that being reduced to occasional displays of traditional art,
music, and dress was exactly what the traditional Haudenosaunee people were struggling against,
and this was exactly why they were protesting and demanding a return of lands that were unfairly
taken: so they con preserve their culture and their identity as distinct peoples, and regain their
independent self-sufficiency. Writing in the spirit of Western liberalism, which has long been
intolerant of anything that is not Western and liberal, the writer suggests that she knows better
than Haudenosaunee people what should be done with all that is owed to them: it would be better
used on improving “health care, poverty, education and drinking water” for all Canadians. After
all, she argues (correctly), “there is no amount of money that can pay for what happened in the
past,” and non-Natives certainly aren’t willing to part with their money anyway. Hence, “moving
forward” and “progressing” --i.e., doing what non-Natives want to do-- is the only solution,
according to this line of reasoning (Howatt, 2006b). This section of the resident’s letter is worth
re-quoting here, for what comes before it:

UN General Assembly (1948) has defined genocide as including the commission of acts “with
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group” (Article II).
550
For example, Moses (2011: 150) notes that Veracini argues that multiculturalism is “easier
than insisting on the need to decolonize settler colonial sovereignties … and disturbing the
foundational determinants of settler colonial polities,” and Hage argues that such policies have
“effaced genuine immigrant otherness by requiring it to become sociologically ‘white’ to qualify
for citizenship participation.”
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A very important step in healing rifts between groups is to be forgiven for past
transgressions and move on from there. There is no amount of money that can
pay for what happened in the past. Wouldn't that money be better spent on
improving health care, poverty, education and drinking water for all Canadians?
(Howatt, 2006b)
Equally in the spirit of Western liberalism and progress, the writer’s version of reconciliation
requires not that non-Natives make amends for past the wrongs they have committed against
Native peoples, but that Native peoples forgive non-Natives, because they need “to be forgiven.”
In other words, the group of people who have perpetrated past historical wrongs against
Haudenosaunee people (and Native people in general) should get something out of this process
(being forgiven), but should not, themselves, be required to give or do anything at all, except for
those things that they already want to do: demolishing reserves and thus taking all that currently
remains in the hands of struggling Native communities. Further, Native people should not only
give their forgiveness and all that remains in their possession, but should entirely give up on
seeking redress for past wrongs or seeking to maintain what they currently have –i.e., they
should “move on from there” in the name of Western progress. This, according to the resident, is
the only solution. Thus, she did not ask, listen to, or even leave space open for Native people to
voice what they needed for reconciliation to occur. And though the protesters had already begun
to give voice to some of these needs, it was more convenient for the resident (and more in line
with Western liberalism and progress) to ignore entirely what Native people said they needed.
After all, according to this line of thinking, Westerners always know best, because they are
“civilized” and can thus lead the rest of the world in their transcendental mission of “progress”
towards an always-unreachable utopia. Denial, dissociation, splitting, projection, projective
identification and a complete lack of critical self-reflection are all at play in this non-Native
resident’s line of reasoning. This is not reconciliation at all, this is a continuation of the
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devastation, dispossession, and destruction of non-Western peoples, with the added extra element
of demanding that Native peoples who have had everything taken from them now give yet one
more thing: their blessing for past, ongoing and even escalating future perpetrations. Yet, any
other path, according to many non-Native residents who opposed the protest, would be harmful
to all parties. As one resident summarized his own “progressive” views on the matter of what
should be done about the protest:
[O]nly one thing prevents me from passionately arguing for, at all costs, more
tolerance, more patience and more restraint on the part of the authorities as we go
forward into the uncertain future.
To my sensitive ears, that sounds very much like a patronizing modern version
of the white man's burden. (Dreschel, 2006)

ENTITLEMENT, EXAGGERATED CLAIMS TO VICTIMHOOD, PROJECTION, AND
AVOIDANCE OF CRITICAL SELF-REFLECTION
[E]very generation of Anglo-Americans down to the present has followed the
pattern set then and has repeated, with minor variations, such justifications for
burning natives in their villages and rooting them out of their swamps.
~ Drinnon 1990, xii
The self, mutilated and amputated by projection, is permanently threatened from
the inside, by the reappearance of the suppressed parts, and from the outside by
the fact that the object normally resists the projective identification. It thus lives
in a two-front war, threatened from both the inside and the outside, cleft and torn
from itself.
~ Hardtmann 1998, 92
Another tactic non-Native residents used for denying potentially threatening feelings of guilt,
and defending against threats to their cultural worldviews and self-esteem, was to make greatly
exaggerated their claims to victimhood. By presenting themselves as victims, and by greatly
exaggerating their victimization claims, non-Natives sought to overshadow and drown out Native
grievances in their own chorus of complaints. But aside from merely seeking to down out Native
grievances, non-Native residents engaged in an elaborate projection or blame-shifting, which
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allowed them to project all of their moral impurities onto the Haudenosaunee protesters (or
Native people in general). Freed from their moral impurities and in denial the existence of
ongoing wrongs committed against the Haudenosaunee (or about non-Native roles in these
wrongs), local residents who opposed the protest were able to treat the Haudenosaunee as
victimizers, and to claim for themselves a status as morally pure victims. Many of these nonNative residents’ exaggerated claims to victimhood were based on the entitled expectations of a
privileged dominant group that was both furious to see their privileges threatened and desperate
to defend these privileges to themselves and others. This behavior is in line with that described
by Branscombe (1998 and 2007), who found that dominant-group members struggle to avoid
reminders of their own privilege, and can sometimes resolve this struggle when they imagine
“drawbacks” to their own membership in the dominant, privileged group, or imagine the
“deservingness” of members of disadvantaged groups. Thus, as was the case in the above
discussions of other behaviors, feelings of threat may have been very real to non-Native
residents, but the cause of these feelings (non-Native complicity in, privilege from, and morally
compromised status due to ongoing colonialism) remained repressed, unexamined, denied and
projected onto the Haudenosaunee protesters. Some of the various ways in which non-Natives
did this will be examined below.
Minimizing, Denying and Supplanting Haudenosaunee Grievances with Exaggerated and
Unrealistic Claims of Non-Native Victimhood
One of the main issues around which non-Native residents demonstrated expectations of
entitlement and claimed victimhood when this entitlement was perceived as threatened was the
police and government failure to immediately end the Haudenosaunee protest “on day one.” As
one resident, who described the protest as “lawlessness at its finest,” remarked:
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I’ve been unhappy about this (the protest) since day 1. I hoped they would be
kicked out. I’m very disappointed in the police. It should have been on day 1.
Not day 60. (Caledonia resident Kevin Clark, quoted in Legall and Morse, 2006)
Like many other non-Native residents, this resident based his anger and frustrations upon
unexamined and/or purposefully manipulated versions of law and order (discussed above). By
providing a completely one-sided view of the law, and entirely ignoring constitutional issues,
Supreme Court of Canada rulings, and binding international human rights requirements, the
resident was able to present the protest as “lawlessness.” In doing so, he felt justified in wanting
to see the protest forcibly ended on day one, when it was entirely legal under even local and
provincial laws. 551 The sense of entitlement expressed by this resident is visible in just behind
the resident’s assertions: the status quo that benefits him should not be disturbed, even through
peaceful, legal protests held by a group of people whose rights are being violated by this status
quo.
Another resident expressed these same sentiments more clearly by arguing that the police
should have ended the protest sooner, adding: “I’m not against native rights, but what about my
right to go about my life and drive down the road without getting turned back at a roadblock?”
(unidentified resident quoted in Harries, 2006e). 552 Like the first resident, this resident voices
his expectations not to be disturbed in his daily routine, even if this status quo routine is
destructive of the rights of others. In fact, the resident minimizes the rights violations being
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See chapter 1. The OPP did not have an enforceable criminal order to remove protesters until
the end of March –many weeks into the protest.
552
The full context provided with this quote is as follows:
Others, less sympathetic, thought the police action was overdue. “If they were going to go in and
do this, they should have done it sooner,” said a Caledonia-area resident who did not want to be
identified.
“Now [the protesters] have had a chance to get organized. I’m not against native rights, but
what about my right to go about my life, and drive down the road without getting turned back at
a roadblock?”
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perpetrated against the Haudenosaunee, while elevating his own personal preferences to the
status of “rights.” By this line of reasoning, his preference of not being inconvenienced in his
daily routine is presented as being at least equal to the international human rights, constitutional
rights, and Supreme Court mandated rights of the Haudenosaunee protesters. Yet, the resident’s
preference for not being inconvenienced is not a right, it is an expectation of entitlement that is
worth some examination. When this resident voiced his frustrations with the interruption of this
entitlement, the road blockades had only been up for one or two days. Further, while some roads
were blocked by police and protesters, there were a number of alternate routes for getting around
town which resulted in, at worse, a seven-minute detour (Interviews, 2009). 553 Thus, the resident
is suggesting that his expectations that he not be forced to take a seven minute detour for one or
two days is somehow at least equal in stature to Haudenosaunee protesters’ grievances: that
hundreds of thousands of acres of their lands have been stolen and are being built upon; that their
culture and existence as a distinct people has been threatened for centuries by this theft and by
the forcible imposition of a colonial system of government upon them; and that the Canadian,
Ontario and Haldimand county governments are refusing to recognize not only their
internationally recognized and legally-binding human rights, but their Constitutional and
Supreme Court mandated rights. Clearly any objective observer can see that the alleged injury to
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Further, evidence suggests that when non-Native residents really needed to get through the
Native roadblocks, and when these people went to Native protesters with their concerns, these
concerns were addressed and residents were allowed to go through. Such was the case with
emergency vehicles, church services, residents living close to roadblocks, and even residents
who had friends coming to feed their fish and water their plants. Of course, residents who felt
their privileged status or financial interests were threatened by the protest, and/or who engaged
in various reassertions of privilege and denigration of Native protesters (or Native people in
general) were the least likely to approach Native protesters and talk to them like fellow human
beings. Doing so would not have occurred to those who needed to establish Native protesters as
enemies and/or who were more interested in promoting anti-protest/ anti-Native rhetoric and
halting any movement whatsoever on Native grievances.
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this non-Native resident is nowhere near the injury that has been (and is being) done to the
Haudenosaunee people. And yet, the resident not only minimizes the latter and greatly
exaggerates the former in an attempt to make them seem equal. He then proceeds to imply by
his very complaint that perhaps his “right” to not be inconvenienced is a bit more important than
the various Haudenosaunee rights involved.
Along these same lines, a number of residents made similarly exaggerated claims, insisting on
the first or second day of the road blockades that these blockades were preventing non-Natives
from living their lives. To this extent, one resident yelled angrily at police: “Hey, you guys
what’s the matter with you. You guys are standing around like a bunch of bozos. At least clear
the road so we can get on with our lives” (Nolan, 2006d). 554 Such expressions of anger at the
police and claims of alleged victimization at the hands of both police and protesters was rooted
in the same sense of entitlement as that displayed by other residents, above. It also relied on the
same minimization or outright denial of Haudenosaunee grievances, and the same exaggeration
or outright fabrication of non-Native victimization. Further examples of this sort of entitled
expectations, minimization/denial and exaggerated claims to victimhood abound, and can be
seen in the county mayor’s comments that residents felt their rights were “taking a back seat” to
Native rights (Bonnell & Canadian Press, 2006c). It can also be seen in assertions made by local
residents on the first or second day of the road blockades, which were located in one far corner
of the town. One resident claimed that the protest was “closing our town down” (Nolan,
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The full context with the quote is as follows:
While calm had returned to the scene, there is still evidence of frustration and tension
over the affair. One man hollered angry comments this morning at four OPP officers
standing by a cruiser at the police perimeter line.
“Hey, you guys what’s the matter with you,” he said. “You guys are standing around
like a bunch of bozos. At least clear the road so we can get on with our lives.”
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2006d), 555 another suggested the town had been taken away from residents and they needed to
take it back (Nolan, 2006c; Bauslaugh, 2006a), 556 and yet another resident insisted that the
protest was “stopping our way of life in town” (Dunfield, 2006). 557
In all of these examples, preeminence was given to the desire of non-Native residents not to
be inconvenienced, while serious ongoing violations of Haudenosaunee rights were completely
ignored. Various non-Native residents attempted to equate an inconvenient detour of a few
minutes with an end to residents’ way of life, or with a loss of the residents’ town, while
Haudenosaunee concerns about encroachment on their lands and the ongoing assault on their
existence as distinct people –i.e., concerns that were actually about a threatened way of life and a
real loss of land-- were dismissed completely as unworthy of attention. Thus, the sense of
entitlement in these various non-Native manipulations –i.e., the demands that non-Natives should

555

Nolan is quoting Caledonia resident Kelly Muir. The full context of this quote is as follows:
The occupation drew the curious, even into the small hours of the morning. Kelly Muir,
19, Rachel Binek, 17, and Rob Weatherstone, 21, found a piece of grass in front of the
nearby Tim Hortons, sat down and covered themselves with a sleeping bag. They
planned to stay the entire night to see if there might be another police raid on the site,
but left after a few hours.
They weren't too impressed with the standoff and, like many Caledonia residents,
wished the authorities would close it down permanently.
"They're closing our town down over this," said Muir. "People are scared in this
town."
She said she has a lot of friends from Six Nations and they do not support the
occupation. "They think it's ridiculous," she said.
556
The sources are quoting signs carried by anti-protest non-Native residents, one of which read:
“We want our town back!”
557
Dunfield is quoting Caledonia resident Amanda McSkimming. The full discussion of
McSkimming’s comments are as follows:
Amanda McSkimming, a resident of Caledonia, said people are shocked and said that
this is happening in their community. A business owner, she complained that she had to
close business yesterday. As well, she said, her children are missing school because
schools in the area have been closed. Ms. McSkimming wants to see the occupation
ended by police. “We need them out of here, it is stopping so many businesses, it is
stopping out way of life in town, you know?”
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always get what they want, even to the detriment of others-- is clear, as are the exaggerated
claims to victimhood, which will be further explored below.
Exaggerated Claims of Victimization and Allegations of Police Discrimination and “StateSponsored Racism”
Because such a large number of non-Native residents felt entitled to a continuation of
colonialism-as-usual, and expected this to take place at any cost, many residents were quickly
angered by the failure of police to act immediately according to these entitled expectations. The
disappointment of these expectations led many of these non-Native residents to feel betrayed or
even “victimized” by the police (Nolan, 2006a). 558 Some of these residents accused police of
having “deserted” them or having “abandoned their post” (Edwards & Gombu, 2006; Healey &
Nolan, 2006). 559 The fact that police were maintaining a large presence around the town and
around the protest site was ignored by residents, because what they really meant by these claims
of victimization was that police did not do what residents opposed to the protest had wanted: i.e.,
forcibly evict the Haudenosaunee protesters. Other residents made even greater exaggerations,
with one claiming that “in no other country or province or state are there roads being blocked off
and businesses closed due to a militant group of disgruntled people” (Huges, 2006). Other
residents who opposed the protest satisfied themselves with only slightly less exaggerated
claims, such as the claim that the failure of police to do what non-Native residents had wanted
was equal to “state-sponsored racism.” In rallying against alleged police discrimination against
558

For example, Nolan reported that: “Some Caledonia residents are upset the government has
let the protest get this far and believe the victims are the people who live in the community.”
559
Edwards, Peter and Phinjo Gombu (With files from Richard Brennan, Rob Ferguson, Sean
Gordon). 2006. Standoff at Caledonia. The Toronto Star. April 21, News, Page A01 [quotes an
area resident claiming police “abandoned their post.”]; Healey, Deirdre and Daniel Nolan. 2006.
Angry Clash; Natives, townspeople in a faceoff after police arrests spark fires, anger. The
Hamilton Spectator. April 21 (SISIS) [quotes a resident claiming police ‘stirred up a hornets
nest and then deserted’ them].
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White non-Native residents, or against a conspiratorial system that allegedly granted “special
privileges” to people belonging to the “right” racial groups (Flemming, 2006a; Jackson, 2006c),
non-Native residents who opposed the protest were able to project their own racism elsewhere.
By accusing others of racism in this way, non-Native residents who most vehemently opposed
the protest seem to have freed themselves to express outright racist views, so long as these views
were couched in the language of their own alleged victimization. The expressions of these views
quickly expanded to include not only Haudenosaunee protesters and Native people in general,
but also immigrants and minorities throughout Canada --i.e., non-White and non-Western
people. As one local reporter complained, in Canada “even newly landed minorities are granted
more support than lifetime citizens” and while “flags of foreign countries are proudly stuck on
back bumpers before a maple leaf” “certain races and religions are given special privileges”
(Jackson, 2006a). Of course, the writer was not talking about the obvious privileges of White
Canadians, which non-Native residents denied and dismissed completely. Rather, he was
complaining about the interrupted entitlement or jealousy that White non-Native Canadians like
him apparently experienced subjectively whenever someone other than them appeared to gain
something they did not have. Through these exaggerated claims to victimhood, those who
fancied themselves non-minorities and “lifetime citizens” (i.e., White Canadians) expressed their
racism and resentment towards virtually every other group, conflating the groups into a common
“them.” They further engaged in the socially-regressive bonding that DeVries (2006) and others
(McFarlane & van der Kolk, 2006; Shiva, 1997) have identified as psychopathological defense
mechanisms resulting from a loss of culture. Though these non-Native residents were not
experiencing a loss of culture, they were experiencing a threat to their cultural worldview, which
was identified in chapters 2 and 3 as being an unhealthy and psychopathological shell of a
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culture (see chapters 2 and 3, including the quotations from Deloria, 1969; Wise, 2005; Baldwin,
1965; Forbes, 2008). In bonding regressively and psychopathologically –the primary means of
bonding in the bankrupt Western culture (see also: Szasz, 1970; Sartre, 1977)—these non-Native
residents voiced their anger and resentment towards not just the Haudenosuanee protesters, but
all Natives, all non-White Canadians, and all non-Canadians in general. They then transformed
their hateful verbal attacks on all these other groups into a narrative of their own alleged
victimization by these other groups, which further fueled their angry, hateful, regressive and
psychopathological bonding.
Other non-Native residents continued making claims in this vein, projecting their own
behaviors onto the Haudenosaunee protesters while completely failing to engage in any form of
critical self-reflection. One example of this, already mentioned in a section above, was in the
statement by one angry non-Native resident that “the native tradition of constantly identifying
themselves as victims” was getting old (Thompson, 2006b). Another resident, equally oblivious
to his own projections and devoid of any critical self-reflection, demanded to know “Why is it
that the very people who insist on flexing their own rights have so little regard for the rest of
us?” (Matthews, 2006). Indeed. Continuing with his projections and complete lack of critical
self-reflection, he continued:
I'm angry because they're breaking the law to get their own way. They're telling
the rest of society to go to hell because it's only their point of view that matters.
… [I]n a democracy we don't get to pick and choose the laws we like and then
obey only them. (Matthews, 2006)
It probably doesn’t need to be pointed out that each of these complaints the resident had seem far
more applicable to the attitudes and behavior of non-Native residents who opposed the
Haudenosaunee protest than to the attitudes and behavior of Haudenosaunee protesters.
Meanwhile, other residents made increasingly exaggerated claims to victim status at the hands of
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Haudenosaunee protesters: the county mayor claimed the entire town was being held hostage or
held for ransom (Bonnell & Canadian Press, 2006c), some non-Native protesters suggested that
Haudenosaunee protesters might next try to take over the homes of non-Native residents
(Bauslaugh, 2006a), 560 and others even made comparisons that likened the Native protesters to
Nazi Germany (Interviews, 2009).
Non-Natives Alleging Victimization for the Loss of Harmonious Relations
Another common claim made by non-Native residents who opposed the protest was that the
protest was “creating a rift” and had to be ended “before it causes resentment”(Unnamed resident
quoted in: Canadian Press, 2006t & 2006c). Variations of this complaint were that the protest
was polarizing the town and leading to mistrust (unnamed resident quoted in: Oliveira, 2006),
driving “a wedge through the community” (Haldimand County Mayor Marie Trainer, quoted in:
Bauslaugh, 2006b), and that the Haudenosaunee protesters were “creating a divide that’s only
going to get bigger as the days go by” (Jackson, 2006a & 2006c). Interestingly, the residents
making these assertions uniformly blamed the protest or the Haudenosaunee protesters for
creating whatever problems existed between Natives and non-Natives in the town, never
considering for once that perhaps the non-Native behavior –including vehement opposition to the
protest, demands that protesters grievances be ignored, insistence on the continuation of
settlement and development on Native lands, complete lack of concern for whether
Haudenosaunee land claims were resolved justly, outright racist remarks, and blatant
discrimination against Native customers in local businesses—was the actual cause of whatever
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Residents at an anti-protest rally allegedly demanded to know: “What’s to say they won’t
come and try to take my house?” The Haudenosaunee Confederacy Council and protesters had
repeatedly assured residents that they were not interested in dispossessing non-Native residents
already living in the town, but that they simply wanted to prevent more non-Native residents
from moving onto the lands under claim.
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“divide” they saw growing. In other words, the terms rift, divide, mistrust, polarize, wedge, and
so forth were code words to indicate non-Native anger that Native people were getting in the way
of what non-Natives wanted to do. Equally interesting, as pointed out by some non-Native
residents who were not vehemently opposed to the protest, racial tensions had always existed in
the town and, according to these latter residents, had been the result of non-Native prejudice
against Natives. As one non-Native resident pointed out:
I know a lot of guys in town that have a prejudice against natives, they feel they
get too many privileges. There’s a lot of fights at hockey games. Some of the
natives don’t stand for the anthem and it bothers a lot of people. You hear things
like, ‘If you don’t stand up for Canada you should get … out of the rink.’ This
conflict is just going to fuel that hate even more. (Resident Pat McKillop, quoted
in: Oliveria, 2006).
Instead of blaming the protesters and the protest for all of the growing animosity, this resident
was clear that the source of the problem was anti-Native hatred among non-Natives, and that this
hatred was bound to grow as a result of non-Natives becoming angry at the protest, just as it
grew any time Native people did something many local non-Natives did not like.
Reminders that racial tensions had always existed, and that non-Natives were largely
responsible for these tensions, had little effect on those non-Native residents who sought to
blame the Haudenosaunee protesters and people for all of their anger. These latter residents were
too caught up in projective blame shifting to critically self-reflect on their own behavior, and
narratives that implicated them in any way in the growing “rift” would destroy the identity they
had been constructing for themselves as morally pure victims. These narratives allow nonNative residents who vehemently opposed the protest to claim that they were justified in their
demands that authorities end the protest, because they were making these demands benevolently
–i.e., they were merely concerned about worsening relations between Natives and non-Natives.
Such narratives of victimization and moral purity, and such claims of benevolence, allowed the
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angriest non-Native residents (who were, in many cases, the most prejudiced against Native
people) to deny their own racism, and even to project it onto Native protesters, thus confusing
the issue in the realm of public opinions and avoiding the stigmatization that comes with more
behavior more obviously motivated by racism. Tellingly, though, while these residents
demanded in the name of benevolence that the protest be ended immediately, how the protest
was ended was of virtually no concern to them, so long as it was ended. Thus, the alleged
morally-pure justification for ending the protest –benevolence in one’s concern about resentment
and souring relations—was betrayed with the complete lack of concern for any resentment that
forcibly ending the protest and returning to colonialism-as-usual would create for the
Haudenosaunee. In other words, those non-Native residents who subscribed to this justification
when demanding an end to the protest were solely concerned with non-Native feelings: nonNatives did not want to feel resentment (i.e., feel like they had gotten the short end of the stick),
which they would feel if the protest continued, and so the protest needed to end before they were
forced to feel this. To this extent, these non-Native residents were not really concerned with a rift
at all, since certainly one would be created by forcibly ending the protest and continuing
colonialism-as-usual. If these non-Native residents had really been concerned with positive
relations (rather than just with how non-Natives felt), they would have acknowledged the
Haudenosaunee’s grievances and demanded a just resolution to Haudenosaunee land claims.
They would also have supported –at the very least-- a partial or temporary development
moratorium on lands under claim until this just resolution was found.
However, such concerns were never voiced by many of the non-Natives who used this
narrative to justify their demands for an end to the protest. Neither the ongoing anti-Native
racism not the ongoing perpetrations against the Haudenosaunee people had any relevance in the
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minds of these residents, who only appeared to care about ending the interruption in what nonNatives wanted to do, so that they did not feel resentful. Further, because Haudenosaunee
protesters had made it absolutely clear that they were not willing to leave the protest site until
their grievances were fairly resolved, those non-Natives who demanded an immediate end to the
protest also seemed to be demanding an end to negotiations aimed at finding a peaceful
resolution to the protest. Thus, they appear to have been advocating a forced end to the protest.
In such a case, not only were Haudenosaunee grievances to go unaddressed, they were to go
unheard. It is thus difficult to see how any person could expect that these non-Native demands
would not be responsible themselves for creating a rift –as advocating armed violence against
one’s neighbor generally does. For this reason, other residents who demanded an end to the
protest perhaps voiced the true nature of these concerns more accurately when they complained
not so much about a rift, but about the “tremendous harm” being done to non-Native residents
and businesses in their town (resident Carol van Imp, quoted in: Edwards & Gombu, 2006). As
two different residents argued: "Something has to be done or it's going to hurt Caledonia. People
won't want to come here" (unidentified resident quoted in Brantford Expositor, 2006a); "The
government needs to come in, bring in the army and clean it up," she said. "This is not going to
be solved peacefully" (resident Carol van Imp, quoted in: Edwards & Gombu, 2006).
Exaggerated Claims of Financial Victimization and Assertions of Entitlement
In addition to the above exaggerated claims to victimization, many non-Native residents seeking
to fuel anti-Native resentment preyed upon non-Native misconceptions and exaggerations about
tax credits that benefit Native people. Under the Indian Act (Canada, 1985), the historic relation
between the British Canadian government and Native peoples of North America has been
deemed to qualify Natives in Canada to certain tax breaks. For example, individual Natives
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living on Native reserves do not pay property taxes to non-Native municipalities, and Nativeowned businesses that operate and/or do most of their business on Native reserves are not
(supposed to be) required to pay income taxes. In addition, when making certain purchases,
particularly purchases of services rendered on Native reserve lands, registered Natives are not
charged sales tax, or (off reserve) are not charged full sales tax (BDO, N.d.; First Nations Tax
Commission, 2007). Though many of these tax breaks are based on long-standing, historic
relations and agreements between Native nations and the British-Canadian government, 561 there
has been a long-standing campaign among resentful non-Natives to abolish all “special” tax
privileges that apply to First Nations people. This campaign has provided selective information
to the general public with the intent of fueling further non-Native resentment and anger towards
Native peoples (i.e., regressive social bonding) in order to pressure government officials to
repeal all Native tax breaks. However, because those involved in this campaign selectively pick
and choose what information they present to the public, they fail to provide an accurate picture
of the “benefits” Native people actually gain from these tax breaks. Some discussion of the
actual tax breaks to First Nations peoples is thus in order before going on to examine the ways in
561

Some of these tax breaks are based on long-standing, historic relations and agreements
between Native nations and the British-Canadian government, while others may be based on
government attempts to break long-standing agreements. For example, on first guess, one would
assume that the property tax exemption arises out of treaty agreements and recognition that all
lands derived from First Nations, and those lands still owned by First Nations, do not fall under
Canadian jurisdiction. However, the Canadian government claims that it owns all of the land
within its borders, whether or not it ever received these lands through treaty agreements (and up
to 90% of the land in Canada was not surrendered by First Nations [Chrisjohn, N.d.]).
Therefore, it may well be, according to the Canadian governments’ rationale, that Native people
do not pay property tax on reserve lands because the Canadian government claims that they are
not the owners of the property, only have occupancy rights, and are using property that belongs
to the government. More research would be needed to fully draw any conclusions on what the
government’s exact legal narrative is on this issue, but it seems clear that –though certainly
Native people should not pay property tax to non-Naïve governments for lands that still belong
to Native people—the Canadian government’s legal intent behind the tax exemption may be
something entirely predatory rather than beneficial to First Nations.
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which local non-Native residents who were opposed to the protest sought to build upon alreadyexisting non-Native resentment on the tax issue in order to generate further resentment and anger
towards the Haudenosaunee protest.
The anti-Native-tax-break campaigners have spread the claim that Native people don’t pay
any taxes at all, that non-Native people financially support Native people through their taxes, and
that this form of “welfare” unfairly benefits and privileges Native people at the expense of nonNatives. However, this information is absolutely incorrect. For example, the vast majority of
Native people pay income tax at the same rates of non-Natives. The only Native people who do
not pay income tax are those who work in a business that is Native-owned at that operates on
reserve lands, which are legally exempt from federal taxes. However, even though reserve lands
are legally exempt from taxation, federal and provincial governments periodically harass Native
business owners whose businesses operate on reserve lands, threatening them with loss of their
business if they do not pay taxes. 562 While this harassment is not legal under Canada’s own
Indian Act, it does generate revenue for the Canadian and Ontario governments in that many
Native business owners give up and start paying federal and provincial income taxes –estimating
that these payments are potentially less costly than court cases against these governments. To
this end, the multi-million dollar business, Grand River Enterprises, on the Six Nations reserve
calculated that it would simply be less costly to pay these taxes than to fight the constant
harassment, seizure of product, court costs, and so forth. Grand River Enterprise now pays
upwards of $60 million a year in taxes to the federal and provincial governments. This amount
far exceeds the funding that federal and provincial governments provide annually to the Six
562

This assertion is based upon an informal review of six years of coverage on the issue by the
Tekawennake and Turtle Island News, as well as other news sources. Specific examples and
news articles can be provided to interested readers, and may be compiled for a future article on
the topic.
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Nations community by tens of millions of dollars. 563 Clearly the Six Nations community and its
members are thus paying far more in income tax than their community receives in government
funding. Income tax generates about 41% of all tax revenue in Canada (First Nations Tax
Commission, 2007: 7).
A large number of Native people, perhaps a majority, also pay property tax either because
their local (often federally-imposed) government collects these taxes from those living on reserve
or, more often, because they live on lands that are not recognized by the Canadian, provincial,
and local governments as reserve lands. Often times these latter lands are, in fact, unsurrendered
lands that should be considered reserve lands (see chapter 4 on extinguishment and jurisdiction).
Further, often the small parcels of lands that are recognized by non-Native governments as
reserve lands are too small to accommodate all Native peoples who wish to live within their own
communities. On the Six Nations reserve, there is a 10-year waiting list for housing loans, and
far more Haudenosaunee Six Nations community members live off reserve than one it
(Alcantara, 2005). 564 Thus, the majority of Six Nations people pay property taxes to local nonNative municipalities. And while Six Nations people who live on reserve do not pay property
taxes, this actually has no impact at all on non-Natives. This is because property taxes stay
within the community or municipality that collects them, to fund street repairs, and other local
improvements (First Nations Tax Commission, 2007: 7). Because the Six Nations reserve is not
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Interview with Caledonia and Six Nations residents, February-June, 2009.
There are an estimated 25,000 Haudenosaunee Six Nations members, but less than 10,000 of
these people live on the Six Nations reserve because of a shortage of land in the area officially
recognized as reserved for the Haudenosaunee. Many lands that were long ago set aside for the
use of future community members were sold by non-Native governments and are presently under
claim. But as the claim process drags on for decades, non-Natives are settling on and developing
these lands as if they are non-Native lands, when at best they are contested lands, and most likely
are Haudenosaunee lands. This issue was, of course, a key motivating factor for the 2006
protest.
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435

under the jurisdiction of any local non-Native municipal government, even if inhabitants of the
Six Nations reserve were to pay property taxes, local non-Native governments would not gain
any tax revenues from these payments, and thus cannot claim to be losing any tax revenues
because these payments are not made.
Some non-Natives have attempted to get around these facts by arguing that the exemptions
from property taxes paid by Native people do impact them, because Native communities receive
funding from the federal government. It is true that the federal government is obligated under
treaty agreements to pay certain annuities to, provide for the well being of, and/or fund certain
services for Native communities (such services include education, health care and so forth). And
according to disgruntled non-Native logic, since non-Natives have fewer tax exemptions than
Native people, these funds are coming out of non-Native pockets. However, this logic falls apart
when subjected to further scrutiny, in part because the federal government provides all
communities with funding –and these federal dollars do not come from property taxes, they
come from income tax (which the vast majority of Native people pay) and/or from sales tax
(discussed momentarily). Further, Native communities actually receive disproportionately less
funding than do non-Native communities, because the latter receive far more funding from
provincial governments. For example, in Toronto, combined government spending (federal,
provincial and municipal) per resident is about $24,000 per year, while in some reserves in
Ontario, which primarily rely upon federal funding, government spending equaled only $11,355
per capita (Land, 2011). Further, government spending increases for First Nations has been
capped at 2% since 1996, despite the fact that Natives comprise the most rapidly growing
population in Canada, and that much of government spending for First Nations goes to paying
salaries for Aboriginal and Northern Affairs Canada bureaucrats, and consulting fees for third
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parties (Land, 2011). This dramatic funding disparity between Natives and non-Natives has
resulted in catastrophes such as the emergency housing situation routinely suffered in Ontario’s
Attawapiskat reserve (Lux, 2011), and ongoing, ‘non-emergency’ conditions such as the lack of
clean drinking water and indoor plumbing in a large portion of houses the Six Nations reserve
(something common to many Native reserves, see: Stastna, 2011). In addition to all of this, as
mentioned above, the Grand River Enterprises on the Six Nations reserve pays many millions
more in federal and provincial taxes than the Six Nations reserve receives in funding from both
governments combined. Thus, if anyone should complain about funding the other group’s
lifestyle, or about special privileges and financial discrimination as it relates to federal and
provincial funding, it should be Haudenosaunee people complaining about funding non-Native
lifestyles, and not the other way around.
Sales tax exemptions are therefore the only form of tax exemption that is enjoyed by
registered First Nations members and not equally enjoyed by non-Native citizens. This sales tax
exemption is conditioned upon, a long history of Euro-native relations and treaty agreements that
recognized Native independence from the British-Canadian government, that pledged noninterference in each others’ affairs, and that required the latter to provide for the well-being of
the former in exchange for permission to use of certain areas of First Nations’ land. This form of
tax exemption is certainly a benefit to First Nations people. However, it is not as beneficial as
non-Natives opposed to First Nations treaty rights would present it. This is because the various
provincial governments are constantly attempting to find ways around these sales tax
exemptions, such as through creating other forms of sales tax that do apply to First Nations
people, or through “harmonizing” all forms of sales tax into one, causing confusion among
business owners as to which taxes do and do not apply, and leading to inapplicable taxation of

437

First Nations people (CNW, 2010; Alexander & Glasner, N.d.). Finally, a commonly recurring
story among Native people is that some non-Native merchants refuses to honor sales tax
exemptions of First Nations people, either refusing to serve the customer who insists on these
exemptions or refusing to accept Native status cards and charging full sales tax on all customers
(Interviews, 2009). Certainly this is a form of discrimination that seems unlikely be reproduced if
it were a group of non-Natives who exclusively had this exemption, but because this sales-tax
exemption is associated with a distinct group of people (the group most often targeted for
derision and scapegoating in Canadian society), it infuriates non-Native people, who
conveniently ignore their own forms of privilege, and can’t stop fixating on the fact that another
group that is supposed to be lower on the social hierarchy has something they do not. 565
Early on in the protest non-Natives used the issue of Native tax exemptions to assert claims to
victimhood and to create and mobilize non-Native resentment and anger towards the
Haudenosaunee protesters or towards Native people in general. To this extent, non-Native
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The fact that many non-Native people feel –quite intensely and angrily—that Native people
should be lower on the social hierarchy than they are is evident in media coverage of Native
issues, and was also quit evident in interviews with non-Native residents (February-June, 2009).
For example, many non-Native residents would angrily tell anecdotes about seeing a Native
person or various generalized Native people driving nice, expensive cars. Often these anecdotes
were immediately related in some way to alleged “special privileges” –with non-Native residents
all but stating (or sometimes actually suggesting outright) that it had been them who had
purchased those cars for Native people –through their taxes. In their telling these anecdotes, it
was always simply assumed that I would immediately understand and commiserate with their
anger at such an injustice as a Native person driving a nice, expensive car that “even” the nonNative resident could not afford to drive (“even I couldn’t afford that” –clearly the suggestion in
“even I…” is that “I” should be better and have better in everything than a Native person). This
expectation of my immediate understanding was evidenced in the fact that many angry anecdotes
about how a Native person had something nice (or nicer than even the storyteller had) were not
accompanied by any explanation, and were told as if the injustice was self-evident. In these
cases, it was only after further inquiry that I was made to understand that the anger came from
the fact that the non-Native person had convinced him or herself that he/she had paid for the
Native person’s nice item through taxes –even though there are no government programs that
help Native people purchase automobiles or other consumer goods, much less very nice
automobiles or consumer goods.
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residents used the term “taxpayers” as if it were an exclusive category synonymous with nonNative residents. They carried signs to anti-protest rallies proclaiming: “We work and pay
taxes!”(Haudenosaunee Confederacy, 2007), and organizers of these rallies played upon
potential non-Native resentment over the issue with statements such as: “We feel its time that
Canadians hear from the tax-paying community of Caledonia” (rally organizer Ken Hewitt,
quoted in Harries, 2006a). Other non-Native residents voiced related, exaggerated complaints
that “the natives get everything for free with their special cards” (Toronto Star, 2006b), or wrote
letters-to-the-editor complaining about the financial advantages Native peoples allegedly “enjoy
over non-natives,” and telling Native people: “I wish no hardship on you people. I just want you
to pay your way like the rest of us do”(Flemming, 2006c). Even the Mayor got in on the action
(as noted above), implying on national TV that Native people didn’t understand what it was like
to have to work to survive: “[The non-Natives] don’t have, uh, monies coming in automatically
every month. They’ve got to work to survive. And, and the Natives’ have got to realize that”
(Haldimand County Mayor Marie Trainer, quoted in: CBC News, 2006a; Harries & Rusk, 2006;
Rook, 2006f).
The misinformed and exaggerated assertions of Native “special privileges” and non-Native
victimhood did not stop with the issue of taxes, but escalated from there. Non-Native residents
angrily opposed to the Haudenosaunee protest painted Native people in general as extortionists,
or more accurately, “hypocrites wailing about assimilation, native traditions and living with
nature while they use the system to extort the government”(Lupton, 2006). Others, as mentioned
in a previous section, insisted that “the natives” were extortionists because they had already been
paid –even over-paid-- for their land through tax credits, and should never have been paid in the
first place (Flemming, 2006b). And still other residents played upon these issues of tax credits
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and non-Native victimization in their exaggerated and misinformed complaints that the federal
government “has done nothing but throw money at the native community for years and they still
are not satisfied” (Thompson, 2006b) or their complaints about an alleged “millions of tax
dollars and generations of time wasted by Aboriginal people and their disputes” which were
ultimately “settled in the courts at our expense” (Smith, 2006c, quoting and paraphrasing Ken
Hewitt).
Other non-Native residents expressed claims to have been financially victimized by
Haudenosaunee protesters in yet another way, equally demonstrative of their sense of
entitlement. For example, within the first two days of the roadblocks which forced residents to
take a seven or so minute detour around town, one resident demanded to know “Who is going to
pay our wages when we can’t go to work?”(Janet Whintemute, quoted in Healty & Nolan, 2006).
Now, certainly the day of the failed Ontario Provincial Police raid was extremely chaotic, with
schools being closed and many residents being forced to come home early from work to watch
their kids and worry over the events in their town. Many schools were also closed on the day
following the failed police raid, as well (which was a Friday). But both the mayor and the
county council had assured residents that schools and everything else in the town would be
functioning normally on Monday, and had insisted that residents should go on with their lives
regardless of whether the roadblocks remained. In addition, though there were roadblocks up on
some of the streets at one far end of the town, residents were still able to get anywhere they
wanted, including work. They simply to take streets other than those they would normally travel
to get there. So the suggestion by this resident that people in the town would not be able to go to
work was an exaggeration. However, of even greater interest is this resident’s suggestion that
someone is responsible for paying the residents’ wages if they could not go to work. This
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resident clearly felt that non-Native residents are entitled to get what non-Native residents expect
to have. There is no fault in this expectation, except in that it is not equally applied to the
Haudenosaunee protesters. Though non-Natives in this resident’s unrealistic scenario should
have whatever it is that they expect to have, and should have any losses in these expectations
recouped, Haudenosaunee protesters, who are dealing with an actual loss far more sizable than a
couple days pay, should be forced off the land and given nothing, so as not to inconvenience
non-Native residents. The sense not only of entitlement, but of exclusionary privileges, speaks
volumes, as does the discriminatory double-standard and complete lack of critical self-reflection.
DEHUMANIZING THE TARGET GROUP AND SETTING THE STAGE FOR VIOLENCE
In dehumanizing his victims, he loses his capacity to care for them, to have
compassion for them, to treat them as human beings. He develops a state of
psychic numbing and a sense of detachment which sharply reduce his capacity to
feel. Insofar as he excludes a whole group of people form his network of shared
empathy, his own community becomes more constricted and his sense of
involvement in humankind declines. …. As he gradually discards personal
responsibility and human empathy, he loses his capacity to act as a moral being.
~ Kelman 1973, 51-52
Once [some non-Natives] don’t get their way then, not all of them, but some do
the racism, thing, and, you know [argue] that these are … you know, they’re not
normal, they’re not real people. They have some lesser rights or have some
characteristic different than the rest of us.
~ Ralph Gerstenberger, President Local 1005 United Steal Workers Union,
Hamilton Ontario, quoted in Autonomy & Solidarity, 2006f
Afterall, violence is the last resort of the incompetent.
~ Caledonia Resident Lorrie Harcourt, Harcourt 2006
In the beginning of chapter 4, some of the dynamics and impacts of government polices and
practices of violence were discussed and it was noted that such policies and practices often result
in what Herbert Kelman (1973) calls the authorization and routinization of attack against and
dehumanization of a group of people who have been set apart from the rest of society as “fair
game.” Together, all of these processes work to diminish or destroy the moral restraints that most
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individuals normally have when it comes to committing acts of violence against other human
beings. The non-Native residents who most angrily and vehemently opposed the 2006
Haudenosaunee protest cannot be said to have participated in sanctioned massacres against the
Haudenosaunee people, but the Canadian and Ontario governments, with the complicity of these
non-Native residents, can be said to be engaging in ongoing atrocities against the Haudenosaunee
and other Native peoples throughout Canada. Similarly, some of the non-Native residents who
most angrily opposed the Haudenosaunee protest did engage in acts of violence that would not
have been acceptable without these government-authorized and routinized processes of targeting
and dehumanizing (indirectly, in pursuit of policy objectives) Native peoples in Canada. As
Kelman (1973) and others have noted, these processes work on a continuum. The examination
of these processes can serve to explain incidents like Abu Ghraib, or massacres in Vietnam, but
they can also serve to explain much lower-level attacks, such as those seen in the Standford
Prison experiment, Stanley Milgram’s famous experiment, and the escalating hostilities and
periodic violent attacks upon Native protesters by local non-Native residents. This section
examines some of the ways in which local non-Native residents –clearly playing off of the
government and media example— collectively participated in these processes and fueled the
lessening of their own moral restraint, particularly by engaging in collective dehumanization
ceremonies aimed at Native people, with the intent of legitimizing non-Native demands for
violence and justifying non-Native incidents of attempted or actual violence. As with the rest of
this chapter, the vast majority of the examples provided in this section are from statements and
actions that occurred within the first two months of the protest, and thus this discussion is not
entirely reflective of the intensified anti-Native rhetoric and violent tendencies that developed
after this two month period, examination of which will have to be reserved for future work.
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Dehumanization Ceremonies
One of the primary ways in which non-Native residents who opposed to the Haudenosaunee
protest authorized and routinized the dehumanization of Haudenosaunee protesters and
increasingly violent expressions of this anger was through their regular gatherings as close as
they possibly could to the protest site. Gathering almost every Friday night, as well as on other
nights and days of the week, non-Native residents yelled racial slurs at Native protesters and
insults at police officers, and sometimes proclaimed their intent to physically confront and
forcibly remove Native protesters from the site vigilant-style. But their main audience was each
other and their primary purpose was to bond in socially-regressive ways, feeding off of their
common anger and hatred towards Native protesters and Native people.
Many non-Native residents who regularly rallied at the barricades considered these gatherings
to be social events. They saw friends they hadn’t seen in a while, bonded with strangers, brought
their children along with them, and attended the events as families (Interviews, 2009). 566 These
regular gatherings also became hotspots for local youth looking for excitement, and local youth
some times made up to 3/4ths of those present (Autonomy & Solidarity, 2009). Yet, though
many non-Natives who attended these rallies did so on a social level, the underlying purpose of
the gatherings was clear in the signs, statements, and actions of residents present. For example,
many residents attending these regular gatherings carried signs with messages that intended to
denigrate Native protesters or Native people. Signs bore remarks such as “I agree with
Marie”(Autonomy & Solidarity, 2006j), referring to the mayor’s off-color remarks implying that
Native protesters did not understand what it was like to have to work for a living, rather than
having checks coming in automatically every months. Signs played upon and reinforced
566

Three years later, some parents spoke proudly of the fact that they were one of those families
that attended the events together (interviews with Caledonia residents, February-June, 2009).
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stereotypes of Native people as criminals and car thieves, 567 such as signs demanding: “Get off
our land and give back my ATV,” implying not only that Native people were car thieves, but that
Native protesters were also trying to steal non-Native (“our) land. Another sign playing upon
this stereotype read: “Lost, 1 white mini van,” and the individual carrying the sign simply
assumed (correctly) that everyone present would get the intended meaning of the joke
(Autonomy & Solidarity, 2006j). Other signs present at the protest were even less subtle in the
non-Native racism they expressed, reading, for example: “CAUTION: running rampant, please
do not feed the animals” (Autonomy & Solidarity, 2009), or: “Where is John Wayne when you
need him?”(Autonomy & Solidarity, 2006j). And other signs emphasized the carriers’ desire to
see violence against the Haudenosaunee protesters by asking for United States intervention or
asking: “What would W do?” referring non-Native residents’ perception of US President George
W. Bush as a violent war monger (who would quickly end such a protest just as he quickly
started wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (Haudenosaunee Confederacy, 2007).
It was not just the signs that non-Native residents carried that turned these gatherings into
dehumanization ceremonies. It was also what non-Natives said and did at these rallies. For
example, video footage of one of these rallies shows a large number of youth gathered around a
barrel fire, singing alternatively the Canadian national anthem and a set of four words chanted
over and over again in the style of mocking Native music: “Hey-how-are-ya, hey-how-are-ya,
hey-how-are-ya.” These chants and songs were simultaneously intended to exclude Native
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A number of stolen vehicles are found abandoned, sometimes after having been thoroughly
torched, on the Six Nations reserve every year. The assumption among non-Native residents has
always been that Six Nations people (or Native people) are responsible for all of the car thefts.
This may or may not be the case, but there is at least some evidence that non-Natives use the Six
Nations reserve –which has left much of the original forest still in tact, and thus provides
numerous isolated hiding spots-- as a dumping ground (Interviews with Caledonia and Six
Nations residents, February- June, 2009).
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people from the Canadian nation and to denigrate Native singing and Native people. As the
youth stood there, various older adults walked by with their signs that make derogatory
comments about Native people in the same manner as described above. One of the teens,
referring to a John Wayne sign, proclaimed “cowboys and Indians,” obviously suggesting that
the non-Native residents were the cowboys. Another youth present responded to this comment,
asking if anyone has any feathers they can throw on the fire. The rest of the youth broke out in a
spontaneous, repeated chant of “burn, Natives, burn!” (Autonomy & Solidarity, 2006j).
Other video footage shows non-Native residents attempting to get as close as they can to the
police barricades, and responding furiously when provincial police stop them from crossing the
barricades onto the Native protest site (Autonomy & Solidarity, 2006l). A sizeable portion of
those stopped then searched for ways to sneak around the police barricade and onto the protest
site. Another video shot that same weekend shows a group of male non-Native teenagers,
accompanied by a non-Native adult, trying to sneak onto the protest site by climbing a fence
away from the police barricades, all the while talking about how they want to shoot the Natives
(Autonomy & Solidarity, 2006a). When the police eventually stepped in to prevent these nonNatives from climbing a fence and entering the protest site, the latter accused the police of
discrimination against non-Natives. Non-Native teens are then shown continuing to talk about
wanting to shoot Natives, as a non-Native adult who was later identified as a member of a White
Supremacist organization tells them that he understands, but that they need to pick their battles.
For example, a portion of the discussion follows. Each line indicates a different teenage speaker,
while the adult’s statements are indicated with the word ADULT:
They always surround the white guys.
Ya.
That’s discriminatory, why are you always surrounding us?…
How discriminatory is that?
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I want to fucking shoot every single one of them…
ADULT: Exactly. But you can’t do it today.
We still gotta try.
ADULT: Not today. You have to pick your battles.
This is our tribe, this is our white tribe.
This is our tribe, ya.
White tribe.
White power!
White power!
Ha ha.
Ya. (Autonomy & Solidarity, 2006a at 3:00 min to 3:30 min)
These regular gatherings/ dehumanization ceremonies were also breeding grounds for all of
the various behaviors discussed above in this chapter –particularly non-Native residents’
exaggerated claims to injury and victimhood. exaggerated claims to victimhood (and lack of
critical self-reflection). For example, one video shows a woman, standing in an angry mob of
non-Native residents gathered as close as possible to the Native protest, screaming angrily that:
“[we’re] not frightening their children, but they’re frightening ours!”(Autonomy & Solidarity,
2009 at about 14:30min). Another resident, a non-Native teenager, claimed that her university
acceptance was going to be cancelled because the protest caused her to miss two days of school
(Autonomy & Solidarity, 2009), while other residents compared the Native protesters to Nazis
(ignoring the presence of several actual neo-Nazis with in the mob of non-Natives) (Autonomy
& Solidarity, 2006c).
While these dehumanization ceremonies offered residents a chance to physically congregate
and to bond in their socially-regressive (and psychopathological) hatred towards Native
protesters, the socially regressive bonding, projection, scapegoating and so forth was not limited
to these dehumanization ceremonies, as much of the rest of the chapter has demonstrated. These
nightly dehumanization ceremonies worked in conjunction with other daily activities in the lives
of non-Natives, and local non-Native residents who vehemently opposed the protest engaged in
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numerous other actions in their daily lives that demonstrated their collective expressions of
opposition to the protest and to Native people, in general. Through these daily activities, nonNatives authorized and routinized for themselves and each other the actions that attacked and
dehumanized Native people in was that would not otherwise be acceptable. These daily
activities thus served to intensify the anger, hatred and willingness to commit violence at the
frequent nightly gatherings near the protest site. Examples of this sort of behavior include the
discrimination displayed by some local non-Native businesses against Native people who
attempted to shop in their establishments. The Kentucky Fried Chicken in town, along with
several other non-Native businesses, refused to sell food to Native people (Autonomy &
Solidarity, 2006i). Non-Native businesses that did not follow suit were threatened with boycotts
by angry non-Native residents who wanted all business to Native people in their town refused
(Autonomy & Solidarity, 2006a). In similar discriminatory fashion, on the day of the failed
police raid school administrators asked Native students to leave school (on that day) “for the
safety of everyone” (Autonomy & Solidarity, 2006i). And elsewhere, before and after the failed
police raid, non-Native residents threw trash out their car windows at Native people walking on
the sidewalk (Haudenosaunee Confederacy, 2007). Despite all of these acts of aggression (and
more not mentioned here), non-Native residents insisted that it was they, and not the
Haudenosaunee people, who were discriminated against. To this end, non-Native residents
complained about the alleged discrimination they suffered when police and politicians did not
do what they wanted (Lupton, 2006), and others carried protest signs at rallies and regular
gatherings intended to make this same complaint. For example, one sign bore the word:
“Discrimi-nation?” surrounded by question marks (Haudenosuanee Confederacy, 2007) though
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the primary “special treatment” that Native people experienced was the racist refusal of service
of non-Native establishments.
The local media also played a key role in fueling the daily dehumanization of Native people,
and in setting the stage for violence at the regular non-Native gatherings and rallies (see for
example, Autonomy & Solidarity, 2006f). For example, particularly after the failed April 19
police raid on the protest site, but also weeks before (and almost from the start of the protest),
non-Native papers attempted first to call into question the peacefulness of the protest, and then to
declare it outright violent. Some of the first news articles taking this angle can be found in the
Regional News. In fact, months before the protest even began, the editor of that paper seems to
have attempted to portray an informational picket by Haudenosaunee people as less than
peaceful (Regional News, 2005). 568 Months later, and a mere week into the Haudenosaunee’s
small, peaceful protest on the edge of town, the columnist for that paper used single quotation
marks around the words ‘peaceful protest,’ implying that the protest was something other than
peaceful, but offered no further explanation for the quotation marks (Jackson, 2006a). The paper
continued utilizing these quotation marks in other weekly editorial columns (Jackson, 2006b &
2006c), while also dialing up the accusations. For example, in his April 5 column he stated that:
“It makes me laugh every time native protesters off Highway 6 say they're peaceful. Nothing
could be further from the truth” (Jackson, 2006c). What had the protesters done, according to the
author, that qualified them as less than peaceful? They made demands that were supposedly
equal to threats, and some protesters had insulted local police officials.
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For example, below an image of this peaceful informational picket, a caption read, in part:
While the group of about 15-20 people said they were conducting a peaceful
protest, they were also handing out flyers that say “it is fully legal for Six Nations
to reclaim the land and issue eviction notices, without restitution to the
homeowners.”
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Early into the protest, other residents also jumped on board the “not peaceful” trend, with
some insisting that things were “just a heartbeat, or a momentary flash of temper, away from
violence”(Howard, 2006). Residents also insisted that when Native protesters repeated
statements that non-Native residents had made at an anti-protest rally, this was “reckless and
inflammatory” (Howard, 2006). The Native protester in question was summarizing comments
by non-Native residents demanding police force and/or asking: “So we can shoot them when?”
(Nolan, 2006c). In summarizing these comments, the protester allegedly remarked that “They
want the OPP to ‘get over there and shoot the hell of dem bad Injuns’” (Howard, 2006). For the
offended non-Native resident, it was the act of repeating these statements, rather than the fact
that they were made in the first place, that was “reckless and inflammatory.” The fact that these
statements had been made at all –repeatedly—did not even merit consideration.
Thus, again, in the minds of non-Native residents seeking to project their undesirable traits
onto others, those targeted for attack were guilty and wrong no matter what they did, while the
behavior of the allegedly morally pure non-Natives needed no scrutiny. After the failed police
raid on the protest site, this sort of thinking escalated along with escalating claims that the
protesters were violent (and criminal, and thugs, and terrorists…). The Non-Native media called
Caledonia “a town under siege” (Rook, 2006d) and liberally peppered their news stories with
references to alleged Native violence. The protest was described as “bigger and angrier than
ever”(CTV News, 2006h), or as as “burning rage” (Hamilton Spectator, 2006a) frustrations that
had “blown wide open” (CTV News, 2006h). It was just a matter of time, the non-Native media
implied, before Native protesters brought in guns. As one news host stated: “No guns visible
yet, but [the protesters are] now saying they won’t back down, and they’re ready for whatever
comes” (CTV News, 2006h). While these accusations of violence were being levied at Native
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protesters, most of the violent rhetoric was coming from angry non-Native residents, such as the
resident who wanted to know: "Have (the police) shot them all yet?" (Oliveira, 2006), 569 or the
countless residents who demanded military force to end the protest (see, for example: Edwards &
Gombu, 2006; CTV News, 2006h; Haudenosuanee Confederacy, 2007).
Other residents took a different angle on the same “not peaceful” line of accusations, arguing
that they were not so much concerned with themselves, but were benevolently concerned for the
“majority of the” Haudenosaunee people, who were allegedly victimized by the protesters.
According to this narrative, because many of the protesters were from other Native reserves
around Canada (including many of the other Haudenosaunee reserves), they did “not represent
Six Nations”(Jackson, 2006b), 570 and were even victimizing the people of the Six Nations
reserve. 571 Some non-Native residents even claimed that the Natives on the site were paid
“professional protesters” (Haudenosuanee Confederacy, 2007), 572 or at least a “ragtag bunch of
activists who are acting like bullies” (Blizzard, 2006; Dreschel, 2006. See also: Best, 2006g),
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The full context of this quote is as follows:
"We've been here all day and (the protesters) have done nothing wrong," said one
woman who asked not to be named.
She said she was disgusted by stories she heard of police raiding the compound early
Thursday morning, allegedly using Tasers and tear gas to subdue the crowd.
"I'm embarrassed to be Canadian right now," she said, and added she was horrified to
hear one woman matter-of-factly ask, "Have (the police) shot them all yet?"
570
“[T]he protesers do not represent Six Nations. Many of the most vocal are from reserves
miles away from here.”
571
“They’re being victimized, because, like he says to me, it’s the Mohawks who don’t even live
here that are causing all the trouble. If the people on the reserve start to speak out, they’ve been
threatened with violence, they’ll be beat up, they’ll be assaulted. They’ll even go to the point
where you know they’ll burn –I’ve heard that they’ll burn their homes down with them in it”
(Interviews with non-Native residents, February-June, 2009).
572
For example, one sign shown in the cited video spun off from a credit card commercial:
“Imported professional protesters: $400/week; 1 OPP Constable: $1330/week; The value of our
kid’s safety and peace in our community: PRICELESS! Open the Roads.”
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and a bunch of terrorists “holding us hostage” and seeking war (Autonomy & Solidarity, 2009).
As residents remarked in one video:
“It’s a terrorist attack. That’s what it is. They’re holding us hostage,” stated one
non-Native resident at an anti-protest rally. “You know what, this would not
happen in the United States. They wouldn’t put up with this shit there, you know
what I mean? It’s a terrorist attack on us. And you know what, it’s not our
problem, it’s the frigging government that has to step in here and clean up this
shit… It’s got nothing to do with Caledonia, just get out there and clean up the
crap.” (Autonomy & Solidarity, 2009)
And:
“They’re not leaving. They want war… They want war.” (Autonomy &
Solidarity, 2009)
Other residents complained angrily about “the bloodshed protesters seem so eager to see happen”
(Thompson, 2006a). According to this narrative, then, since Native protesters were not peaceful,
and even wanted violence and war, this is what they should get. Thus, in perhaps the only time
that non-Native residents opposed to the protest sought to give to Native people something they
allegedly wanted, these residents advocated just this (see above examples). As terrorists, bullies,
anarchists, and criminals, it was clear to non-Native residents (as it generally is to White
Westerners) that absolutely no negotiations should take place with those who disagree with them,
and this sentiment that was repeated again and again in only slightly varied ways, such as asking
for George Bush or US intervention, or demanding: “No negotiations or discussions should be
made with disrupters of the peace”(Huges, 2006) and: “Negotiating with criminals not only gives
legitimacy to their false claims but also will encourage future illegal acts”(Thompson, 2006b; see
also: Meyer, 2006) 573

573

According to this last source: “ If you give in to bullying and intimidation it does not stop. …
The intimidation and bullying of law-abiding citizens and businesses is not acceptable.”
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According to non-Native residents, negotiations were not possible anyway, because the
Haudenosaunee people allegedly couldn’t get along with each other and couldn’t effectively
govern themselves because they had no idea who was in charge or because “the unruly
individualism of their spiritual ancestors” that was living on in the present was yet merely “a
convenient excuse for pure anarchy” (Jackson, 2006b; Dreschel, 2006). 574 Further, the
Haudenosaunee community couldn’t competently manage the land they had (Jackson, 2006a;
Stoneman, 2006). 575 Thus, as this anti-protest narrative went, “no matter who owns the
land”(Mark Vandermaas, quoted in vidkid1983, 2007) it would not be “a viable solution” to turn
the land “over to protesters, or even leave it vacant” (Meyer, 2006) (because this was not what
non-Natives wanted to do). The insistence on not negotiating also played upon illusionary
wording that was intended to obscure the issue of land ownership altogether, such as by referring
to the land as “our land” or discounting the concept of land ownership altogether when
acknowledgement of the Haudenosaunee claim was unavoidable. For example, one non-Native
resident confronted with potential Haudenosaunee ownership of the land quickly dismissed this
possibility by referring to the land as everyone’s land: “It’s all our land… we’re all human
beings, we all live on this earth. How the hell can they said it’s their land… I’m just as native to
this land as they are. I was born and raised on this land…” (Autonomy & Solidarity, 2006e). He
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The latter source asked rhetorically: “who do you try to strike a conclusive agreement with
when you’re dealing with a longhouse divided against itself?” The former source stated
ignorantly: “It sounds like natives on Six Nations have a hard enough time getting along
themselves. Between different tribes, a band council, confederacy council, a group of Mohawks,
the Haudenosaunee people, hereditary chiefs and clan mothers, no wonder they have no idea
who's in control.”
575
The first source was already quoted in an above section. The second source complained that:
“As Keepers of the Land you seem to have a lot of Smoke Shops and Strip Malls close to reserve
borders.”
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then quickly reverted back to assertions of non-Native ownership: “We’ll get our land back”
(Autonomy & Solidarity, 2006e).
Despite these persistent refusals of non-Native residents to acknowledge or deal with
reminders of the Haudenosaunee claims to ownership, according to the Local President of the
Steel Workers Union in Hamilton, non-Native residents of Caledonia knew when they purchased
their homes that the Haudenosaunee claimed ownership of the land:
[I]t turns out that all of the residents of Caledonia know that there’s an issue of a
land dispute. Like, 20-30 years ago, the reason you could buy houses cheaply in
Caledonia was because you weren’t really sure if you owned the land or not. So, it
turns out everyone in Caledonia knows that. And, uh, they may not have liked it,
but they know that this is the six miles on each side of the Grand River, they knew
that. (Ralph Gerstenberger, quoted in Autonomy & Solidarity, 2006f)
Years later, when confronted with the claim they had known about all along, the only response of
non-Native residents was to demand that their government “come in, bring in the army and clean
it up” because no other, less violent solution was allegedly possible (Carol Van Imp, quoted in
Edwards & Gombu, 2006; see also: Howatt, 2006).
Such sentiments were widely-expressed at the anti-protest rallies, where non-Native residents,
waving Canadian flags and demanding the forceful intervention of the army, became
increasingly vocal of their anger and willing to engage in violence. In some cases this violence
was taken out on police officers, as non-Native residents demanding “law and order” jumped on
police cars or threw punches at police officers (Autonomy & Solidarity, 2006i). 576 Non-Native
anger was also directed at other non-Native people who supported the protest. Some of these
non-Native supporters of the protest were called traitors, “Indian lovers,” or other racial slurs.
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Talking about a previous rally, one non-Native resident noted nonchalantly: “[I]t was just
mostly townspeople getting a little bit rowdy, just crossing that yellow tape, and nothing really
happened –a couple people threw a couple punches at a couple police officers, but it was nothing
totally out of control.”
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They were also subjected to loud accusations about their sex lives (such as speculation that the
person must be “fucking an Indian”), and to verbal and physical threats and intimidation and
outright physical assaults (Interviews, 2009; Autonomy & Solidarity, 2006g, 2006h, 2006d). In
fact, non-Native residents who opposed the protest were apparently so angered by the existence
of non-Native support for the protest that they spoke in anti-protest meetings about finding the
homes of people who had supported or given money to the protesters in order to do damage to
the homes or physically intimidate and threaten them into ending their support activities
(Interviews, 2009; Autonomy & Solidarity, 2006h). As a result, at least some of these local nonNative residents experienced various low-level attacks on their homes, as well as verbal and
physical assaults on the street (Interviews, 2009; Autonomy & Solidarity, 2006h). Yet,
according to those committing the attacks, the Native protesters were the ones who were thugs
and bullies, and non-Natives opposed to the protest were the ones who should not give in to
intimidation and threats. Or, at least, this was the version of the world that these non-Natives
engaged in projection, scapegoating and a complete lack of critical self-reflection chose to
create.
Similarly, non-Native residents who were upset with the lack of police force, frequently
suggested taking matters into their own hands, and clearing the Native protesters off the site
themselves --either with permission of the police:
You know this is just going to escalate. You’re gonna bring people from all over
the province. You guys can’t do your jobs? Give your job up, hand your arms
over to us, we’ll take care of it. (Non-Native resident shown in Haudenosaunee
Confederacy, 2007)
Or without this permission:
"Come on," said one instigator carrying a large Canadian Flag at the end of the
rally. "There's 1,500 of us, let's go over there and get them out ourselves if the
OPP can't do it." (Non-Native resident quoted in Windle, 2006c)
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In some cases they appear to have had partial permission from the police to escalate their angry
anti-protest and anti-Native rhetoric to action. For example, according to one non-Native resident
living near the protest site, the OPP gave him permission to arm himself (Autonomy &
Solidarity, 2006d). Other residents, particularly in the neighborhood closest to the protest site,
did just this, lining their back fences with Molotov cocktails that were ready to light and throw at
Native protesters, cleaning large gun collections openly in their backyards to intimidate
protesters (Interviews, 2009) and even making plans to have guns shipped in from Hamilton or
elsewhere in the event that the “shit hit the fan” and non-Natives needed to fight a race war with
Native protesters/people (Interviews, 2009).

Chapter Conclusion
Non-Native residents who were vehemently opposed to the protest expected to see a symbolic
enactment of Canadian social relations of domination through a quick, forceful end to the
Haudenosaunee protest. These expectations were reinforced by the rhetoric government officials
and local authorities employed, which dismissed entirely the Haudenosaunee grievances and,
along with policy practices, authorized and routinized the targeting of Haudenosaunee protesters/
people for dehumanization and attack (see chapter 4). When the expected symbolic enactment
did not occur, residents who were most vehemently opposed to the protest were faced with a
number of uncomfortable and even intolerable emotions that bubbled up from their
subconscious. Those most unwilling or unable to face or tolerate these emotions dissociated
from their emotions and projected them onto Native protesters and Native people in general, who
had long been identified as “fair game” for targeted attacks in Canadian society. By dissociating
from their own socially-unacceptable thoughts and behaviors, and from the root of the emotions
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they experienced, and by projecting their guilt, aggression, and moral impurities onto Native
protesters, non-Native residents psychopathologically discarded aspects of themselves through
projective identifications. These projective identifications allowed the most angry non-Native
residents to view themselves as morally pure victims, and thus to feel justified in their rage and
hate-filled rhetorical attacks on the Native protesters and Native people more generally. The
resulting feelings of justification and “victimization” led many of these residents to begin taking
matters into their own hands --playing off the rhetoric by government and local authorities and
further engaging in their own, collective forms of authorization, routinization and
dehumanization. All of these activities set the stage for the various instances of attempted and/or
actualized, racialized violent aggression that followed.
Thus, through this imagined, attempted, or actualized aggression and violence, local nonNative residents appear to have been seeking to compensate for feelings of, on the one hand,
guilt, fear, anxiety and paranoia and, on the other hand, powerlessness, loss of identity, and
threats to their cultural worldview/ self-esteem. This imagined, attempted, and/or actualized
aggression and violence provided non-Native residents with the illusion that they were in control
(Kelman, 1973: 58; Litowitz, 2000), 577 and thus was a way for many non-Native residents to
attempt to reclaim and/or defend their privilege. Yet, though these dissociations and projective
identifications allowed non-Native residents to hide from themselves their guilt, complicity and
criminality in the ongoing dispossession of the Haudenosaunee (and other Native) people, they
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As Kelman noted: “Both regimentation and oppression create a feeling of powerlessness, a
loss of personal agency, a deprivation of the sense of identity. Violence can offer a person the
illusion that he is in control, that he is able to act on his environment, that he has found a means
of self-expression. It may be the only way left to him to regain some semblance of identity, to
convince himself that he really exists. The sad irony is that violence is a response to
dehumanization that only deepens the loss that it seeks to undo; it is an attempt to regain one’s
sense of identity by further destroying one’s sense of community.”
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did not hide much of this from the casual outside observer. Or, at least, they did not hide any of
this from those who have not been indoctrinated into the Canadian status quo, which sees Native
people as permanent “fair game” for attack in Canadian society, and treats Native peoples as
permanently “in the way” of government and other authorities’ pursuit of policy objectives –i.e.,
of “progress”-- such as the accumulation of capital from the theft of Native lands and resources.
To these latter observers, non-Native residents who were most actively opposed to the
Haudenosaunee protest, and who made up at least 20-30% of the small town of 10,000 residents,
frequently behaved in ways that were much more reflective of the accusations they hurled
towards Haudenosaunee protesters than the protesters did themselves.
This chapter has focused on the patterns of thought and behavior exhibited by large numbers
of non-Native residents in Caledonia during the first two months of the 2006 Haudenosaunee
protest, and while many of these patterns of thought and behavior are rather reprehensible, the
non-Native residents of Caledonia and surrounding areas cannot bear the weight of this
reprehensibility alone. As others have noted (see chapter 4), the conditions for the production of
atrocities rely upon government policies and practices to authorize and routinize the targeting
and dehumanization of particular groups in society (Kelman, 1973; Lifton, 1975; Kakel, 2011).
As chapter 2 has attempted to demonstrate, the existence of conditions for the production of
atrocities is an inherent part of Western society. This society and its cultural worldview have
been built upon more than a millennium of societal trauma and atrocities that have yet to be
acknowledged and examined, and form which Western society has yet to heal. These traumas
and atrocities, and the psychopathological responses coping mechanisms that accompany them,
are not only integral parts of Western society and the Western cultural worldview, but comprise
the foundation upon which these have been built. As such, it should be little surprise that these
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patterns of psychopathological thinking and behavior are reproduced and reenacted daily in the
behaviors of large portions of the individual, group, and national members of Western society
and/or adherents to the Western cultural worldview. Non-Native residents in Caledonia are mere
products of this society, socialized into their patterns of thought and behavior throughout their
lifetimes. In other words, the:
psychogenesis of the adult makeup in civilized society cannot, therefore, be
understood if considered independently of the sociogenesis of our ‘civilization’.
By a kind of basic ‘sociogenetic law’ the individual, in his short history, passes
once more through some of the processes that his society has traversed in its long
history. (P. 42).
As I have argued elsewhere in this chapter and in this dissertation, it is not the people in
Western society who are psychopathological, it is the society itself, and the patterns of thinking
and behavior that it instills in each and every individual and group within reach of its socializing/
“civilizing” processes. This is not to say that non-Native residents who engaged in the abovediscussed behaviors are not individually responsible for their behaviors. They definitely are.
And as also mentioned above, all non-Native residents in Caledonia were exposed to Western
socializing/ “civilizing” processes, and were exposed to the same levels of government and
authority-promoted authorization, routinization and dehumanization targeting Native people.
Yet, many non-Native residents chose to follow a different path, either supporting the protest to
greater or lesser extents, remaining neutral, or simply remaining silent and refraining from
(public) participation in the behaviors described in this chapter. Thus, despite the very valid
observations on hegemony and the near futility of resisting it (see for example, Litowitz, 2000;
Kennedy, 11982; Gramsci, 1971; Foucault, 1995; and perhaps also: Horkheimer, 1996;
Horkheimer & Adorno, 1997; Marcuse, 1964), resistance is always thinkable, if one is willing to
think. Part of the problem is, as John Trudell (2003) has frequently pointed out, independent
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thinking is somewhat of an anomaly in Western society, 578 which has long valued obedience to
authority and conformity to social expectations over the individuality it so prides itself on
(supposedly) characterizing (see chapters 2 and 4, as well as: Kelman, 1973: 41; Haney &
Zimbardo, 1973a & 1973b; Milgram, 1974; Fussell, 1992; Bourdieu, 1986).
Of course, none of this is stated to suggest that when residents exaggerated, fabricated,
twisted and manipulated facts and arguments to justify their anti-Native positions and actions,
they could not help themselves. As pointed out in this chapter, the other part of the problem is
that these 2,000-3,000 non-Native residents chose to engage in the behaviors that they did
because they consciously or unconsciously wanted to defend the financial and/or social
privileges that they enjoyed at the expense of Native peoples (and defend these by virtually any
means necessary). However, when they made this choice, they did so according to the status quo
patterns of thinking and behavior of the society in which they live. For these residents, for a
number of reasons discussed in this chapter, following this status quo, however
psychopathological it is, demonstrated not only self-interest, but obedience within and
conformity to the norms of Western society. In this context, it was neither the opposition to
hearing Haudenosaunee grievances or the racism against Native people that was abonormal, nor
was the silence of the vast majority of residents abnormal. Rather, the assertive challenge to the
colonial status quo of ongoing dispossession of Native peoples from their lands, resources and
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Particularly in modern Western society, we are constantly bombarded with information, much
of which tells us we are inadequate so that we will buy products or fashions in an attempt to
(temporarily) alleviate our alleged inadequacies. In this environment, many people prefer to
conform to the external and arbitrary standards of fashion and society over thinking and being
true to oneself (or even knowing oneself). While they do this, they often have the illusion of
expressing themselves individually, but most often this is through consumption of goods already
mass-manufactured and marketed for the purpose of making the masses feel their purchase
represents their “individuality” (See also: Horkheimer, 1996; Horkheimer & Adorno, 1997;
Marcuse, 1964).
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human rights was incredibly “abnormal,” as was the support that trickled in from sympathetic
non-Natives living near and far from the protest site. By assertively challenging their ongoing
colonial dispossession, Native protesters were challenging the very foundations of Western
society and the Western cultural worldview, and non-Native residents who responded angrily to
these challenges were seeking to preserve and protect that foundation from crumbling before
their eyes. The fact that the latter saw themselves as patriotic heroes, and as the real Canadians
who would fight to the end for “their” country by forcing “lesser” others to know their place, is
far more representative of the psychopathological values of Western society as a whole than it is
of any individually-based psychopathology.
At the same time, though 20-30% of the people in this small town of 10,000 residents
publicly participated at least some of the anti-protest/anti-Native activities, many non-Native
residents were supportive of the protest. Those who supported the Native protesters did so
because they saw the common collective humanity that all people share. They were able to
engaged in critical self-reflection, to put themselves in the place of “the other” (see for example,
Mead, 1962). As such, they were able to feel sympathy and empathy for others, and to hear the
grievances of others without feeling overwhelmed by the threat of destruction (of themselves,
their self-esteem, or their cultural worldview) (Lifton, 1975 & 2002). In other words, they had
not dehumanized themselves and others to the extent that they were no longer capable of acting
as moral beings (Kelman, 1973). As such, they sought to be honest with themselves about what
is just and what is unjust, and they sought to speak and/or act out this truth in their behaviors
despite the norms of the society in which they live. Perhaps one could say that they interpreted
the Liberal rhetoric of universality in ways that the Western cultural worldview never fully
intended, interpreting an inclusive, justice-driven universality that is far more reflective of the
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collective, communal ideas of Native cultural traditions, such as Haudenosuanee Great Law of
Peace. John Mohawk (2008) summarizes part of this non-Western universalistic ideal as the
essential understanding that justice cannot be achieved until everyone’s interests are included:
The pursuit of peace is not merely the pursuit of the absence of violence. Peace is
never achieved until justice is achieved. And justice is not achieved until
everyone’s interests are addressed. You can’t achieve peace unless it is
accomplished by a constant striving to address the issues of justice.
Of course, some would argue that addressing everyone’s interests is nice in theory but
impractical and impossible in reality, because it takes a considerable amount of time and effort,
and is messy, difficult, and sometimes painful. It also requires that the interests of the privileged,
dominating few are put at par with the interests of the masses, and that the ongoing accumulation
through dispossession, which has characterized Western society from perhaps its inception, ends.
So unappealing is this non-Western universalism to holders of Western wealth and privilege that
the founding fathers of the United States self-interestedly concluded that it could never ‘work’.
These founding fathers, like many other Western governments, instead chose of model of
representative democracy, which originally limited the vote or the ability to represent anyone to
White, Protestant, property-owning males with ancestry from certain European countries. But
this type of thinking and structuring of society is destroying the planet, and has been destroying
other life forms, other human cultures, and other ways of structuring society for too long.
Westerners have long forgotten how to be part of self-governing, inclusive communities that
flourish from out individual strengths, interests and abilities and have instead become passive
and dependent upon distant, dishonest, and self-interested government representatives who are
more interested in pleasing their corporate partners’ drive for capital accumulation than the
pursuit of justice or the defense of the moral (and legal) rights of the vast majority of human
beings not only within their districts but on the planet. The psychopathology of Western society,
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thus, really is like a disease or a cancer that is consuming everything last living thing and
destroying its host in the process. As a result, our entire planet now suffers form a sickness it
may not be able to overcome before or until plant and animal and human life have been
extinguished. This sickness only continues to worsen daily because of Western obedience,
conformity, complacency, and complicity in it, which has left no room in our worldview or
imaginations for alternatives to our present, dominating and monoculture that destroys
alternatives and smashes dissent from within and without Western society.
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Conclusion
How to live in this life? is the real question we all face. All other subjects are
insignificant when compared to this one.
~ Forbes 2008, xxi
Despite the rhetoric of government officials, local authorities and many non-Native residents, the
Haudenosaunee were correct in their assertions about their land. Neither the Canadian nor
Ontario government has ever been able to produce documentation demonstrating that the lands
under protest in 2006 were legally surrendered. Lacking evidence of legal title to the land,
government officials launched a public relations campaign to discredit the Haudenosaunee
protesters and their traditional government. This campaign characterized the protesters and their
government as a “radical faction” that acted impulsively and irresponsibly and that allegedly
used misinformation or fabricated claims to justify the 2006 protest. In fact, these
characterizations more accurately represented the behavior of the government officials who
employed them. They also more accurately represented the behavior of non-government
authority figures and the non-Native residents who most vehemently opposed the protest. The
use of such characterizations further reflect a long-standing pattern in Canada of authorizing and
routinizing the targeting of Native peoples as “fair game” for attack in the pursuit of policy
objectives that benefit government, its corporate partners, and virtually all non-Native people to
some extent.
The ongoing perpetration of atrocities against Native peoples in Canada is not an aberrant
phenomenon in Western society, but is part of the foundation on which this society has been
built and continues to operate. Thus, the problematic patterns of thought and behavior displayed
by government officials, local authorities, and non-Native residents during the 2006
Haudenosaunee protest are part and parcel of the same patterns of oppression and destruction
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that devastated the European masses and their collective communities in the Middle Ages and
that continue to destroy communities and dispossess peoples around the globe. The European
masses that had once fought so bitterly against these forces of destruction eventually became so
pacified, tamed, and “civilized” as to embrace the imposed social relations of domination –and to
be wholly unconcerned with the death and destruction wrought by their society upon other
peoples and life forms in the world. As numerous scholars have stated, the failure to feel sadness
or compassion for those who are victimized is a form of sickness, reflecting one’s
dehumanization of oneself. The acceptance of this dehumanization, and its imposition upon
others, only speaks to the power of the devastation and trauma wrought by this society and its
cultural worldview on its own members, as well as other peoples and life forms.
Though Western society continues to justify itself and its foundational behaviors in the name
of “progress,” “civilization,” and other forms of Western arrogance and delusion, many nonWestern cultures have long viewed Western society as a predatory and destructive form of
disease that has sought to spread its unhealthy monoculture over the entire planet, destroying
everything in its path. Unfortunately, these non-Westerners are far more accurate in their
assessment than many Westerners still care to admit. But today even growing numbers of
“civilized” Westerners are beginning to question the value of their society’s constant quest for
accumulation, which has destroyed large potions of the planet for human habitation, has forced a
mass extinction of life forms, and has posed an increasingly serious threat to the future existence
of all life on the planet.
Some of the contributions that I hope this dissertation has made to academic literature
include, first of all, an understanding of the various issues involved in the 2006 Haudenosuanee
protest, of the Canadian government’s policies towards indigenous peoples within the
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geographical borders of Canada, and of the legal and historical issues surrounding this protest,
including international law as it relates to the rights of indigenous peoples. Further, this
dissertation has provided a framework for identifying problematic patterns of thought and
behavior in Western society, and for understanding the historical origins and present-day
perpetuations of these problematic patterns. This framework may contribute to the literatures of
cultural studies, and historic sociology, as well as comparative cultural studies, through the
comparison and contrast of the Western cultural worldview with non-Western, indigenous
cultural worldviews. This dissertation has also proposed a theory and framework for the study of
transgenerational societal trauma including through examples of the ways that unresolved trauma
is perpetuated, reproduced, and reenacted anew by Westerners upon themselves and other
Westerners, as well as upon non-Western peoples and other living things. The examination of
the psychopathological nature of some forms of unresolved trauma makes a contribution to the
trauma literature, particularly the small but slowly growing literature on societal trauma, as well
as the small but growing literature on healing traumatized societies.
This dissertation also forges an understanding of many of the psychological and sociological
dynamics present in settler colonial societies, including the failure of these societies and their
members to see themselves as complicity in the perpetuation of the colonial oppression of
indigenous peoples. Additionally, by considering the various motivations and justifications
involved in racial, ethnic, cultural, national and, to a lesser extent, gendered assertions of
domination, this dissertation seeks to make a contribution to the literatures of settler colonial
studies, racial and ethnic studies, and interracial conflict. Finally, by contextualizing the ongoing
human rights violations (atrocities) in Canada within Western society’s historic cultural patterns
of thought and behavior, this dissertation seeks to contribute to the literature on atrocities and
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atrocity producing situations. Certainly a number of other scholars have also examined the
linkages between historic, unresolved trauma and, for example, the rise of fascism in Nazi
Germany (see chapter 4 or Appendix 2). So this part of the dissertation builds upon ideas
already expressed in the clinical trauma and other literatures and adds to them with an
examination of historical trauma which goes much further back in time than these other studies
have. This portion of the dissertation also adds to the already substantial body of literature
concerned with unquestioned obedience to authority, by tracing these patterns far back in time in
Western society, and relying on Sociological theories (such as Elias’ theory on the Civilizing
Process) to offer some additional, underlying explanations for this phenomenon.
TOWARDS A THEORY OF SOCIAL JUSTICE
Those not familiar with settler colonialism literature may have some concerns over, or questions
regarding my decision to focus on non-Native government and resident responses to the protest,
as opposed to focusing on examining Haudenosaunee society and reasons for Haudenosaunee
protest. Within the context of settler colonialism literature, this is an entirely legitimate line of
inquiry. Outside of the realm of settler colonial studies, the most useful analogy I can think of at
present would be socio-historical studies of slavery in the US south. There are probably very
few academics today who would insist that someone studying slavery in pre-civil war south, or
even Jim Crow segregation in the post-civil war south, needs to look equally at “all sides.” Few
people today would sympathetically consider and defend the decisions of slaveholders to hold
slaves, or of policy makers to justify slaveholding. Those who do will face harsh criticisms of
white supremacy and racial bias. Further, it is not very difficult to understand why slaves would
want to revolt, and their decisions to do so, while interesting in the numerous factors involved,
are rarely the focus of inquiry. Rather, what academics study, and what still desperately needs to
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be explained, is how and why some human beings decided that it was okay to enslave and own
as property other human beings, and how and why the first group justified and perpetuated this
practice for several centuries (or how and why the first group vehemently opposed and resisted
the end of slavery and/or the end of segregation).
Likewise, when studying the ongoing colonial oppression of indigenous peoples who are
surrounded by settler colonial societies, what desperately needs to be understood is not so much
why indigenous peoples occasionally chose to protest against their ongoing colonial
dispossession, but how and why the present society, and its members, justifies and perpetuates
this ongoing dispossession. As such, insistence that a student of settler colonialism must look
with equal sympathy upon “all sides” in a conflict between indigenous peoples and the settler
colonial societies that oppress them is racially, culturally, and nationally charged, and ignores the
fact that relations among all sides are far from equal. Just as there was with slavery in the US
south, there actually is an objectively moral right and wrong on this issue. But just like historic
writers such as Toqueville, many living within settler colonial states today have not yet come to
see it. Fortunately, international human rights law, created long ago by developing Western
“nation-states,” has not remained constrained by the Western mentality and continues to
increasingly recognize the inherent and wide-ranging rights of indigenous peoples worldwide,
with the support of the majority of nation-states in the world. For this reason, I suggest that,
while there probably won’t be a civil war to end ongoing colonial oppressions of indigenous
peoples in settler colonial states, this colonial oppression will be ended eventually, and will one
day be looked back upon as another horrifying chapter in human history that is finally clearly
seen as morally wrong. I ask readers to consider this, as they form reactions to the dissertation,
and consider their position in this history.
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Sociologists who spend an entire book or dissertation criticizing something are generally
expected to provide some sort of social policy prescriptions. Once we know what is wrong with
something, we become far more interested in the solution(s) than the criticisms. So to this extent,
I want to offer some “social policy prescriptions” here, though in this particular case “social
policy prescriptions” is not really the correct term. This is because, in Western society, the
concept of social policy generally implies top-down decisions that are made by a handful of
people who then impose these decisions upon the rest of society. Particularly when there are
negative consequences to these policy decisions, those doing the imposing are often not,
themselves, impacted. Of course, this procedure fits snuggly into the norm of Western society
and the Western cultural worldview, but it is exactly this society and cultural worldview, with its
top-down way of adversely impacting the lives of Westerners and non-Westerners alike, that has
been problematized in this dissertation. Thus, something other than prescriptions of the “social
policy” sort is in order. There is much more than can be said than is said here. Below are just
some general ideas of where things need to go now. A fuller discussion of these ideas will have
to be reserved for a future work.
Though this is, in part, a dissertation about a Native land claim in Ontario, Canada, the
psychopathological patterns of thinking and behaving which have been examined in this
dissertation have an impact far beyond Ontario, Canada. For this reason, even those who are
alienated from themselves and their ability to feel compassion for others should be concerned
about what happens to the Haudenosaunee in Ontario, as well as all people(s) and all life forms
around the globe. The issues discussed in this dissertation impact all of the people and living
things on the planet, and continue only to the detriment of us all.
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To this extent, all people have a responsibility to act now, in whatever fashion possible, to
stop the mounting destruction spurred on by the psychopathological patterns and processes
inherent in Western society. Members of Western society have a particularly large and urgent
responsibility. As members of a society that has perpetrated and that continues to perpetrate
horrible wrongs against other peoples, life forms, and the planet, members of Western society
have been the prime beneficiaries of these destructive processes and have a moral responsibility,
to themselves and all other peoples and life forms, to act to stop this destruction from within the
society that is perpetrating it. Part of this moral responsibility to end this destruction includes the
responsibility to heal ourselves collectively and individually from the past societal, group and
individual traumas that have been inflicted upon us during our lifetimes and that have been
passed down to us through the generations. Both our healing as Westerners and our imperative
transformation from destructive ways of living to a healthy society require that we rediscover our
own humanity and our connections to others and to the world around us, that we regain our
ability to act in the world as moral beings, and that we reconstruct new communities and
identities in ways that nurture and heal rather than oppress and destroy. 579
Key to succeeding in these endeavors is our ability to rediscover and reclaim our selfdetermination, as individuals and communities. In this area we owe a great debt to the
indigenous peoples of the world who have worked long and hard to wrench the international
legal concept of self-determination away from the realm of exclusive state-centric thinking and
acting. Numerous developments in international human rights law over the last few decades
have advanced an international recognition that the right to self-determination applies not only to
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On these being requirements for healing from trauma, see: Kelman (1973); McFarlane & van
der Kolk (2006), Egendorf (1975: 123), Hutchinson & Bleiker (2008: 395), Bar-On et al. (1998:
395), Hardtmann (1998); Korn (2002: 9), and so on.
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“nations” of people who are governed by hierarchical, dominating “nation-state” governments,
but also to indigenous peoples and their traditional forms of self-organization and selfgovernance. While most non-indigenous peoples still do not have an internationally-recognized
right to self-determination outside of the Western-style nation-state system, our ability to achieve
this in the future, and to recognize self-determination for a broad range of non-state-centric
social organizational forms can only be strengthened when we support and promote the selfdetermination rights of indigenous peoples around the world.
We also need to recognize that, while self-determination is a form of independence, one of its
most important aspects is the acknowledgement and advancement of our collective
interdependence with all other peoples, both within our own local communities and between
these communities and all other Western and non-Western communities. Indeed, as
Haudenosaunee and other indigenous cultures have long taught, all peoples and all life forms
have an equal right to what they need to survive and to share in the natural world that belongs
equally to all of us. If we truly want healthy, non-pathological communities and cultures, we
need adopt non-Western conceptions of universal justice and sovereignty, which not only
recognize these inherent rights of all people(s) and living things, but that also require active
striving for the fulfillment of these rights. Westerners can only hope to begin moving in this
direction if we abandon our insecure and arrogant need to feel superior to all other peoples and
living things. Westerners need to humble ourselves and to begin the process of critical selfreflection, which requires really listening to and learning from the vast accumulated wisdom of
non-Western peoples around the world. In particular, we need to listen to and learn from the
indigenous peoples around the world whose traditional cultures contain much of the antidote
Western society so desperately needs to save itself from itself. These very indigenous peoples
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have been leading the struggle against Western society’s psychopathological destruction from
their earliest encounters with it, many centuries before even the most observant Westerners
recognized it for what it is, and they have managed to survive and maintain their indigenous
identities and cultures despite several hundred years of plunder, pillage, enslavement, genocide,
and colonialism. These are, indeed, cultures containing far more wisdom than Western society
can claim to have. Thus, the pathway to our liberation lies in our ability to look beyond the
Western monocultural, hierarchical domination that has robbed us of healthy cultures and caring
communities and has alienated us from aspects of ourselves, including our shared humanity.
Though rebuilding our communities in the image of participatory, self-governing, and even
self-sufficient entities is time consuming and difficult work, particularly now when so many
people are suffering from so much past and present trauma, we have few other choices if we
want our children and grand children to have an environment that can actually sustain life. The
alternative, as many Westerners are beginning to learn, is simply not sustainable for life on the
planet. Westerners, tamed and “civilized” into their own alienation and oppression, have long
benefited from the “civilization” (traumatization and domination) of other peoples and life
forms. But just as unresolved trauma is perpetuated and reproduced in various forms, multiplying
the pain and destruction suffered through the generations, traumatized Western society’s
psychopathological obsession with accumulation through dispossession will be (and is) always
eventually turned back upon the Western masses and non-elites. What we do or allow to be done
to other people really is, now and in the future, reenacted upon ourselves.
I’d like to end with two quotes, the first of which illustrates, in part, the sentiments of this last
point.
I’m the one who has seen all the genocide first hand
They couldn’t cheat me fast enough to take what I had
And now they build their trophy houses right on top of my grave
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If they have no honor, let me have no shame
And don’t forget about me
I’m the voice singing in your head
And don’t forget about me
I’ve told the stories that you’ve had
Don’t forget about me
Take notice of all they do
Cause if they do it to me
Who’s to say they won’t do it to you?
(Bucher 2007)
And finally, in the words of my dearest friend Dehatkadons Arnie General, “That is all, for
now.”
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Appendix I
March 27th, Confederacy
Letter to Michael Coyle, and
April 12 suggestions in
negotiations
Moratorium on development on lands under
claim until there is a broader resolution of
Six Nations land rights
Resolve among all Crown agents to not
criminalize the actions of Six Nations
protesters

An end to the self-dealing, and the
elimination of the Indian Act (Band) Council
on all issues related to Six Nations lands.

April 12, Band Council Chief
David General's Proposal ("A
Way Forward: Dissolving the
DCE Blockade").

April 17th "Joint Offer for a
New Understanding Among
Six Nations[,] Canada and
Ontario."
Haldimand County will maintain some
agricultural lands between Caledonia and SN

OPP: Limit efforts to maintenance of peace,
public safety and law and order. Band
Council: Intervene on behalf of "John and
Jane Doe" who cause no problems during
the exit from the DCE.
Confederacy: Provide cleansing for Six
Nations territory through a reading of the
Great Law; Explore governance issues with
the Band Council. Band Council:
Acknowledge role of traditional government
and explore governance options for the Six
Nations Grand River Territory.
Canada should reinstate funding for Six
Nations Band Council to research land claims
Canada should help to fund the Six Miles
Deep educational campaign
Canada: Commit to discussions on
remaining claims that could involve land

Ontario: Reopen discussions on 30 parcels
of land previously discussed;
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Canada: Will provide funding for Band
Council and Confederacy Council to discuss
governance of community, in order to move
forward on other initiatives relating to the
past and future of the Haldimand Tract.

Canada commits to re-instate funding to SN
for research into land and resource claims
Canada and Ontario commit to providing
funding for the public education campaign
Canada and Ontario commit to further
accelerating process to resolve SN claims,
through negotiations with Band Council on
two previously agreed to claims. Canada
commits to fast-track some land claims,
resulting in settlement payments, if ratified
by community [[through voting process
determined by Canada]]. Canada commits
to facilitating the addition to reserve lands
that Six Nations acquires over time.
Ontario agrees to reopen discussions on
these 30 parcels of unsold, surrendered
lands

Ontario: Begin a discussion of all claim lands
that are currently owned by the province
and administered by the Ontario Realty
Corporation.

Band Council: Create a Land Development
Unit to process Impact Benefit Agreements
(IBA) immediately. This unit should look at
encouraging involvement and capacity
development within traditional perspective
by employing qualified options for the
SNGRT. Canada: Encourage consultation
and accommodation with Six Nations by
provincial and municipal governments.
Haldimand: Begin discussion regarding
development on claimed land and seek all
opportunities to work out joint initiatives
that will be mutually beneficial to Six
Nations. Developers: Commit to coming to
the table with the Six Nations Land
Development Unit to discuss an Impact
Benefit Agreement.

Ontario has land holdings in the area of the
Six Nations reserve, notably the former
Burtch Correctional Facility, the south
Cayuga lands, and the Townsend land
assembly. In recognition of the
development pressures in the Haldimand
tract, and to help support the future
development of Six Nations, Ontario is
prepared to immediately start discussions
about how to make these lands available to
the community. Ontario proposes that any
lands made available pursuant to these
discussions would be credited or set off
against any lands transferred to any claims
settlement agreements. Ontario and
Canada would provide resources to assist
Six Nations in developing and maintaining
the capacity to assemble these and other
lands as they come into Six Nations hands
over time.
Canada and Ontario agree to work with the
SN to put into place appropriate measures
regarding the implications of SCC rulings,
and to have a continuing dialogue to discuss
the impact of development in the Haldimand
Tract and to gain an understanding of Six
Nations' views of its rights and interests in
respect to this development.

Light grey indicates that the item on the right seems to have been a very partial response to the item on the left.
Dark grey indicates that the item on the left was not addressed by any item on the right.
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Appendix 2
Trauma, the Individual and Society: An Overview of Trauma Theory
This appendix provides the reader with an overview of individual responses to trauma as
understood in the clinical literature. It also attempts to compile a basic working profile of
traumatized societies by examining the various ways in which some of the psychopathological
coping mechanisms discussed in chapter 2 come into being and come to be institutionalized in
societal behavior and cultural worldviews. This is a much-abbreviated discussion. In giving the
reader an overview of the dynamics of individual trauma, and in laying out a beginning working
profile of societal trauma, this appendix is expected to 1) demonstrate some of the
psychologically-acknowledged processes behind individual and societal trauma and 2) lay a
groundwork for the discussion of both: (a) Canadian government policies as they relate to
atrocity-producing situations (chapter 4), and (b) non-Native responses to the 2006
Haudenosaunee protest in the context of these government policies and of societal trauma
(chapter 6).
It should be emphasized that the various behaviors and psychological mechanism used to
psychopathological extremes described below are societal phenomena, and are specific to
Western society. Other societies may display some of these various patterns of thought and
behavior, but other societies have not been examined here, Western society has. Further, these
patterns of thought and behavior are quite useful in examining various conflicts and issues
displayed within Western society –particularly by dominant groups in Western society—but they
cannot be used to make generalizations about individuals.
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TRAUMA AND THE INDIVIDUAL
Traumatic experiences are those characterized by a sense of physical and psychological threat
that evokes extreme feelings of fear, terror, helplessness and loss of control that lie “outside the
range of ordinary emotional experience” (Herman, 1992: 42, see also 33). During the traumatic
event, these intense feelings overwhelm an individual’s (or society’s) mechanisms for selfprotection, self-defense, self-organization and coping (Herman, 1992: 34; van der Kolk &
McFarlane, 2006: 4). As they become overwhelmed during the traumatic event, an individual’s
component responses to danger become severed and fragmented, resulting in a temporary state of
psychological shock that is often characterized by some combination of disorganization,
confusion, immobilization, denial and/or dissociation (Williams, 1989: 75; Herman, 1992: 3435). These normal psychological defense mechanisms generally serve to protect an individual by
lessening the impact of the traumatic event (Goodwin, 1989: 10) and frequently resulting in
partial or total amnesia surrounding aspects of the traumatic event (van der Kolk & McFarlane,
2006: 10).
After experiencing a traumatic event, most people re-experience parts of the trauma through
involuntary repetitive memories of the event (van der Kolk & McFarlane, 2006: 5, 8), which may
be accompanied by anger, self-doubt and/or depression (Williams, 1989: 76). This repetitive
replaying of the memories, emotions and/ or sensations related to the traumatic event usually
helps people to modify and build a tolerance to these intense, trauma-related emotions, and to
eventually integrate these emotions, sensations and memories into the existing schemas that they
hold about themselves and the world around them (van der Kolk & McFarlane, 2006: 3, 5, 8;
Litz et al. 2009: 698). However, in a portion of people who experience traumatic events, these
overwhelming emotions, sensations, and memories cannot be properly modified, tolerated and/or
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integrated. Instead, they remain disorganized, fragmented, and disconnected from personal
schemas, and it is at this point that these overwhelming emotions, sensations, and memories
begin to “take on a life of their own” (Herman, 1992: 34, 35; van der Kolk & McFarlane, 2006:
8). Small reminders of the traumatic event can trigger sensory, emotional, visual flashbacks,
which in turn trigger biological/neurological responses as the person’s body reacts as if the
traumatic event is recurring (van der Kolk & McFarlane, 2006: 9-10, 13). 580
Over time, if the trauma and these reactions to it are not resolved, the trauma survivor can
become progressively sensitized to increasingly generalized environmental cues, or even to
normal physical sensations and internal emotional states (van der Kolk & McFarlane, 2006: 910, 13). This increased sensitization generally is accompanied by prolonged, repeated states of
hyperarousal in which a trauma survivor’s biological, neurological and psychological resources
become depleted (van der Kolk & McFarlane, 2006; 12) and the survivor loses the ability to
respond normally to non-trauma-related stimuli in the surrounding environment (Ibid: 12, 13).
Increased sensitization can also result in kindling, or neurological and biological changes that are
incredibly difficult to reverse (van der Kolk & McFarlane, 2006: 8, 9-10, 13; Korn, 1997: 5),
including changes in the size and functioning of certain brain structures, changes in “normal”
levels of certain hormones in the blood, and even changes at the RNA 581 level (van der Kolk et
al., 1997; Post et al., 1995; Post et al., 1998). These neurobiological changes and the increased
sensitization that accompanies them cause the traumatic memories to become more firmly
entrench in an individual’s mind, biology, and nervous system, making it difficult for a trauma
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For example, van der Kolk and McFarlane (2006: 10) refer to one firefighter who avoids
watches because these remind him of previous urgent calls in which he had only minutes to
respond (van der Kolk, 2006: 10).
581
RNA stands for Ribonucleic Acid, and is the genetic material that aids in cell reproduction
through binding with and transcribing cellular DNA.
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survivor to pay attention to internal and external stimuli that are not threatening or related to the
traumatic event, to sort out relevant from irrelevant stimuli, or “to define their needs, anticipate
how to meet them, and plan for appropriate action” without becoming distressed, overstimulated
and hyperaroused (van der Kolk & McFarlane, 2006: 14, 10, 13).
As the processes of sensitization and kindling cause a trauma survivor’s hyperaroused state to
become associated with an increasingly wide range of internal or external stimuli, the trauma
survivor begins seeking ways to numb his or her pain and avoid this state of hyperarousal. The
latter requires that the trauma survivor avoid an increasingly large range of daily experiences by
reorganizing his or her life around avoiding specific and more generalized triggers of the trauma
(van der Kolk & McFarlane, 2006: 6, 12), which prevents them from developing larger
“repertoires of neutral and pleasurable internal and environmental sensations” that could help
them to begin to reduce the disproportionate impact that past traumatic events continue to have
on their lives (van der Kolk & McFarlane, 2006: 10, 14, 12; Herman, 1992: 47). As their “inner
life and outer range of activity” become constricted even from neutral or potentially pleasurable
situations (Herman, 1992: 49; van der Kolk & McFarlane, 2006: 12), so does the range of
emotion that a trauma survivor allows him or herself to feel. Many survivors who are not in a
state of hyperarousal report feeling emotionally numb, even dead inside, and have difficulty
experiencing any feelings, including those of love or compassion for others (Herman, 1992: 4849; van der Kolk & McFarlane, 2006: 12; Goodwin, 1989: 10). Trauma survivors may further
exacerbate these problems through the extensive use of drugs, alcohol, and/or other forms of
sensation seeking to numb or cover over intense, painful emotions, sensations, and memories, all
of which lead to further withdrawal and detachment from the world (Williams, 1989: 79; van der
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Kolk & McFarlane, 2006: 12; Korn, 1997: 5). 582 Over time these avoidance and numbing
mechanisms lessen the frequency of intrusive reliving experiences and hyperaroused states, but
also lead to the maintenance of an “altered relationship with the self and others” and a distorted
sense of the world and reality, which is sometimes accompanied by magical thinking, and is
often mistaken as characteristics of a survivor’s personality, rather than symptoms of traumatic
stress disorder (van der Kolk & McFarlane, 2006: 16-17; Herman, 1992: 46-49).
Generally, trauma survivors who develop some form of chronic trauma stress disorder 583
alternate between states of isolated avoidance, numbing, depression and hopelessness, on the one
hand, and on the other hyperaroused states of intense anxiety, fear, anger, panic, restlessness,
exaggerated startle response and irritability, difficulty concentrating and processing information,
nightmares and sleep disturbances and intrusive memories, sensations and emotions relating to
the trauma (Williams, 1989: 77; van der Kolk & McFarlane, 2006: 13, 16-17; Herman, 1992: 1,
47, 56; Kon, 1997: 5). In this oscillation between intrusion/hyperarousal and
avoidance/numbing, the trauma survivor is both unable to process and integrate the traumatic
memories and to find a balance between these two extremes (Herman, 1992: 47). Further, this
constant oscillation can multiply a trauma survivor’s sense of unpredictability and helplessness
(Herman, 1992: 47) and leave him or her more sensitized and vulnerable to new traumas and/or
less able to cope with the accumulation of additional stress (Williams, 1989: 77-78; van der Kolk
& McFarlane, 2006: 9).
582

“THUS, many people with PTSD not only actively avoid emotional arousal, but experience a
progressive decline and withdrawal, in which any stimulation (whether it is potentially
pleasurable or aversive) provokes further detachment. To feel nothing seems to be better than
feeling irritable and upset” (van der Kolk & McFarlane, 2006: 12).
583
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders officially recognizes only a small
number of these, such as Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). PTSD represents only one
rather narrow range of symptom combinations, but there is a much broader range of ways in
which traumatized people respond to, and express, traumatic stress symptoms.
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Perhaps in an attempt to gain mastery over incredibly painful intrusive experiences, many
trauma survivors suffering form chronic forms of traumatic stress engage in various compulsive,
and often unconscious forms of re-exposure or reenactment of the trauma (van der Kolk &
McFarlane, 2006: 10-11; Herman, 1992: 39-42). Such reenactment or re-exposure can include
risk-taking, self-destructive behaviors and various forms of “acting out,” as well as behaviors
that involve harm to others, such as reenactments of the original trauma in which the survivor
takes the role of the perpetrator, creating new victims. Van der Kolk & McFarlane (2006: 10-11)
offer some examples of this sort of reenactment:
…combat soldiers may become mercenaries or join police swat teams; abused
women may be attracted to men who mistreat them; sexually molested children
may grow up to become prostitutes. Understanding this seemingly paradoxical
phenomenon is of critical importance, because it could help clarify many forms of
social deviance and interpersonal misery. Freud (1920/1955) thought that the aim
of such repetition is to gain mastery, but clinical experience shows that this rarely
happens; instead, repetition causes further suffering for the victims and for the
people around them. In this reenactment of the trauma, an individual may play the
role of either victimize or victim.
In some cases, this compulsive risk-taking, self-destructive, re-experiencing behavior can be
directly linked to feelings of guilt that many people who survive traumatic events carry with
them. 584 For example, Goodwin (1989: 11) has observed that many combat veterans racked with
guilt over their survival perpetually “set themselves up for hopeless physical fights with
insurmountable odds,” find themselves in repeated auto accidents, or donate blood compulsively.
Similarly, Williams (1989: 77) noted that trauma survivors often compulsively ruminate over
various alternate “if-only” scenarios of things that they could have done to prevent the trauma,
and Herman (1992: 53) noted that rape victims often do the same, blaming themselves for their
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Though this is not always the case, and other self-destructive behaviors also have links to
childhood traumas or “painful encounters with hostile caretakers during the first few years of
life” (van der Kolk & McFarlane, 2006: 11).
480

victimization, perhaps because imagining “that one could have done better may be more
tolerable than to face the reality of utter helplessness.”
Likewise, on the same theme of guilt, Litz et al. (2009) have found that traumatic experiences
often violate an individual’s most basic sense about him or herself and the world around him or
her. One common belief in liberal, individualistic-oriented Western society is the belief that the
world is just, that individuals control their own fates, and that bad things do not happen to good
people (Litz et al., 2009: 699; McFarlane & van der Kolk, 2006: 26, 28, 35; Devries, 2006: 399,
402). Thus, when people holding these beliefs are traumatized, they may experience intense
feelings of guilt, shame, confusion and self-blame for the traumas they experienced –feelings
which may be reinforced by unpredictable states of hyperarousal, including uncontrolled
expressions of anger.
Individual Vulnerability to Trauma
Though the study and awareness in Western society of psychological responses to traumatic
events has been characterized by “episodic amnesia” (Herman, 1992: 7), as well as episodic
attempts to link post traumatic reactions to individual weakness or predisposing factors, 585 the
fact remains that any one –including “people of the clearest intellect, strongest will, greatest
character, and highest critical power” can suffer from post traumatic reactions after surviving a
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Van der Kolk & McFarlane (2006: 6) have linked these attempts to the psychological “need to
deny that all people can be stressed beyond endurance,” noting:
When the issue of causation becomes a legitimate area of investigation, one is
inevitably confronted with issues of man’s inhumanity to man, with carelessness and
callousness, with abrogation or responsibility, with manipulation, and with failures to
protect. In short, the study of trauma confronts one with the best and worst in human
nature, and is bound to provoke a range of intense personal reactions in the people
involved.
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traumatic event (Herman, 206: 12, 3). 586 There is, however, both a broad range of traumatic
disorders and a broad range of traumatic experiences precipitating these disorders, and there are
a number of factors that influence who will suffer from various post-traumatic stress disorders
and how severely these people will suffer. Perhaps the most powerful of these factors would be
the nature of the traumatic event itself, and Herman (1992: 57) has argued that there is a “simple,
direct relationship between the severity of the trauma and its psychological impact, whether that
impact is measured in terms of the number of people affected or the intensity and duration of
harm.” Thus, while virtually everyone exposed to a traumatic event experiences some degree of
intrusive symptoms in the first few days, weeks, or months following the event, Herman (1992:
47-48) has suggested that many people who are exposed to a single traumatic event that is
relatively short in duration are less likely to develop post traumatic symptoms lasting more than
six months, though they may typically remain fearful and anxious for up to a year after the event.
However, such an estimated time frame for resolution of post-traumatic symptoms does not
apply to all survivors of all forms of trauma, and several studies of rape victims have
demonstrated that intrusive symptoms can sometimes persist for many years. 587
As the duration and intensity of the trauma increases, so does the duration and severity of
post-traumatic symptomatology, something demonstrated repeatedly in studies of combat
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Here Herman is quoting Bruer and Freud in their studies on what was then referred to as
hysteria (but is now recognized as a combination of symptoms frequently found in those
suffering from post-traumatic stress).
587
Herman (1992: 47-50) reports on a number of studies involving rape victims who were still
suffering from intrusive thoughts and fears a year later, 2-3 years later, and even 9 or more years
later. In this last study, post-traumatic symptoms were not examined, but participants were
reported to have had “more nervous breakdowns, more suicidal thoughts, and more suicide
attempts than any other group. When prior to the rape they had been no more likely than anyone
else to attempt suicide, almost one in five (19.2 percent) made a suicide attempt following the
rape.”
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veterans (Herman, 1992: 57). 588 But other aspects of the traumatic event also influence a
survivor’s ability to resolve the inevitable intrusive symptomatology after the trauma. For
example, man-made traumatic are associated with much higher rates of severe and long-lasting
post-traumatic symptoms than natural disasters (Herman, 1992: 7). Other factors influencing the
severity and duration of post-traumatic symptoms include the extent to which --and whether or
not-- a person is: taken by surprise, trapped, exposed to extreme violence, physically injured,
witness to the death or injury of others, exposed to dead bodies, brought to the point of
exhaustion, threatened with death of bodily injury, and/or made to feel hopelessness,
helplessness, and terror (Herman, 1992: 33-34, 54, 59; Litz et al, 2009). Further, one’s own role
in the traumatic event, and the responses of others to the event and/or the survivor can have
lasting impacts on a trauma survivor’s ability to resolve intrusive symptomatology, with acts of
socially cooperating with others to survive the trauma leading to relatively lower
symptomatology (Herman, 1992: 59) 589 acts of perpetration, killing, and participating in,
witnessing and failing to stop atrocities result in some of the highest rates of severe and long
lasting post-traumatic symptoms (Litz et al., 2009: 695, 697-98, 700; Kelman, 1973; Lifton,
1975, 2002; McNair, 2005; Grossman, 1996; Herman, 1992: 2, 54).
Probably the second most important factor influencing the severity and duration of an
individual’s post-traumatic reaction is the subjective interpretation and meaning that a survivor
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Similarly, a study of people who had been held hostage found that the longer a person had
been held hostage “the more symptomatic they were, and the slower they were to recover”
(Herman, 1992: 48). A follow-up study with the participants nine-years alter found that almost
half were still experiencing symptoms of avoidance and over a third were still experiencing
intrusive symptoms. Further, while “general anxiety symptoms tended to diminish over time,
psychosomatic symptoms actually got worse.”
589
Herman (1992: 59) notes that high levels of sociability, cooperation with others and internal
locus of control are factors positively influencing combat veteran’s ability to survive traumatic
events relatively unscathed, while some of these same factors serve as more of a liability for
women who survive a sexual assault.
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attaches to the traumatic event (van der Kolk & McFarlane, 2006: 7, 6). Of course, a person’s
subjective interpretation of an event is very much dependent upon prior experiences, current
attitudes, beliefs, cultural worldview, and ideas about one’s self worth and one’s place in the
world around him or her. Part of what gives traumatic events a long-lasting impact upon
survivors is that they violate many of these fundamental attitudes, beliefs, ideas and worldviews
(Litz et al., 2009: 698) --or, in some cases, these events confirm previous beliefs than an
individual has tried to deny (van der Kolk & McFarlane, 2006: 8). Attitudes and beliefs that are
commonly violated by traumatic events include the previously-mentioned assumptions
commonly made by members of Western society --who have long been accustomed to blaming
individuals for their suffering and to Calvinistic interpretations of good fortune 590-- that good
things happen to good people and bad things happen to bad people (McFarlane & van der Kolk,
2006: 26, 28, 35; Devries, 2006: 399, 402; Litz et al., 2009, 698-99). In addition, traumatic
events frequently violate one’s sense of trust, safety, independence, intimacy, control, selfesteem, feelings of personal goodness and worth, sense that the world has meaning, and deeply
held moral beliefs or ideas about law, justice and fairness (Litz 698-99; Herman, 1992: 51-52,
54). Further, these events frequently “call into question basic human relationships,” and severely
590

The preachings of Calvinism generally held that our fate is predestined, that personal actions
on earth could not influence our fate (though clergy members might be able to do so, having a
more direct line to God), and that only a few, select individuals will enjoy everlasting life after
death. According to Weber (1930/1992), these beliefs caused considerable anxiety for followers
of Calvinism (and Protestants in general), which was so intolerable as to cause Calvinists to
search –despite their doctrine-- for earthly “signs” that they were among the saved. Personal
good fortune came to be one of the main signs of personal salvation after death (good things
happen to good, “saved” people), and the pursuit of personal wealth became an almost
compulsive activity for those who could never truly be sure whether they were among the saved
–or, at least, this already compulsive activity (see chapter 2) was extensively justified and
promoted by the Calvinist/Protestant religion. Remnants of these beliefs/justifications have long
since remained influential in western society, which partially explains why the “just world”
assumption described in the text is inherent in, but also entirely unique to, western society (see
the citations in the text).
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challenge or shatter attachments to friends, family and community, as well as an individual’s
construction of self in relation to others or to oneself (Herman, 1992: 51-53, 55). Often as a
result, “[d]evelopmental conflicts of childhood and adolescence, long since resolved, are
suddenly reopened. Trauma forces the survivor to relive all her earlier struggles over autonomy,
initiative, competence, identity, and intimacy” as well as to struggle with doubt, betrayal, guilt,
shame, and a shattered sense of personal agency and connection to a broader community
(Herman, 1992: 52; see also Kelman, 1973; Litz et al., 2009: 699).
The subjective meanings that one attaches to a traumatic event may well be influenced by a
number of additional factors, including the age, degree of social support, degree of connection to
others and/or resources needed for resolving post-traumatic symptoms, and the relative degree of
empowerment or disempowerment one already feels in society. For example, Herman (1992:
60) cites an “inverse relationship between the degree of psychopathy and the age of onset of
abuse among abused children,” and similarly notes that younger, less educated soldiers in
Vietnam were both more likely to see heavy combat and to have few resources for social support
upon their return. Most studies on post-traumatic stress have consistently cited the availability of
appropriate social support resources as a key factor in an individual’s ability to recover from a
traumatic event with few lasting symptoms (including: Litz et al, 699; McFarlane & van der
Kolk, 2006: 25, 27; Kelman, 1973; Lifton, 1975; Egendorf, 1975; DeVries, 2006). And it is
clear that individuals and/or communities that are relatively disempowered in society have fewer
resources available to them and/or have fewer connections to people who can point them to
appropriate resources (See for example: Wright-Berton & Stabb, 1998; Warner & Weist, 1998).
Past traumatic experiences can also have considerable influence on an individual’s
susceptibility to developing chronic post-traumatic stress symptoms after encountering a new
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trauma. This is true even in people who were not previously bothered by a past traumatic event,
as well as among people who have already resolved post-traumatic symptoms relating to such an
event. For these individuals, the new traumatic event can provoke distressing, intrusive
memories, sensations, and emotions associated not only with the new trauma, but with these past
traumas as well (van der Kolk, & McFarlane, 2006: 9; Williams, 1989: 78). In fact, those who
have already resolved past traumatic symptoms can become symptomatic again in reaction to the
accumulation of stress in one’s daily life (Williams, 1989: 78), or in response to new information
pertaining to a past trauma (van der Kolk & McFarlane, 2006: 6). Further, experiencing
numerous, severe, and long-term traumatic events has also been linked to the development of
other increasingly severe psychological problems, including Borderline Personality Disorder,
Dissociative Identity Disorder (formerly known as Multiple Personality Disorder), and
Schizophrenia –all of which have acknowledged links to childhood trauma. 591 Indeed, most
psychiatric inpatients “have histories of severe (usually intrafamilial) trauma,” and a number of
studies have documented physical or sexual abuse histories among violent criminals, as well as
the links between a child’s exposure to abuse or domestic and his or her later victimization of
animals or other human beings (van der Kolk & McFarlane, 2006: 11; Ascione & Arkow, 1999)
or his or her later vulnerability to repeated victimization. 592 What’s more, because there is
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See, for example: Jha, Alok. 2012. Severe abuse in childhood may triple risk of
schizophrenia. The Guardian. April 21. Online: http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2012/04/21/severeabuse-in-childhood-may-triple-risk-of-schizophrenia/. This is not a new realization, as R.D.
Laing talked about the links between family dynamics (not necessarily trauma) and
schizophrenia in the 1960s. However, they have almost been treated as such (new observations)
in western society’s episodic amnesia pertaining to trauma and various post traumatic stress
symptomatology/ disorders (as mentioned in Herman, 1992). See: Laing, R.D. 1959/1986. The
Divided Self. Penguin Books; and Laing, R.D. 1969/1972. The Politics of the Family: and other
essays. New York: Vintage Books.
592
See the above discussion on re-experiencing/ reproducing/ reenacting traumatic events as a
common post-traumatic symptom.
486

transmissible and transgenerational aspect of traumatic stress symptoms (through which
traumatic stress symptoms can be passed from survivors of trauma to family members or
intimate others who have not experienced a trauma, and can also be passed down in families
through several generations 593), one might also wonder whether familial histories of trauma
increase one’s vulnerability to new traumatic events. 594 The writer is not aware of any studies on
this topic as yet (but also has a writing deadline, and cannot spend time searching).
The increased susceptibility one has to developing chronic and/or severe traumatic stress
symptoms when he or she has experienced previous traumas may be attributable to a number of
factors. For example, it may be due, in part, to the subjective meanings that survivors of
previous traumas attached to new traumatic events: new traumatic events can confirm previous
beliefs about the world, oneself or others that an individual had struggled to deny (Ibid, 6, 8, 9).
In addition, new traumatic events may provoke new interpretations of previous traumas. Since
the subjective meanings attached to traumatic events evolves over time, the receipt of new
information or the development of new interpretations regarding these events has been shown to
produce traumatic symptoms in trauma survivors who did not previously experience them. Van
der Kolk & McFarlane (2006: 6) provide an illustration of this in a rape victim who did not
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Some of the older studies on this include: Bar-On et al., 1998; Felsen, 1998; Hardtman, 1998;
Korn, 1997; Catherall, 1998; Williams, 1998; Remer & Ferguson, 1998. (Due to time
constraints, I am not able to read any more recent studies, though I am aware that more recent
studies only reinforce the findings cited here).
594
Though the question is certainly confused by the fact that traumatized parents may be more
likely to suffer from trauma-related psychological distress that impacts parenting and/or that
reproduces past traumas within the present family structure –factors which could constitute new
traumatic events, rather than simple transgenerational transmission of post-traumatic symptoms
without traumatic events. (See, for example, Felsen, 1998, p. 44, who found both patterns in
which children identified with and learned to “behave and think in disorganized ways similar to
those of their [traumatized] parents” and/or in which traumatized parents’ disorders prevented
them from parenting, creating other disorders in their children not necessarily mirroring their
parents’ trauma).
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develop post traumatic symptoms after her attack until many months later, when she learned that
the man who raped her had killed another of his rape victims, and reinterpreted her rape as a lifethreatening event. Further, since the accumulation of stress (mentioned above) can exacerbate
previously resolved traumatic symptoms, suggesting that intrusive thoughts of previous
traumatic events may dissipate but may never be fully “resolved,” it is possible that trauma
survivors must always devote some psychological and biological resources to suppressing
intrusive thoughts, and that new traumatic events can simply overwhelm an individual’s ability
to do so.
All of the above-discussed possibilities for trauma survivors’ increased susceptibility to
becoming symptomatic after experiencing new traumatic events involve some level of
subjective-societal interaction, but societal structures and cultural worldviews may actually have
a much greater impact upon an individual’s ability to withstand traumatic events without
developing chronic symptomatology than Westerners generally recognize. 595 This may be
especially true of Western society and the Western cultural worldview which, as argued in
chapter 2, was built around countless long-term traumatic events directly impacting large
portions of that society and indirectly impacting virtually the whole of that society, the impacts
of which continue to reverberate throughout Western society (and the world) today. As such,
Western society and the Western cultural worldview were also built upon numerous maladaptive
adjustments to, and psychopathological mechanisms for coping with (or, more accurately,
denying), the impacts of these severe, long-term traumatic events; and many of these
mechanisms serve not only to perpetuate the adverse impacts of these past traumatic events
today, but to perpetually reenact these events and to constantly create and inflict new traumas
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On this point, see also: Devries, 2006: 404.
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upon Westerners and non-Westerners worldwide. New traumas experienced by Westerners
victimized by their own society and cultural worldview range from the psychological trauma of
ecocide; 596 to social, political and economic marginalization, disempowerment and
disconnection 597 (including those resulting from austerity programs and resulting in recent unrest
throughout Europe and North America 598); to policies that service larger corporations at the
expense of the majority of people in a given Western country and that country’s economy as a
whole; 599 to the wide range of structurally and institutionally-perpetuated violent victimization
and the increasing levels of psychological dysfunction and distress in Western society resulting
from all of the above. 600
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See for example, the various essays in: Roszak, Theodore, Marey E. Gomes and Allen D.
Kanner. 1995. Ecopsychology: Restoring the Earth, Healing the Mind. San Francisco: Sierra
Club Books.
597
See, for example, Wright_Berton & Stabb, 1998 (who found that minority males are exposed
in their neighborhoods and schools to much higher rates of violent crime than any other group,
and who found that 29% of high school juniors in a major metropolitan area in the south had
clinical levels of PTSD –which suggests that far more were traumatized by did not exhibit the
specific complex of symptoms required for the diagnosis); or Warner & Weist, 1998 (who found
that 75% of male and 70% of female African American urban youth in Chicago had witnessed
someone being shot, stabbed, robbed or murdered, and were also exposed to much higher rates of
crime, unemployment, substandard housing, inadequate schools and limited medical or mental
health resources/care).
598
See, for example, Harvey’s (2003) chapter on Accumulation by Dispossession.
599
Such as the recent financial crisis. See for example the documentary film Inside Job (2010,
Sony Classics).
600
For example, looking just briefly at one western country, the United States, van der Kolk &
McFarlane (2006: 5) cite a number of studies demonstrating that perhaps as many as one fourth
of all adolescents in the United States have been physically or sexually assaulted, and 76% of
adults report past or present exposure to extreme stress. Meanwhile, the World Health
Organization suggests that “one in four people in the United States suffers from chronic anxiety,
a mood disorder or depression” (Hedges, 2012). The rates for childhood assault may actually be
higher, as cited statistics for child sexual abuse (which does not include mere physical assault or
other forms of childhood trauma and/or abuse) suggests that one in four girls and one in seven
boys are sexually abused before they turn 18; that the abuse is usually repeated, lasting a number
of years; that more than 90% of these children are abused by someone they know, love and/or
trust; that there are more than 39 million survivors of childhood sexual abuse in the United
States; that childhood sexual abuse makes up only 7.6% of reported types of child abuse; that
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Thus, even by providing only a very few examples of the numerous ways in which Western
society and the Western cultural worldview consistently traumatizes its members, it should be
clear that this society is failing its members (as well as all other peoples and life forms around
the world) even before they are exposed to new individual, group, or societal-level traumatic
events. What makes this considerably worse is the fact that, as a predatory/ perpetrator society,
Western society and the Western cultural worldview provides its members with few, if any,
healthy mechanisms for coping with the numerous traumas this society and worldview
perpetually create. Instead, this society and worldview promote –and even require or demand—
that its members engage in only the most harmful and psychopathological mechanisms for
dealing with (i.e., denying and repressing) the numerous new traumatic experiences to which it
routinely, perpetually subjects Westerners, non-Westerners and all life on the planet. These
psychopathological mechanisms have been enshrined in the Western worldview, passed down
from generation to generation, and encoded in societal, group, and individual expectations and
codes of behavior; and they require that Westerners (and colonized non-Westerners) adapt
unrealistic, psychopathological views of their place in the world and their connection to each
other, to non-Westerners, and to all plant and animal life on the planet. 601 It also requires that we

80% of 21-year-olds abused as children meet the diagnostic criteria for one or more
psychological disorders; and that an estimated 30% of these abused children will go on to abuse
their own children as adults. (See, for example, the following advocacy websites: Darkness to
Light, 2012; Turningpointservices.org, 2012; Childhelp, 2012). Clearly childhood sexual abuse
is of epidemic proportions in the United States, as it is throughout western society, particularly
given the role of leading institutions, such as the Catholic (and Christian) church in perpetuating
the spread of childhood sexual abuse, while also taking a leading role in western society's denial
and cover up of these crimes. See also the above footnote citing Warner & Weist (1998) and
Wright-Berton and Stabb (1998).
601
On this latter point, see also: Metzner, Ralph. 1995. They Psychopathology of the HumanNature Relationship. Pp 55-67 in: Rhodore Roszak, Mary Gomes and Allen Kanner (Eds.)
Ecopsychology: Restoring the Earth, Healing the Mind. San Francisco: Sierra Club Books; or see
any number of other essays in the same book.
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learn, validate and actively submit to rigid hierarchies of dominance, in which some individuals
are considered to be more worthwhile than others, and are able to abuse or violate the rights of
these allegedly “lower” others at will and with relative impunity. 602 The Western cultural
worldview also encourages or requires Westerners (and colonized non-Westerners) to be
intolerant of others and of parts of themselves, to dehumanize other Westerners and nonWesterners, to employ projection and scapegoating against these others, and to engage in forms
of magical thinking, cultural amnesia and historical/biblical re-writes that erase the past and
present reality in favor of Western psychopathology (on the above points about Western society,
see Chapter 2).
Given these traits of Western society and the Western cultural worldview, it should be little
wonder that trauma survivors have the most difficulty reintegrating into, and rebuilding their
lives around, these problematic Western patterns of thinking and behavior. Traumatic events tear
holes in the fabric of survivors’ lives, including the Western cultural worldview into which they
have been indoctrinated. Depending on the size and number of these holes, and the extent to

602

Though Hardtmann relates this type of extreme hierarchy of domination to the Nazi era
(“during the Nazi period, every “Aryan” person—even the children—had the power to persecute
“non-Aryan” people. Any kind of mischievous, even playful, attitude against minorities was
legalized and promoted by the authorities. Many people used this empowerment in their
everyday lives”), it is also reminiscent not only of the Jim Crow era in the United States south,
but of present day race relations in the United States (as per the recent shooting deaths of
Trayvon Martin in Florida and Kenneth Chamberlain in White Plains, New York. On the latter
and the refusal of a Grand Jury to indict officers responsible for an egregious violation of police
protocol, see: DemocracyNow! 2012. Grand Jury Clears White Plains Police in Kenneth
Chamberlain’s Death, New Tape Shows Fatal Raid. May 4. Online:
http://www.democracynow.org/2012/5/4/kenneth_chamberlain_sr_as_charges_ruled), and of
present Native-non-Native relations --and the persistent violation of the human rights of the
former-- in Canada (and the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and so forth), as outlined in
Chapter 4.
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one’s desire to deny or acknowledge them, 603 survivors looking through them may glimpse with
some degree of clarity the false, contradictory, and highly problematic nature of Western
“civilization.” 604 In the face of these critically reflective glimpses –whether they are forcibly
induced through traumatic events, or purposefully chosen through rational and necessary
processes of critical self-reflection (processes that are largely discouraged in the Western cultural
worldview)—the veneer of Western “civilization,” and the cultural worldview around which
Westerners have constructed their lives begins to erode and fall apart. This dissolution is
traumatic not only because of the loss of the socially-constructed protections provided by one’s
cultural worldview (DeVries, 2006), but because what one glimpses beyond the veneer of
Western “civilization” is an absolutely horrifying combination of destructive and
psychopathological behaviors: Western “civilization” is --and has long been-- on a murderous,
suicidal rampage, destroying as much plant, animal and human life, and as much of the planet as
possible before killing ourselves (and the rest of humanity) in our final, suicidal act. 605 As the

603

“The conflict between the will to deny horrible events and the will to proclaim them aloud is
the central dialectic of psychological trauma. … Remembering and telling the truth about terrible
events are prerequisites both for the restoration of the social order and for the healing of
individual victims”(Herman, 1992: 1).
604
After all, as Stanely Diamond (1974: 48) has noted: “it is only in modern civilization that the
state dynamic compounded by secondary imperialism –is totalitarian, and dissociation from our
human possibilities, our species being, increasingly acute. .... Perhaps the most alienated can, by
confronting and acting on their own condition, free themselves. Only then can we speak of
progress, which is always, in part, a primitive return; a reformulation of old impulses in new
situations and social structures.”
605
Bauman (2000: viii) made a somewhat similar observation about his study of the Holocaust.
The more he studied the topic, the more he came to see it as a window, through which he had not
previously looked, because:
Like most of my colleagues, I assumed that the Holocaust was, at best, something to be
illuminated by us social scientists, but certainly not something that can illuminate the
objects of our current concern. I believed (by default rather than by deliberation) that
the Holocaust was an interruption in the normal flow of history, a cancerous growth on
the body of civilized society, a momentary madness among sanity. Thus I could paint
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veneer of Western “civilization” falls away, so do all of the alleged justifications and
rationalizations for our behavior, and we are left only with the naked truth that we are the enemy
that we have projected onto countless other peoples and living things (this will be discussed
further below).
Thus, trauma survivors in Western society often come to view social interactions and world
around them as counterfeit and untrustworthy (Lifton, 1975: 182; see also: Herman, 1992: 5152), or they come to feel alienated, disconnected, misunderstood and abandoned by their society,
their communities, and friends, family and loved ones whose lives are reflective of and built
around the Western cultural worldview. After all, in a “civilization” that blames individuals for
their own pain and suffering (Devries, 2006: 402, 404), that provides its members with only the
most psychopathological mechanisms for dealing with (denying the impact of) traumatic events,
and that is highly intolerant of criticisms that expose the destructive and psychopathological
nature it was constructed to deny, survivors of multiple traumas really are abandoned and left to
their own devices. 606 If they attempt to reintegrate into society and rebuild lives around the
Western cultural worldview, they are plagued by cynical feelings of counterfeit in all

for the use of my students a picture of normal, healthy, sane society, leaving the story of
the Holocaust to the professional pathologists.
However, once he did look, and the more he looked, he developed a quite different image of
what this event was and meant for western “civlization”:
Looking through that window, one can catch a rare glimpse of many things otherwise
invisible. And the things one can see are of the utmost importance not just for the
perpetrators, victims and witnesses of the crime, but for all those who are alive today
and hope to be alive tomorrow. What I saw through this window I did not find at all
pleasing. The more depressing the view, however, the more I was convinced that if one
refused to look through the window, it would be at one’s peril.”
606
“When culture loses important aspects of its ability to function and becomes incapable of
guiding grief reactions or to provide support, individuals are left unprotected and left to their
own devices” (DeVries, 2006: 405)
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relationships, 607 and doubt their ability to be who they are in relation to others (Herman, 1992:
52) --since Western society largely discourages this. 608 On the other hand, if they follow their
vision and intuition –something that is necessary for healing— and refuse to participate in what
they see as the lie all around them, 609 they may find it consistently difficult to be or feel a part of
the society around them and may attempt to completely withdraw from it, living painful lives of
misunderstood isolation in order to maintain what they can of their sanity. In either case, they
607

An example of how these feelings and emotions may be processed is provided by Herman
(1992:52), quoting Virginia Wolf’s combat veteran, Septimus Smith: “The secret signal which
one generation passes, under disguise, to the next is loathing, hatred, despair…. One cannot
bring children into a world like this. One cannot perpetuate suffering, or increase the breed of
these lustful animals, who have no lasting emotions, but only whims and vanities, eddying them
now this way, now that….For the truth is… that human beings have neither kindness, nor faith,
nor charity beyond what serves to increase the pleasure of the moment. They hunt in packs.
Their packs scour the desert and vanish creaming into the wilderness.”
608
“They’re mining us. … [And] the poison, the toxic that is left over from the mining of the
being part of human … through the intelligence of the human, are in all the fears and doubts and
insecurities that we have in our lives –without our own personal reality-- about who we are…
That’s the pollution and the toxic left over from the mining of the being part of human. That’s
the pollution that’s left over, see, and in that kind of a haze, … we don’t see ourselves clearly.
We do not see and recognize clearly who we are. And we’re never encouraged to. We’re
encouraged to be “good citizens,” or “good” this religion, or “good” that religion, or good…
workers, good [whatever]. But we’re never encouraged to be real about human beings. In a
way, we’re never really encouraged to be good to ourselves. See, we’re mentally and
psychologically oppressed and manipulated so that we seek things to gratify ourselves, but that
doesn’t mean we’re being good to ourselves. And the mining process to me, you know, it’s the
civilizing process itself. Because somewhere in there, it’s like someone’s eating the spirit. Our
spirit is being converted into an energy to run something. Alright? And it’s like it’s eating our
spirit. See and, you know, everyone has their religions and their stuff, but see it makes me
wonder, how do we participate in this spiritual reality, if we live in a mechanism now where the
human has been conditioned and trained to eat its own spirit, and turn it into fuel for this system”
(Trudell, John. 2008. They’re Mining Us. Track 6 of: DNA: Descendant Now Ancestor. (Audio
CD) Effective Records. See also, Litowitz, 2000, p. 528 (“domination requires the estblishment
of an entire way of life as standard and expected, the identification of the dominated with the
dominators, and the subtle establishment of the prevailing ideology as natural and inevitable,
indeed, commonsensical. When domination reaches the internal world of actors, resistance is
almost unthinkable”).
609
“If every human being woke up tomorrow and said, “I will not enable what I know to be the
lie, all day today,” it would change. It could not function. If every human being got up
tomorrow and said, “I will not enable it. I will not participate in the lie today,” it would change”
(Trudell, op. cit., track 18, What Happened to the Tribes of Europe).
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may fall prey to severe psychological distress, since reintegration into a society that dismisses or
reacts violently against criticism may require denial of one’s own traumatic experiences and the
lessons from those experiences –something which goes against the grain of what is necessary to
heal from trauma—and failure to fully integrate into Western society is always pathologized by
Western society. In all scenarios, traumatized individuals risk being marginalized, pathologized,
dismissed, or even deprived of their freedom, because the society around them is both fully
incapable of embracing and healing them, and driven to pathologize and scapegoat any who
don’t fully conform to it’s norms (as Thomas Szasz has pointed out a number of times). 610

TRAUMA AND SOCIETY
Throughout history, some people have adapted to terrible life events with
flexibility and creativity, while others have become fixated on the trauma and
gone on to lead traumatized and traumatizing existences. Societies that have been
massively traumatized have followed roughly similar patterns of adaptation and
disintegration.
~ Bessel van der Kolk & Alexander McFarlane, The Black Hole of Trauma 611
The knowledge of horrible events periodically intrudes into public awareness but
is rarely retained for long. Denial, repression, and dissociation operate on a social
as well as an individual level. … Like traumatized people, we have been cut off
from the knowledge of our past. Like traumatized people, we need to understand
the past in order to reclaim the present and the future.
~ Judith Herman, Trauma and Recovery 612

610

See, for example, Szasz, 1970. See also: Devries (2006: 405: “One formal social response to
overwhelming stress is the expansion of the medical system itself, which legitimizes the
reallocation of community resources”). On the additional profit motive behind this, see also:
Ridgeway, James. 2011. Mass psychosis in the US: How Big Pharma got Americans hooked on
anti-psychotic drugs. Aljazeera.net. July 12. (Online:
http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/opinion/2011/07/20117313948379987.htm). Meanwhile, all
non-westerners who resist the traumatizing encroachments of western society (as well as those
who don’t resist) are already understood through the constructs and “logic” of western society to
be inferior, “primitive,” “backwards,” and in the way of “progress.”
611
Op. cit., 2006, p. 3.
612
Op. cit., 1992, p. 2.
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Though the concept of societal trauma has been around in some form at least since the 1970s
(Kelman, 1973; Lifton, 1975), the topic remains largely understudied, perhaps in part because in
Western society the topic of trauma itself has been forgotten repeatedly over the past century
(Herman, 1992:7-8). After all, the study of trauma ultimately confronts us with “human
vulnerability in the natural world” (Herman, 1992: 8), “man’s inhumanity to man” and “the best
and worst in human nature” (van der Kolk & McFarlane, 2006: 6). In many cases these are
things societies, like individuals who have a choice in the matter, prefer to forget. 613 Thus,
remembering is easily resisted unless and until political movements develop that both force these
issues forward in our collective conscience and provide a social context “that affirms and
protects the victim[s] and that joins victim[s] and witness[es] in a common alliance.” As Herman
has further remarked on the topic:
The study of war trauma becomes legitimate only in a context that challenges the
sacrifice of young men in war. The study of trauma in sexual and domestic life
becomes legitimate only in a context that challenges the subordination of women
and children. Advances in the field occur only when they are supported by a
political movement powerful enough to legitimate an alliance between
investigators and patients and to counteract the ordinary social processes of
silencing and denial. In the absence of strong political movements for human
rights, the active process of bearing witness inevitably gives way to the active
process of forgetting. Repression, dissociation, and denial are phenomena of
social as well as individual consciousness. (Ibid).
Though concepts of societal trauma have not found full expression in any academic
literature, 614 the parallels between individual and societal responses to trauma have frequently

613

“War and victims are something the community wants to forget; a veil of oblivion is drawn
over everything painful and unpleasant. We find the two sides face to face; on the one side the
victims who perhaps wish to forget but cannot, and on the other all those with strong, often
unconscious motives who very intensely both with to forget and succeed in doing so. The
contrast … is frequently very painful for both sides. The weakest one … remains the losing
party in this silent and unequal dialogue” (Leo Eitinger, quoted in Herman, 1992: 8).
614
Though a very few articles have worked towards this effort, such as DeVries (2006) and
Stamm, B. Hundnall, Henry E. Stamm, IV, Amy C. Hundnall, and Craig Higson-Smith. 2003.
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been noted by some of the most renowned scholars on the effects of trauma –as demonstrated in
the two introductory quotes to this subsection. Further, a growing number of studies –
particularly those examining transgenerational trauma—have examined specific aspects of
traumatic reactions that are displayed in whole groups within society (if not whole societies) and
passed on through the generations (Hardtmann, 1998; Bar-On et al., 1998; Felsen, 1998). Other
scholars have examined societal responses to traumatic events during the period of a particular
trauma or after (Lifton, 1975, 2002, 2004; Eisenhardt, 1975; Egendorf, 1975; Kelman, 1973;
Martinot, 2003; Bauman, 2000; Williams, 2000; Halloran, 2007). Many of these studies have
focused on specific traumatic symptoms, such as the denial of guilt and the numerous
psychopathological mechanisms employed to this effect. In the discussion that follows, I ask the
reader to keep in mind that when it is said that societies are engaging in certain patterns of
thought and behavior, what is meant is that whole groups of people within a society –often the
majority of a society-- are engaging in these patterns of thought and behavior --to some extent-because they have been socialized into them, and because these patterns, though recognized in
trauma literature as psychopathological, have become normalized and expected ways of thinking,
behaving and acting in these societies. It needs to be pointed out that, as with any norm or
conglomerate of behaviors in society, there is an entire continuum (or more accurately, a web)
upon which the norm /conglomerate of behaviors is adopted or ignored. Thus nothing in the
below discussion is intended to suggest that everyone in a given, traumatized society engages in
all of the below discussed patterns. Some people will engage in some and not others. Some will
engage in all of the below-discussed patterns of thought and behavior. Further, though the
likelihood that one can be born and raised in Western society, or assimilated into it, and not

Considering a theory of cultural trauma and loss. Journal of Loss and Trauma, vol. 9, pp. 89111.
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internalize many of these patterns of thought and behavior to some extent is slim, the extent to
which individuals in society engage in various patterns of thought and behavior always varies in
any society. The point to keep in mind is that societies are often characterized by certain
predominating patterns of thought and behavior, and, I argue, that most of us in Western society
engage in most of these behaviors to some extent which is not healthy for us or for other people
and other life forms in the world around us. In addition, many of the below-discussed patterns of
thought and behavior (like those discussed in chapter 2) are so prevalent in Western society, are
prevalent to such a great extent, and are perhaps far more prevalent than other patterns of thought
and behavior that we mythically attribute to ourselves (freedom, democracy, peace-loving) that
these patterns –rather than our myths—are much more accurate characterizations of the Western
cultural worldview and Western society as a whole than are our numerous (in some cases
narcissistic) myths. (What’s more, many of the overly-favorable, self-serving myths that we have
created about our society were constructed through some of the very processes described below).
It might also be worth nothing here that, while it is certainly true that individuals adopt certain
of these patterns of thought and behavior to greater or lesser extents depending upon their
various group identities, these patterns of thought and behavior are intended to analyze societies
and are not generally suited for analyzing differences in behavior of different groups within a
given society. There is a single exception to this general rule, and that is that the patterns of
thought and behavior laid out below are particularly well suited to analyzing the behavior of
groups that engage in collective angry and violent behavior directed towards intimidating or
asserting/maintaining privilege over other individuals or groups within society. In particular,
these patterns of thought and behavior are particularly well suited to understanding behavior by
dominant group members who benefit from historical and/or present day subjugation of non-
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dominant groups, and who are thus actively engaged in the below described defense mechanisms
as a way of denying their own guilt in the historical or ongoing subjugation of others and/or of
attempting to find various other ways of justifying this historical or ongoing subjugation. In
addition, the below-described patterns of thought and behavior, like those in chapter 2, are quite
specific to Western society and its particular historical circumstances. Other traumatized,
predatory societies may well engage in some or all of these behaviors, but have their own
specific histories and are likely to also have their own history-specific behavior patterns (as Elias
(1998) has pointed out). At any rate, as the past several hundred centuries have demonstrated,
Western society is by far the most predatory of all societies in existence today, and the below
discussions of pathological patterns of thought and behavior has been specifically tailored to
Western society and its own unique history with this in mind.
Like the conscious awareness and/or study of trauma, there are a number of other unsettling
things that societies often seek to forget, repress, or reduce to a much more simplified, less
threatening form. For the United States, the war in Vietnam was certainly one of these, and a
number of scholars have written about US society’s “incredible reluctance” to look critically at
the war, and thus is “insistence that we learn nothing” from it (Lifton, 1975: 189, 184. See also:
Kelman, 1973; Eisenhardt, 1975; Egendorf, 1975). In this same country, the present wars in Iraq
and Afghanistan (and beyond) can join the list of things the country refuses to examine, and
prefers to forget (Lifton, 2002; Litz et al., 2009; Martinot, 2003), as can the country’s history of
genocide, colonialism and slavery, which US society denies with a “seemingly glacial amnesia”
(Martinot, 2003: 407. See also: Williams, 2008). In German society, the Holocaust is a period in
history that many would prefer to forget; and despite having been forced to acknowledge and
face these horrors to some extent after WW II, many Germans today have only a fragmented and
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faulty understanding of the event (Hardtmann, 1998: 87-88). A great number also actively avoid
any understanding or inquiry into the impacts that these past events have had on their present
lives --though the impacts have been considerable (Hardtmann, 1998; Bar-On et al., 1998;
Felsen, 1998). But the Germans are not alone in their denial surrounding this event. Much of
Western society continues to deny its own collective responsibility for this event, as well as its
continuing vulnerability to (and occasional repetition of) similar events on a lesser or similar
scale. As Bauman (2000: xii) has noted, “[t]he more ‘they’ are to blame, the more the rest of ‘us’
are safe, and the less we have to do to defend this safety.” 615 Perhaps to this extent, even many
Israelis born after WWII have fragmentary understandings of the impacts the Holocaust has had
on their present lives, and have “tended to simplify the relevance of past events (especially, the

615

Unfortunately, most scholars of the Holocaust look form the event, forward towards present
day, rather than looking back in time to truly understand the origins of this event. Sven
Lindqvist (1996: 9, 10) elaborates on this failure:
The idea of extermination lies no further from the heart of humanism than Buchenwald
lies from Goethehaus in Weimar. That insight has been almost completely repressed,
even by the Germans, who have been made sole scapegoats for ideas of extermination
that are actually a common European heritage.
…
But in this debate, no one mentions the German extermination of the Herero people
in southwest Africa during Hitler’s childhood. No one mentions the corresponding
genocide by the French, British or the Americans. No one points out that during
Hitler’s childhood, a major element in the European view of mankind was the
conviction that “inferior races” were by nature condemned to extinction: the true
compassion of the superior races consisted in helping them on their way.
All German historians participating in this debate seem to look in the same direction.
None looks to the west. But Hitler did. What Hitler wished to create when he sought
Lebensraum in the east was a continental equivalent of the British Empire. It was in the
British and other western European peoples that he found the models, of which
extermination of the Jews is, in Nolte’s words, “a distorted copy.”
See also: Kakel, Carroll P., III. 2011. The American West and the Nazi East. New York: Palgrave
MacMillan.
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Holocaust) within their present political and social perspectives” (Bar-On et. al, 1998: 98,
106). 616
Australian society also has its share of events it wishes to deny, such as the genocide of
Aboriginal peoples. And though the collective Australian identity largely recognizes the need
for (at least some symbolic forms of) reconciliation with Aboriginal peoples (Halloran, 2007:
14), a large portion of Australian society would simply prefer to forget these crimes of the past,
to minimize their collective responsibility for making reparations for them, and to avoid at all
costs any personal responsibility for acting in this regard (Halloran, 2007; Williams, 2000).617
Likewise Williams (2008: 229) has noted the “deep psychological needs” of people in the United
States to deny past wrongs (including genocide) committed against indigenous peoples in North
America, preferring to imagine itself as a nation “created through the consent of the people” (at
230 & 242) which had freed itself from the “darkness of European corruption” (at 230), and was
thus morally pure (at 231, 247-49). Meanwhile, Canada has sought to see itself as perhaps more
morally pure than the United States, having had no history of violent revolution or Jim Crow-era

616

“While in Germany, students tended to claim that ‘nothing in the Nazi era was relevant’ for
their present social perspective, in Israel we found the opposite tendency (‘The Holocaust was
very relevant for our present social contexts’)” (Bar-On et al., 1998: 98). This oversimplification also indicates an understandable lack of fully processing and coming to terms with
the meaning and impact of the event –i.e., a form of denial which may at least partially explain
Bauman’s (2000: ix) observations: “The Jewish state tried to employ the tragic memories as the
certificate of its political legitimacy, a safe-conduct pass for its past and future policies, and
above all as the advanced payment for the injustices it might itself commit.” (Injustices that have
since been well-documented in both scholarship and international law).
617
According to Williams (2000: 137) The former Prime Minister of Australia, Mr. Howard,
denied the history of genocide in Australia outright, attributing claims that it occurred to the
“guilt industry” or a “political conspiracy to generate and manipulate spurious guilt.” Halloran
(2007: 14) notes that while some 75% of Australians surveyed “expressed some form of support
for reconciliation,” less than 30% said they were willing to personally engage in behaviors
necessary to bring this about (at 13), only 14% expressed some sense of guilt about the past
treatment of Aboriginal peoples (at 3, citing McGarty et al.), and 48% indicated that they held
negative and resentful attitudes towards Aboriginal peoples in Australia (at 3).
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segregation, and imagining itself to have been far more benevolent towards indigenous peoples
than the violent, genocidal United States. But Canada has its own history of genocide (See, for
example: Reid, 1993a & 1993b; Upton, 1977), which it continues to deny vehemently despite its
being periodically pointed out by a few academics and activists; and the country’s current Prime
Minister has even gone so far as to deny Canada’s history of colonialism (O’Keefe, 2009;
Ljunggren, 2009), despite the country’s continued reliance on colonial-era legislation in its
ongoing dispossession of indigenous peoples from their lands, resources, treaty and human
rights. 618
Denial is a normal, psychological mechanism for temporarily lessening the impact of
information or experiences that are extremely difficult to handle and that are likely to overwhelm
a person or a society’s immediate ability to cope with and process the event or information.
Denying the reality of an event gives the shocked or traumatized society more time to take in the
information and to adjust to the drastic life changes that may be involved. Denial is thus often
the first stage in the grieving process, and is frequently utilized during traumatic events and their
aftermath (Williams, 1989: 75-76) as a means of delaying their full psychological impacts.
However, when denial becomes a permanent state of being, rather than a temporary mechanism
for coping, it becomes maladaptive, destructive, and psychopathological because it prevents the
remembering and truth telling about traumatic events that is necessary for healing and for “the
restoration of social order” (Herman, 1992: 1), and it prolongs the post traumatic
symptomatology. 619

618

Here I am referring to Canada’s Indian Act, which is discussed further in chapter 4.
“The conflict between the will to deny horrible events and the will to proclaim them aloud is
the central dialectic of psychological trauma” (Herman, 1992:1).

619
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In the case of predatory societies, such as Western society, denial is frequently utilized not
only to avoid the guilt and grief associated with having survived various perpetrations and
atrocities 620 (many of which were perpetrated against Westerners at the hands of Westerners, see
chapter 2), but also to avoid and/or quickly get rid of grief and “deeply painful emotion[s]” of
guilt that are associated with witnessing and/or participating in the reenactment of perpetrations
and atrocities against others (Williams, 2000: 137; Litz et. al., 2009: 697). Unfortunately, for
those seeking a permanent state of denial, historical facts can be, and frequently are lied away,
but actions “can neither be revoked or erased by a mere act of the imagination.” They leave
lingering, “visible and tangible” effects in the external world (Hardtmann, 1998: 91, citing
Arendt, 1967, 1971; Herman, 1992: 1) that can serve as constant reminders of one’s guilt. In
addition, the failure to integrate traumatic experiences often leads to increased feelings of “guilt,
shame and anxiety” (Litz et. al., 2009: 697). Thus, the attempted denial of guilt and guilt-related
grief often produces new guilt, both through constant reminders of one’s guilt in the external
world and through the guilt, shame and anxiety these unintegrated reminders produce. 621 In
addition, the failure to integrate memories and emotions related to traumatic, guilt-related events
can produce other forms of “lingering psychological distress” in the form of intrusive thoughts,
emotions, sensations and imagery, as well as in avoidance behaviors (Ibid).
It is thus common for societies (or individuals) wishing to deny permanently their guilt and
guilt-related actions to employ the additional psychological coping mechanisms of repression,
dissociation, splitting and projection /projective identification (Hardtmann, 1998, 91, 88-89;
Devries, 2006: 40). Many of these defense mechanisms are like denial in that they either are

620

See Williams, 1989 on survivor guilt and grief.
Litz et al. (2009: 697) have argued that feelings of guilt and demoralization are highly
correlated with PTSD.
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commonly utilized in every day life and/or are adaptive mechanisms for temporarily coping with
overwhelming experiences or information. But when employed on a more permanent basis, all of
these defense mechanisms lead to further psychopathologies that compound the adverse effects
of failed integration and healing. Like denial, repression leaves traces of the unpleasant or
intolerable thoughts, emotions, and memories in the subconscious –traces which constantly
threaten to resurface and wreak havoc on a society’s otherwise contained, controlled, and above
all false vision of reality. Meanwhile, though dissociation and splitting offer the subject a cleaner
break from unpleasant or intolerable parts of itself, by splitting these off from consciousness
altogether, these defenses are also prone to periodic collapse (see for example, Hardtmann, 1998:
89) or intrusion from emotions, sensations or memories associated with the repressed reality.
What’s more, these defense mechanisms are only employed at a hefty price: a loss of identity
and, through a more full dissociation from emotions, a loss of agency. Hardtmann (1998: 92) has
explained the loss of identity:
The subject, however, would try to obtain liberation through oblivion from
something that actually happened, looses [sic] a part of its history, and therefore a
part of its identity. In this way, the subject walks around without a shadow and
becomes “face- and history-less” and is yet permanently in restlessness and fear
of being caught by its own shadow and its true face.
And:
The subject thereby saves itself froma critical argument with the evil (or good)
within itself or the other. It pays for the loss of self with a false, usually idealized,
self-image and an unrealistic and overweening self-assumption. (91)
Similarly, the loss of agency can arise from the dissociation and splitting from painful
emotions and memories relating to past traumatic events. Through dissociation, a subject
separates from a part of oneself –i.e., certain unpleasant or intolerable thoughts, memories,
emotions and sensations are split off from consciousness, and placed out of reach in another (or
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many) separate personalities (or personality fragments) of which the core personality can be
totally unaware. Also through splitting the good and the bad in people, objects, and events are
separated and left unintegrated, so that the subject can view the same leader, country, or group of
people as either all good or all bad, without any conscious awareness of the targets other
characteristics. 622 In both dissociation and splitting directed at oneself, as well as splitting
directed at others, the subject creates a false construct of moral purity “that promise renewed
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See, for example, Lifton (1975: 193), who discusses “ideological totalism” as “an all-ornothing stance that impels one toward obliterating perceptions of reality.” Both dissociation and
splitting are quite common in western society today, which has a long-standing philosophical
tradition of attempting to separate emotions from “rationality” [despite/ignoring the fact that
emotions “reside at the core of one’s being, the part of it with which one makes sense of the
world” (Nussbaum, quoted in: Hutchinson & Bleiker, 2008, p. 393)]. And while dissociation can
be quite normal in everyday life (such as when one does tasks automatically while thinking of
something else, and later cannot recall the steps he/she took in doing the task), western society
pushes its members to dissociate to destructive extents, and as a whole has dissociated from past
memories and emotions to pathological extents. Splitting has also reached pathological extents,
in that large portions in the United States are not able to understand, for example, that not all
Arabs (or people who look Arab) are Muslim and not all Muslims (or people who “look”
Muslim) are terrorists. Splitting in this manner has long been an inherent thought process in the
United States, one that many people engage automatically against any group of people whom
(they are told) pose an alleged threat. Splitting is also easily observable in the media, politics
and pop culture. People in the public spotlight are expected to be (and treated as if they are)
either all good or all bad. Political candidates, pop stars and countless other media targets that
were once considered “all good” can easily and immediately be brought down by exposing some
personal flaw, which is generally sensationalized but also generally within the realm of typical
human behavior (drug abuse, eccentric behavior, stark changes in hairstyles, can turn large
segments of the public against certain pop stars almost overnight. Certain types of sexual
“deviance” (which is often –thought not always-- behavior that is quite normal, but just not
admitted), or, to a lesser extent, financial scandals and/or lying (which have become so normal
for politicians as to barely make waves anymore) can destroy a politician within days.
Interestingly (or frighteningly), actual policy decisions –such as authorizing assassinations of
foreign and U.S. citizens abroad, or outlawing labor unions—generally do not lead to immediate
condemnation by large sectors of the public in the way that personal imperfections do. This
suggests that large portions of the U.S. public frequently judge politicians based on how similar
the politician is to their moral ideals for personal behavior, and not according to any wellthought-out analysis of policy –i.e., of what politicians are actually elected to do. This is perhaps
largely because most people in the U.S. don’t really pay attention to political issues except when
their emotions of anger and resentment are mobilized by some political campaign such as the
Tea Party or Sarah Palin speeches.
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innocence and guiltless sanctimony” (Egendorf, 1975: 124; see also: Lifton, 1975:194). A typical
fixture in liberal Western society, this moral purity (or religion-based intolerance) often holds
that everyone should conform to the subject’s moral code, that one can easily avoid guilt and
imperfection if one makes the right choices, and if one experiences guilt or is seen to be
imperfect it is a result of his/her own choices and he/she would be (Litz et al., 2009: 699;
Williams, 2008: 247). But the construction of this code places individuals and societies in great
danger, since neither can ever be morally pure. As Williams (2008: 246-48) notes, for societies
like the United States, which has built itself around ideals of being morally pure, the
“psychological threat is of nuclear proportions”:
[T]o grant reparations systematically as a matter of right, in recognition of wrongs
committed, might suggest not merely that the United States is guilty of sporadic
misdeeds, but that it is rotten at the root. It is not, after all, a light to the
enlightened nations. It was born in blood, and it feeds itself on land chocked with
the bodies of its victims. (246)
But herein lies the dilemma, as Williams again points out:
An irredeemably sinful America is not America. And so in the context of
American culture, an imperfect origin really does suggest the present illegitimacy
of the country. … And so Americans will go to great lengths to deny and reject
any such intimation, not least through implacable hostility to reparations [to
Native nations] for loss of sovereignty. (248).
Thus, even after a subject dissociates and splits itself off from the intolerable parts of itself, it
deals with the ‘permanent restlessness and fear of being caught by its own shadow,’ and/or the
fear of being revealed in its moral impurity, by projecting these intolerable aspects of itself onto
scapegoated others. 623 The separation from intolerable emotions, memories and parts of oneself
not only deprives one of identity, but also of agency, in two senses. First, the emotional
623

“To save one own’s [sic] skin from the inner persecutor, the other is sacrificed, thereby
serving as a scapegoat … The subject thereby saves itself from a critical argument with the evil
(or the good) within itself or the other. It pays for the loss of self with a false, usually idealized,
self-image and an unrealistic and overweening self-assumption” (Hartdmann, 1998: 91).
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deadness and psychic numbing leaves one in a state of self-alienation and “inner paralysis.” 624
Unable to rely on emotions for guidance in important (or even minor) decisions, the subject is
left vulnerable to external influences and/or internal, authoritarian political entrepreneurs 625 who
purposefully capitalize on strong negative emotions by offering politically strategic
interpretations of the “threat” that underlies them (see: Hutchinson & Bleiker, 2008). 626 Second,
by using blame and other projective defenses to escape one’s own guilt and moral impurities, a
society and its members denies and separates itself from its own responsibility and agency. 627
Projection is another psychological mechanisms that is frequently employed through the
course of daily life; but like the other psychological defense mechanisms, projection can become
psychopathological and even politically dangerous. According to Hardtmann (1998: 91) this
occurs when the target of projection is viewed as either all good or all bad, and is denied
independence, self-reliance, and the ability to actively resist the projection. In this case, the
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“The suppression of feelings led to an inner paralysis, a loss of liveliness, and a diffuse
incapability in situation when difficult decisions in life had to be made. The children remained
foreign to themselves, felt “alien in their own house,” in their body, and in their soul, in some
cases developing psychosis-like symptoms and symptoms of a split personality or a false self. …
Some of them generally perceived emotions and affects as irrational, something that one can
only fight, suppress, and control, but cannot use in a sensible way to understand more about
oneself” (Ibid: 89).
625
In fact, one of the three processes cited by Kelman (1973) as contributing to a group or
society’s willingness to commit mass atrocities is the process of routinization, which is
purposefully intended to cause a dissociation from emotions, and thus make individuals and
groups more susceptible to authoritarian orders that would otherwise appear to be immoral (and
illegal).
626
In the aftermath of trauma, it is frequently the case that “[c]ertain forms of emotions –hatred,
fear and anger—become central tools for political appropriation while others, such as empathy,
compassion and wonder, become marginalized. The consequences are often fatal, leacing to new
sources of hate and thus new forms of conflict” (Hutchinson & Bleiker, 2008: 390).
627
“[B]laming is both a tactic for gaining political advantage and a projective defence against
persecutory guilt. …[I]t largely prevents the development of feelings of responsibility”
(Williams, 2000: 138). See also, DeVries (2006: 407) on the various “regressive moves to
release individuals behaviorally and ideologically from an intolerable complexity that cannot be
managed or used in a more productive way.”
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projection becomes pathological projective identification, which leaves the realm of fantasy and
becomes “relevant to action, and produce[s] effects” in the real world. Hardtmann (1998)
remarks on the difference:
Fantasies generally, if they are not relevant for action, do not leave traces in the
outside world. They can therefore, even if they are important for the self and
trigger feelings of shame and guilt, be put off easily. We all know the feeling
experienced when waking form a nightmare, relieved that we have just dreamt.
Actions can neither be revoked nor erased by a mere act of the imagination. They
are withdrawn from the sole power of the subject by the fact that they cannot be
renounced and develop a life of their own. The effects of a violent act, for
instance, are visible and tangible. One can erase the traces, as the Nazis tried to
do, and smear the references, but one cannot make it undone. (P. 91)
Both the emotional deadness and psychic numbing that can be associated with dissociation,
and the splitting and projection of undesirable parts of oneself onto scapegoated others, can
result in further disturbed, psychosis-like thinking structures (Hardtmann, 1998: 89, 92; see also:
DeVries, 2006: 411). By denying others independence from projective identifications or the
ability to resist them, the subject dehumanizes others just as it has dehumanized and reduced
itself to a one-dimensional (false) self, incapable to accepting or even examining its own
reality. 628 The projective identification leaves the self/ society mutilated and struggling against
threats internally –from the repressed and denied parts of oneself—and externally –from the
targeted group’s resistance to the projection (Hardtmann, 1998: 92). The scapegoated targets’
resistance to these projective identifications can lead the subject to lash out in anger, rage and
violence, experiencing this resistance as a threatened annihilation (and thus imagined
victimization), because it threatens to disrupt the subject’s fantasy world with reality
628

See, for example, Hardtmann (1998: 91): “The person does not manage to deal with faults,
weaknesses, and good qualities, and to develop a realistic and healthy self-perception” and the
projective target “is either disparaged or idealized, perceived and treated as the devil and the
ultimate evil or as the incarnation of divinity and goodness.” Further: “[s]uch splitting becomes
necessary if the subject cannot accept itself the way it is.” See also, Kelman (1973) on the
process of dehumanization.
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(Hardtmann, 1998: 92; Lifton, 1975: 194 and 2002: 70, 69). 629 In fact, if there is some societal
acknowledgment of past wrongs committed against the targeted/scapegoated group, their mere
presence can also be experienced as a threat, since they “represent the memory of suffering, rage
and pain in a world that longs to forget” (McFarlane & van der Kolk, 2006: 28). 630
A number of writers have commented on some aspect of these psychopathological defense
mechanisms. For example, in examining attempts by European descendants in Australian
society to evade feelings of guilt for genocide, atrocities and other wrongs committed against
Aboriginal peoples, Williams (2000: 138-40) draws upon the concept of persecutory guilt, which
is linked to denial and blame-shifting (or a projective mechanism and “a political process that
disguises itself as the objective identification of guilty parties), which lead to feelings of
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For example, Lifton (1975: 194) talks about the “overall psychohistorical response to change
in United States society during the 1970s, noting:
…the fearful sense that various forces of change threaten to destroy or kill something in
the American cultural-ideological essence, a perception that is itself called upon in
order to ward off the unacceptable feeling that the process of decay is internal
(nationally and individually). Broadly speaking, one could say that Watergate and My
Lai represented desperate last-ditch efforts to maintain a faltering cosmology around the
American secular religion of nationalism, which was inwardly perceived to be
collapsing. At such a moment, as many people (notably Hannah Arendt) have said,
there is a greater likelihood of violence or extreme measures of one kind or another—of
the kind we saw at Watergate and My Lai.
See also, Hardtmann, 1998, p. 92 (“The self, mutilated and amputated by projection, is
permanently threatened from the inside, by the reappearance of the suppressed parts, and from
the outside by the fact that the object normally resists the projective identification. It thus lives
in a two-front war, threatened from both the inside and the outside, cleft and torn from itself.
Cure would only be possible if an inner reconciliation and a destruction of the false self-image
took place”).
630
Western society’s “reactions [to trauma] seem to be primarily conservative impulses in the
service of maintaining the beliefs that the world is fundamentally just, that people can be in
charge of their lives, and that bad things happen to people who deserve them. Bearers of bad
tidings are generally considered dangerous; thus, societies tend to be suspicious that victims will
contaminate the social fabric, undermine self-reliance, consume social resources, and live off the
strong. The weak are a liability, and, after an initial period of compassion, are vulnerable to
being singled out as parasites and carriers of social malaise” (McFarlane & van der Kolk, 2006:
35).
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resentment and contempt. Similarly, Martinot (2003: 409) has described the paranoid
projections of slave patrols in the U.S. in the late 1600s, noting that the patrols quickly devolved
to using gratuitous violence, venting class-based frustrations at the slaves, and gaining social
approval from their superiors for this behavior. According to Martinot, this violence induced
further paranoia (“a self-induced fear generated by their own injustice), which “perpetuated a
culture of terror,” projected the imagined source of social threat onto the slaves, produced
demands for social solidarity (conformity) among whites, and created a “sense of well-being and
self-justification toward slavery.” These various mechanisms, in turn, created the need for and
fact of white racial identity in the United States. 631 For Martinot, all of these mechanisms,
together, form the foundation of patriotism in the United States, which is exemplified in the Bush
administration’s war launched on Iraq, “from the paranoia in all the administration’s false
rationales, through their use in generating consensus, to the absolute violence deployed in the
invasion” (409-10). Meanwhile, studying the more general impact of loss of cultural (or
societal) identity DeVries (2006) has found that the consequences of these losses frequently
include denial, projection, “narcissistic survival strategies,” “regressive social bonding”(410),
various conservative impulses and psychopathological reactions (411), and violence and
aggression (407) in the quest for pathological liberation (410). 632

631

“Based on a system of oppression and comprised of paranoia, a demand for consensus, and
violence, the structure of racialization came to be called “race.” …In sum, the foundations of
patriotism in the U.S. have been, from the beginning, imbued with a solidarity based upon a
paranoia and a gratuitous violence launched to render that paranoia real” (Martinot, 2003: 409).
632
Numerous other studies have examined aspects of these dynamics as well, but cannot be
summarized here. See, for example, Hutchinson & Bleiker’s 2008 work on reconciliation, which
discusses tendencies of traumatized societies to build “a sense of identity and political
community that rests on a stark separation between a safe inside and a threatened outside. Dealt
with in this way, trauma can come to inscribe and perpetuate exclusive and often violent ways of
configuring community” which can produce new antagonisms and forms of violence (386). See
also, Lifton, 2004 (on the “ideological vision that equates Iraqi fighters with “terrorists” and
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In all of these examples, as well as in other studies of these dynamics, the projective,
paranoid, and delusional (or near-psychotic) quest for pathological liberation from unpleasant or
intolerable memories, thoughts, feelings, and parts of oneself leave the self mutilated and
destroyed, psychologically. Further, the reenactment of various past traumatic events 633 and the
perpetration of various new traumatic events against scapegoated others, serve as additional
traumas and moral trepidations, which must also be denied, split-off, projected, and defended
against consciousness awareness and thus threatened annihilation. 634 Through these
mechanisms, societies and their members entrench themselves into habits of predatory,
perpetrating thoughts and behaviors which they refuse to acknowledge because doing so could
open the floodgates to overwhelming memories and unbearable emotions. These would be
unbearable not only because of their intolerable emotional content, but also because through the
cycles of self-mutilation and perpetration, and the striving for moral purity, the self has been left
with exaggerated and unrealistic expectations and without any loving parts that can accept faults

seeks to further justify the invasion”); Lipsitz, 2008 (on the ways in which whiteness “recruits
people to be defenders of white group position and privilege rather than opponents of
exploitation and injustice”); Lifton, 2002, p. 68 (“in the act of killing one defines the evil of “the
enemy” [even when the victim is a civilian] which in turn evokes the necessity of one’s actions
and one’s own relationship to virtue”); and so on.
633
First, the original traumatic events, including long-standing histories of traumatic events.
Second, the damage to self from refusing to acknowledge, accept and integrate these traumatic
events as part of the self, and thus from failing to heal from these first traumas. Third, the
damage to self from the various defense mechanisms utilized to maintain the separation and
splitting off from traumatic memories, traumatic symptoms, intolerable emotions and unpleasant
or negative aspects of oneself. Fourth, the perpetration against others in the psychopathological
attempts to liberate (but the actual mutilation of) the self, which are yet additional traumatic
events which must be denied and defended against conscious awareness… And the cycle
continues and reinforces itself.
634
On reenactment of trauma, see: van der Kolk & McFarlane, 2006, p. 11; Herman, 1992, pp.
39-40; McFarlane & van der Kolk, 2006. See also: Lifton, 1975; Martinot, 2003.
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and weaknesses (Hardtmann, 1998: 91). 635 The inability to deal with faults and weakness in
one’s self leads to an identification with the aggressors and perpetrators and an inability to
tolerate or have compassion for weakness or faults in others. McFarlane & van der Kolk (2006:
36) elaborate:
Clinical work has taught us that the ability to tolerate the plight of victims is, as
least in part, a function of how well people have dealt with their own misfortunes.
When they have confronted the reality of their own hurt and suffering, and
accepted their own pain, this generally is translated into tolerance and sometimes
even compassion for others. Conversely, as long as people deny the impact of
their own personal trauma and pretend that it did not matter, that it was not so
bad, or that excuses can be made for their abuses, they are likely to identify with
the aggressors and treat others with the same harshness with which they treat the
wounded parts of themselves. Identification with the aggressor makes it possible
to bypass empathy for themselves and secondarily for others.
This identification with the perpetrator is further reinforced in predatory societies by the fact that
national identification requires its members embrace and identify in some form with the
perpetrations of the past, as well as the ongoing denial of and/or perpetuation of these
perpetrations –even if narcissistic (or near-psychotic) delusions of moral purity disguise the acts
and mentality of perpetration and moral decay.
However, society’s inability or unwillingness to come to terms with past traumas and these
various psychopathological coping mechanisms have dire consequences not only for the targets
of the projective scapegoating, but also for the society and its members who struggle to maintain
images of their own moral purity. McFarlane and van der Kolk (2006: 33-34) elaborate again:
Failure to deal with the plight of victims can be disastrous for a society. The costs
of the reenactment of trauma in society, in the form of child abuse, continued
violence, and lack of productivity are staggering. Failure to face the reality of
trauma may have devastating political consequences as well. For example, in the
aftermath of World War I, the inability to face its effects on the capacity of
veterans to function effectively in society, and the social intolerance of their
635

And thus the “weak are a liability, and… are vulnerable to being singled out as parasides and
carriers of social malaise” (McFarlane & van der Kolk, 2006: 35).
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“weakness,” may have substantially contributed to the subsequent rise of fascism
and militarism. The impossible war reparations of the Treaty of Versailles,
motivated by a lust for revenge by the Allies, humiliated an already humiliated
Germany. The German nation, in turn, dealt mercilessly with its own war
veterans, who were accused of being moral invalids. This cascade of humiliations
of the powerless set the stage for the ultimate debasement of human rights under
the Nazi regime, the extermination of the weak and the different, and the moral
justification for the subjugation of “inferior” people—the rationale for the ensuing
war.
Similarly, Hardtmann (1998: 93) has cited the “denial and splitting” as the mechanisms through
which “the majority of the German people entered an alliance with the Nazis against the Jewish
minority in 1933” in order to save “themselves from a critical argument with themselves and
their own failures.” Kelman (1973), Lifton (1975) and others (Egendorf, 1975; Eisenhardt, 1975)
also identified many of these processes in both the unwillingness of U.S. society to look at the
reality of the Vietnam War, and in the creation of atrocity-producing situations by U.S. soldiers
in Vietnam.
The combination of these various psychopathological mechanisms are passed on from one
generation to the next, traumatizing and psychically injuring the children of traumatized parents
through projections and projective identifications. Because the parents deny and repress
conscious knowledge of their own traumas, there may be little way for the children to gain the
awareness of these traumatic events that is needed for healing. Further, as the parents utilize
projective defense mechanisms in their denial and splitting, the children are often subjected to
periodic and unpredictable angry outbursts by parents. 636 This may lead them to feel that they are
“in an imperceivable world” where the connection between parental guilt-inducing
communications or angry outbursts and the incidents that allegedly induced them are hidden
636

“The children of the second generation have become objects of their parents’ splitting and
projective identification. They then lived either as projectively distorted, bizarre objects in a
quasipsychotic world, or they shared these projections and thus became incapable of finding an
independent identity of their own” (Hardtmann, 1998: 89).
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(Hartdmann, 1998: 89; Felsen, 1998: 46). Hardtmann (1998: 88) gives an example of this type
of projective identification, noting a five-year-old who let his dog carry a bag of breakfast rolls
home. When his father saw this, and saw that the bag had touched the dirt, he burst out in a rage,
yelling “I shall teach you to drag the one who gives you bread through the dirt,” and then hit the
child hard enough to break his arm. Through parental projection and the reenactment of societal
traumas on their children, the original traumatic events remain buried, while the
psychopathological mechanisms for denying these past traumas become concretized as
behavioral norms throughout sectors of society, or entire societies. Thus, subsequent generations
are traumatized and socialized into the psychopathological behavior patterns of previous
generations, as each individual “in his short history, passes once more through some of the
processes that his society ha traversed in its long history” (Elias, 1998: 42). And thus, the cycles
of defensive denial, repression, splitting, dissociation, projective identification, paranoia,
reenactment, and new perpetration continues throughout Western society.
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